COX (JASON) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: OCTOBER 8, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000176-MR
JASON COX
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENRY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00098
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, CLAYTON AND COMBS, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Jason Cox appeals from the judgment of the Henry Circuit
Court sentencing him to a total of ten years’ imprisonment following his guilty
plea to two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree. Cox asserts that the circuit
court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He
alleges that the plea was involuntary because it was the product of ineffective
assistance of counsel since his attorney did not fully advise him of the
ramifications of pleading guilty to an offense that would label him a sexual
offender. This Court previously placed his appeal in abeyance pending a decision
of the United States Supreme Court addressing whether a counsel providing
incorrect information regarding a defendant’s immigration status violates the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. That decision has now been rendered, and we shall
address the merits of Cox’s appeal. Having considered the record, the parties'
briefs, and the applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the Henry Circuit
Court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1999, the Henry County grand jury indicted Cox for a single Class
A felony of sodomy in the first degree of a child less than twelve years of age.
From 1999 through 2003, Cox refused any plea offers by the Commonwealth. On
March 30, 2003, Cox was convicted in Jefferson Circuit Court of kidnapping and
second-degree robbery. He was sentenced to ten years on each offense with the
sentences to run concurrently for a total of ten years. After the conviction in
Jefferson County, Cox decided to plead guilty in the Henry County case.
Thereafter, the indictment, with Cox’s consent, was dismissed and a new
proceeding was initiated by information. Proceeding by information, Cox was then
charged with two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree.
Next, Cox filed a motion to enter a guilty plea. The motion, which
was signed by Cox, recited that he believed that his attorney, Gary Stewart, had
fully informed him about the case and that he understood the process. The plea
-2-
agreement itself included that Cox must engage in sexual offender risk assessment,
submit to HIV and DNA testing, complete the sexual offender treatment program,
and register as a sex offender following completion of his sentence. On November
20,
2003, the trial court placed Cox under oath and conducted a hearing pursuant to
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
Cox pled guilty to two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, with
a penalty of up to five years for each of the Class D felonies. He was to be
sentenced to five years on each count, to run consecutively for a total of ten years.
Further, the sentence in the Henry County case was to run concurrently with the
ten-year sentence he received in Jefferson County. Among other requirements, the
trial court ordered sex offender risk assessment and set sentencing for
approximately two months later. Based upon this hearing, the circuit court entered
a guilty plea on November 24, 2003, containing the following language: “the plea
is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Final sentencing was set for
January 15, 2004.
On January 20, 2004, Cox, through counsel, filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that at the time of the guilty plea he did not
understand the ramifications of being labeled a “sex offender.” The trial court
overruled the motion. Approximately three months later, Cox filed a pro se motion
to dismiss his privately retained counsel and withdraw his guilty plea. Cox
claimed that his privately retained counsel told him that he would be eligible for
-3-
parole after serving two years of the sentence. But Cox contended that his parole
eligibility date, plus both his minimum and maximum serve-out time, were
extended because they were now based upon the date he completed the sexual
offender treatment program (hereinafter “SOTP”). He maintained that the time
necessary to complete SOTP is difficult to pinpoint and unlikely to be within the
two-year serve-out time. The reason is that acceptance into SOTP is discretionary
with the Department of Corrections and it takes time to complete the program.
Additionally, Cox’s newly appointed counsel filed a similar motion incorporating
Cox’s pro se motion and attachments.
On November 23, 2004, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing
where both Cox and his original counsel, Gary Stewart, testified. Stewart said that
he informed Cox that his original charge, sodomy in the first degree, carried a
possible sentence of twenty to fifty years of life imprisonment and that he would
be classified as a violent offender, and therefore, not eligible for parole until
serving eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence. In addition, Cox would not be
eligible for early serve-out. Moreover, Stewart explained that the plea agreement
allowed Cox to plead guilty to two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree by
way of information. The plea agreement also provided for two five-year sentences
to run consecutively for a total time period of ten years. Stewart also stated that he
told Cox that he would be eligible for parole after serving two years or twenty
percent (20%) of the sentence, but he would have to complete the SOTP.
-4-
Before entering into the plea agreement, Cox wrote Stewart and
requested information including information about the SOTP. Stewart said they
would discuss these issues on the date of the plea agreement hearing. Stewart said
that he went over the details of the plea agreement with Cox including the
requirement that Cox complete SOTP and the fact that it would be difficult to get
into SOTP if he entered a guilty plea without admitting guilt. Stewart maintained
that Cox did not ask about the details of SOTP until after he had entered the plea.
