HENRY K. JARRETT, III v. CYNTHIA M. JARRETT; HON. DENNIS SIMS
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RENDERED: AUGUST 31, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001557-MR
HENRY K. JARRETT, III
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE PAULA SHERLOCK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-503843
CYNTHIA M. JARRETT; HON. DENNIS
SIMS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ABRAMSON, ACREE AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: Henry K. Jarrett, III, appeals from findings of fact, conclusions of law
and a judgment dissolving his marriage to Cynthia M. Jarrett. Henry argues that the trial
court was unfairly biased against him, failed to properly restore certain nonmarital
property to him, improperly valued certain marital property, failed to make sufficient
findings of fact supporting the maintenance award to Cynthia, and awarded excessive
fees to Cynthia’s attorney. We agree with Henry that he was entitled to restoration of his
original nonmarital contribution to the marital residence, that the court’s findings
concerning the amount and duration of maintenance were insufficient, and that the
court’s award of attorney fees was arbitrary. We find no error on his other claimed
grounds. Hence, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for additional factual
findings and entry of a new judgment.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
Henry and Cynthia Jarrett were married on July 9, 1983, in Jefferson
County, Kentucky. One child who was born of the marriage is now emancipated.
Throughout the marriage, Henry was employed as an attorney. For much of the
marriage, Cynthia was employed as a legal secretary. In recent years, she has reduced
her outside employment to part-time and has attempted to establish a home-based sewing
business.
The parties separated on September 29, 2003, and Cynthia filed a petition
for dissolution of the marriage on October 16, 2003. After extensive discovery, the trial
court conducted a bench trial on all contested issues on August 16-17, 2005. The court
entered a dissolution decree on December 29, 2005. On March 15, 2006, the court
entered separate findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment on the contested
issues of property division, maintenance, and attorney fees. Thereafter, Henry filed a
motion to alter, amend or vacate, CR 59.05, or in the alternative a motion for additional
findings, CR 52.02. For the most part, the trial court denied the motions, but it did make
additional findings on Henry’s claim of a nonmarital contribution to the residence and
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concerning attorney fees. Following additional post-judgment motions, mostly involving
attorney fees, Henry appealed to this Court.
ALLEGED BIAS OF TRIAL JUDGE
We will first address Henry’s claim that the trial court exhibited personal
bias and prejudgment against him through its comments from the bench during
proceedings, its evidentiary rulings, its judgment and postjudgment rulings.
Consequently, he asserts that the trial judge should have recused itself. However, the
record does not support Henry’s assertions that the trial judge was personally biased
against him.
In Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787 (Ky. 2001), the Supreme
Court of Kentucky reiterated the burden placed upon a party seeking disqualification of a
judge:
KRS 26A.015(2) requires recusal when a judge has
“personal bias or prejudice concerning a party . . . [,]” or “has
knowledge of any other circumstances in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” KRS
26A.015(2)(a) and (e); see SCR 4.300, Canon 3C(1). The
burden of proof required for recusal of a trial judge is an
onerous one. There must be a showing of facts “of a
character calculated seriously to impair the judge’s
impartiality and sway his judgment.” Foster v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 348 S.W.2d 759, 760 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 993, 82 S.Ct. 613, 7 L.Ed.2d 530 (1962);
see also Johnson v. Ducobu, Ky., 258 S.W.2d 509 (1953).
The mere belief that the judge will not afford a fair and
impartial trial is not sufficient grounds for recusal. Webb v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 904 S.W.2d 226 (1995).
Id. at 794-95.
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Likewise, the fact that the judge may have formed an opinion about a party
based upon the evidence is not grounds for recusal. Rather, the focus of our inquiry must
be on whether the judge’s attitude towards a party was based upon any extra-judicial or
improper factors. Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Ky. 1986). See
also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550-51, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1155, 127 L. Ed. 2d
474 (1994). While we question certain aspects of how the trial court handled this case
and the appropriateness of certain comments, we cannot find that these actions
categorically demonstrate unfair bias on the part of the trial judge.
Henry first contends that the trial court’s pretrial and postjudgment rulings
demonstrate that the trial judge was biased against him. We agree that Henry’s motions
to alter, amend or vacate and for additional findings operated to stay the execution of the
judgment. CR 62.01. Consequently, the court’s order enforcing maintenance during the
pendency of these motions was erroneous. But the trial court’s adverse rulings, even if
erroneous, do not provide a basis for finding bias absent some showing that they were
based on improper factors.
