RICHARD D. BISSELL v. LORI BAUMGARDNER
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RENDERED: AUGUST 24, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002574-ME
RICHARD D. BISSELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY NEIL PHILPOT, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-D-00686-001
LORI BAUMGARDNER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: THOMPSON AND WINE, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE: Richard D. Bissell appeals from a November 13, 2006 order of the
Fayette Circuit Court granting a Domestic Violence Order (DVO) to Lori Baumgardner
and also awarding temporary custody of the parties’ child to her. Bissell contends that
the trial judge should have recused himself due to bias, that the court’s findings that
domestic violence had occurred were not supported by substantial evidence, and that the
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Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
court lacked personal and subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the DVO and the temporary
custody award. We find no error on any of these points. However, we conclude that the
DVO should clearly reflect that the temporary custody award was pursuant to the court’s
temporary emergency jurisdiction and was without prejudice to any custody proceeding
in an appropriate jurisdiction. Hence, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
entry of an amended DVO.
Bissell and Baumgardner were married in 2000. At the time of the
marriage, Baumgardner had one child from a previous marriage. In late 2000, the parties
had a child together, R.L.B. The family resided in Kentucky until 2005, when they
moved to Utah.
On June 30, 2006, Baumgardner and the two children returned to Kentucky
to visit her family. Several days later, Baumgardner told Bissell that neither she nor
R.L.B. would be returning to Utah. Sometime thereafter, Bissell filed a dissolution action
in Utah.
The current controversy stems from an incident which occurred on August
13, 2006. Several days earlier, Bissell picked up R.L.B. and took him to a family
gathering in Ohio. He returned R.L.B. to Baumgardner on August 13. According to
Baumgardner’s petition:
[Bissell] came into my apartment while dropping off our son
[R.L.B.]. He said he wants to shoot my whole family and he
wants to shoot me “in the face.” He said if I don’t agree to
give him the amount of money he wants out of the house in
UT he is going to hurt me. He said he does not make threats,
he just does it. There is a history of severe verbal abuse
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toward me and the boys. There has also been past physical
abuse toward my oldest son . . . .
On September 5, Baumgardner filed a domestic violence petition on behalf
of herself and the two children. Based on the allegations in the ex parte petition, the
circuit court granted an emergency protective order (EPO) restraining Bissell from
further acts of domestic violence, from further contact with Baumgardner or the children,
and from disposing of or damaging any property of the parties. The EPO also granted
Baumgardner temporary custody of the children and directed Bissell to pay temporary
child support.
The matter was scheduled for a hearing on September 19. Prior to the
hearing, Bissell filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Kentucky lacked jurisdiction over
him and the subject matter. The parties appeared for the hearing before Judge Kim
Bunnell. Judge Bunnell noted that Baumgardner was accompanied by her stepfather,
former Fayette Circuit Judge Charles Tackett. Judge Bunnell stated on the record that,
while she did not know Baumgardner, she knew and respected Judge Tackett. Based on
this information, Bissell asked Judge Bunnell to recuse herself and requested appointment
of a special judge. Judge Bunnell granted the motion to recuse. By agreement of the
parties, the court extended the EPO to allow appointment of a special judge.
The matter was referred to the chief regional judge, who randomly assigned
the case to Judge Timothy Philpot. Bissell filed a new motion to recuse Judge Philpot,
arguing that the matter should be assigned to a judge from outside Fayette County. In
addition, Bissell asserted that, before his service on the bench, Judge Philpot had been a
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law partner with a close friend of Judge Tackett. In addition, Bissell also noted that
Judge Tackett had contributed to Judge Philpot’s judicial campaign. Bissell asserted that
this prior relationship created an appearance of partiality requiring Judge Philpot to
recuse himself. Judge Philpot denied the motion to recuse, explaining that he had never
had any relationship with Judge Tackett outside of court, and that he had no knowledge
as to whether Judge Tackett had contributed to his campaign.
