NORMAN LEE BAIRD v. HONORABLE SHEILA NUNLEY FARRIS, FAMILY JUDGE SHIRLEY D. BAIRD
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 7, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000259-ME
NORMAN LEE BAIRD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM UNION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA NUNLEY FARRIS, FAMILY JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-D-00028-002
SHIRLEY D. BAIRD
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, Norman Baird, appeals pro se from an order of the Union
Family Court reissuing a Domestic Violence Order (“DVO”) against him. Finding no
error, we affirm.
Norman and Shirley Baird were married and lived together for 34 years
until they separated in April 1997, following an incident during which Norman threw
Shirley against a shower wall and held a gun to her head. Shirley moved out of the
1
Senior Judge J. William Graves sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
marital residence and into an apartment in Morgantown, Kentucky. The parties thereafter
divorced.
In April 1998, a DVO was issued against Norman after he threatened to kill
Shirley and all of her fellow employees at the Union County Courthouse, where she is
employed as a deputy circuit court clerk. After the DVO expired in April 2001, Norman
again engaged in threatening behavior against Shirley, including following her to work,
driving around her residence and following her when she went to visit her mother in a
nursing home. In December 2002, Shirley filed a petition for a second DVO. The family
court entered a DVO against Norman on February 18, 2003, to remain in effect until
February 17, 2006.
On February 1, 2006, Shirley filed a motion to extend the DVO for an
additional three years. After a brief hearing, the family court extended the DVO until
February 17, 2009. Norman thereafter appealed to this Court.
In an unpublished opinion rendered December 1, 2006, a panel of this
Court vacated the DVO and remanded the case for further proceedings. Without making
any conclusions as to whether the evidence would ultimately support the reissuance of
the DVO, the majority noted,
[W]e are somewhat troubled by the brevity of the reissuance
hearing conducted by the family court. From our review of
that hearing, it appears that the only ground given by Shirley
for the reissuance of the DVO was that her life had been
“much more peaceful” over the past three years. While this is
undoubtedly true and an important consideration in the family
court's determination, we are hesitant to conclude that this
-2-
ground - standing alone - is sufficient to support the renewal
of a DVO.
...
We have recently emphasized the “enormous
significance” of DVO petitions, [Wright v. Wright, 181
S.W.3d 49, 52 (Ky. App. 2005)], and we reiterate that
significance here. We are simply not convinced that the
family court gave proper consideration to the restrictiveness
of a DVO or all of the facts and circumstances surrounding
this case before rendering its decision. Accordingly, we are
compelled to vacate the reissued DVO and remand this case
for a new hearing taking into full account the [Kingrey v.
Whitlow, 150 S.W.3d 67 (Ky. App. 2004)] and Wright
opinions . . . .
Judge Wine dissented, opining that the family court acted within its discretion in
reissuing the DVO pursuant to KRS 403.750(2).
On remand, the family court held a second hearing on January 8, 2007,
after which it reissued the DVO to remain in effect until 2009. Norman again appeals to
this Court arguing that there is no evidence to support the DVO.
A DVO may be entered by a court after a full evidentiary hearing "if it
finds from a preponderance of the evidence that an act or acts of domestic violence and
abuse have occurred or may again occur . . . ." KRS 403.750(1). The preponderance of
the evidence standard is met when sufficient evidence establishes that the alleged victim
"was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence." Commonwealth
v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996). Subsection (2) of KRS 403.750
authorizes the reissuance of a DVO, and provides:
-3-
Any order entered pursuant to this section shall be effective
for a period of time, fixed by the court, not to exceed three (3)
years and may be reissued upon expiration for an additional
period of up to three (3) years. The number of times an order
may be reissued shall not be limited. With respect to whether
an order should be reissued, any party may present to the
court testimony relating to the importance of the fact that acts
of domestic violence or abuse have not occurred during the
pendency of the order.