Henry next contends that the trial court strictly enforced pretrial discovery
orders against him, but allowed Cynthia to file late or incomplete responses to his
discovery requests. However, such decisions are clearly within the discretion of the trial
court. Berrier v. Bizer, 57 S.W.3d 271, 278 (Ky. 2001), citing CR 36.02. We find no
evidence that the trial court’s discretion was influenced by bias or any improper factors.
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Furthermore, much of Henry’s argument on this point is based on his
contention that Cynthia was required to specifically identify the amounts of each of her
claims, relying on Fratzke v. Murphy, 12 S.W.3d 269 (Ky. 1999). He asserts that the trial
court exhibited bias in favor of Cynthia by failing to enforce this requirement. But the
notice requirements of CR 8.01 only apply to claims for unliquidated damages. CR
8.01(2). Cynthia’s claims for maintenance and division of marital property were not
“unliquidated damages” within the meaning of the terms used in CR 8.01. Hence, the
trial court’s refusal to require Cynthia to identify the amounts of her claims was not
erroneous, much less an indication of bias.
Henry next complains that the court’s allocation of time at the bench trial
showed favoritism toward Cynthia. But upon reviewing the trial tape, we find no
evidence of any hostility shown by the trial judge toward Henry. Furthermore, Henry
does not indicate when or whether he objected to the trial court’s request to hear from
witnesses out of order. And he does not suggest that the court’s conduct of the trial
interfered with his ability to present evidence. The trial court has discretion to control the
presentation of evidence. Thus, we can find no unfair prejudice to Henry from the
court’s conduct of the trial. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 685 S.W.2d 549 (Ky. 1985); Estes v.
Estes, 464 S.W.2d 813 (Ky. 1971).
Henry’s strongest argument concerns a statement by the trial judge during a
pretrial hearing to the effect that the court believed Henry was underreporting his income.
In addressing Henry’s subsequent motion to recuse based on this statement, the trial
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judge admitted that this comment was inappropriate because this issue had been reserved
for trial. While we would agree that this statement was ill-advised at the time, we find no
indication that the trial judge could not impartially consider the evidence presented at
trial. In fact, the trial court ultimately found no evidence that Henry had failed to report
any income. Rather, the only issue which the court considered was the reasonableness of
Henry’s claimed business deductions, which we will address separately. After reviewing
the record as a whole, we cannot find that Henry met his burden of proving unfair bias
sufficient to warrant recusal of the trial judge.
TRACING OF NONMARITAL FUNDS
Turning now to the substantive issues in this case, Henry first argues that
the trial court failed to restore two of his nonmarital contributions to marital property.
Specifically, he claims that he was entitled to an interest in the equity in the marital
residence based upon a contribution of nonmarital funds in 1987, and to restoration of
Cynthia’s attorney fees which he paid with nonmarital funds during the pendency of this
action. The trial court found that Henry had failed to meet his burden of tracing the
nonmarital funds into the marital residence. The trial court also denied Henry’s request
for restoration of the attorney fees without explanation. While we find that Henry was
entitled to restoration of his original contribution to the marital residence, we conclude
that Henry was not entitled to the additional nonmarital interest which he claimed in the
residence or to restoration of the funds used to pay Cynthia’s attorney fees.
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The concept of “tracing” is not expressly created by statute, but it is
strongly implied by the presumptions created in KRS 403.190. Essentially, the tracing
requirement simply means that “[w]hen the original property claimed to be nonmarital is
no longer owned, the nonmarital claimant must trace the previously owned property into
a presently owned specific asset.” 15 Graham & Keller, Kentucky Practice, Domestic
Relations Law, § 15.10 at 512 (2nd ed. 2000). If the claimant does so, then the trial court
assigns the specific property, or an interest in the specific property, to the claimant as his
or her nonmarital property. On the other hand, a claimant cannot meet the tracing
requirement simply by showing that he or she brought nonmarital property into the
marriage without also showing that he or she has spent his or her nonmarital assets in a
traceable manner during the marriage. Under such circumstances, the trial court will not
assign the property to the claimant as nonmarital property, but it may consider nonmarital
contribution as a factor when it makes a just division of the parties’ marital property. See
Chenault v. Chenault, 799 S.W.2d 575, 578-79 (Ky. 1990). See also Brunson v.
Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Ky.App. 1978); Angel v. Angel, 562 S.W.2d 661, 664-65
(Ky.App. 1978).