The court, with the agreement of the parties, again extended the EPO until
the scheduled evidentiary hearing on November 13, 2006. After hearing the testimony of
both Baumgardner and Bissell, the trial court granted the DVO. The court found that
there had been an act of domestic violence and that Baumgardner was fearful of
imminent physical injury. The court ordered the parties to have no violent contact, but
did not prohibit all contact. In addition, the court did not include R.L.B. or
Baumgardner’s other child within the scope of the DVO. The DVO includes the form
language requiring Bissell to surrender any firearms and his concealed-carry license. The
court also granted Baumgardner temporary custody of R.L.B., subject to later
adjudication in the concurrent Utah divorce proceeding. Bissell now appeals from this
order.
As an initial matter, Bissell contends that Judge Philpot was required to
recuse himself. KRS 26A.015(2) requires recusal when a judge has “personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party . . .” or “has knowledge of any other circumstances in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” KRS 26A.015(2)(a) and (e); see SCR
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4.300, Canon 3C(1). “The burden of proof required for recusal of a trial judge is an
onerous one.” Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 794 (Ky. 2001). “There must
be a showing of facts ‘of a character calculated seriously to impair the judge’s
impartiality and sway his judgment.”’ Id., citing Foster v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.2d
759, 760 (Ky. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 993, 82 S. Ct. 613, 7 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1962);
Johnson v. Ducobu, 258 S.W.2d 509 (Ky. 1953).
Bissell has failed to make any showing that Judge Philpot’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. “The mere belief that the judge will not afford a fair and
impartial trial is not sufficient grounds for recusal.” Stopher, 57 S.W.3d at 794-95, citing
Webb v. Commonwealth, 904 S.W.2d 226 (Ky. 1995). Likewise, the mere fact that
Baumgardner is related by marriage to a long-retired Fayette Circuit Court judge is not a
sufficient basis to require recusal of all Fayette County judges. Furthermore, a judge is
not required to disqualify himself or herself based solely on an allegation that a litigant or
counsel for a litigant has made a legal campaign contribution to the political campaign of
the trial judge. Dean v. Bondurant, 193 S.W.3d 744, 748 (Ky. 2006).
In addition, we find no basis for Bissell’s allegation that Judge Philpot’s
conduct during the hearing demonstrated bias. Bissell first asserts that Judge Philpot
unreasonably excluded the testimony of his expert witness. However, the trial court’s
adverse ruling, even if erroneous, does not provide a basis for finding bias. Moreover,
the testimony of the psychologist who evaluated Bissell after the incident had only
limited relevance to the issues before the court. Since Bissell does not appeal from the
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court’s order excluding the testimony, we cannot find that the court’s ruling was
erroneous, much less that it demonstrated improper bias.
Finally, our review of the record discloses no evidence that Judge Philpot
was biased against Bissell or that he prejudged the merits of the case. The first entry date
on the DVO appears to be merely a clerical error. The court made its factual findings and
entered the DVO after the evidentiary hearing on November 13, 2006. And upon
reviewing the record, we find that the court’s conduct of the evidentiary hearing was
entirely appropriate. The court allowed both parties considerable latitude in crossexamination. While the court engaged in some independent questioning of Bissell, those
questions were only to clarify certain aspects of his testimony and did not demonstrate
any improper partiality against Bissell.
Moreover, the court’s questions were entirely relevant to the issues raised in
the petition. A court may enter a DVO “if it finds from a preponderance of the evidence
that an act or acts of domestic violence and abuse have occurred and may again occur
. . . .” KRS 403.750(1). The preponderance of the evidence standard is met when
sufficient evidence establishes that the alleged victim “was more likely than not to have
been a victim of domestic violence.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278
(Ky. 1996).