At the hearing, testimony was provided that, following the entry of the
plea, Cox wrote another letter to his attorney saying that, in retrospect, he did not
want to enter a plea. In the letter, Cox stated that, because it would be a hardship
on his family for him to be considered a sex offender or labeled one for his entire
life, he had a change of heart and did not want to enter the plea.
Cox admitted at the hearing that he had seen and received the
Commonwealth’s letter detailing the plea offer, agreed to the time offer, and read
and signed the plea agreement but claimed that he only read the first page of the
agreement. Cox acknowledged that, even though he only read the first page, he
was aware of the content of the following pages because of previous involvement
with the law. He further claimed that prior to entering into the plea, he had sent a
letter to Stewart to find out how SOTP worked. Stewart, however, did not have the
relevant information for him on the day he pled guilty.
Cox went on to say that because entry into SOTP was discretionary
with the Department of Corrections, he could not start SOTP until formally
-5-
sentenced, and the program takes twenty-four to thirty-six months to complete.
Finally, the parole board would not see him until he completed the program.
Hence, Cox believed that his parole eligibility was pushed back from April 2005 to
March 2008, his minimum serve-out time from December 2010 to December 2012,
and his maximum sentence serve-out from May 2013 to May 2015. Nonetheless
Cox’s original understanding about the plea was that because both the Jefferson
County and the Henry County sentences ran concurrently, he would meet with both
parole boards in April 2005. Cox said if he had known this additional information
about SOTP, he would not have pled guilty.
Notwithstanding this claim concerning his attorney’s failure to give
him information about SOTP, Cox admitted that he pled guilty. In addition, he
stated during cross-examination that he would still see the parole board in four
months and that he had no idea as to the parole board’s actions or whether he
might be paroled. On November 10, 2005, the circuit court denied the motions to
withdraw the guilty plea. The trial court found that, although Cox’s attorney did
incorrectly inform him about his parole date, this occurrence did not constitute
gross misadvice. Later, in March 2006, the trial court pronounced final judgment
and sentencing pursuant to the plea agreement. On March 13, 2008, our Court
granted Cox’s motion for belated appeal from the November 2005 orders, which
denied his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. We will now address the appeal.
ISSUE
-6-
Cox argues that, because of ineffective assistance of counsel, his
guilty plea was involuntary, and hence, the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Additionally, since the denial of
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the United States Supreme Court has
rendered Padilla v. Kentucky, - U.S. - , 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284, 78
USLW 4235 (2010), which Cox contends bolsters his position. We will examine
the guilty plea, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the effect of the
recent United States Supreme Court decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s determination whether a plea was voluntarily entered is
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Bronk v. Com., 58 S.W.3d 482,
489 (Ky. 2001). A decision which is supported by substantial evidence is not
clearly erroneous. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409,
414 (Ky. 1998). If, however, a trial court determines that a guilty plea was entered
voluntarily, it may then grant or deny the motion to withdraw the plea at its
discretion. This decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.
Bronk, 58 S.W.3d at 487. A trial court abuses its discretion when it renders a
decision which is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by legal
principles. Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258 (Ky. 2004).
Whereas on appeal of ineffective assistance of counsel, under
Strickland v. Washington, the appellant must show that his counsel’s performance
was deficient and these deficiencies prejudiced the defense. Strickland v.
-7-
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
The standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel arguments is de novo
with the reviewing court evaluating counsel’s performance and any potential
deficiency caused by it. See Brown v. Com., 253 S.W.3d 490, 500 (Ky. 2008),
citing Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1164 (6th Cir. 1997). But, “even though
[] both parts of the Strickland test . . . involve mixed questions of law and fact, the
reviewing court must defer to the determination of facts and credibility made by
the trial court.” See Brown, supra, citing McQueen v. Com., 721 S.W.2d 694, 698
(Ky. 1986). “In appealing from the trial court's grant or denial of relief based on
ineffective assistance of counsel [, Cox] has the burden of showing that the trial
court committed an error in reaching its decision.” Id. Keeping these standards in
mind, we now turn to the facts of the case.
ANALYSIS
Our analysis requires us to address the claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, the impact of Padilla v. Kentucky on the issue and this case, plus the
efficacy of the guilty plea. We will begin by discussing Cox’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Because Cox contends that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel in connection with his plea agreement and guilty plea, we will examine
whether this lack of effective assistance entitles him to withdraw his plea. Cox
argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty
-8-
plea and render the plea involuntary. Under the theory that a plea was made
involuntarily, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be made prior to
sentencing. Bronk, 58 S.W.3d 482. Initially, we assess the legal requirements
regarding effective assistance of counsel.