In 1987, the marital residence was threatened with foreclosure. Henry
states that he sold a nonmarital gold coin and applied $1,362.72 of the proceeds toward
the past-due mortgage payment. In its supplemental findings of fact, the trial court found
that Henry had traced his nonmarital contribution into the marital residence. But the
court declined to restore the nonmarital contribution because “the proceeds from the
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liquidation of [Henry’s] gold coin were used to keep the marital residence from going
into foreclosure after a period when [Henry], the primary wage earner of the family,
failed to make mortgage payments.” Thereafter, the court indicates that Henry failed to
prove that this payment should be applied as an equity contribution rather than toward
interest and fees.
We agree with Henry that the trial court erred by finding that he had failed
to satisfy the tracing requirements with respect to the original $1,367.72 contribution. As
the trial court noted, Henry clearly established that he sold the nonmarital coin and then
shortly thereafter made the mortgage payment with a portion of the proceeds. The parties
agree that this payment stopped the pending foreclosure of the marital residence. The
fact that Henry may have been responsible for the original default does not negate his
nonmarital contribution. Furthermore, there is no requirement that Henry prove that this
nonmarital contribution was applied toward equity. Consequently, we agree that Henry
was entitled to restoration of this nonmarital contribution.
However, Henry further argues that the payment should be considered a
nonmarital contribution to the equity in the marital residence. Thus, he asserts that he is
entitled to the restoration of his $1,367.72 contribution, plus the increase in value of the
marital residence attributable to that contribution. See Newman v. Newman, 597 S.W.2d
137 (Ky. 1980); Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky.App. 1981). In
Travis v. Travis, 59 S.W.3d 904 (Ky. 2001), the Kentucky Supreme Court explained that
the Brandenburg formula is not automatically applicable to situations such as this.
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Where property consists of both marital and nonmarital components, the
trial court must determine the parties’ separate nonmarital and marital shares or interests
in the property. Travis, 59 S.W.3d at 909. But when the property acquired during the
marriage includes an increase in the value of an asset containing both marital and
nonmarital components, the trial court must determine from the evidence why the
increase in value occurred. If the increase in value was due to general economic
conditions, then the increase is deemed to be nonmarital. But if the increase is due to the
joint efforts of the parties, then the increase in value is marital. Moreover, KRS
403.190(3) creates a presumption that any such increase in value is marital property.
Therefore, a party asserting that he or she should receive appreciation upon a nonmarital
contribution as nonmarital property carries the burden of proving the portion of the
increase in value attributable to the nonmarital contribution. Otherwise, the increase will
be characterized as marital property. Travis, 59 S.W.3d at 910-11.
In this case, Henry did not establish that the increase in value of the marital
residence was due to general economic circumstances or his sole efforts. Therefore, the
appreciation in value of the residence must be deemed to be marital property. Thus,
Henry is only entitled to restoration of his original $1,367.72 contribution.
Henry next claims that he was entitled to restoration of fees which he paid
with nonmarital funds to Cynthia’s attorney. Prior to trial, the court ordered Henry to
advance $7,500.00 to Cynthia’s attorney. Henry cashed out $4,000.00 from a nonmarital
trust/annuity to apply toward that obligation. However, the tracing rule applies to
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nonmarital contributions to marital assets. A party is not entitled to restoration of a
contribution of nonmarital funds unless that contribution can be traced to a specific asset
owned at the time of dissolution. Chenault, 799 S.W.2d at 579. In this case, Cynthia’s
attorney fees were not a marital asset, but an obligation which the trial court assigned to
Henry. Furthermore, the court did not order Henry to apply any particular assets toward
this obligation. While this contribution should be taken into consideration in the court's
division of marital property, Henry was not entitled to a restoration of those funds.
DIVISION AND VALUATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
Henry’s second series of arguments concerns the trial court’s valuation of
certain marital property. He specifically claims that the trial court over-valued the two
automobiles (which were awarded to him), under-valued Cynthia’s business (which was
awarded to her), and failed to charge Cynthia for withdrawals she made from her
retirement account during the parties’ separation. In reviewing the trial court’s valuation
of marital property, we must defer to the considerable discretion of the trial court unless it
has committed clear error or has abused that discretion. The trial court’s findings of fact
will “not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” CR 52.01.
Substantial evidence has been defined by Kentucky courts as that which, when taken
alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in
the mind of a reasonable person. Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481
S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky. 1972). “Mere doubt as to the correctness of the finding [will] not
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justify [its] reversal.” Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003), citing 7 Philips,
Kentucky Practice, Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated, § 52.01 at 279 (6th ed. 2005).
We cannot find that the trial court clearly erred in determining the divisible values of any
of these items of marital property.
