HIGHLANDS HOSPITAL CORPORATION VS. CASTLE (LONNA)
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RENDERED: JULY 16, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002432-MR
HIGHLANDS HOSPITAL CORPORATION
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-01303
v.
LONNA CASTLE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND DIXON, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SPECIAL JUDGE.
ACREE, JUDGE: Highlands Hospital Corporation appeals the denial by the Floyd
Circuit Court of its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new
trial following a jury’s verdict holding the Hospital liable to its former employee,
1
Retired Judge John W. Graves sitting as temporary Special Judge by assignment of the Chief
Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
Lonna Castle, for wrongful termination and awarding her compensatory damages
and equitable relief, and punitive damages. We reverse and remand the case for
further proceedings.
I. Factual Background
Castle worked as an obstetrical nurse at the Hospital for nearly
fourteen years. On September 2, 2005, Castle assisted with the emergency
caesarian-section delivery of the child of a patient referred to in the briefs as HS.
As part of her duties, Castle filled out and signed a surgical record form. This
form contained a box intended to be checked by a nurse to indicate that the patient
had signed a specific form consenting to the upcoming surgery. Castle testified at
trial and does not now contend otherwise that she checked the box despite the fact
that she had not looked at the patient’s records to verify that in fact they included a
prior consent form.
After the surgery, Hospital personnel discovered there was no signed
prior consent form in the file. The obstetrician who performed the surgery sought
to correct Castle’s error, instructing her to visit the patient in the post-operative
recovery room and to obtain the patient’s signature on the consent form despite the
fact that the surgery had already taken place. Castle complied with that instruction.
These circumstances soon came to the attention of the Hospital’s
administrators and, on September 8, 2005, Castle was suspended pending further
investigation. As a result of the investigation, the Hospital concluded Castle had
violated two provisions of its written policies. First, the Hospital found that Castle
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falsified a medical record when she incorrectly indicated that the patient’s signed
consent had been obtained prior to surgery. Second, the Hospital determined that
Castle engaged in behavior inconsistent with the practice of nursing when she
obtained a signed consent form from a patient who was already in the postoperative recovery room. Both of these acts were “Group I” violations; that is,
violations included among those determined by the Hospital’s written policies to
be of the highest magnitude and for which the prescribed discipline was immediate
discharge. Based on Castle’s Group I violations, she was discharged on September
21, 2005.
The Hospital made a report of Castle’s actions to the Kentucky Board
of Nursing (KBN), believing such report was required by KRS 314.031. In
pertinent part, the statute makes it “unlawful for any . . . employer of nurses . . . to
refrain from reporting to the board a nurse . . . suspected of negligently or willfully
acting in a manner inconsistent with the practice of nursing [or] falsifying or in a
negligent manner making incorrect entries or failing to make essential entries on
essential records.” KRS 314.031(4)(c), (i). The KBN performed its own
investigation and, after applying its statutory standards, decided to take no formal
action against Castle.
As a nurse, Castle was also under certain reporting duties including a
requirement that she comply with KRS 216B.165(1) which states, in pertinent part:
Any . . . employee of a health care facility . . . who
knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the quality
of care of a patient [or] patient safety . . . is in jeopardy
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shall make an oral or written report of the problem to the
health care facility . . . .
KRS 216B.165(1). The record shows that on the same date as the incident
involving the consent form, Castle made such an oral report as is required by this
statute. This occurred after her supervisor approached her in another patient’s
room and rebuked her for failing to begin an intravenous drip to induce labor,
referred to as induction. Castle responded that she could not begin the induction
because there were not enough nurses on the ward. According to Castle, the
discussion with her supervisor became quite heated. Castle testified that she had
complained of understaffing numerous times within her fourteen-year career at the
Hospital.
After she was terminated, Castle brought suit against the Hospital
claiming she was fired in retaliation for reporting understaffing on the maternity
ward on the day in question. After the Hospital’s motions for directed verdict were
denied, the jury determined that the evidence supported Castle’s claim and
awarded her $80,000.00 in back pay, $500,000.00 in front pay, and $250,000.00 in
punitive damages. The Hospital filed a timely motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The Hospital’s motion contained
numerous arguments. Generally, the Hospital argued that Castle failed to present a
prima facie case for retaliatory discharge, that the trial court improperly admitted
irrelevant evidence, that Castle failed to prove entitlement to either compensatory
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or punitive damages, and that the jury was improperly instructed. The trial court’s
order summarily denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
II. Issues on Appeal
In all, the Hospital presents six arguments. The Hospital argues that
the trial court erred in denying its motion for JNOV because: (1) as a matter of
law, Castle was not entitled to damages for future economic loss (“front pay”); (2)
to the extent the law allows an award of front pay, its award is a matter for the
court and not the jury; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support an award of
punitive damages. The Hospital also argues that the trial court should have granted
a new trial on the issues liability for retaliatory discharge, compensatory damages,
and punitive damages because: (4) irrelevant evidence was admitted that was
highly prejudicial to the Hospital; (5) the jury was not properly instructed on the
issue of liability under KRS 216B.165; and (6) the jury was not properly instructed
as to punitive damages. We will address these arguments as they fall into natural
categories as follows: first, issues related to the Hospital’s liability under KRS
216B.165; second, issues related to the award of “front pay”; and third, issues
related to the award of punitive damages.
III. Standard of Review
The variety of arguments presented requires application of a variety of
standards of review.
In ruling on either a motion for a directed verdict
or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a
trial court is under a duty to consider the evidence in the
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strongest possible light in favor of the party opposing the
motion. Furthermore, it is required to give the opposing
party the advantage of every fair and reasonable
inference which can be drawn from the evidence. And, it
is precluded from entering either a directed verdict or
judgment n.o.v. unless there is a complete absence of
proof on a material issue in the action, or if no disputed
issue of fact exists upon which reasonable men could
differ.
Taylor v. Kennedy, 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky.App. 1985). A reviewing court may
not disturb a trial court’s decision on a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Bierman v. Klapheke, 967 S.W.2d
16, 18 (Ky. 1998). The denial of a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict should only be reversed on appeal when it is shown that the verdict was
palpably or flagrantly against the evidence such that it indicates the jury reached
the verdict as a result of passion or prejudice. Id. at 18-19.
Furthermore, “whether front pay should be awarded and if so, the
amount, are issues for the trial court and not the jury.” Dollar General Partners v.
Upchurch, 214 S.W.3d 910, 918 (Ky.App. 2006), citing Brooks v. LexingtonFayette Urban County Housing Authority, 132 S.W.3d 790, 806 (Ky. 2004). We
review such legal determinations de novo. Steel Technologies, Inc. v. Congleton,
234 S.W.3d 920, 931 (Ky. 2007), citing Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 1685-86, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001).
“[A]buse of discretion is the proper standard of review of a trial
court’s evidentiary rulings.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11
S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000) (citations omitted). “The test for abuse of discretion
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is whether the trial [court’s] decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id. at 581.
We review the award of punitive damages de novo, mindful that
Exacting appellate review ensures that an award of
punitive damages is based upon an “‘application of law,
rather than a decisionmaker’s caprice.’”
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513
(2003), citing Cooper Industries at 436, 121 S.Ct. 1678, quoting BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996)(Breyer, J.,
concurring).
IV. Issues Related To The Hospital’s Liability Under KRS 216B.165
Castle based her cause of action for retaliatory discharge on the
prohibition contained in KRS 216B.165(3) which states, in pertinent part:
No health care facility . . . shall . . . subject to reprisal, or
directly or indirectly use, or threaten to use, any authority
or influence, in any manner whatsoever, which tends to
discourage, restrain, suppress, dissuade, deter, prevent,
interfere with, coerce, or discriminate against any . . .
employee who in good faith reports, discloses, divulges,
or otherwise brings to the attention of the health care
facility . . . the circumstances or facts to form the basis of
a report under subsection[ ] (1) . . . of this section. [See
KRS 216B.165(1), supra.]