The trial court noted this was a very close case and essentially came down
to a credibility determination. Bissell focused heavily on Baumgardner’s delay in
seeking the EPO and the fact that there had been no previous allegations of domestic
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violence during the marriage. While these are relevant factors to assess the credibility of
an allegation of domestic violence, they are not necessarily controlling. In the end, the
court found Baumgardner to be more credible than Bissell. The
trier of fact has the right to believe the evidence presented by
one litigant in preference to another. The trier of fact may
believe any witness in whole or in part. The trier of fact may
take into consideration all the circumstances of the case,
including the credibility of the witness.
Anderson, 934 S.W.2d at 278 (internal citations omitted). Given the evidence presented,
the trial court’s credibility determination was not clearly erroneous. Moore v. Asente,
110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).
Bissell primarily argues that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over
him and subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the DVO. We disagree. The Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), codified in Kentucky at KRS
403.800 to 403.880, governs jurisdiction in determinations involving custody of a child.
On the other hand, a Kentucky court has jurisdiction to enter an EPO or DVO to “[a]ny
family member or member of an unmarried couple who is a resident of this state or has
fled to this state to escape domestic violence and abuse . . . .” KRS 403.725(1). Unlike
the residency requirements to establish home-state jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, there
is no minimum time period to establish residency for a protective order. Spencer v.
Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14, 17 (Ky.App. 2006). Since Baumgardner had clearly reestablished her residency in Kentucky, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to
enter the DVO.
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We further find that Kentucky properly exercised personal jurisdiction over
Bissell. Kentucky has adopted a three-prong test to determine personal jurisdiction. See
Wilson v. Case, 85 S.W.3d 589 (Ky. 2002).
The first prong of the test asks whether the defendant
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of acting within
the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state.
The second prong considers whether the cause of action arises
from the alleged in-state activities. The final prong requires
such connections to the state as to make jurisdiction
reasonable.
Id. at 593, citing Tube Turns Div. of Chemetron Corp. v. Patterson Co., Inc., 562 S.W.2d
99, 100 (Ky.App. 1978). “Each of these three criteria represents a separate requirement,
and jurisdiction will lie only where all three are satisfied.” Id., citing LAK, Inc. v. Deer
Creek Enterprises, 885 F.2d 1293, 1303 (6th Cir.1989). See also Spencer, 191 S.W.3d at
16-17. In this case, Bissell made the alleged threat to Baumgardner in Kentucky, thus
satisfying all three elements.
However, the court’s additional order awarding temporary custody of
R.L.B. to Baumgardner does implicate the UCCJEA. The parties agree that R.L.B.
resided in Utah for eleven months prior to returning to Kentucky. And at the time of the
DVO hearing, R.L.B. had been in Kentucky for less than six months. Furthermore, there
was a pending dissolution and custody proceeding in Utah. As a result, Utah remained
the child’s home state, KRS 403.800(7), and the custody determination was subject to the
Utah courts. KRS 403.822(1)(a).
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But as noted above, the trial court’s oral ruling indicates that its custody
award was temporary and subject to later adjudication in the Utah proceeding. However,
the trial court made this ruling orally; the written and entered DVO does not reflect these
qualifiers. Nevertheless, Baumgardner also points out that Kentucky courts have
temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA “if the child is present in this state
and . . . it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling
or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” KRS
403.828(1). Baumgardner argues that the court properly granted her temporary custody
of R.L.B. given its finding that Bissell made threats of domestic violence against her.
We agree. Since the court found that Bissell’s allegations of threats of
domestic violence were substantiated, the court properly exercised temporary emergency
jurisdiction to award temporary custody of R.L.B. to Baumgardner. Furthermore, the
court’s exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction does not impinge upon the superior
jurisdiction of the Utah courts to make the final custody jurisdiction. See KRS 403.824;
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-202. But to avoid any possible confusion, the DVO should be
amended to reflect that the Fayette Circuit Court made the temporary custody award
pursuant to its temporary emergency jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the DVO entered by the Fayette Circuit Court on November
13, 2006, is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for entry of an amended
order as set forth in this opinion.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Richard D. Bissell, pro se
Herriman, Utah
Carl D. Devine
Micah E. Salsman
Lexington, Kentucky
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