With respect to the valuation of the automobiles, neither party testified
entirely from their personal knowledge. Both parties introduced computer appraisals
based upon standard values and adjusted for mileage and condition of the vehicles.1
Henry argues, however, that Cynthia’s appraisal does not accurately reflect the mileage
and condition of either vehicle. Consequently, he asserts that the trial court clearly erred
by accepting Cynthia’s appraisals of the vehicles rather than his.
While Henry’s position is reasonable, we note that he did not introduce any
independent evidence supporting his description of the mileage and condition of the
vehicles. Consequently, the sole issue before the trial court concerned the credibility of
Henry’s and Cynthia’s separate appraisals. Such determinations are squarely within the
discretion of the trial court. Therefore, we cannot find that the trial court clearly erred by
accepting Cynthia’s appraisals over Henry’s.
Henry next argues that the trial court erred by finding that Cynthia’s home
sewing business had no value which could be divided. He notes that the business had
assets of a $2,000.00 sewing machine, copyright, materials, supplies and inventory.
1
Both parties obtained their appraisal information from http://www.nadaguides.com - the website of the National Automobile Dealers Association. The printed and electronic versions of the
NADA Guides are recognized to be authoritative sources as to the values of new and used
vehicles.
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Consequently, he argues that the court should have assigned some marital value to these
assets.
However, Henry concedes that Cynthia had not actively operated the
business for two years prior to trial, the business has an outstanding debt of $6,000.00,
and the business had never operated at a profit. Furthermore, while the court found the
business debt to be marital, it assigned the debt entirely to Cynthia. Under the
circumstances, the court could reasonably find that the sewing business had no value
above its liabilities.
DISSIPATION OF ASSETS
Henry argues that the trial court should have charged Cynthia for
withdrawals she made from her retirement account during separation. Between the
parties’ separation and the trial, Cynthia withdrew approximately $11,000.00 from her
individual retirement account. The parties agree that the IRA is a marital asset. The trial
court noted that Cynthia did not receive maintenance during the separation, but she
continued to live in the marital residence and Henry continued to pay the mortgage and
other necessary expenses.
Nevertheless, the trial court found that Cynthia’s withdrawals from the IRA
were for her reasonable and necessary expenses during the period of separation. Since
there was no showing that Cynthia dissipated these assets, the court concluded that the
withdrawals should not be charged against Cynthia’s share of the marital property.
Again, we cannot find this conclusion to be clearly erroneous.
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MAINTENANCE
Henry’s primary argument concerns the trial court’s award of lifetime
maintenance to Cynthia in the amount of $1,350.00 per month. An award of maintenance
is within the sound discretion of the court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an
abuse of discretion. Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990); Perrine v. Christine,
833 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1992). When determining whether an award of maintenance is
appropriate, KRS 403.200(1) requires the trial court to find that the spouse seeking
maintenance: (1) lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to her,
to provide for her reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support herself through
appropriate employment. While Henry takes issue with the trial court’s findings
concerning Cynthia’s earning capacity and expenses, he does not seriously contend that
Cynthia is currently able to meet her reasonable needs even with the marital property
apportioned to her and the earning capacity which he would impute to her. Therefore, we
cannot find that the trial court erred by finding that Cynthia is entitled to maintenance.
Rather, Henry takes issue with the trial court’s findings concerning the
amount and duration of maintenance. He argues that the trial court failed to make
sufficient findings supporting its award. In particular, Henry contends that the award is
based upon erroneous findings concerning his income and Cynthia’s earning capacity.
He further argues that the trial court considered improper factors, disregarded Cynthia’s
admissions that she was voluntarily underemployed, and improperly considered
Cynthia’s unsupported testimony about her medical conditions. Henry argues that the
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trial court failed to consider changes in Cynthia’s expenses which occurred after the trial
but prior to the judgment. Based on these erroneous findings, Henry contends that the
award of maintenance is excessive as to both amount and duration.
KRS 403.200(2) provides that once it is established that maintenance is
appropriate:
The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and
for such periods of time as the court deems just, and after
considering all relevant factors, including:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, including marital property apportioned to [her],
and [her] ability to meet [her] needs independently, including
the extent to which a provision for support of a child living
with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education
or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find
appropriate employment;
(c) The standard of living established during the
marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition
of the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance
is sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse
seeking maintenance.
In determining the amount of a maintenance award, KRS 403.200(2) clearly
directs the trial court to consider “all relevant factors.” The statute does not, however,
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require the court to make specific findings of fact as to each relevant factor. Drake v.
Drake, 721 S.W.2d 728 (Ky.App. 1986).