KRS 216B.165(3). Because the legislature did not specify any remedy in that
statute, Castle brought her claim pursuant to KRS 446.070, which creates a private
right of action for “the violation of any statute[.]” KRS 446.070.
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To establish her claim, Castle was required to present evidence that
(1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the Hospital knew she had engaged in
that activity; (3) Castle suffered adverse employment action; and (4) there was a
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action. Brooks, supra, at 803. There is no real dispute regarding the first three
elements of the cause of action, but only as to the causal connection between
elements (1) and (3).
The Hospital’s argument before this Court as to the jury’s
determination of liability under KRS 216B.165(3) is that while Castle’s complaint
only alleged the single report of understaffing on September 2, 2005, she was
allowed to present evidence over the Hospital’s objection of multiple prior reports.
The Hospital also objected to the reference in the jury instruction to “reports”
rather than to the single report alleged although the singular form of the word was
used in the same instruction in two other places.2
We see no error in the trial court’s overruling of the Hospital’s
objection to evidence that Castle made multiple reports. As the Hospital noted, it
took no adverse action on the prior occasion of those reports. The jury was
properly permitted to consider whether Castle’s repeated reports had a cumulative
effect on the Hospital’s decision to terminate her or, alternatively, whether proof
that the Hospital took no adverse action on prior occasions undermined the causal
relationship between her final report and her termination.
2
Castle’s motion during the trial to amend the complaint to allege multiple reports in conformity
with the evidence was denied by the trial court.
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Furthermore, we see no error in the instruction. The Hospital argues
the instruction allowed the jury to consider reports of understaffing other than
Castle’s single report on September 2, 2005. Ultimately, the one-time use of the
plural “reports” in the instruction amounts to little more than a typographical error.
While the instruction may have drawn the jury’s attention to Castle’s other reports,
it was the admission of that evidence that allowed the jury to consider it. As we
have found no error in the admission of that evidence, and as the verdict relative to
the finding of a causal connection between Castle’s report and her termination is
supported by substantial evidence, we will not interfere with the jury’s verdict on
the issue of the Hospital’s liability under KRS 216B.165(3).
V. Issues Related To The Award Of “Front Pay”
The Hospital makes the following argument regarding front pay: (1)
equitable remedies are available in statutory causes of action only if the enabling
legislation authorizes the equitable remedy; (2) front pay is a form of equitable
remedy; (3) the enabling legislation in this case does not authorize any equitable
remedy including front pay; (4) Castle is not entitled to recover front pay. We
agree and begin our analysis by considering the nature of all retaliatory discharge
claims.
The Kentucky legislature defines the parameters of all retaliatory
discharge claims. As held in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Marshall, 586 S.W.2d 274
(Ky.App. 1979), the “common law rule has always been that a contract of
employment is terminable by either party at will, in the absence of some statutory
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or contractual standard that modifies this rule.” Marshall at 281. Therefore, no
cause of action for retaliatory or wrongful discharge will be permitted unless the
“discharge is contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as
evidenced by . . . a constitutional or statutory provision.” Firestone Textile Co.
Div., Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky.
1983)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This means that all
retaliatory discharge cases in Kentucky are either constitution-based or statutebased. In this case the cause of action is statute-based; the tortious conduct is
defined in KRS 216B.165(3) and the cause of action is authorized and the remedy
is defined by KRS 446.070. The claim of retaliatory discharge being a creature of
statute, it is the legislature that defines the parameters of any recovery.
If a statute prohibits specific conduct, but fails to specify a remedy,
we may look only to KRS 446.070 to provide it. Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399,
401 (Ky. 1985). KRS 216B.165(3) prohibited the Hospital from taking adverse
employment action against Castle for making certain reports, but that statute does
not specify any remedy for its violation. Therefore, we look to KRS 446.070 to
determine whether the legislature authorized the remedy Castle seeks. KRS
446.070 provides
A person injured by the violation of any statute may
recover from the offender such damages as he sustained
by reason of the violation, although a penalty or
forfeiture is imposed for such violation.
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Castle’s remedy is thus limited to “such damages as [s]he sustained by reason of
the violation” of KRS 216B.165.
When the Supreme Court considered the availability of an equitable
remedy in a similarly statute-based retaliatory discharge claim, such remedy was
determined to be unavailable. Pari-Mutuel Clerks’ Union of Kentucky, Local 541,
SEIU, AFL-CIO v. Kentucky Jockey Club, 551 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Ky. 1977). Like
Castle’s claim, the discharged employee’s claim in Pari-Mutuel Clerks’ Union was
based on a prohibitory statute that did not specify a remedy.3 Like Castle’s claim,
the remedy had to be found in KRS 446.070. In Pari-Mutuel Clerks’ Union, “the
relief sought [was] the reinstatement of discharged employes[.]” Pari-Mutuel
Clerks’ Union at 802. Recognizing that the enabling legislation had not authorized
such relief, and that granting reinstatement would require the Court to add
language to the statute, the Supreme Court said, “Obviously, we must decline to do
so, since legislation is constitutionally the exclusive function of the General
Assembly and not that of the courts.” Id. at 803. The discharged employee was
limited in his remedy “under KRS 446.070 to recover from his former employer
whatever damages he has sustained by reason of the violation.” Pari-Mutuel
Clerks’ Union at 803; Simpson County Steeplechase Ass’n v. Roberts, 898 S.W.2d
523, 525 (Ky.App. 1995)(interpreting the same enabling legislation “held that the
statute does not permit injunctive relief.”). We can reach no other conclusion than
3
In Pari-Mutuel Clerks’ Union, the discharged employee’s claim was based on the employer’s
violation of KRS 336.130 and brought pursuant to KRS 446.070. The pre-emption of KRS
336.130 by National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq, was recognized by Smith v.
Excel Maintenance Services, Inc., 617 F.Supp.2d 520, 523-24 (W.D.Ky. 2008).
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that if equitable relief could have been found in KRS 446.070, it would have been
found in Pari-Mutuel Clerks’ Union. Equitable relief is no more available in
Castle’s case.
Castle attempts to make a distinction between reinstatement and front
pay. However, front pay is simply a substitute for reinstatement. Brooks, supra,
132 S.W.3d at 806 (“front pay either supplements the equitable remedy of
reinstatement or acts as a substitute for it”). Furthermore, as the Hospital correctly
notes, front pay is still “[c]onsidered an equitable remedy[.]” Dollar General
Partners, supra, 214 S.W.3d at 918. Allowing the equitable remedy of front pay
when the equitable remedy of reinstatement is prohibited would create an
impermissible incongruity in Kentucky jurisprudence. Consequently, Castle is not
entitled to equitable relief in the form of front pay.
Castle argues that in Brooks, supra, our Supreme Court discussed and
allowed an award of front pay. This argument fails, however, because in Brooks
the Supreme Court was applying a statute that included language authorizing the
“Circuit Court to enjoin further violations[.]” Brooks at 809, quoting KRS
344.450. The Court concluded that “the power to order reinstatement appears to
fall within the trial court’s power” under KRS 344.450. Brooks at 806. Unlike the
statute involved in Brooks, there is no language in KRS 216B.165 or KRS 446.070
authorizing the circuit court’s exercise of any injunctive authority whatsoever.
