RICHARDSON (SOLOMON) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 1, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001568-MR
SOLOMON RICHARDSON
APPELLANT
ON REMAND FROM SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY
NO. 2007-SC-000661-DG
v.
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIE REINHARDT WARD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00490
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: THOMPSON AND WINE, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: This appeal is before us on remand from our Supreme
Court for reconsideration in light of its decision in Commonwealth v. Alleman, 306
S.W.3d 484 (Ky. 2010). Upon reconsideration, we affirm.
The facts underlying this case were stated in our previous opinion as
follows:
On September 30, 2004, Richardson was indicted by a
Campbell County grand jury for second-degree forgery
and for operating a motor vehicle on a suspended or
revoked driver’s license. Subsequently, he pled guilty,
and on January 26, 2005, he was sentenced to three
years’ imprisonment which was probated for five years.
Soon thereafter, Richardson’s probation was transferred
to Hamilton County, Ohio.
On May 31, 2006, Tara Giust, a Kentucky probation
officer, signed an affidavit stating that Richardson had
violated a condition of his probation by threatening his
Ohio landlord, Jeff Lewis. Consequently, on July 6,
2006, a probation revocation hearing was held in
Campbell County, Kentucky. The Commonwealth
presented two witnesses to establish that Richardson had
violated a condition of his probation by threatening his
landlord. After calling one witness in his defense,
Richardson testified on his own behalf.
Several days after the revocation hearing, the trial court
issued an order that provided, in pertinent part;
This matter was before the Court on July 7,
20062 for hearing to revoke Defendant's
probation and on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. Counsel for the parties and the
Defendant were present. Based upon the
testimony adduced, argument of counsel and
a review of the record herein, the Court
finds as a matter of fact that the Defendant
has violated the terms and conditions of his
2
The hearing was held on July 6, 2006.
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probation and, thus, concludes as a matter of
law that the Defendant’s probation should be
revoked. Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant's
probation is revoked.
In an opinion rendered on August 17, 2007, this Court reversed and
remanded the probation revocation order of the trial court. We concluded that the
trial court’s failure to adequately set out the evidence relied on and the reasons for
revoking Richardson’s probation violated his due process rights. After the
Commonwealth petitioned the Kentucky Supreme Court for discretionary review,
our Supreme Court ordered the petition to be held in abeyance pending the
outcome of another appeal. Subsequently, on March 18, 2010, our Supreme Court
rendered Commonwealth v. Alleman, 306 S.W.3d 484 (Ky. 2010), and then
remanded the instant case to us for reconsideration in light of its decision in
Alleman.
In Alleman, our Supreme Court held that oral findings and reasons for
revocation stated by the trial court from the bench satisfy a probationer's due
process rights under Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d
484 (1972), which had been previously interpreted to require written findings. Id.
at 484-85. Additionally, the court held that an untranscribed videotape recording,
containing oral findings made from the bench, is constitutionally sufficient, “at
least where, as here, [a reviewing court possesses] a video record that is
sufficiently complete to allow the parties and [court] to determine ‘the evidence
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relied on and the reasons for revoking probation.’” Id. at 487 (quoting Black v.
Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985)).
Here, the trial court issued a written revocation order providing that
Richardson violated “the terms and conditions of his probation.” While the
revocation order did not contain any reference to the specific probation term or
condition violated or to the violative conduct, the trial court’s written findings and
the untranscribed videotape recording of the revocation proceeding are sufficiently
complete to permit the parties and this Court to determine the evidence relied on
and the reasons for revoking Richardson’s probation.
From a review of the videotape recording of the revocation
proceeding, the Commonwealth moved to revoke Richardson’s probation because
it believed that he committed the crime of aggravated menacing under Ohio law.
As a condition of his probation, he was to refrain from violating the laws of
Kentucky, any other state, and the United States. According to testimony at the
hearing, he threatened to kill his landlord, which violated Ohio Revised Code
(O.R.C.) § 2903.21(A). Under this menacing statute, “[n]o person shall knowingly
cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the
person or property of the other person, the other person's unborn, or a member of
the other person's immediate family.” Therefore, the evidence relied on and the
basis of the revocation are clear from the record.
Moreover, our conclusion in this case is consistent with the holdings
in Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1983), and United States v. Smith,
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767 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1985), which were expressly embraced by our Supreme
Court in Alleman. Id. at 487. In the federal cases, the courts were more willing to
reject constitutional due process challenges when only one probation violation was
alleged, which permitted the reviewing court to determine the basis of the trial
court's decision to revoke probation. Morishita, 702 F.2d at 209-10; Smith, 767
F.2d at 524. Therefore, because only one probation violation was alleged in this
case, the record is even more permitting of review to determine the basis of the
trial court’s decision to revoke probation.
Accordingly, we conclude that the untranscribed videotape recording
and the trial court’s written findings, especially considering the fact that only one
probation violation was alleged, are sufficient to satisfy Richardson’s
constitutional due process rights in light of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision
in Alleman.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Campbell Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Julia K. Pearson
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kristin N. Logan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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