RICKIE L. DAVIS; VIVIAN J. DAVIS v. GENEVIEVE R. GARRETT (NOW GOODLETT); CHARLES SHAWN LYON
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RENDERED: JULY 13, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001631-ME
RICKIE L. DAVIS;
VIVIAN J. DAVIS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA WALKER FITZGERALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-502581
GENEVIEVE R. GARRETT (NOW GOODLETT);
CHARLES SHAWN LYON
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, KELLER, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
KELLER, JUDGE: Rickie and Vivian Davis appeal from an order of the Jefferson
Family Court, Division Three (the Division Three Court) denying their motion to be
declared de facto custodians of their great nephew, C.L. The Davises also appeal the
Division Three Court's order denying their request for visitation with C.L. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.
As with many family law cases, this case has a lengthy and rather
contentious procedural history. We will only set forth in detail the facts and procedural
history that are necessary for our opinion. We will not set forth in any detail the
numerous motions and/or allegations filed by the parties that are not relevant hereto.
FACTS
On June 22, 2003, Genevieve R. Garrett1 (Goodlett) gave birth to C.L. On
July 28, 2003, Rickie and Vivian Davis, Goodlett's aunt and uncle, filed a petition for
custody of C.L. in Oldham Circuit Court. The Davises noted in their petition that C.L.
had resided with them since "shortly after his birth," that Goodlett consented to the award
of both temporary and permanent custody to the Davises, and that Charles Shawn Lyon
was C.L.'s putative father. In her entry of appearance and waiver of service, Goodlett
stated that she waived and released all right to custody of C.L. "but only if this Court
awards custody to Petitioners" (the Davises). Goodlett reserved and retained "all rights
she may have to custody of the infant child should the putative father or any other person
or persons attempt to attain custody or possession of the infant child." On August 27,
2003, Lyon filed a response to the Davises' petition and a counter-petition for custody. In
his counter-petition, Lyon stated that he believed that he was C.L.'s father and that he had
sought visitation with C.L., but had been refused access to the child. Lyon sought
temporary custody of C.L. and requested that the court order a paternity test and, if the
test confirmed that Lyon was C.L.'s father, that Lyon be awarded permanent custody.
1
During the course of these proceedings Ms. Garrett married and used her current husband's last
name, Goodlett, throughout the majority of the litigation below.
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The paternity testing was delayed while Lyon filed a paternity action in district court,
where Lyon was ultimately determined to be C.L.'s father.
With his paternity determined, Lyon filed a motion seeking sole custody of
C.L. in February of 2004. In March of 2004, Lyon filed a motion seeking a default
judgment against the Davises and Goodlett, who had not responded to his counterpetition for custody. Lyon also alleged that the Davises lacked standing as they did not
meet the statutory requirements to be considered de facto custodians of C.L. The Davises
then sought, and received, an order permitting them to amend their petition to allege that
Lyon was not fit to have custody of C.L. because of Lyon's history of domestic violence,
abuse of his other children, and alcohol and illicit drug abuse.
On June 30, 2004, the Davises filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice
their petition for custody. In their motion, the Davises stated that they believed that it
was in C.L.'s best interest to be in the custody of Goodlett and that Goodlett was in a
financial and emotional position to care for C.L. Furthermore, the Davises noted that
C.L. had been gradually introduced into Goodlett's home and was living with Goodlett.
The Oldham Circuit Court granted that motion and dismissed the Davises as parties to the
action on June 30, 2004.
On July 6, 2004, the Oldham Circuit Court, noting that the Davises had
withdrawn their motion for custody, ordered joint custody of C.L.2 and set forth a
visitation schedule for Lyon and C.L. Furthermore, because the Davises had dismissed
2
The Oldham Circuit Court's order does not specify joint custody between Goodlett and Lyon.
However, since the Davises' petition had previously been dismissed, we presume the order of
joint custody refers to Goodlett and Lyon.
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their petition and Lyon and Goodlett both resided in Jefferson County, the Oldham
Circuit Court transferred this case to the Division Three Court.
Following several motions not relevant to our determination, Lyon and
Goodlett eventually agreed to mediation and entered into a visitation and child support
schedule on November 3, 2004. However, this apparent peaceful interlude did not last
long as Lyon filed a motion on December 29, 2004, for sole custody and for an order
limiting Goodlett to supervised visitation. It appears from the record that this motion was
motivated by a dependency action that had been filed against Goodlett in Jefferson
Family Court, Division Six (the Division Six Court). The Division Six Court action arose
from allegations that Goodlett had sexually abused her six-year-old child from another
relationship. The Division Six Court removed both the six-year-old and C.L. from
Goodlett's care, limited Goodlett to supervised visitation with C.L., and gave temporary
custody of C.L. to the Davises. The Division Three Court denied Lyon's motion for sole
custody on January 5, 2005.