Our conclusion that front pay is not an available remedy under KRS
216B.165 obviates the need to address the Hospital’s second argument that the
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award of front pay is a matter for the court and not the jury. However, as noted in
the Standard of Review, supra, that issue already has been resolved by Brooks and
Dollar General Partners. See also, Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 184 S.W.3d
492, 494 n.1 (Ky. 2005)(“the trial court rather than the jury should determine the
appropriateness and amount of front pay”).
VI. Issues Related To The Award of Punitive Damages
The Hospital presents several arguments challenging the punitive
damage award. We take particular note of the arguments that the trial court erred
by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of the Hospital’s alleged
dissimilar prior bad acts, and that the punitive damage instruction was improper
because it was worded in a way that allowed the jury to punish the Hospital for
conduct other than that prohibited by KRS 216B.165, all in violation of established
principles of due process. We believe these arguments have merit.
Castle and her witnesses offered evidence that the Hospital was
understaffed on dates when Castle made no report and on occasions when Castle
was not even on duty. Furthermore, Castle presented witnesses who testified to
their belief that these incidents of understaffing jeopardized the health and safety
of, or actually harmed, patients.4
4
Some stories offered by Castle and her witnesses were clearly intended to inflame the passions
of the jury. In one case, a mother was given the wrong medicine and, according to the testimony,
nearly died because of the error. In another, a baby stopped breathing after going too long
between feedings. Whether these mistakes could have been avoided by increased staffing will
never be known. Perhaps the most emotion-evoking example involved a newborn who died
while being transported to another hospital. Castle presented no evidence as to the cause of the
infant’s death or even that the Hospital’s maternity ward was understaffed at the time.
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The Hospital objected to the admissibility of this evidence because it
was not relevant to Castle’s claim that she was terminated for her own reporting of
understaffing on September 2, 2005, in violation of KRS 216B.165(3). Castle’s
counsel responded that the evidence was relevant because “in the instructions on
punitives, one of the things the jury has to consider is the harm that was caused by
the understaffing.”5 Castle’s counsel further argued that
This is not about September 2nd. This is about the
staffing problem at Highlands Hospital that happened
over a great period of time. And the jury needs to
determine what is appropriate for punitive damages, to
know what harm was caused not just to the plaintiff but
to these other poor victims who weren’t ever told what
the Hospital did to them.
The trial court considered the parties’ arguments and admitted the evidence. At the
close of proof, the Hospital moved for directed verdict on the grounds, among
others, that there was no admissible evidence supporting an award of punitive
damages. The motion was denied.
Counsel for both parties then tendered proposed punitive damage
instructions from which the trial court prepared the instruction that was eventually
presented to the jury. The Hospital first objected to the use of any punitive damage
instruction at all arguing again that the evidence did not warrant one. After the
trial court overruled that objection, the Hospital objected to the specific form of the
5
Castle never argued that evidence of understaffing reports or understaffing itself was relevant to
establish that Castle made her September 2, 2005 report in good faith, a liability element of her
cause of action rather than an element of damages.
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punitive damage instruction the trial court proposed to use.6 The instruction read,
in pertinent part, as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 6
If you answered “YES” to Instruction No. 2
[regarding the Hospital’s liability to Castle for retaliatory
discharge] and if you are further satisfied from the
evidence that in its conduct toward [Castle], the
Defendant’s employees acted in reckless disregard for the
lives, safety or property of others, including [Castle], you
may in your discretion award punitive damages against
the Defendant in addition to the [compensatory] damages
you have awarded . . . .
Your discretion to determine and award an
amount, if any, of punitive damages is limited to the
following factors:
A. The harm to [Castle] as measured by the
[compensatory] damages you have awarded . . . caused
by the conduct of the Defendant’s employees toward
[Castle];
B. The degree, if any, to which you have found
from the evidence that the conduct of the Defendant’s
employees toward [Castle] was reprehensible,
considering:
1. The degree to which the conduct of the
Defendant’s employees showed an indifference to or a
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others;
2. The degree to which [Castle] had
financial vulnerability;
OR
6
The punitive damage instruction the trial court used was very similar to that proposed by Castle
since both were based on John S. Palmore, Kentucky Instructions to Juries, § 39.15 (2006). As
Castle notes, the trial court “gave the proposed instruction provided by Nurse Castle[.]”
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3. The degree to which the conduct of the
Defendant’s employees involved repeated actions as
opposed to an isolated incident.
Reminding the trial court of its objection to the admission of
understaffing evidence, the Hospital argued that the language in Castle’s and the
trial court’s instructions would allow the jury to punish the Hospital for harm
alleged to have been inflicted upon patients rather than punishing the Hospital for
terminating Castle. The Hospital’s counsel stated,
It’s the same concern I had when they started putting in
evidence . . . that back in 2002 or 2003 there was an
understaffing on the [maternity] unit. The message to the
jury here is, well, let’s deal with all that stuff. And that
was never this case.
This was never a case against the Hospital for safety or
anything else. It was a case of – did Ms. Castle get retaliated against and that was the sum and substance of it.
And this jury instruction is so open-ended that it allows
the jury to find them – I mean – I think it is a very serious
due process violation to start with. I guess if we have got
to instruct on punitive damage we would tender our
instruction on that, which at least I believe is more
limited.
The trial court overruled the Hospital’s objection and its motion for a more limited
instruction on punitive damages. Counsel then proceeded to closing arguments.
In closing, Castle’s attorney placed strong emphasis on the evidence
of understaffing. Re-emphasizing that Castle’s complaint was not just about her
retaliatory discharge, her counsel said to the jury,
You’ve got the power and you’ve got the opportunity to
fix this. The hospital’s had the courage to come in here
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and try to cover you up with red fish. Now, do you have
the courage to fix the problem?
The most important thing is that when you leave this
courthouse today you feel proud of what you’ve done.
You hold your head up high and be proud of your
verdict, of what you do today, because God forbid that,
this time next year, you should read in the newspaper
about a baby dying at Highlands, and look in the mirror
and think you had a chance to prevent that.
After the jury determined liability and awarded compensatory and punitive
damages, the Hospital moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; the motion
was denied.
On appeal, the Hospital argues that the evidence of understaffing was
not relevant under Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 401 and therefore
inadmissible under KRE 402. Citing KRE 403, the Hospital further argues that
even if the evidence is relevant, it should have been excluded as unduly prejudicial.
KRE 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value of
this evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of under prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury”). The Hospital also argues that
under KRE 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”
KRE 404(b). Finally, the Hospital argues that its due process rights were violated
(1) because no punitive damage instruction should have been given, (2) because
the trial court’s instruction allowed the jury to base a punitive damage award on
evidence of the Hospital’s dissimilar conduct, and (3) because the trial court
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rejected the more narrowly-tailored punitive damage instruction it proposed that
would have prevented the jury from considering evidence of dissimilar conduct.
Castle counters these arguments by stating that evidence of the
Hospital’s “prior bad actions . . . cannot be excluded simply because it might seem
‘prejudicial’” and by arguing that “[t]hese shocking facts are central to Nurse
Castle’s case, and were properly considered by the finder of fact.” Regarding the
jury instruction, Castle states that the “trial court properly gave the proposed
instruction provided by Nurse Castle [because it was] drawn from Palmore,
Kentucky Instructions to Juries, 5th ed. [as opposed to the Hospital’s] proposed jury
instructions [that] were copied from an earlier edition of the text [Palmore, 4th ed.],
which failed to take into account recent changes in the law on punitive damages.”
A. Inadmissibility of Evidence of Dissimilar Acts
These issues of the inadmissibility of evidence of dissimilar acts and
the obligation of a trial court to tailor punitive damage instructions are directly
addressed in the United States Supreme Court cases of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003), and Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 127 S.Ct. 1057 (2007), respectively. Therefore, we
discuss their applicability here.