In Kingrey v. Whitlow, 150 S.W.3d 67, 70 (Ky. App. 2004), a panel of this
Court interpreted KRS 403.750(2) as granting courts the "authority to reissue DVOs even
in the absence of additional acts of domestic violence and abuse during the prior period."
We further noted,
Contrary to the circuit court's interpretation, we do not read
the statute as requiring proof of additional acts of domestic
violence or abuse during the prior period before a DVO may
be reissued. Rather, the statute makes it clear that testimony
that such acts did not occur may be presented for the court's
consideration in determining whether or not to reissue the
order.
...
In addition to the language in the statute itself, we conclude it
is logical to believe that the legislature intended to give the
district courts authority to reissue DVOs even in the absence
of additional acts of domestic violence and abuse during the
prior period. The domestic violence and abuse statutes are to
be interpreted by the courts to allow victims to obtain
protection against further violence and abuse. See KRS
403.715(1). If a DVO has been effective in giving protection
to a victim of domestic violence and abuse, then the district
court should not be required to reject a request to extend the
effective period of the DVO simply because no additional
acts have occurred. In other words, the fact that a DVO has
been effective in preventing acts of domestic violence and
abuse is not a reason to require the court to remove the
-4-
protection that had previously been afforded to the victim.
Rather, it is merely a factor for the court to consider when
faced with a request to reissue the DVO.
Id. at 69-70.
Although the statute does not require evidence of additional acts of
domestic violence to warrant the reissuance of a DVO, the panel on the prior appeal
herein was persuaded by Judge Knopf's concurring opinion in Kingrey, supra, wherein he
commented, "It is important to remember that a person subject to a DVO is placed under
significant restrictions. Consequently, a DVO should not be renewed merely at the
request of the petitioning party. Rather, there must be some showing of a continuing
need for the DVO." Id. at 70.
During the 2007 hearing, the family court in this case heard testimony from
several witnesses, including both Norman and Shirley. At the conclusion of the evidence,
the court found from a preponderance of the evidence that there was a continuing need
for the DVO. Although Norman denies any acts of abuse,2 the family court found
substantial evidence that Shirley had been the victim of extensive domestic violence
during the parties' marriage. And Norman's conduct after the marriage continued to be
such that Shirley lived in fear of what he would do. The family court commented that
when the first DVO expired in 2001, Norman again began harassing Shirley to the extent
that a second DVO was issued. Further, the court expressed concern over the fact that
when this Court issued its opinion in December 2006, Norman immediately attempted to
2
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wine expressed concern that Norman “denies past abuse even
though he pled guilty to two counts of terroristic threatening. He accuses his [ex]-wife of
abusing the system and he minimizes the value of a DVO.”
-5-
retrieve his guns from the local sheriff's office, even before the family court had received
notice that the DVO had been vacated.
In making its ruling, the family court stated that it had considered the
Wright and Kingrey decisions, and we conclude that it did so. Although the court
disagreed with Norman's argument that the DVO was punitive, it acknowledged that the
order placed restrictions on Norman's life. Even though it determined that the DVO was
still warranted, the family court agreed with Norman that such should not prevent him
from having contact with his grandson. As such, the court included an exception in the
DVO to permit Norman to attend any function in which his grandson was a participant.
Clearly, the family court was familiar with the history of the parties, and
was within its authority to weigh the testimony, make credibility judgments, and
conclude that the evidence supported the reissuance of the DVO. See Reichle v. Reichle,
719 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. 1986). We are of the opinion that the evidence presented during
the hearing established sufficient grounds, other than simply Shirley's peace of mind, to
reissue the DVO. Since the court's finding is supported by sufficient evidence and is not
clearly erroneous, we affirm its decision.
The Union Family Court's reissuance of the Domestic Violence Order is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Norman Lee Baird, Pro Se
Sturgis, Kentucky
Shirley Baird, Pro Se
Morganfield, Kentucky
-6-
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.