Furthermore, the amount and duration of maintenance are within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d at 937; Combs v. Combs, 622 S.W.2d
679, 680 (Ky. App. 1981), citing KRS 403.200(2); Browning v. Browning, 551 S.W.2d
823 (Ky.App. 1977); and Russell v. Russell, 878 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Ky.App. 1994). “As an
appellate court, . . . this Court is [not] authorized to substitute its own judgment for that
of the trial court on the weight of the evidence, where the trial court’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence.” Leveridge v. Leveridge, 997 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ky. 1999),
citing Combs, 787 S.W.2d at 262.
Nevertheless, the trial court’s exercise of its discretion regarding
maintenance must be based upon sufficient findings of fact which are supported by the
evidence. Following entry of the judgment, Henry filed a motion pursuant to CR 52.02
for additional factual findings on specific issues involving the amount and duration of
maintenance. The trial court denied his motion for additional findings. Based upon the
lack of necessary findings supporting the maintenance award, Henry argues that this
Court must set aside the maintenance award for additional findings. Under the
circumstances presented in this case, we agree.
It is well-established that a final judgment shall not be set aside because of
the failure of the trial court to make a finding of fact on an issue essential to the judgment
unless the failure is brought to the attention of the trial court by a written motion pursuant
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to CR 52.02. CR 52.04. In the absence of such a motion, this Court must presume that
the evidence presented at trial supports the trial court’s conclusions. Cherry v. Cherry,
634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982). But conversely, CR 52.02 does not require a trial court
to make additional findings in response to a motion. The rule simply states that the court
“may amend its findings or make additional findings” in response to a motion. By its
own terms, the rule permits the trial court to determine the sufficiency of its factual
findings.
But where a party preserved the issue through a proper motion, the question
on appeal is whether the omitted finding involves a matter which was essential to the trial
court’s judgment. As this involves a question of law, we need not defer to the trial
court’s conclusion that its findings were sufficient. Furthermore, since the issue is
preserved for review, this Court is not required to presume that the evidence supports the
trial court’s conclusions. With this standard in mind, we agree that Henry was entitled to
specific factual findings on several issues which he raised relating to the maintenance
award.
First, we agree with Henry that the trial court failed to adequately explain
its findings concerning Henry’s income and earning capacity. At trial, Cynthia claimed
that Henry was under-reporting his income and that his deductions for business expenses
were excessive. The trial court found no evidence that Henry had failed to report any
income. The court then suggested that some of Henry’s deductions of personal expenses,
while appropriate for tax purposes, were not appropriate to determine his income for
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maintenance purposes. The court also stated that Henry has been able to meet his
reasonable needs and to pay private school tuition for their adult daughter “from his
personal resources.” However, the trial court did not determine Henry’s actual income.
Rather, the court summarily found “the sum of $60,000.00 a year as a reasonable amount
to impute as income to [Henry].”
The trial court’s finding “imputing” income to Henry was a poor choice of
words. For purposes of determining child support and maintenance, a court may impute
income to a party it finds to be voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. However, the
trial court never explained its reasons for imputing income to Henry and evidence
presented at trial does not support a conclusion that Henry is underemployed.
The trial court noted that Henry has been a practicing attorney for twentyfive years and “bills at the rate of $175.00 per hour.” But the court also states that the
gross receipts for Henry’s law practice in 2003 and 2004 were $54,495.00 and
$76,621.00, respectively. While it could be implied that the court implicitly disallowed
some of Henry’s business deductions, we note that the gross receipts from Henry’s legal
practice exceeded the sum of $60,000.00 only in 2004 – the year immediately preceding
the bench trial. And while the trial court suggested that Henry has income from his
nonmarital property, the trial court did not make any findings concerning the amount of
income which that property could be expected to produce for Henry. Given Henry’s
prior income history, there was no evidence to suggest that Henry is underemployed.
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In determining the amount of maintenance, KRS 403.200(2)(f) requires the
trial court to consider “[t]he ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to
meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.” As part of this
determination, the trial court must consider the obligor spouse’s income and his
reasonable expenses. Without adequate factual findings supporting its decision, we are
unable to review the trial court’s conclusions imputing income to Henry and finding that
he can meet his reasonable needs while paying maintenance to Cynthia. We conclude,
therefore, that the trial court erred by denying his motion for additional factual findings
on this issue. Consequently, this matter must be remanded for additional findings.
Greathouse v. American National Bank and Trust Co., 796 S.W.2d 868, 878 (Ky.App.
1990).
Second, we also agree with Henry that he was entitled to additional findings
concerning Cynthia’s income. Henry contends that the trial court erred by finding that
Cynthia is unable to earn more than her current income. He first argues that the trial
court erred by accepting Cynthia’s testimony about her health problems without any
supporting expert medical testimony or documentation. Such evidence is necessary in
personal injury cases, where a plaintiff must prove damages with reasonable certainty.