Both State Farm and Philip Morris are the progeny of BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996), which articulated
three guideposts for courts to use in evaluating whether punitive damages awards
are unconstitutionally excessive: 1) the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct;
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2) the ratio of the punitive damages to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff; and
3) a comparison of the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal penalties
that could be imposed for comparable misconduct. Gore at 574-75. The Gore
guideposts were applied and expounded upon in State Farm, which focused on the
reprehensibility guidepost and reversed a punitive damage award that was based on
evidence of a “defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which
liability was premised[.]” State Farm at 422.
More recently, in Philip Morris, the Court reiterated its concern for a
fair process and focused on the need for the trial court, by appropriate instruction,
to assure “that juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking, not simply to
determine reprehensibility but also to punish for harm caused strangers.” Philip
Morris at 355.
While State Farm and Philip Morris give guidance for post-judgment
reviews of punitive damage awards, their holdings have real practical value for
practitioners, and for trial courts ruling on evidentiary matters such as those now
before this Court. This can be seen in the procedural histories of both cases,
beginning with State Farm. We will discuss Philip Morris in the context of our
analysis of the punitive damage instruction, infra.
In State Farm, the United States Supreme Court took discretionary
review of a decision by the Utah Supreme Court, captioned Campbell v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2001), rev’d, State Farm Mut. Auto.
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Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003). The Utah Supreme
Court framed the issue as follows:
Did the trial court commit reversible error by admitting
“other acts” evidence in violation of Utah Rule of
Evidence 404(b)?
Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1144. Notably, Utah’s Rule 404(b) is identical to the
Kentucky Rule of Evidence upon which the Hospital relied. The Utah Supreme
Court concluded,
that the trial court did not exceed the permitted range of
discretion in finding that the “other acts” evidence was
offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose.
Id. at 1157.
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court determined
that the Utah courts’ analysis was incorrect. However, the Court faced an
analytical problem. “[A]dmissibility of other acts evidence is ordinarily governed
by Rule 404(b) and . . . since this determination was made by the Utah courts
applying their own state evidentiary rules, the Supreme Court had no authority to
evaluate whether those rules were properly applied.” Jim Gash, Punitive
Damages, Other Acts Evidence, and the Constitution, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 1191,
1232 (2004)(footnotes omitted).7 Consequently, the Supreme Court could only
7
Professor Gash cites as authority, among others, the cases of Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S.
422, 438 n.6 (1983) ( “[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in
a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules.”), and Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977) (“it is normally within the power of the State to regulate procedures
under which its laws are carried out, . . . and its decision in this regard is not subject to
proscription under the Due Process Clause unless it offends some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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reverse the Utah Supreme Court if it determined, independently of the state courts’
interpretation of its own evidentiary rules, that the admission of other acts evidence
violated the United States Constitution. Id. at 1231-32.8 And that is precisely what
the Court did.
In State Farm, the Court first enumerated the five factors used in
determining the reprehensibility of a defendant. They are whether:
the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic;
the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the
target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the
conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated
incident; and the harm was the result of intentional
malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
State Farm at 419. Particularly applicable both in State Farm and in the case now
before this Court is the second factor – whether “the tortious conduct evinced an
indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others[.]” Id. The
legal analogies between the cases do not end there.
In State Farm, the Campbells were at fault in an auto accident. Their
insurer was State Farm, whose “handling of the claims against the Campbells
merits no praise.” Id. Taken at face value, the Hospital’s understaffing likewise
merits no praise. In an approach similar to that taken by Castle, the Campbells
8
Citing Jammal v. Van De Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991) (“While adherence to state
evidentiary rules suggests that the trial was conducted in a procedurally fair manner, it is
certainly possible to have a fair trial even when state standards are violated; conversely, state
procedural and evidentiary rules may countenance processes that do not comport with
fundamental fairness.”); id. at 920 (“The . . . issue is not whether introduction of [the evidence]
violated state law evidentiary principles, but whether the trial court committed an error which
rendered the trial so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due process.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
-21-
tried to make their case about more than the harm they suffered as a result of the
defendant’s tortious conduct.
From their opening statements onward the Campbells
framed this case as a chance to rebuke State Farm for its
nationwide activities [stating,] “[T]his is a very important
case. . . . [I]t transcends the Campbell file. It involves a
nationwide practice. And you, here, are going to be
evaluating and assessing, and hopefully requiring State
Farm to stand accountable for what it’s doing across the
country, which is the purpose of punitive damages”.
[parenthetical omitted] This was a position maintained
throughout the litigation. In opposing State Farm’s
motion to exclude such evidence under Gore, the
Campbells’ counsel convinced the trial court that there
was no limitation on the scope of evidence that could be
considered under our precedents.
State Farm at 420-21.9 As noted, State Farm objected to the admission of this
evidence both under Rule 404(b) and Gore but the trial court admitted the
evidence. That evidentiary ruling was reversible error. “[T]he Utah courts erred in
relying upon this and other evidence: The courts awarded punitive damages to
punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the Campbells’ harm.”10 Id. at
9
The parties in the case sub judice and the trial court, like the Campbells, referenced Gore
several times throughout the trial relative to these evidentiary issues.
10
The United States Supreme Court’s use of the plural, “Utah courts,” in this quote can only
refer to the trial court and the appellate Supreme Court. The procedural history shows that the
case was originally decided on State Farm’s motion for summary judgment which the
Campbell’s appealed to the Utah Supreme Court and which that court transferred to the Utah
Court of Appeals in accordance with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 42. The Campbells
appeal of the summary judgment was successful. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
840 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1992). There were no evidentiary rulings addressed by the Utah Court
of Appeals in that decision. Upon remand, a jury awarded judgment, including punitive
damages, in favor of the Campbells. Campbell, 65 P.3d 1141. Both the Campbells and State
Farm appealed that judgment directly to the Utah Supreme Court in accordance with that court’s
original appellate jurisdiction. Utah Const. art. 8, § 3. Therefore, the error in evidentiary rulings
was first committed by the Utah trial court, and then by the Utah Supreme Court when it
affirmed the trial court.
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422. “The Utah Supreme Court’s opinion makes explicit that State Farm was
being condemned for its nationwide policies rather than for the conduct directed
toward the Campbells.” State Farm at 420.
The rule we take from State Farm is this: “A defendant’s dissimilar
acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve
as the basis for punitive damages.” Id. at 422. This is not only a rule for reviewing
courts, but an evidentiary rule for trial courts as well. See Philip Morris, 549 U.S.
at 352-53, 127 S.Ct. at 1062 (stating that the Court “need now only consider the
Constitution’s procedural limitations.” Emphasis supplied.). The Utah Supreme
Court understood this. On remand, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that
the Supreme Court leashed us more tightly to the
established analytical guideposts of Gore . . . by
narrowing the scope of relevant evidence which we may
consider in evaluating the reprehensibility of State Farm's
conduct . . . . Drawing on views expressed in Gore, the
Supreme Court limited evidence that can properly be
weighed in the reprehensibility scale to behavior which
took place within our borders and was directed at the
Campbells. [citation omitted]
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 413 (Utah
2004)(emphasis supplied).