The law on claims of attorney ineffectiveness is clear. First, the
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient by demonstrating
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and next the defendant must prove
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so severely that it deprived
the defendant of a fair trial. Gall v. Com., 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693
(1984). In order to demonstrate the prejudice requirement,
The defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.
Id. at 694; 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
In cases like this one, where the defendant disputes the voluntariness
of the plea, for the trial court to confirm that it properly exercised its discretion, it
must show that it considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
guilty plea. Centers v. Com., 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky. App. 1990). Then, the trial
court must juxtapose the presumption of voluntariness inherent in a proper plea
colloquy with a Strickland inquiry into the performance of counsel.
-9-
Continuing with our analysis of the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, we now examine its application to this case where Cox is claiming that the
guilty plea was involuntary because of poor representation by his counsel. In
particular, Cox must illustrate that counsel's assistance was ineffective in enabling
him to intelligently weigh the legal alternatives in deciding to plead guilty, must
demonstrate “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel's performance fell
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance, and [must show]
that the deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea process
that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the
defendant would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to
trial.” Sparks v. Com., 721 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Ky. App. 1986).
In its opinion, the trial court found that Cox did not show that his
counsel made errors so serious that his performance fell outside the range of
professionally competent assistance. The trial court found explicitly that Cox was
fully aware of the consequences of pleading guilty to a sexual offense in that he
knew, and his plea recited, that he must enter and successfully complete a SOTP
while incarcerated. Further, Cox was informed that his parole would be subject to
completion of the program, and he would not be released until it was completed.
As noted by the trial court, a defendant does not need to be informed of the full
range of sentences a court may impose, and a voluntary plea is not considered less
valid because the defendant was not fully aware of the possible consequences
arising from the pleading. Jewell v. Com., 725 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Ky. 1987). We
-10-
concur with the trial court that Cox did not establish that counsel’s performance
was outside the prevailing norms of professional assistance in helping a defendant
weigh alternatives in whether to enter into a guilty plea. In fact, the plea
agreement itself cited Cox’s requirement to participate in SOTP, and the trial court
again informed Cox during the plea colloquy.
Cox also argues that his attorney grossly misadvised him about the
effect of SOTP on his parole eligibility. While it is true that Cox’s attorney misstated that Cox would be eligible for parole after serving two years of the sentence,
it does not alter the fact that Cox was informed and knew that he must complete
the SOTP in prison. In addition, we note that the plea agreement negotiated
between Cox’s counsel and the Commonwealth took the original charge, in which
the violent offender statute would require that Cox serve eighty-five percent (85%)
of his sentence, and amended it to one which mandated that Cox serve twenty
percent (20%) of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole. Significantly,
the original charge also carried a possible sentence of twenty to fifty years or life
imprisonment. Cox’s counsel provided him this information.
Cox also contends that even though it is universally accepted that an
attorney is not required to advise a defendant about the “collateral consequences”
of his plea, it has an exception; that is, flagrant or gross misadvice by counsel
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882 (6th
Cir. 1988). Here, we do not find that the attorney’s misinformation about parole
-11-
eligibility rises to the level of gross or flagrant misadvice since; as we have
outlined, Cox knew about the SOTP requirements.
Thus, given the fact that a plea is not considered involuntary and
unintelligently made when a defendant is not aware of all the potential
consequences of the plea and that no constitutional right exists for a defendant to
be fully informed about parole (“parole is not a constitutional right.” (Turner v.
Com., 647 S.W.2d 500 (Ky. App. 1982)), we agree with the trial court that Cox
received effective assistance of counsel. Because we have determined that Cox
received effective assistance of counsel, it is not necessary for us to address the
prejudice component of the Strickland analysis.
2. Padilla v. Kentucky
This appeal has been held in abeyance awaiting the results of Padilla
v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473. In Padilla, the Supreme Court held in a 7-2 decision
that a criminal defense counsel had failed to provide his non-citizen client effective
assistance when counsel did not tell the client that he was almost certain to be
removed from the United States to his country of origin if he pled guilty.
The decision was the first where the Court has applied the Strickland
standard to an attorney's failure to advise the client about a "collateral"
consequence of conviction, meaning, about something other than imprisonment,
fine, probation and the like (collectively known as "direct" consequences of
conviction). Brown v. Goodwin, 2010 WL 1930574 (D.N.J. 2010). The federal
court in discussing Padilla commented:
-12-
However, while Padilla's implications for cases
involving removal are clear, the holding of Padilla seems
not importable-either entirely or, at the very least, not
readily importable-into scenarios involving collateral
consequences other than deportation. See Padilla v.
