AGNES G. TALBOTT AND JOHN R. TALBOTT v. HON. AUDRA J. ECKERLE; MADELINE TALBOTT; AND JENNIFER LIEBSON
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 21, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000449-MR
AGNES G. TALBOTT AND
JOHN R. TALBOTT
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH E. McDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-001779
HON. AUDRA J. ECKERLE;
MADELINE TALBOTT; AND
JENNIFER LIEBSON
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, KELLER, AND MOORE, JUDGES.
KELLER, JUDGE: Agnes Talbott (Agnes) and John Talbott appeal from the Jefferson
Circuit Court's denial of their request for a writ of mandamus. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm.
FACTS
On October 24, 2005, the Nelson District Court entered a judgment finding
that Agnes was partially disabled in managing her personal affairs and financial
resources. The district court also appointed Madeline Talbott (Madeline) guardian for
Agnes. Pursuant to the judgment and order of appointment, Agnes's rights to dispose of
property, to execute instruments, to enter into contractual relationships, to determine
living arrangements, to consent to medical procedures, and to obtain a motor vehicle
operator's license were placed in Madeline's control. It does not appear from the record
that any appeal was taken from either the judgment or the order of appointment.
Following the entry of the Nelson District Court's judgment and order,
Agnes filed a number of motions, which the court addressed in its October 5, 2006, order.
Because it provides some procedural and factual context to this case, we adopt the
following portions of that order:
In January of 2006 Madeline Talbott placed her mother in
Our Lady of Peace Hospital for a period of time. Upon
Agnes' [sic] release from that hospital, on the advice of
medical professionals, Madeline placed Agnes in Meadows
East Nursing Home and Rehabilitation Center in Louisville,
KY. To simply say that Agnes was unhappy in being placed
at Meadows East would be a gross understatement. Agnes
began filing motions to remove Madeline as her Guardian as
early as March 1, 2006. For various reasons the hearing on
said motions was continued several times. On July 25, 2006
Agnes filed a Pro Se [sic] motion requesting that her case be
transferred to Louisville, Jefferson County, KY. On August
1, 2006 attorney John David Seay filed the same motion
along with a number of additional motions that will be
addressed later in this Opinion and Order. On September 6,
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2006 attorney Seay and attorney Allen Gailor filed a joint
motion asking that the case be transferred to Louisville.
The Court will now address the various motions on which
testimony was taken at the hearing. Agnes' [sic] pro se
motion as well as the motions of her attorneys to transfer
venue of this case from the Nelson District Court to the
Jefferson District Court was previously overruled by Order of
this Court dated September 22, 2006 and entered on
September 25, 2006.
The Defendant's [sic] next motion was to set aside the
appointment of Madeline Talbott as Limited Guardian for
Agnes alleging that the Court failed to give Agnes' [sic]
wishes due consideration when Madeline was named Limited
Guardian. This Court conducted a full hearing on the issue of
the appointment of a Limited Guardian and a Limited
Conservator for Agnes on October 21, 2005. Agnes' [sic]
wishes were once again stated to the Court at that time. The
Court after hearing all the testimony on that date appointed
Madeline Talbott after giving due consideration to the
testimony of Agnes, Madeline Talbott, and John Talbott, a
sibling of Madeline's who also applied to be appointed as
Limited Guardian and Limited Conservator for his mother.
Agnes' [sic] next motion was to set aside the appointment of
Madeline as Limited Guardian because the Court failed to
limit her term of appointment as provided in KRS 387.590(7)
and a companion motion that asked in the alternative that if
the Court failed to set aside the appointment for failure to
limit the term of appointment, that the Court hold a hearing
concerning the appropriate term of appointment. The Court
has previously entered an Order addressing the order of
appointment which did limit the term of appointment of
Limited Guardian to a period of five years which will expire
October 21, 2010. This Order was dated September 19, 2006
and entered on September 20, 2006.