Our own Supreme Court has similarly recognized that State Farm is
about the inadmissibility of evidence, noting “the United States Supreme Court
sharply limited the use of evidence of other transgressions to prove entitlement to
punitive damages.” Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 179 S.W.3d
-23-
815, 819 (Ky. 2005)(emphasis supplied), quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422-23,
123 S.Ct. 1513.
The error in admitting evidence of understaffing and the harm Castle’s
witnesses alleged it caused patients can be summarized as follows. This was
dissimilar other acts evidence – not evidence of the tortious act upon which
liability was premised – and of the very type prohibited by State Farm. Clearly,
the act upon which Castle’s complaint premised the Hospital’s liability was the
termination of her employment in violation of KRS 216B.165 and not the
Hospital’s understaffing.
However, this determination is neither an end to the Hospital’s
arguments nor our analysis. Philip Morris indicates that, by properly instructing
the jury, the prejudicial impact of such other acts evidence might be sufficiently
tempered to render the erroneous admission of such evidence harmless.
Like State Farm, Philip Morris illustrates that “the United States
Constitution requires both procedural and substantive limits on punitive damage
awards.” Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 344 Or. 45, 176 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Or.
2008)(emphasis supplied)( on remand from and citing Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at
352-53, 127 S.Ct. at 1062). As such, both cases lend themselves to practical
application at trial – State Farm to the admissibility of evidence and Philip Morris
to the crafting of jury instructions.
B. Improper Punitive Damage Instruction11
11
A preliminary issue, one never raised or determined, was whether punitive damages are
available at all for a cause of action brought pursuant to KRS 446.070 to recover damages for a
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Just as in the case sub judice, one of the issues in Philip Morris
“arose in the context of the trial court’s refusal to give a particular proposed jury
instruction that defendant had requested.” Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 344 Or.
45, 176 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Or. 2008). In both this case and Philip Morris, the
appellant argued “the trial court should have accepted, but did not accept, a
proposed ‘punitive damages’ instruction” that would have prohibited the jury from
punishing the appellant “for injury to other persons not before the court.” Philip
Morris at 350. In both cases, “[t]he judge rejected this proposal[.]” Id. at 351.
Philip Morris vacated the Oregon Supreme Court’s opinion because
“the Due Process Clause prohibits a State from punishing an individual without
first providing that individual with ‘an opportunity to present every available
defense.’ Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66, 92 S.Ct. 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Yet a defendant threatened with punishment
violation of KRS 216B.165(3). The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that the punitive damages
statutes, KRS 411.184 and KRS 411.186, “apply only to those cases in which punitive damages
are already authorized by common law or by statute.” Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v.
McCullough, 123 S.W.3d 130, 139 (Ky. 2003). Castle’s cause of action has no counterpart at
common law and the implicated statutes do not specify punitive damages as a remedy. In the
absence of “[t]he express inclusion of punitive damages in these statutes,” McCullough at 140,
no punitive damage instruction was authorized. See Jackson v. Tullar, 285 S.W.3d 290, 298
(Ky.App. 2007)(“In determining whether punitive damages are authorized by a particular statute,
Kentucky courts have applied a strict, literal interpretation of the relevant statutory language.”).
However, the Hospital never made this argument and, unlike the defendant in Childers Oil Co.,
Inc. v. Adkins, 256 S.W.3d 19 (Ky. 2008), does not raise this issue as palpable error.
Consequently, that argument has been waived.
However, McCullough calls into question, if it does not reject outright, the holding in Simpson
County Steeplechase Ass’n v. Roberts, 898 S.W.2d 523 (Ky.App. 1995), that punitive damages
are generally available in retaliatory discharge cases and specifically available in such cases
brought pursuant to KRS 336.130. Applying McCullough’s reasoning to the facts and statute
involved in Simpson County Steeplechase would have resulted in a different outcome in that
case.
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for injuring a nonparty victim has no opportunity to defend against the charge[.]”
Philip Morris at 353. The Court explained that
to permit punishment for injuring a nonparty victim
would add a near standardless dimension to the punitive
damages equation. How many such victims are there?
How seriously were they injured? Under what
circumstances did injury occur? The trial will not likely
answer such questions as to nonparty victims. The jury
will be left to speculate. And the fundamental due
process concerns to which our punitive damages cases
refer – risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty and lack of
notice – will be magnified. State Farm, 538 U.S., at 416,
418, 123 S.Ct. 1513; BMW [of North America v. Gore],
517 U.S., at 574, 116 S.Ct. 1589.
Philip Morris at 354. Citing both Gore and Philip Morris in its brief, the Hospital
makes this very argument – allowing the case to center on harm caused to patientnonparties deprived it of fair notice. We find merit in this argument.
Castle’s response is identical to the response of the appellee in Philip
Morris that “she is free to show harm to other victims because it is relevant to a
different part of the punitive damages constitutional equation, namely,
reprehensibility.” Id. at 355. Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court said “a
jury may not go further than this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a
defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to have visited on nonparties.”
Id. The argument, said the Court,
raises a practical problem. How can we know whether a
jury, in taking account of harm caused others under the
rubric of reprehensibility, also seeks to punish the
defendant for having caused injury to others? Our
answer is that . . . where the risk of that misunderstanding
is a significant one – because, for instance, of the sort of
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evidence that was introduced at trial or the kinds of
argument the plaintiff made to the jury – a court, upon
request, must protect against that risk.
Id. at 357 (emphasis supplied). The Hospital made that request, specifically
arguing that the more limited instruction on punitive damage it proposed would
have lessened or eliminated the risk identified in Philip Morris. Like the trial court
in Philip Morris, the trial court in the case before us failed to protect against that
risk when it instructed the jury in a way that allowed it to punish the Hospital for
harm it allegedly visited upon nonparties. This constitutes reversible error.
Again, this does not end the analysis. If it did, we would remand the
case for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. As we further discuss, the
admissible evidence remaining once evidence of understaffing is eliminated does
not justify instructing the jury on punitive damages. Therefore, we are vacating the
punitive damage award.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) (1979), states that
“Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.”
Kentucky’s highest court said, “The threshold for the award of punitive damages in
a tort case is whether there is misconduct as described in the Restatement, supra,
‘outrageous’ in character[.]” Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690
S.W.2d 382, 389 (Ky. 1985). In short, there was nothing outrageous about Castle’s
termination; her termination harmed no one but Castle. Even if, as the jury found,
the Hospital’s reasons for terminating her included Castle’s making of a report
-27-
under KRS 216B.165(1), the proof supported a finding of a non-retaliatory reason
as well – the violation of the Hospital’s prohibition against falsifying medical
records.
Castle presented no evidence at trial and makes no argument here that
the Hospital engaged in outrageous conduct other than “that the hospital was
chronically short staffed and that she and the other nurses were forced to risk
injury or death to their patients and the incident trauma and liability, due to the
hospital’s wrongful conduct.” (Appellee’s brief, p. 14). This is not the tortious
conduct upon which Castle premised her complaint.
Castle’s further argument is somewhat circular. She argues that “the
jury had the discretion to award punitive damages upon evidence that [the
Hospital’s] employees acted ‘in reckless disregard for the lives, safety or property
of others, including [Castle].’” She confuses jury instruction standards for a
finding of “gross negligence” – a basis of liability – and jury instruction standards
for finding punitive damages. To some degree, this mistake is understandable. In
Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1998), which Castle cites, the trial court
submitted the case to the jury for a determination of
punitive damages upon an instruction from Horton v.
Union Light, Heat & Power Co., Ky., 690 S.W.2d 382,
388 (1985), which requires proof of “wanton or reckless
disregard for the lives, safety or property of others.”
Williams at 261. However, reading Horton reveals the instruction to which
Williams refers is not a punitive damage instruction. In Horton, before the Court
reached the issue of punitive damages, it said
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the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that
the totality of circumstances indicated “a wanton or
reckless disregard for the lives, safety or property of
other persons.” This was the standard for deciding
“gross negligence” submitted by the instructions. These
instructions have not been challenged in this case.