Kentucky, 176 L.Ed.2d at 293-94 (stressing that the
measure of deportation is unique at its being so
intimately related to the underlying criminal conviction
that the measure is ill-suited for the “direct/collateral
consequences” distinction); accord 8 U.S.C. § 1226
(directing mandatory civil detention upon expiration of
the alien's prison term).
Id. at 13 (footnote omitted). Hence, even though the holding in Padilla
specifically refers to deportation measures, which are unique because they are so
intimately related to the underlying criminal conviction, it apparently does not
extend to other collateral consequences.
Furthermore, we do not believe that Padilla relies on the distinction
between direct and collateral consequences of the right to counsel in the Sixth
Amendment. Rather, we conclude, whether deportation is considered a “direct” or
“collateral” consequence of conviction is irrelevant when advice of counsel is the
issue. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to
evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk
of deportation. We conclude that advice regarding
deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland
applies to Padilla's claim.
Padilla, 130 S.Ct at 1482. In pertinent part, the Supreme Court agreed that
“counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,”
citing the first prong of the Strickland test. 130 S.Ct. at 1482. But the Supreme
-13-
Court remanded Padilla for a judicial determination of whether counsel's failure to
notify him of the immigration consequences of his plea prejudiced him, which is
the second prong of Strickland. Id. at 1483-1484.
3. Guilty plea
Following a trial court’s determination that a guilty plea is not the
result of ineffective assistance of counsel, it may exercise its discretion in granting
or denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea based on the totality of the
circumstances. Rigdon v. Com., 144 S.W.3d 283, 287-288 (Ky. App. 2004).
In fact, a guilty plea is valid only when it is entered intelligently and
voluntarily. Thompson v. Com., 147 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Ky. 2004). Thus, Kentucky
Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.08 requires a trial court, at the time of the
guilty plea, to determine “that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of
the nature of the charge[,]” to fulfill “the dual purpose of having a judicial
determination that the guilty plea is made voluntarily and understandingly and
providing an appropriate court record demonstrating those important facts.” RCr
8.08; Lucas v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Ky. 1971). And RCr 8.10
gives trial courts the discretion to permit a defendant to withdraw his or her guilty
plea before final judgment and proceed to trial. RCr 8.10. And as noted above,
whether to permit withdrawal of a plea is a decision subject to the sound discretion
of the trial court.
Moreover, the failure to understand the possible consequence of a
guilty plea is not a basis for withdrawing it. “A multitude of events occur in the
-14-
course of a criminal proceeding which might influence a defendant to plead guilty
or stand trial.” Jewell, 725 S.W.2d at 595. Additionally, as stated in Edmonds,
“[t]he requirement that a plea be intelligently and voluntarily made does not
impose upon the trial judge a duty to discover and dispel any unexpressed
misapprehensions that may be harbored by a defendant.” Edmonds v. Com., 189
S.W.3d 558, 567 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Armstrong v. Egeler, 563 F.2d 796, 800 (6th
Cir. 1977)). Consequently, it is the responsibility of the trial court to evaluate
whether errors by trial counsel significantly influenced the defendant's decision to
plead guilty in such a manner as to give the trial court reason to doubt the
voluntariness and validity of the plea.
Cox claims that he was not aware of the consequences of his guilty
plea because he did not fully understand the ramifications of pleading to an offense
that would label him as a sexual offender. He asserts that, had he been aware of
the effect the SOTP would have on his parole eligibility, minimum expiration date,
and maximum expiration date, he would not have pled guilty. This assertion,
however, is not supported by the record. The plea agreement signed by Cox
specifically obligated him, under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 17.495, to
register as a sexual offender upon completion of his sentence. Furthermore, Cox
knew that he must submit to sexual offender risk assessment, test for HIV and
DNA, and complete the Department of Corrections’ SOTP.
A mere change of heart by a party pleading guilty to an offense does
not constitute adequate grounds for withdrawing a plea. Plea agreements that are
-15-
properly executed, as was the case herein, stand for something. Additionally, our
Court has ruled that a defendant does not need to “be informed of every possible
consequence and aspect of the guilty plea. . . . To require such would lead to the
absurd result that a person pleading guilty would need a course in criminal law and
penology.” Turner, 647 S.W.2d at 500-01. Here, we find that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it ascertained that Cox voluntarily entered a plea of
guilty and denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Henry Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Meggan Smith
Assistant Public Advocate
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-16-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.