See Rogers v. Sullivan, 410 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Ky. 1966). But as previously noted,
maintenance is not an item of damages. It is a statutorily-created right based upon
consideration of enumerated factors. We find no authority for Henry’s contention that a
spouse cannot testify generally about her health or physical ailments which limit her
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working capacity. Rather, the absence of supporting medical evidence merely goes to
the weight of Cynthia’s testimony.
Having said this, however, we caution that trial courts should consider such
evidence carefully. While a spouse may testify about her health and symptoms, she may
not offer a medical diagnosis outside of her knowledge or experience. Likewise, such
testimony may not include hearsay from medical providers. Finally, due process and
fundamental fairness require a trial court to apply the same evidentiary standards to
opposing parties. Thus, unless the trial court adequately explained the disparate
treatment, we would consider it an abuse of discretion to require one party to present
medical evidence of a work restriction while accepting the other party’s unsupported
statements regarding a limited ability to work.
But in this case, Henry does not argue that Cynthia’s testimony included
any improper evidence. She testified that she is unable to sit for long periods due to
bouts of dizziness, a racing heart, and pain in her lower back and hip. Cynthia introduced
her prescription records, and she discussed her absences from work due to medical
appointments. She did not attempt to testify regarding any medical diagnosis or work
restrictions imposed by her physicians. Although the trial court was not required to
accept Cynthia’s testimony without supporting medical testimony or documentation, we
cannot find that the trial court clearly erred in doing so. Furthermore, we find no
indication that the trial court applied disparate evidentiary standards to the parties.
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The more difficult question concerns how Cynthia’s testimony should be
viewed in light of her pretrial admissions. In response to a request for admission,
Cynthia admitted that her medical conditions did not prevent her from maintaining fulltime employment during the marriage. She admitted that no physician has placed any
restrictions on her work activity. And she further stated that her “decision not to seek
other employment is based on personalty [sic] preference, my side business, and the
enormous amount of time I have committed to this dissolution action.”
Henry contends that these admissions should have precluded Cynthia from
testifying about any limitations on her ability to work. Since Cynthia never withdrew the
admissions, he argues that they conclusively establish that Cynthia is voluntarily
underemployed. CR 36.02. See also Berrier, 57 S.W.3d at 278-80. But while Cynthia
admitted that she reduced her employment to part-time for personal reasons, her other
admissions also addressed her health problems. And when viewed as a whole, the
admissions would not necessarily negate the trial court’s finding that Cynthia “is unlikely
to be able to increase her income at her age with her present education and skills and
physical limitations,” since this finding relates only to Cynthia’s future earning capacity.
But we agree with Henry that the trial court failed to adequately address the
effect of these admissions upon the determination of her current income and earning
capacity. Even if Cynthia’s admissions did not amount to a categorical admission of
underemployment, they strongly suggest that the recent reduction in her income was due
to a temporary, rather than permanent, loss of earning capacity. Since maintenance must
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be based on Cynthia’s reasonable needs in excess of her income and other resources, the
trial court’s failure to make findings on this question necessarily implicates its
conclusions concerning the amount of maintenance. See Sayre v. Sayre, 675 S.W.2d 647,
648 (Ky.App. 1984). Therefore, the trial court must make additional findings on this
issue.
Third, we agree with Henry that he was entitled to additional findings
concerning Cynthia’s reasonable expenses. In determining maintenance, the trial court
found that Cynthia’s monthly expenses would be approximately $2,742.00 per month
after she moved from the marital residence. These expenses included projected housingrelated expenses of $1,100.00 per month. Prior to entry of the judgment, the marital
residence was sold and Cynthia purchased a new residence. In his CR 59.05 motion,
Henry stated that Cynthia’s housing expenses had been reduced to $500.00 per month,
and he argued that her maintenance should be adjusted accordingly. The trial court
denied Henry’s motion without addressing this issue.
In Rayborn v. Rayborn, 185 S.W.3d 641 (Ky. 2006), the Kentucky Supreme
Court found that a change in circumstances occurring after the entry of the decree but
before entry of the judgment cannot serve as a basis for a subsequent modification of
maintenance pursuant to KRS 403.250. Id. at 643-44. Since these changes in Cynthia’s
expenses cannot be raised at a later date, Henry properly raised the issue in his motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. Consequently, he was entitled to additional
findings on the merits of the issue.
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Henry’s fourth argument is that the trial court’s award of maintenance was
influenced by an improper factor – evidence of his infidelity during the marriage.