Horton at 387-88 (emphasis supplied). The punitive damage instruction, not this
liability instruction, was the focus of Horton.
Nevertheless, Castle further argues that punitive damages were
appropriate because the trial court relied on the current edition of the model jury
instruction, Palmore’s Kentucky Instructions to Juries, Fifth Ed., Vol. 2, § 39.15:
Punitive Damages. Because none of the three reprehensibility factors used in
Castle’s instruction and as described in State Farm are present in this case, this
argument also fails. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (“The existence
of any one of these [reprehensibility] factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may
not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of
them renders any award suspect.”).
Relying on a model instruction would seem a safe approach, but it is
not always so. Walker v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-SC-000480-MR, 2007 WL
2404508 *6 (Ky., Aug. 23, 2007)(model instructions are not binding upon the
courts).12 The pitfall that caught Castle and the trial court was the failure of the
model instruction to accurately track the law upon which it is based. Specifically,
one of the five factors identified in State Farm as indicative of reprehensible
conduct was whether “the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless
12
Cited here in accordance with Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.28(4)(c).
-29-
disregard of the health or safety of others[.]” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, 123
S.Ct. at 1521 (emphasis supplied). In the most recent version of Palmore’s
Instructions, the jury is to consider “the degree to which D’s conduct evinced an
indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others[.]” Palmore,
Instructions, Vol. 2, § 39.15. Notably missing from the model instruction is the
qualifying adjective “tortious.” See Lawrence v. Risen, 598 S.W.2d 474, 476
(Ky.App. 1980)(conduct first must be found to be tortious to allow punitive
damages; failure of plaintiff’s claim “on which actual damages could be awarded
. . . precluded [him] from seeking exemplary ones”). The absence of this
qualifying language allowed the jury to consider more than the Hospital’s tortious
conduct; it allowed the jury to consider the conduct Castle made the focus of her
case – understaffing – evidence of dissimilar conduct.
We believe it likely that Palmore’s model instruction left out the
adjective “tortious” to eliminate the need to define the somewhat technical term for
the jury. However, the word’s elimination from the model instruction neither
obviates nor satisfies the trial court’s duty to craft a punitive damage instruction
that assures the jury’s consideration of the reprehensibility factor is limited to the
same conduct upon which the defendant’s tort liability is based.
What Castle should have presented as evidence and argued to the jury
was how “the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of
harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehensible[.]” Philip Morris
549 U.S. at 355, 127 S.Ct. 1057 (emphasis supplied). Hypothetically, had Castle
-30-
been on duty at the moment of her termination, the health or safety of the patients
for whom she was providing care, potentially, could have been jeopardized. But
that simply was not the case.
There was no evidence that Castle’s termination posed any risk,
substantial or otherwise, to anyone other than her. Once the inadmissible evidence
of understaffing is disregarded, we see there was no evidence that justified
including this factor in the punitive damage instruction. It was error to do so.
The second State Farm factor for determining reprehensibility used in
the instruction was the “degree to which [Castle] had financial vulnerability[.]”
To be sure, infliction of economic injury . . . when the
target is financially vulnerable, can warrant a substantial
penalty. But this observation does not convert all acts
that cause economic harm into torts that are sufficiently
reprehensible to justify a significant sanction in addition
to compensatory damages.
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996).
In the strictest sense, the Hospital’s act of terminating Castle caused
economic harm because she lost her employment income. However, that kind of
“economic harm was a natural consequence of terminating [Castle] from her
employment[.]” Ojeda-Rodriguez v. Zayas, 666 F.Supp.2d 240, 265 (D.Puerto
Rico 2009) (discharged employee alleged defamation and denial of due process
hearing). If we were to categorize as financially vulnerable every person who
loses employment income, we would then be constrained to say that every
termination from employment (or suspension without pay for that matter) is
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reprehensible. But that is simply not so. See, e.g., Morgan v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 559 F.3d 425, 441-42 (6th Cir. 2009)(“it would not be accurate to describe [the
discharged employee] as financially vulnerable”); Austin v. Norfolk Southern
Corp., 158 Fed.Appx. 374, 389 (3rd Cir. 2005)(No evidence “that the [30 day]
suspension [without pay] put her [the employee] in a financially vulnerable
position”). Obviously, a finding that the tort victim was financially vulnerable
must depend on the presence of some additional factor or factors.
Kentucky has not defined “financial vulnerability.” In an effort to
determine what factors other than loss of employment income would serve to make
a discharged employee financially vulnerable, we looked to every readily available
case in our sister states and in the federal courts in which financial vulnerability
received any discussion at all. Case law is sparse as to this precise issue, and the
cases we found are short on analysis. Some cases make no finding of financial
vulnerability, but without analysis of any kind as to why.13 Others do make a
finding of financial vulnerability, but do so without explanation.14 However,
several cases do shed a little light on the issue.
Focusing on cases of wrongful or retaliatory discharge, we see that
employees were found to be financially vulnerable because certain special
circumstances impacted their financial security even before they were terminated
13
See, e.g., Hines v. Grand Casino of Louisiana, L.L.C. – Tunica-Biloxi Indians, 358 F.Supp.2d
533, 552 (W.D.La. 2005).
14
See, e.g., Laymon v. Lobby House, Inc., 613 F.Supp.2d 504, 513 (D.Del. 2009)(“Laymon was
economically vulnerable in that she was employed by Lobby House who paid her wages”).
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and while they still earned a salary. These cases involved employees who were
“low-paid” or unskilled or who were older and, because of those circumstances,
had minimal prospects for re-employment.15 In what appears to be a sub-category
of this group, single parents were also determined to be financially vulnerable.16
Castle has little in common with the employees in these cases. She is
neither a single mother nor her family’s sole provider. She is not unskilled,
uneducated, or elderly. Rather, she is an experienced, educated nurse whose skills
have been perennially in high demand. When she marketed those skills, she
readily found replacement employment. The Hospital presented evidence that
15
Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1283 (11th Cir. 2008)(manual laborer
with elevator fabricating company “was financially vulnerable”); Lopez v. Aramark Uniform &
Career Apparel, Inc., 426 F.Supp.2d 914, 970 (N.D.Iowa 2006)(employees “were poor and
uneducated”); Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal.4th 686, 219 P.3d 749, 793-94 (Cal. 2009) and
Roby at 801 (Werdegar, J., concurring)(employee known by her employer to be chronically ill,
“was a relatively low-level employee who quickly depleted her savings and lost her medical
insurance as a result of her termination” and became “completely disabled from employment”);
Gober v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 137 Cal.App.4th 204, 220, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 92, 105 (Cal.App.
2006)(“victims were a group of grocery store employees”); Baker v. National State Bank, 353
N.J.Super. 145, 801 A.2d 1158, 1165 (N.J.Super.A.D. 2002) and Baker v. National State Bank,
312 N.J.Super. 268, 711 A.2d 917, 921 (N.J.Super.A.D.1998)(because of their age, employees
had difficulty finding new employment, their “family was forced to borrow funds to maintain
their household[,]” and they “struggled financially following their termination and had to reduce
their standards of living considerably”); Tomao v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 2007 WL 2225905,
*21, No. 04-C-3470. (N.D.Ill. July 31, 2007)(employee “was over 60 years of age at all times
relevant”); LaMore v. Check Advance of Tennessee, LLC, No. E2009-00442-COA-R3-CV, 2010
WL 323077, *2, *16, *17 (Tenn.App. January 28, 2010)(single mother of special needs child,
was “low-paid” and “unable for other unfortunate reasons, to work”); see also Parrish v.
