CHRISTOPHER A. WILLIAMS v. RACHEL A. CUNNINGHAM
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 19, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000597-ME
CHRISTOPHER A. WILLIAMS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE DONNA DELAHANTY, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 06-J-506-517 AND 06-J-506-838
RACHEL A. CUNNINGHAM
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; LAMBERT, JUDGE; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Christopher Williams appeals from an order granting joint custody
of his daughter, Emily Cunningham, to him and the child's mother, Rachel Cunningham,
but finding it to be in the child's best interest that her primary residence be with her
mother. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the Jefferson Family Court.
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Senior Judge William L. Knopf, sitting as Special Judge by Assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110 (5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Christopher and Rachel are the natural parents of ten-month old, Emily, but
have never been married. Neither party asserts that the other is an unfit parent nor does
either question paternity.
Rachel, who resides with her mother and twenty-three year old brother, has
been Emily's primary caregiver since birth. After initially not being involved in Emily's
life, Christopher began calling Rachel once or twice a week seeking to come by her house
to visit Emily. Rachel allowed access to Emily unless she was breast-feeding or needed
care, and alternative times were always offered in those situations. Christopher never
asked to take Emily away from the house, or for an overnight visit until after the filing of
court proceedings.
On October 27, 2006, Christopher filed a Petition for Paternity, Custody,
and Visitation. A hearing was held on January 10, 2007. At the hearing, Christopher
admitted that he was not comfortable being alone with Emily. Rachel then testified that,
on November 25, 2006, she agreed to drop Emily off at Christopher's house for their first
visit on their own. Christopher, however, did not have the essentials to care for Emily,
i.e. bottles, diapers, wipes, etc. Christopher also failed to listen or follow medication
needs for Emily and ignored Rachel's instructions to properly cover Emily's head and ears
when outdoors.
Based upon the testimony at the hearing, the court determined it to be in
Emily's best interest for the parties to share joint custody but for Emily to primarily reside
with Rachel. Christopher filed a Motion to Amend, Alter, or Vacate the January 30,
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2007, Order, and the court, by a separate one-page Order entered March 7, 2007, granted
the Motion to Alter or Amend, but denied the Motion to Vacate. The court by Amended
Order concluded that Rachel had been the primary provider since birth and that she had
provided a stable and caring environment. The court further determined that although
Christopher had “demonstrated a willingness to care for Emily that he had not provided a
stable environment and seemed to lack insight into the need to plan ahead for the care of
a young infant.” The court then fashioned a parenting plan taking into consideration
among other things the age of the child and the parties' work schedule. This appeal
followed.
In Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2003), the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that a reviewing court may set aside findings of fact in a custody case “only if
those findings are clearly erroneous, i.e., whether or not those findings are supported by
substantial evidence.” Allen v. Devine, 178 S.W.3d 517, 524 (Ky.App. 2005), citing
Moore, 110 S.W.3d at 354. Substantial evidence has been defined by Kentucky courts as
that which, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative value
to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person. Id. Mere doubt as to the
correctness of a finding will not justify its reversal. Id.
After a trial court makes the required findings, it must
then apply the law to the facts. The determination of the
proper law to be applied to the facts is reviewed de novo.
[Furthermore], 'the resulting custody award as determined by
the trial court will not be disturbed unless it constitutes an
abuse of discretion.' 'Abuse of discretion in relation to the
exercise of judicial power implies arbitrary action or
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capricious disposition under the circumstances, at least an
unreasonable and unfair decision.'
Id. (citations omitted).
Christopher presents two arguments: first, that the trial court wrongfully
applied the long-since abolished tender years presumption to determine custody; second,
that the trial court's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree on
both counts.
While the court did state as part of its reasoning that “Emily had spent all of
her young life in the home of a loving, caring mother who is closely bonded to [her],”
this is not tantamount to applying the tender years presumption. The tender years
presumption, which expressed preference for mothers as custodians of young children,
applied only where both parents were found equally fit to raise the child. See Jones v.
Jones, 577 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Ky.App. 1979). The court clearly found that although
“[Christopher] has demonstrated a willingness to care for his daughter...[he] does not
have a stable environment at this time and appears to lack insight into the need to plan
ahead for the care of a very young infant.” The court weighed the testimony it heard and
determined that Christopher was not as fit as Rachel at this time. Therefore, we find no
error.
Christopher's second argument must also fail. He essentially contends that
the court erroneously placed greater weight on the testimony and opinion of Rachel than
on his own testimony and opinions. This Court, however, will not second guess a trial
court that has had the opportunity not only to listen to the testimony of the witnesses but
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also to observe their demeanor when presenting it. Richardson v. Richardson, 18 S.W.2d
387, 390 (Ky. 1949). Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the court's
findings were supported by credible evidence and that none of the findings were clearly
erroneous.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Jefferson Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sammy Deeb
A. Holland Houston
Louisville, Kentucky
Denise M. Helline
Ruck, Wilson, Helline & Brockman,
PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
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