KENNETH BRAD WESTBAY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 26, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002109-MR
KENNETH BRAD WESTBAY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN K. MERSHON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-001044
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL, STUMBO, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Kenneth Brad Westbay (“Westbay”) entered a conditional guilty
plea pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09 in the Jefferson
Circuit Court to the charges of possession of a controlled substance, first degree,1 and
being a persistent felony offender in the second degree (PFO II).2 He received a sentence
of six years imprisonment, and was probated for a period of five years. Within the guilty
plea, Westbay reserved the right to appeal the circuit court's denial of his motion to
suppress. It is from this denial that he appeals and for the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1415.
2
KRS 532.080.
In the early morning hours of June 20, 2005, officers from the Louisville
Metro Police Department entered Portland Beer Depot3 during a routine drug and alcohol
inspection. Police had received several complaints about prostitution and drug trafficking
occurring in the immediate vicinity of the bar. The officers were clearly identifiable as
law enforcement personnel as they were wearing police vests and badges. When the
officers entered the pool room at the rear of the bar, only two men were present, one of
whom was Westbay. Upon seeing Detective Timothy Murphy (“Detective Murphy”),
Westbay attempted to leave through an emergency exit. Detective Murphy attempted to
stop Westbay for questioning, but Westbay physically resisted the detective. Once he
was subdued, Detective Murphy placed Westbay in handcuffs.
During a subsequent pat-down for weapons, Detective Murphy felt
something in Westbay's front pocket. Without prompting from the officers, Westbay
spontaneously stated “it's cocaine.” Officer Derrick Payne then escorted Westbay to the
front of the building where he removed a plastic baggie of suspected cocaine from
Westbay's pocket. Westbay was then placed under arrest for possession of cocaine.
Based upon these facts, a Jefferson County grand jury indicted Westbay on March 30,
2005, for possession of a controlled substance in the first degree and for being a
persistent felony offender in the second degree.
On August 1, 2005, Westbay filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized
from him on the basis that Detective Murphy did not have “articulable suspicion that
3
According to the record, Portland Beer Depot is a tavern/bar located on Pflanz Avenue in
Louisville.
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criminal activity may be afoot and that [Westbay] may have been armed and dangerous
so as to justify a Terry4 stop and frisk.” The trial court held a hearing on the motion at
which only Detective Murphy testified. His testimony regarding the incident paralleled
the facts set forth above. After considering the parties' briefs on the issue, the trial court
entered a written order on October 28, 2005, denying the motion to suppress. On
November 2, 2005, Westbay filed a motion to reconsider the October 28, 2005, order
denying suppression of the evidence, which the trial court denied by written order entered
on December 12, 2005.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Westbay entered his conditional guilty plea
on July 14, 2006, specifically reserving therein the right to appeal from the denial of his
suppression motion. On August 29, 2006, Westbay was sentenced, pursuant to the
Commonwealth's recommendation, to three years on the possession charge, enhanced to
six years by the PFO II charge, with the sentence being probated for a period of five
years. Westbay timely appealed his conviction to this Court solely on the basis of the
denial of his suppression motion.
The standard for our review is set forth in Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Under that decision, the
determination of a circuit court regarding a suppression motion based on an alleged
illegal search is subject to a two-pronged analysis. First, historical facts should be
reviewed for clear error, and the facts are deemed to be conclusive if supported by
4
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
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substantial evidence. Second, determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause
are mixed questions of law and fact and are therefore subject to de novo review. See also
Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Ky.App. 2003). Furthermore, we
are bound to give “due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges
and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699.
In the case at bar, Westbay contends the circuit court erred in denying his
suppression motion because his interaction with the police officers was in violation of the
Fourth Amendment5 search and seizure protections and the guidance set forth in Terry.
Pursuant to Ornelas, we shall first address the historical facts for clear error and then
consider the circuit court's determination of reasonable suspicion and probable cause.
Detective Murphy presented uncontroverted testimony at the suppression
hearing regarding the historical facts recited herein. Upon review of the record, we find
the circuit court took all of the evidence into account, including the supplemental briefs
presented by the parties, prior to making a decision. If substantial evidence appears in
the record to support the circuit court's findings, even if there is conflicting evidence, the
decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky.
2003); Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920 (Ky.App. 2002); Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 52.01. Moreover, “judging the credibility of witnesses and weighing
5
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”
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evidence are tasks within the exclusive province of the trial court.” Moore, supra at 354
(citing Bowling v. Natural Resources & Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d
406 (Ky.App. 1994)). We find the historical facts relied upon by the circuit court were
supported by substantial evidence and are therefore not clearly erroneous. Thus, the facts
are conclusive.
Next we must inquire as to the propriety of the Circuit Court's
determination of the existence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. When making
such a determination, the “totality of the circumstances--the whole picture--must be taken
into account. Based upon that whole picture, the detaining officers must have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621
(1981). In United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740
(2002), it was held that such a “process allows officers to draw on their own experience
and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative
information available to them that might well elude an untrained person” [internal
quotation marks omitted] [citations omitted].
Detective Murphy testified there had been several citizen complaints made
to law enforcement regarding criminal activity occurring in the immediate vicinity of the
Portland Beer Depot. Based upon this information, officers decided to check the
premises for such activity. Detective Murphy testified Westbay immediately attempted
to flee the area when he saw the officers, thereby raising the officer's suspicions of
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possible criminal activity. Further, based upon Westbay's continued efforts to vacate the
premises and “get away” from the officers, Detective Murphy became fearful Westbay
might be armed with a weapon of some sort. Thus the officer deemed it prudent to place
Westbay in handcuffs until such time as it could be determined whether he was, in fact,
armed. According to Detective Murphy, less than fifteen seconds elapsed between his
first entry into the pool room and Westbay being placed in the handcuffs. Although
Detective Murphy did not recognize Westbay on sight, upon learning his identity the
officer immediately recalled that Westbay was wanted in connection with a separate
criminal endeavor. Although not mentioned in the Commonwealth's brief, this
realization further solidified Detective Murphy's suspicions. Thus, based upon these
facts, the trial court found first that Westbay's actions created a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity and second that the officer acted prudently given the totality of the
circumstances. We agree.
Upon our review of the record, we believe Detective Murphy did, in fact,
have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Westbay was engaged in criminal
activity, in accord with Cortez, supra. Therefore, on the facts before us, we hold
Detective Murphy was justified in his attempt to briefly detain Westbay for further
investigation. Accordingly, the trial court properly refused to suppress the seized
contraband.
Finally, we believe it important to note that the situation quickly ripened
into probable cause to arrest when Westbay spontaneously admitted having narcotics on
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his person. Upon being placed under arrest, the illicit drugs were retrieved. In United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224, 94 S.Ct. 467, 471, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), the
United States Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is well settled that a search incident to a
lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. . . . The validity of the search of a person incident to a lawful arrest has
been regarded as settled since its first enunciation[.]” See also Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 ,79
S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Pruitt v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W.2d 551 (Ky. 1956);
and Johnson v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.2d 913 (Ky. 1931). Thus, the ultimate search of
Westbay's person was incident to a valid arrest, and therefore passes constitutional
muster. The Circuit Court committed no error in denying the motion to suppress the
evidence obtained thereby.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
G. Murray Turner
Mulhall, Turner, Coombs & Malone, PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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