Sollecito, 280 F.Supp.2d 145, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)(“the evidence in the record does not
demonstrate that Parrish was financially vulnerable to the point of being deprived of food, shelter
or basic necessities”).
16
Blount v. Stroud, 395 Ill.App.3d 8, 915 N.E.2d 925, 942 (Ill.App. 2009)(single mother of two
children about to testify for co-worker in discrimination case whose “supervisor told her that the
co-worker ‘didn’t pay your bills,’ that he did, and that she should do what he said so that she and
her children did not ‘go over a cliff’ financially.”); Brady v. Curators of University of Missouri,
213 S.W.3d 101, 111 (Mo.App. 2006)(father of two sons forced to “rely on his former wife for
financial help, thus making him financially vulnerable”); LaMore, supra; Watson v. E.S. Sutton,
Inc., No. 02 Civ. 2739 (KMW), 2005 WL 2170659, *17 (S.D.N.Y. September 6, 2005)(“single
mother . . . was left with no income [and] had to scramble to support herself and her child”).
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there were other nursing positions available in Castle’s area that she did not pursue
because, as she acknowledged, she did not read the newspapers in which those jobs
were advertised.
Of the cases we found, Castle’s circumstances appear more in line
with the employees in Richardson v. Tricom Pictures & Productions, Inc., 334
F.Supp.2d 1303 (S.D.Fla. 2004), and Parrish v. Sollecito, 280 F.Supp.2d 145
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)/Parrish v. Sollecito, 249 F.Supp.2d 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
In Richardson, the plaintiff’s employer discharged her in retaliation
for asserting a claim of sexual harassment, thereby depriving her of her income as
a sales representative for a media production company. Nevertheless, the court
determined “there is no evidence . . . that Richardson was financially vulnerable to
a significant degree.” Richardson at 1324; see also Morgan v. New York Life Ins.
Co., supra, at 441-42 (6th Cir. 2009)(“it would seem to be a stretch to describe [the
discharged employee, a 50-year-old insurance company executive] as financially
vulnerable”). Richardson, unlike the employees who were determined to be
financially vulnerable in the cases cited, supra, had a marketable skill set in sales.
The only real financial vulnerability Richardson could claim was her temporary
loss of income from employment. Castle and Richardson have this in common.
In Parrish, the plaintiff was hired as a finance manager at two interrelated auto dealerships. Parrish, 249 F.Supp.2d at 344. After asserting a claim of
sexual harassment and hostile work environment, Parrish’s employment at one of
the dealerships was terminated, and this “caused her to lose approximately half of
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her income.” Parrish, 249 F.Supp.2d at 346. Presumably because the work
environment at the other dealership remained hostile in her opinion, she resigned
from that employment as well. Parrish, 249 F.Supp.2d at 346. Although Parrish
“testified to being in a vulnerable economic position after her recent divorce,
indicating that she desperately needed her job[,]” the court held that “the evidence
in the record does not demonstrate that Parrish was financially vulnerable to the
point of being deprived of food, shelter or basic necessities.” Parrish, 280
F.Supp.2d at 163. Like the employee in Richardson, Parrish had marketable skills.
In Parrish’s case, those skills were in finance. In Castle’s case, her skills were
nursing. The record in Castle’s case demonstrates to us that she was not more
financially vulnerable when she was terminated than was Parrish or Richardson.
Certainly she was not deprived of food, shelter or basic necessities.
We do not intend to indicate that Castle’s circumstances were
identical to those of Parrish and Richardson. They were not. However, State
Farm provides a “flexible general standard to be applied to each particular case as
the facts required.” Rodgers, supra, 179 S.W.2d at 825. Applying that standard
here, we find that Castle has far more in common with Parrish and Richardson than
with the employees in other cases who were experiencing financial vulnerability
even before their termination. For this reason, we conclude that Castle was not
financially vulnerable for purposes of determining under State Farm the
reprehensibility of the Hospital’s conduct in terminating her employment. The
evidence in this case did not justify including this factor in the jury instruction.
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The third and last of the five State Farm factors used in the punitive
damage instruction to assist the jury in determining reprehensibility was “[t]he
degree to which the conduct of the [Hospital’s] employees involved repeated
actions as opposed to an isolated incident[.]” State Farm includes this factor
because, just as “a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first offender
. . . repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance of
malfeasance[.]” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423, 123 S.Ct. 1513, quoting Gore, supra,
517 U.S. at 577, 116 S.Ct. 1589.
However, as with our consideration of the first factor used in the
instruction, we must not lose sight of the conduct we are considering. The
question is not whether the evidence revealed repetitive episodes of understaffing.
To justify including this factor in the punitive damage instruction, there must have
been “evidence of repeated misconduct of the sort that injured” Castle. State
Farm, 538 U.S. at 423, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (emphasis supplied). While “evidence of
other acts need not be identical to have relevance in the calculation of punitive
damages,” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423, 123 SCt. 1513, “courts must ensure the
conduct in question replicates the prior transgressions.” Id. (emphasis supplied),
citing TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462, n.
28, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993). In Kentucky, we require such
replication to be “so strikingly similar to the present act as to constitute a
‘signature crime.’” Rodgers, supra, 179 S.W.2d at 819, citing Rearick v.
Commonwealth, 858 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Ky. 1993). Here, no such evidence existed.
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Castle presented no evidence whatsoever that her termination in
violation of KRS 216B.165 replicated any prior act of the Hospital. In fact, the
evidence clearly established the contrary. Despite a fair number of employee
reports regarding understaffing, the Hospital never took any adverse action toward
any of those employees with the exception of the Hospital’s termination of Castle.
That was an isolated incident and including this element in the punitive damage
instruction was error. Doing so further confused the jury, allowing them, again, to
consider, and punish the Hospital for, understaffing.
Because the United States Supreme Court has said that the absence of
all of the reprehensibility factors renders any award of punitive damages suspect, it
is simple logic to conclude that the same absence renders a punitive damage
instruction inappropriate. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513. In this
case, the award of punitive damages is more than suspect because, in addition to
the absence of all the State Farm factors, there are other reasons to conclude that
punitive damages are not warranted in this case.
We turn again to State Farm, in which the Supreme Court said,
It should be presumed a plaintiff has been made whole
for his injuries by compensatory damages, so punitive
damages should only be awarded if the defendant’s
culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is
so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further
sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence.
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. at 1521. Castle was awarded $80,000 as
compensation for the loss of income she experienced between the date of her
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termination and the date of the jury’s verdict, prior to which she had secured other
employment as a nurse. The jury awarded her nothing on her claim of emotional
distress caused by her termination. We presume, therefore, that she has been made
whole by the award of compensatory damages.
Second, this is a “‘mixed-motive’ case, i.e., where both legitimate and
non-legitimate reasons motivated the decision” to terminate the employee. Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93, 123 S.Ct. 2148 (2003). The jury’s
determination that Castle’s discharge was retaliatory does not equate to a
determination that no legitimate reason existed for her termination. See First
Property Management Corp. v. Zarebidaki, 867 S.W.2d 185, 188-89 (Ky.
1993)(jury need only “believe[ ] the impermissible reason did in fact contribute to
the discharge as one of the substantial motivating factors”). Castle does not
dispute either that she falsely reported that a prior consent had been obtained
without confirming that fact, or that she obtained a written consent to surgery after
the surgery had been completed. Both were legitimate reasons for her termination.
One might argue that a punitive damage instruction could be based
solely on the jury’s determination that Castle’s termination was retaliatory.
