JAMES ROBERT MCDANIEL, II v. MICHELLE MAUPIN
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002458-ME
JAMES ROBERT MCDANIEL, II
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CASEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES G. WEDDLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00126
MICHELLE MAUPIN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, LAMBERT AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
STUMBO, JUDGE: James Robert McDaniel, II appeals from findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order of the Casey Circuit Court in an action filed by Michelle
Maupin seeking a child custody order. James argues that the Casey Circuit Court
improperly exercised jurisdiction in the matter after being informed that James had
previously filed a similar petition in Scott Circuit Court. He maintains that the principles
of priority and comity should have operated to vest jurisdiction with the Scott Circuit
Court rather than the Casey Circuit Court, and that the Casey Circuit Court improperly
failed to abate the Casey County proceeding. For the reasons stated below, we find no
error.
Michelle Maupin gave birth to Ashlee McDaniel out of wedlock on
December 8, 2003. A DNA test subsequently proved James to be Ashlee’s father.
Ashlee lived with Michelle in Scott County, and Michelle served as Ashlee’s primary
caregiver. Though no formal visitation schedule was established, James and/or his
mother took care of Ashlee from time to time. The record indicates that Michelle began
residing in Casey County in April 2005, and shortly thereafter married Jamey Maupin
with whom she, Ashlee and Ashlee’s sister now reside.
On June 27, 2006, James filed a petition in Scott Circuit Court seeking
custody of Ashlee. Three days later on June 30, 2006, Michelle filed a similar petition in
Casey Circuit Court also seeking custody. Each petition proceeded toward adjudication,
with the Casey County matter moving at a faster pace. James’ petition reached the
Domestic Relations Commissioner (“DRC”), who found that since April or May 2005,
Ashlee spent more than 50% of her time in Scott County, that the Scott County action
was the senior action, and that the venue issue should be decided by Scott Circuit Court.
While the Scott County action was pending, the Casey County action
continued and reached finality. Shortly before the final order was rendered in the Casey
County action, James filed a motion in the Casey Circuit Court proceeding seeking to
abate the action based on the Scott Circuit Court DRC Report rendered on October 4,
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2006, which was confirmed by order of the Scott Circuit Court on October 16, 2006.
The motion was denied by way of an order rendered on October 27, 2006.
On October 30, 2006, the Casey Circuit Court rendered the findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order from which James now appeals. The court found in
relevant part that the proper venue for the action was Casey Circuit Court. It went on to
order that joint custody, care and control of Ashlee was awarded to James and Michelle,
with Michelle designated the primary residential custodian. As a basis for the finding
that Casey County was the proper venue, the court pointed to “undisputed clear and
convincing evidence” that Ashlee permanently resided in Casey County since April 2005.
James now appeals from the October 30, 2006, findings of fact, conclusions
of law and order. He maintains that the Scott Circuit Court - a court of competent
jurisdiction presiding over a senior action - has both a right and duty to dispose of the
venue issue. He notes that Michelle’s Casey County action - having been filed three days
later - was the junior action, and that the principles of priority and comity should operate
to bar the Casey Circuit Court from acting in a matter contrary to that of the Scott County
proceeding. In response, Michelle argues that the evidence clearly shows that Ashlee has
permanently resided in Casey County since April 2005, and that there is no question but
that the child’s county of residence is the proper venue for adjudicating a petition to
establish custody.
We have closely studied the record, the written arguments and the law, and
find no basis to overturn the order of the trial court. The matter before us is primarily a
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question of venue, and there appears to be no statutory guideline for the resolution of
questions of venue in child custody proceedings. Rather, the courts have employed
practical or “common sense” tests to resolve these issues. In Hummeldorf v.
Hummeldorf, 616 S.W.2d 794 (Ky.App. 1981)1, a panel of the Court of Appeals stated,
In Shumaker, the parties disputed the proper forum for
modification of an existing child custody decree. The two
courts involved were the circuit court which granted the
original decree and the circuit court of the county where the
parties had subsequently moved and lived at the time the
modification was sought. The Shumaker decision approved
the assumption of jurisdiction by the latter court. The
following factors were considered there and would be
relevant in cases like the one on appeal: (1) the county of the
parties’ marital residence prior to separation; (2) the usual
residence of the children, if any; (3) accessibility of witnesses
and the economy of offering proof.
Similarly, in Wallace v. Wallace, --- S.W.3d ----, 2007 WL 1378149
(Ky.App. 2007) (rendered May 11, 2007; to be published), a panel of this Court
determined that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)
- which addresses interstate custody disputes - could be useful in determining the venue
of intrastate custody and visitation proceedings. Citing Lancaster v. Lancaster, 738
S.W.2d 116 (Ky.App. 1987), the Wallace court reaffirmed that venue should be found
with the “more convenient and most interested forum.”
When we apply Hummeldorf, Lancaster, and Wallace to the facts at bar,
there is little doubt but that the Casey Circuit Court was a proper venue for adjudicating
the custody and visitation issues. Testimony was adduced that Michelle and Ashlee
1
Abrogated on other grounds.
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established their permanent residence in Casey County in April 2005, where they now
reside with Michelle’s husband. The record also indicates that Ashlee’s sister, babysitter
and the extended family of her step-father are permanent residents of Casey County.
The Casey Circuit Court found this evidence to be both “clear and convincing” and
“unrebutted,” and it constitutes a proper basis for the court’s implicit determination that
Casey County was the “more convenient and most interested forum.” Wallace, supra.
And finally, the Hummeldorf court noted that the circuit court is vested with discretion in
matters of venue. It stated that, “a circuit court can proceed when it is the most
convenient forum, and when necessary can thwart the efforts of a party to establish an
unrealistic or burdensome forum.” Hummeldorf at 798. Since substantial evidence is
contained in the record to support the court’s finding that Ashlee permanently resides in
Casey County, and because the case law allows for venue to be found in the more
convenient and most interested forum, we find no error on this issue.
We acknowledge that James’ argument addressing the principles of priority
and comity is not without merit, as those principles serve to promote judicial economy
and avoid duplicate and possibly conflicting rulings. See generally, Riddle v. Howard,
357 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1962). Fortunately, there is no evidence in the record that the Scott
Circuit Court proceeding produced a conflicting result (or any result, for that matter), and
James’ argument on this issue does not form a basis for tampering with the order on
appeal.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the findings of fact, conclusions of
law and order of the Casey Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Theodore H. Lavit
Lebanon, Kentucky
Greg Dunn
Liberty, Kentucky
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