However, a trial court may consider such misconduct as a factor in determining the
amount of maintenance. See Tenner v. Tenner, 906 S.W.2d 322 (Ky. 1995); Chapman v.
Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1973). Moreover, Henry does not identify anywhere in
the record where the trial court indicated that it considered his misconduct during the
marriage as a factor in determining maintenance. In the absence of any evidence in the
record supporting this speculation, we can find no error or abuse of discretion.
Henry’s last argument with regard to maintenance is that the trial court
improperly considered the marital debt assigned to Cynthia. The trial court found all of
the debt to be marital and divided it equally between the parties. The court then assigned
the debt to the party in whose name the debt was incurred, and ordered Henry to pay
Cynthia $6,000.00 to equalize the division of debt. While Henry does not contest the trial
court’s allocation of debt, he argues that the court should not have considered Cynthia’s
share of the debt in determining her reasonable needs for maintenance purposes.
In essence, Henry contends that the inclusion of Cynthia’s debt payments in
her monthly expenses appears to negate the assignment of debt to her. However, we find
no authority to support his position that these expenses must be excluded in determining
Cynthia’s reasonable needs. Likewise, the trial court must consider Henry’s debt
payments in determining whether he can meet his reasonable needs while paying
maintenance to Cynthia.
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Because we are remanding this case for additional findings, we will also
address Henry’s broader argument concerning the duration of the maintenance award.
Henry correctly notes that KRS 403.200 seeks to enable the unemployable spouse to
acquire the skills necessary to support himself or herself in the current workforce so that
he or she does not rely upon the maintenance of the working spouse indefinitely. Clark
v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56, 61 (Ky.App. 1990). But “in situations where the marriage was
long term, the dependent spouse is near retirement age, the discrepancy in incomes is
great, or the prospects for self-sufficiency appears dismal[,]” our courts have declined to
follow that policy and have instead awarded maintenance for a longer period or in greater
amounts. Id. Further, KRS 403.200 specifically states that the trial court should consider
the standard of living to which the parties are accustomed in determining the amount and
duration of the award. “It is especially acceptable for the trial court to consider the
impact of the divorce on the nonprofessional’s standard of living and award an
appropriate amount that the professional spouse can afford.” Id. See also Powell v.
Powell, 107 S.W.3d 222, 224 (Ky. 2003).
In this case, we have a long-term marriage of twenty-three years. While
there is some dispute concerning the parties’ respective incomes, the evidence clearly
shows a significant disparity between their incomes and earning capacities. Even if
Cynthia is underemployed, her highest annual income during the marriage was
$17,533.40, and she has limited skills sufficient to earn more than that amount.
Furthermore, she no longer has any significant retirement savings. And Henry concedes
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that there was very little marital property to be divided. Finally, there is no dispute that
the parties maintained a comfortable standard of living during the marriage.
Thus, it seems apparent to this Court that Cynthia is entitled to
maintenance, perhaps even lifetime maintenance. And given the proper findings, the trial
court’s original award may well be justified. For this reason, we cannot reach the merits
of Henry’s argument that the amount and duration of maintenance was excessive. This
matter can only be reviewed once the trial court makes sufficient findings.
ATTORNEY FEES
Henry argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its award of
attorney fees. “KRS 403.220 authorizes a trial court to order one party to a divorce
action to pay a “reasonable amount” for the attorney’s fees of the other party, but only if
there exists a disparity in the relative financial resources of the parties in favor of the
[obligor]. . . .” But even if a disparity exists, the amount of fees is within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Ky. 2001).
The court may also consider conduct or tactics by either party during the litigation.
Gentry, 798 S.W.2d at 938; Connelly v. Degott, 132 S.W.3d 871, 873 (Ky.App. 2003).
Nevertheless, even the broadest discretion must not be exercised arbitrarily.
In this case, we are troubled by the manner in which the court exercised its discretion.
Prior to trial, the court ordered Henry to advance the sum of $7,500.00 to Cynthia’s
attorney for her fees. At trial, Cynthia sought a total of $22,500.00 in attorney fees. In
its first judgment, the trial court awarded Cynthia an additional $10,000.00 in attorney
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fees, bringing the total to $17,500.00. But in its order denying Henry’s CR 52.02 and CR
59.05 motions, the court, on its own initiative, awarded an additional $5,000.00 in fees to
Cynthia’s attorney. In explaining this decision, the court stated that it had been
“somewhat conservative” in its initial award. The court added that it now believed the
award was too low and that all of Cynthia’s attorney fees were reasonable “due to the
protracted and contentious nature of the litigation, attributable in most part to [Henry],
and the disparity in income between the parties.”