However, the contrary appears to be the universal rule.17 The “mere existence of a
17
See, e.g., Seitzinger v. Trans-Lux Corp., 40 P.3d 1012, 1020 (N.M.App. 2001)(citing cases
from the Seventh Circuit, Alabama and Mississippi “holding that the mere existence of a
retaliatory discharge will not automatically give rise to a right to punitive damages”); Wallace v.
Halliburton Co., 850 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Okl. 1993)(“to warrant an instruction on punitive
damages . . . [t]he fact the employee was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers’
compensation claim is not enough”); Ancira Enterprises, Inc. v. Fischer, 178 S.W.3d 82, 94
(Tex.App.-Austin, 2005)(“evidence of retaliation alone is generally insufficient to support an
award of punitive damages”); see also Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat. Corp., 649 F.Supp. 647, 663
(N.D.Ind. 1986), aff’d, 834 F.2d 1373 (7th Cir. 1987)(“Retaliation by itself would obviously not
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retaliatory discharge will not automatically give rise to the right to punitive
damages.” Peters v. Rivers Edge Min., Inc., 224 W.Va. 160, 680 S.E.2d 791, 821
(W.Va. 2009)(quotation marks and citation omitted). While Kentucky has not yet
addressed this issue, we have no difficulty joining this majority view now.
Determination that an employee’s discharge is retaliatory is not, by itself, sufficient
to sustain an award of punitive damages.
Third, examining the enabling legislation in this case in light of the
analysis set forth in Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. McCullough, 123 S.W.3d
130 (Ky. 2003), we are convinced the legislature did not intend that punitive
damages be awarded for violations of KRS 216B.165. McCullough at 138
(reversing Court of Appeals which, “[d]espite the plain language of the statute”
excluding punitive damages, erroneously “held that punitive damages are
nonetheless available under KRS 344.450”); see footnote 11, supra. While the
Hospital waived the right to have the punitive damage award set aside solely
because the legislature did not authorize that remedy, the intent of the legislature
remains a valid consideration in the due process analysis.
When the legislature creates a cause of action, it must decide, as a
matter of public policy, whether allowing private litigants to recover punitive
damages will “further [the] State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful
conduct and deterring its repetition.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 568, 116 S.Ct. 1589.
Reading KRS 216B.165 together with KRS 446.070, it is clear the legislature did
automatically justify punitive damages.”).
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not allow private litigants such a right, but instead reserved to the Kentucky
Cabinet for Health and Family Services the authority to punish health care
facilities for violating KRS 216B.165. See KRS 216B.165(5)(“All health care
facilities and services licensed under this chapter shall, as a condition of licensure,
abide by the terms of KRS 216B.155 and this section.”); KRS 216B.042(3)(“The
cabinet may revoke licenses or certificates of need for specific health facilities or
health services . . . on the basis of the knowing violation of any provisions of this
chapter.“).
For a violation of KRS 216B.165, the legislature limited private
litigants to recovery only of “such damages as [the plaintiff] sustained by reason of
the violation” of the prohibitory statute. KRS 446.070. “Punitive damages are not
‘damages sustained’ by a particular plaintiff. Rather, they are private fines levied
by civil juries to punish a defendant for his conduct and to deter others from
engaging in similar conduct in the future.” In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander,
Newfoundland, On Dec. 12, 1985, 684 F.Supp. 927, 931 (W.D.Ky. 1987)
(interpreting federal law and international treaty). The legislature did not authorize
punitive damages in cases brought pursuant to KRS 446.070.
Finally, we conclude that the award of punitive damages was
animated by passion and prejudice. While the amount of the award (just more than
three times the compensatory award) is not so great by itself as to suggest the
influence of passion or prejudice, when combined with the absence of competent
evidence of reprehensibility it is “enough to induce us to look to the record for
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sources of prejudice.” Clement Bros. Co. v. Everett, 414 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Ky.
1967). “We find them[,]” as did the Supreme Court in Clement Bros., “in the
closing arguments of appellee[’s] counsel [which] appear to have been designed
specifically to appeal to and arouse the passions and prejudices of the jury.” Id.;
see also Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. Wilhite, 143 S.W.3d 604, 629 (Ky.App.
2003)(setting aside punitive damage award based upon “a determination that the
verdict was the result of passion or prejudice as indicated by . . . the inflammatory
nature of the closing arguments in question.”). The focus of Castle’s counsel’s
closing argument was hardly the Hospital’s tortious conduct; it was the unproven
incidents of understaffing which allegedly placed patients in jeopardy. We are
sufficiently convinced not only that the punitive damage award lacked the support
of competent evidence, but also that it was the product of the jury’s passions and
prejudices.
We therefore agree with the Hospital that no punitive damage
instruction was justified by the facts of this case. Giving such an instruction
allowed Castle to emphasize incompetent evidence resulting in a verdict based on
passion and prejudice and otherwise offensive to judicially defined due process
protections. The Hospital’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
should have been granted. It was clear error to fail to do so.
VII. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Floyd Circuit Court
judgment upon the jury’s verdict regarding the Hospital’s liability to Castle for
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violating KRS 216B.165 and its award of compensatory damages in the amount of
$80,000; we reverse as clearly erroneous the circuit court’s denial of the Hospital’s
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding the award of front pay
and punitive damages; and we remand the matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
DIXON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GRAVES, SPECIAL JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
GRAVES, SPECIAL JUDGE, DISSENTING: The majority has
written a learned opinion with an extended examination of recent United States
Supreme Court decisions pertaining to punitive damages. However, I must dissent
because those decisions have been read too broadly and have been misapplied to
the facts in this case. I read the Supreme Court cases only as limiting the
multiplier between actual damages and punitive damages. I do not read those
opinions as defining the elements of the actionable wrongdoing.
Moreover, the facts in the United States Supreme Court decisions deal
with punishment for extraterritorial torts. In the facts at bar, all the wrongdoing
(understaffing) occurred under one roof. Consequently, the trial court was correct
in ruling that evidence of understaffing was more probative than prejudicial, as a
logical nexus existed between the discharge and the pervasive understaffing.
There are three rationales for awarding punitive damages: punishing
the defendant, deterring the defendant from similar conduct in the future, and
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acting as an incentive to encourage private lawsuits seeking to assert legal rights.
Punitive damages are also thought to have arisen as an additional means of
compensation for such costs as attorney fees and damages from emotional injuries
which historically were not recoverable in court.
The punitive damages decision is a mixture of arguably predictable
components and understandable but unpredictable elements. Jurors’ evaluations of
wrongfulness are based on the conscience of the community. Punitive damages
require jurors to make a qualitative assessment based on a host of facts and
circumstances unique to the particular case before it.
Credibility determinations, weighing of evidence, and drawing
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a reviewing
court. Inferences from admitted evidentiary facts are as much a prerogative of the
fact-finder as inferences as to the credibility of the witnesses. Consequently,
judgments NOV should be granted in limited circumstances.
Evidentiary facts alone should not justify a judgment NOV. Even
though there may be no dispute as to the facts, inferences of ultimate fact could be
drawn from evidentiary facts that raise issues of credibility. Here, inferences from
the facts raised a contested factual issue; namely, a connection between the
understaffing and the dismissal of the plaintiff.
Reviewing courts invade the province of the jury when they size up
the quantum or quality of the evidence or the plausibility of theories. Jury
decisions provide many timely benefits; namely, better quality decisions, better
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sense and understanding and appreciation of the working of the legal system, and
community involvement in the decision. Here, it was reasonable for the jury to
return a punitive damages verdict.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kimbley A. Kearney
Edward M. Kay
Chicago, Illinois
Earl M. McGuire
Bobby Rowe
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
Donald P. Wagner
Stacy E. Miller
Lexington, Kentucky
Anna Whites
Frankfort, Kentucky
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