Agnes then moved the Court to allow her to move from her
present location at Meadows East to her home at 207 West
Beall Street in Bardstown KY. She alleges that she is a
virtual prisoner at Meadows East. During the hearing held on
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September 27, 2006 Agnes admitted that she did go out with
friends and family on occasions from Meadows East but
stated that she still felt she should be allowed to go home to
Bardstown and believed that she could properly care for
herself. At the time Agnes testified it was apparent that she
was oriented to time and place and was aware of a number of
current events. However, it was also apparent from her
answers to various questions that Agnes is not competent to
handle her personal affairs or her financial resources at this
time. Agnes suffers from a number of delusions including
one that she has found the cure for the disease of Alzheimers
[sic] which she claims to be the drug lithium. She also claims
to know more about lithium than all doctors and that she
expects to be awarded the Nobel Prize for her finding the cure
to Alzheimers [sic]. She testified she receives $8000.00 a
month in Social Security benefits. When asked by the Court
if she remembered giving $10,000.00 to a handy man shortly
before the Limited Conservatorship was sought she indicated
that she did and felt that it was the right thing to do. This was
not the only instance in which Agnes had been duped out of
money by someone. At the disability trial held on October
20, 2005 Agnes admitted she had bought a car for an
employee at Walmart, because the women [sic] told Agnes
she needed a car. While Agnes and her husband. . . are not
poor people they don't appear to have the financial means to
make gifts of this size to people who would not qualify as a
family member or a close personal acquaintance of the
Talbott's.
It is apparent that Agnes, even if capable of doing so, would
not take medications as prescribed. This is based upon
Agnes' [sic] testimony that she knows better than the doctors
when it comes to various medicines. Agnes also is not
capable of driving a car due to her belief that she does not
have to stop for stop signs if she doesn't want to stop.
According to Agnes, a policeman told her she did not have to
stop if no other cars were at the intersection. When asked
about this she simply laughed and stated [sic] "Well, this is
Bardstown."
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The Court finds that Agnes is not capable of living
independently nor is she capable of managing her financial
affairs at this time.
Therefore, the premises considered, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, the above described motions of Agnes Talbott,
are overruled.
Agnes did not appeal from this order, choosing instead to file a petition for termination or
modification of guardianship and conservatorship in Jefferson District Court. In her
petition, Agnes stated that she had undergone a preliminary and cursory examination by a
psychiatrist who determined that she "is probably capable of making informed decisions
in her personal affairs and in her financial affairs, with such advice and assistance as she
is fully capable of obtaining voluntarily, and, therefore, she is not now partially disabled."
Although we cannot locate a copy of that petition in the record containing an entry date
by the clerk, it appears that it was filed on or near February 5, 2007. At that time, Agnes
also filed a motion for an interdisciplinary evaluation report and a motion for jury trial.
We note that these pleadings were filed just three months after the Nelson District Court's
finding that Agnes lacked the capacity to manage her personal or financial affairs and
denied her request to transfer venue to Jefferson District Court.
On February 15, 2007, the Jefferson District Court denied Agnes's petition
and motions and dismissed her case. In doing so, the Jefferson District Court found that
it lacked jurisdiction and noted that the Nelson District Court had previously issued an
order "regarding jurisdiction and venue." Agnes then filed a petition for mandamus with
the Jefferson Circuit Court. In that petition, Agnes argued that she is involuntarily
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confined at Meadows East Rehabilitation and Care Center (Meadows East); that the
Jefferson District Court properly had jurisdiction; that Jefferson District Court was the
proper venue for her action; that she had no adequate remedy by way of appeal; that the
Jefferson District Court should be ordered to schedule the requested interdisciplinary
evaluation and to hold the requested jury trial; and that the Jefferson District Court judge
who ruled against Agnes should not be permitted to sit on the case. The Jefferson Circuit
Court dismissed Agnes's petition for mandamus noting, in pertinent part, that the proper
mechanism for relief was an appeal, not mandamus. Furthermore, the circuit court noted
that Agnes could pursue her motion to terminate or modify guardianship/conservatorship
in the Nelson District Court. It is from this order that Agnes appeals.1
In her appeal, Agnes argues that the Jefferson Circuit Court erred when it
dismissed her petition for mandamus. In support of her position, Agnes argues that
mandamus was appropriate because appeal is not an "adequate remedy." Furthermore,
Agnes argues that the Jefferson District Court was a proper forum for her action, and that
she was not required to return to the Nelson District Court. We disagree as to Agnes's
first argument; therefore, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To prevail in this appeal, the appellant must
demonstrate that the circuit court abused its discretion when it
denied the petition for writ of mandamus. Cf. Rowley v.