Throughout the spring and summer of 2005, Goodlett and Lyon filed a
number of motions dealing with visitation and child support issues and the court issued
several orders requiring psychological and home evaluations. These motions and orders,
other than revealing the apparent inability of Goodlett, Lyon, and the Davises to
cooperate with each other, are not meaningful to this appeal.
On August 24, 2005, Goodlett, Lyon, and the Davises participated in
mediation and they all agreed to joint custody between Goodlett and Lyon and a
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visitation schedule for the following six weeks. On November 30, 2005, the parties
attended a third mediation and agreed to a visitation schedule through the end of the year.
The apparent truce among the parties again broke down and the Davises
filed a motion on January 3, 2006, asking the Division Three Court to set aside the order
dismissing their initial petition for custody. In support of their motion, the Davises stated
that they had dismissed their petition based on their belief that Goodlett and Lyon would
be able to care for and raise C.L. However, they no longer believed that was possible.
Furthermore, the Davises noted that C.L. had lived with them for the majority of his life,
other than for a few months in 2005 when he lived with Goodlett. Finally, the Davises
asked the family court to declare them de facto custodians of C.L.
On January 5, 2006, Lyon filed a motion asking the family court to set out a
schedule for transitioning C.L. to his full-time care. Lyon noted that he and Goodlett had
previously agreed to joint custody but that C.L. had been removed from Goodlett's care
by the family court.
The Division Three Court held a hearing on the preceding motions filed by
the Davises and Lyon. We note that, although the Davises and Lyon had witnesses
available to testify, the Division Three Court did not hear any testimony. Rather, the
court heard argument from counsel and asked counsel what testimony might be
presented.
In its final written order, the Division Three Court denied the motion to set
aside the order granting the Davises' motion to dismiss as well as their motion to be
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declared de facto custodians. Pursuant to the mediation agreement, the court awarded
joint custody to Goodlett and Lyon and declared Lyon to be C.L.'s residential custodian.
The court stated that Goodlett should have visitation with C.L. pursuant to the order of
the family court and ordered the Davises to gradually transition C.L. to Lyon over a fourweek period. Finally, the court denied the Davises' motion for ongoing visitation. It is
from this order that the Davises appeal.
ANALYSIS
As set forth above, prior to the transfer to the Division Three Court, the
Davises voluntarily dismissed their petition for custody in Oldham Circuit Court. They
subsequently sought an order from the Division Three Court vacating the order
dismissing their claim, which was denied. Therefore, before we can address whether the
Division Three Court erred in failing to hear evidence on the Davises' motion to be
declared de facto custodians, we must address whether the Davises were properly before
that court. The method for setting aside an order is contained in CR 60.02; therefore, we
will analyze the family court's denial of the Davises motion under the CR 60.02 standard,
which is abuse of discretion. See Richardson v. Brunner, 327 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Ky.
1959). For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the Division Three Court did not
abuse its discretion.
The Civil Rules provide that, after a counterclaim has been filed, a plaintiff
may only voluntarily dismiss an action without prejudice by order of court. CR 41.01(2).
Once a court order dismissing without prejudice is obtained, the parties are left as if no
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action had been instituted. Magill v. Mercantile Trust Co., 4 Ky.L. Rptr. 927, 81 Ky. 129
(Ky. 1883). CR 60.02 provides the method for seeking relief from an order of the court
and sets forth six reasons that a party may cite to justify setting aside a court's order:
(a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
(b) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59.02;
(c) perjury or falsified evidence;
(d) fraud affecting the proceedings, other than perjury or
falsified evidence;
(e) the judgment is void, or has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or
(f) any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying
relief.
Motions relying on (a), (b), or (c) must be made "not more than one year after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." CR 60.02.
The Davises filed their petition for custody in Oldham Circuit Court on July
28, 2003. Without objection by Lyon and Goodlett, the Davises moved to dismiss that
petition in June of 2004. On June 30, 2004, the Oldham Circuit Court granted the
Davises' motion to dismiss and, on July 6, 2004, awarded joint custody of C.L. to
Goodlett and Lyon. The Davises did not appeal or otherwise seek to alter the June 30,
2004, order until they filed their motion to set aside on January 3, 2006. As grounds for
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their motion, the Davises stated that, when they dismissed their petition for custody, they
believed that Goodlett and Lyon "would be capable of and willing to raise" C.L.