Based solely on the disparity of incomes and resources, the trial court could
have properly exercised its discretion to award attorney fees of either $17,500.00 or
$22,500.00. But the court’s late decision to increase the lower award by $5,000.00 was
arbitrary. We recognize that the trial court is in the best position to judge the conduct or
tactics which waste the court’s and attorneys’ time, and this Court must give the trial
court wide latitude to sanction or discourage such conduct. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d at 938.
However, the record does not support the trial court’s stated reasons for increasing the
award.
At trial, Cynthia primarily argued that Henry was underreporting income
and that he had dissipated assets. She also challenged his nonmarital claim to an
inheritance and a trust. The trial court found for Henry on the first two issues, and
Cynthia dropped her marital claim to the other property. Since he prevailed on these
issues, Henry contends Cynthia’s claimed attorney fees were not reasonable and that the
award was excessive.
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Simply because Henry prevailed on these issues does not mean that Cynthia
did not reasonably incur attorney fees in raising them. But likewise, the result indicates
that Henry had a reasonable basis to litigate these issues. However, the trial court seemed
to take great issue with Henry’s unwillingness to settle the disputed issues in this
litigation. But while “[a] judge should encourage and seek to facilitate settlement, . . .
parties should not feel coerced into surrendering the right to have their controversy
resolved by the courts.” SCR 4.300, Code of Judicial Conduct, Commentary to Canon
3B(8). Similarly, the court should not use its discretion to impose attorney fees under
KRS 403.220 as a punitive sanction against a party who reasonably decided to litigate
disputed issues.
Furthermore, the record does not support the trial court’s opinion that
Henry was primarily responsible for the contentious nature of the litigation. Rather, the
record indicates that both parties engaged in conduct which caused protracted litigation.
For example, early in the litigation, Cynthia entered Henry’s law offices without
permission and improperly removed client files. Furthermore, Cynthia sought discovery
of Henry’s client escrow account, which required the trial court to conduct an in camera
review to address Henry’s claim that this information was privileged. On the other hand,
Henry raised a number of issues of questionable merit, most notably his argument
concerning the application of CR 8.01(2).
Finally, Cynthia’s attorney argues that the additional award was appropriate
based upon Henry’s actions in filing his postjudgment motions and an original action in
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this Court against the trial judge. But as this Court found above, Henry was entitled to
additional findings on several of the issues he raised in his postjudgment motions. Thus,
we cannot say that his motions were unreasonable or brought in bad faith. Likewise, we
agree with Henry that the trial court’s order directing enforcement of the maintenance
award while the postjudgment motions were pending appears to violate the clear
language of CR 36.02. The trial court’s subsequent denial of this motion rendered the
issue moot. Further, this Court denied Henry’s petition for a writ of prohibition, finding
that he had failed to show irreparable harm as a result of the order. Nonetheless, we
conclude that Henry had a reasonable basis for bringing the postjudgment motions and
the original action. Therefore, that conduct could not serve as a basis for awarding
additional attorney fees to Cynthia.
In most cases, such factors would not be sufficient to overturn a trial court’s
discretion in awarding attorney fees. But in this case, the trial court initially made a
lesser award of fees and then subsequently increased the award on its own motion. Under
such circumstances, the increase must be supported by more than the trial court’s mere
reconsideration of the original award. In the absence of sufficient evidence or findings,
we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Cynthia’s attorney an
additional $5,000.00 in fees. Therefore, we reinstate the original award of $17,500.00.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the record does not support Henry’s argument that the trial
court was unfairly biased against him. We find that Henry was entitled to a $1,362.72
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credit for a nonmarital contribution to the marital residence, but he failed to prove an
entitlement to restoration of any other nonmarital property. The trial court’s findings
concerning the valuation of the marital property were supported by substantial evidence.
Likewise, the trial court’s finding that Cynthia is entitled to maintenance was also
supported by substantial evidence. However, the trial court failed to make essential
findings on certain issues relating to the amount and duration of the maintenance award.
Therefore, we must remand this matter for additional factual findings. Finally, the trial
court abused its discretion by awarding Cynthia’s attorney an additional $5,000.00 in fees
after entry of the initial judgment. Consequently, we must set aside that award and we
direct the trial court to reinstate its original award of $17,500.00.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Jefferson Family Court is affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded for additional factual findings and entry of a new
judgment as set forth in this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES:
Wallace N. Rogers
Louisville, Kentucky
Wm. Dennis Sims
Louisville, Kentucky
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