1
We note that Agnes filed a motion for immediate intermediate relief with this Court, which
this Court denied. Agnes G. Talbott; et al. v. Hon. Audra J. Eckerle; et al., 2007-CA-000449MR (March 6, 2007). In doing so, this Court noted that Agnes could have filed an appeal from
the Jefferson District Court's order of dismissal and that Agnes had failed to demonstrate why
that mechanism of redress was not adequate.
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Lampe, Ky., 331 S.W.2d 887 (1960). This court will not
determine the merits of the motion filed by the appellant in
the district court; rather, we will confine ourselves to the
question of whether the circuit court abused its discretion in
failing to direct the district court to rule on the pending
motion. “Mandamus is a proper remedy to compel an inferior
court to adjudicate on a subject within its jurisdiction where it
neglects or refuses to do so, but will not lie to revise or
correct a decision.” Hargis v. Swope, 272 Ky. 257, 114
S.W.2d 75, 77 (1938), citing J.B.B. Coal Co. v. Halbert, 169
Ky. 687, 184 S.W. 1116 (1916).
Owens v. Williams, 955 S.W.2d 196, 197 (Ky.App. 1997).
ANALYSIS
With the above standard in mind, we must address whether the Jefferson
Circuit Court abused its discretion when it dismissed Agnes's petition for a writ of
mandamus. In the appropriate situation, a litigant may obtain a writ of mandamus as set
forth in CR 81. However, "[a] writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which
should only be granted in cases where, if it was not, the moving party would suffer great
and irreparable injury." Owens Chevrolet v. Fowler, 951 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Ky. 1997).
A writ of mandamus is not appropriate "when a movant has another adequate remedy
available to him." Id. at 582.
The Jefferson Circuit Court pointed out, in pertinent part, that Agnes had
other adequate remedies available, namely an appeal from the Jefferson District Court's
order. Agnes argues that an alternative remedy was not adequate because an appeal to
the circuit court would have been too time consuming, the appellate process does not
provide for expediting an appeal, and any delay would have negated all of Agnes's
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discovery. However, we note that the Jefferson District Court stopped all discovery;
therefore, no discovery could have occurred and no discovery could have been negated.
Furthermore, although CR 72 does not specifically provide a mechanism for expediting
an appeal from the district court to the circuit court, it does not specifically prohibit a
litigant from requesting an expedited appeal. Finally, we note that Agnes has stated
repeatedly throughout the record that she is "incarcerated" at Meadows East and that
delay in freeing her from this incarceration amounts to "inexorable irreparable harm."
However, Agnes's testimony before the Nelson District Court that she "did go out with
friends and family on occasions from Meadows East" negates her statements that she is
incarcerated. Therefore, any delay that may have resulted from an appeal would not
result in inexorable, irreparable harm. Because Agnes had a viable alternative to seeking
a writ of mandamus, we hold that the Jefferson Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion
when it dismissed Agnes's petition for such a writ.
We need not address whether Agnes was free to pursue an action in
Jefferson District Court, as that is an issue for the circuit court to address on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Jefferson Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed
Agnes's petition for a writ of mandamus because Agnes had a viable alternative avenue of
redress; an appeal to the circuit court. Therefore, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court
order.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
Alex F. Talbott
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE MADELINE
TALBOTT:
Daniel M. Oyler
Louisville, Kentucky
NO BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES HON.
AUDRA J. ECKERLE AND JENNIFER
LIEBSON
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