However, they now realized that would not be the case. It appears that the Davises were
asserting that they had been mistaken when they moved to dismiss their petition. As
such, the Davises should have filed their motion to set aside within one year of the
Oldham Circuit Court's order, which they did not do. Therefore, their motion was
untimely and the Division Three Court properly denied it. Because the Davises had
dismissed their petition and had neither filed a new petition nor obtained an order setting
aside their dismissal, the family court correctly found that only Goodlett and Lyon were
parties to the action pending before it.
As to the issue regarding the Davises' status as de facto custodians, KRS
405.020(3) provides that "a person claiming to be a de facto custodian . . . may petition a
court for legal custody of a child. The court shall grant legal custody to the person if the
court determines that the person meets the definition of de facto custodian and that the
best interests of the child will be served by awarding custody to the de facto custodian."
In order to obtain a determination of their status, the Davises were required to file a
petition for custody. It is undisputed that the Davises did file a petition for custody in the
Oldham Circuit Court. However, the Davises dismissed that petition, with leave of court,
prior to the transfer of this case to the Jefferson Family Court. The Davises did not file a
petition for custody and were not properly before that court. Therefore, the family court
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had no authority to make any determinations regarding the Davises' status as de facto
custodians.
We are sympathetic to the Davises' arguments regarding the best interests
of C.L. However, before making those arguments, the Davises were required to take
steps to become parties before the family court. This, they failed to do.
The next issue raised by the Davises is that the Division Three Court
abused its discretion by refusing to grant them ongoing visitation. Although couched by
the Davises as an abuse of discretion standard, the Division Three Court denied their
motion as a matter of law. Therefore, our standard of review is de novo. LexingtonFayette Urban County Health Department v. Lloyd, 115 S.W.3d 343 (Ky.App. 2003).
Specifically, the Davises argue that the Division Three Court failed to take
into consideration the best interests of C.L. Lyon argues that the Division Three Court
correctly found that there was no basis in law for it to award visitation to the Davises. As
set forth below, we agree with Lyon and the family court.
As noted by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Cole v. Thomas, 735
S.W.2d 333, 334 (Ky.App. 1987) in pertinent part:
Visitation, set by a court, is a limitation on exclusive custody
awarded to a party. Phillips v. Horlander, Ky., 535 S.W.2d
72 (1975). It is apparent, from reading the statutes dealing
with the care and custody of children that the legislature has
sought to limit the right of visitation to only those involved in
a “jurisdictionally sound” custody proceeding when it is in
the best interest of the child to do so, Simpson v. Simpson,
Ky., 586 S.W.2d 33 (1979), and to a child's grandparents
under KRS 405.021. It was only in 1984 that the legislature
decided to extend the right of grandparents to petition for
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visitation when the parent or parents of the child are not
deceased. Clearly, a review of these statutes represents the
legislature's desire to leave for the most part the total custody,
care and upbringing of a child in the hands of the custodial
parent. In other words, the legislature determined that the
parents are entitled to decide who their child shall visit and
who they shall not. Only grandparents have been given the
right, outside a custody proceeding, to request visitation.
...
To allow great-grandparents to be included within KRS
405.021(1) would open the door to aunts and uncles, cousins
and great-great-grandparents. While we would not be adverse
to allowing those persons “standing in loco parentis” or “any
person having an interest in the welfare of the child” to file
petitions such as this, we do not believe this was the intention
of the legislature. A hearing to determine the best interest of
the child in regard to visitation is only required in a
“jurisdictionally viable custody action.” Simpson, supra, at
36.
Based on the above, the family court correctly held that "there is no basis in law for the
Court to order" visitation for the Davises with C.L.
We note that the Davises argue that the family court failed to take into
account the best interest of C.L. when it denied ongoing visitation. Again, while we are
sympathetic to the Davises, there is no basis in the law as it currently stands for the court
to award them visitation; therefore, the family court correctly did not address the issue of
the best interest of C.L. However, as did the family court, we urge the Davises, Goodlett,
and Lyon to "to set aside their differences and to consider the best interests of [C.L.] in
determining any on-going [sic] contact with extended family members and those who
have cared for [him]."
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Finally, we note that the Davises cited Moore v. Assente, 110 S.W.3d 336
(Ky. 2003), throughout their brief. However, that case is clearly distinguishable from the
case herein. In Moore, both parents consented to placement of the child with the
Assentes and the Assentes were parties to the action. In the present case, Lyon has never
consented to the placement of C.L. with the Davises, and the Davises ceased to be parties
to this action in July of 2004, when they voluntarily dismissed their petition for custody.
Therefore, we hold that Moore has no application to the case herein.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the decision of the Jefferson Family
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
Sandra B. Hammond
Thomas G. Karageorge
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
CHARLES SHAWN LYON:
Jacqueline M. Caldwell
Louisville, Kentucky
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE GENEVIEVE
R. GARRETT (NOW GOODLETT)
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