JOSEPH MARK BOURNE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 13, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001555-MR
JOSEPH MARK BOURNE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DARREN W. PECKLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00053
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; KELLER, JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: Joseph Mark Bourne, pro se, appeals from an order
of the Boyle Circuit Court denying, without an evidentiary hearing, his Kentucky Rule of
Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion to vacate or set aside a judgment sentencing him
to six years in prison following his guilty pleas to various crimes. We affirm.
On April 14, 2004, Bourne was indicted on one count of second-degree
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
21.850.
unlawful transaction with a minor, one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, one count of first-degree sodomy, one count of misdemeanor possession of drug
paraphernalia, and one count of trafficking in marijuana within 1000 yards of a school.2
The charges stemmed from an incident on March 16, 2004, wherein Bourne allegedly
committed sexual assault against a juvenile. Based upon the victim's statements, law
enforcement officers obtained a search warrant for Bourne's apartment on March 18,
2004. Inside the apartment, the officers found a handgun, rolling papers, scales, a rolling
machine, baggies, a calculator, a police scanner, scissors, a pipe, and a roach clip.
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, Bourne entered
guilty pleas to all charges. In exchange for the guilty pleas, the Commonwealth
recommended that the first-degree sodomy charge be amended to second-degree sodomy
with Bourne to receive a five-year sentence, that he be sentenced to five years for
unlawful transaction with a minor, that he be sentenced to five years for trafficking in
marijuana within 1000 yards of a school, that he be sentenced to twelve months for
possession of drug paraphernalia, and that he be sentenced to six years for possession of a
handgun by a convicted felon. The Commonwealth further recommended that all
sentences run concurrently. On May 4, 2005, the Boyle Circuit Court entered its final
judgment and sentenced Bourne to six years in accordance with the plea agreement.
On January 20, 2006, Bourne filed a motion to vacate or set aside the
judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42 and a motion for an evidentiary hearing. On March 6,
2
See Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 520.065(1), KRS 527.040, KRS 510.070, KRS
218A.500, and KRS 218A.1411, respectively.
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2006, the court entered an order denying both motions. Bourne filed a second RCr 11.42
motion on June 19, 2006, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. On June 26, 2006,
the court denied the second motion stating that Bourne failed to present any grounds for
relief that were not known and could not have reasonably been presented in the previous
RCr 11.42 motion. This appeal followed.
RCr 11.42(3) provides that a defendant is
required to “state all grounds for holding the sentence invalid of which the movant has
knowledge. Final disposition of the motion shall conclude all issues that could
reasonably have been presented in the same proceeding.” This rule promotes judicial
efficiency by preventing a court from expending time and resources in rehearing
arguments that could have been brought in a previous motion. Case v. Commonwealth,
467 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Ky. 1971). See also McQueen v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 70,
71 (Ky. 1997).
Bourne argues that his constitutional and due process rights were violated as a
result of ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. We agree with the circuit court that Bourne has failed to state any grounds for
relief that were not known or could not reasonably have been presented in his previous
RCr 11.42 motion. Thus, Bourne is precluded by RCr 11.42(3) from raising this
successive motion. Nevertheless, we will briefly address the issues raised by Bourne
upon the merits.
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Bourne first argues that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that his court appointed
attorney failed to fully inform him of the consequences of his guilty pleas and entered the
plea agreement without his consent. Bourne also argues that his attorney failed to
conduct any pretrial investigation so as to establish a defense.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984), the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the standard governing review of claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Under this standard, a party asserting such a claim is
required to show: (1) that the trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell
outside the range of professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the deficiency was
prejudicial because there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different but for counsel's performance. Id. at 687. This standard was adopted by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985).
This test is modified in cases involving a defendant who enters a guilty
plea. In such instances, the second prong of the Strickland test includes the requirement
that a defendant demonstrate that but for the alleged errors of counsel, there is a
reasonable probability that the defendant would not have entered a guilty plea, but rather
would have insisted on proceeding to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct.
366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726 (Ky.App.
1986).
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A reviewing court must entertain a strong presumption that counsel's
challenged conduct falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. The defendant bears the burden of overcoming this
strong presumption by identifying specific acts or omissions that he alleges constitute a
constitutionally deficient performance. Id. at 689-90. The relevant inquiry is whether
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id at 694.
Applying this standard to the present case, Bourne provides no grounds for
post-conviction relief under RCr 11.42 due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Bourne's
argument that his court appointed counsel failed to fully inform him of the consequences
of a guilty plea is refuted by the record. The record discloses that Bourne signed a form
entitled “Commonwealth’s Offer on a Plea of Guilty” on March 30, 2005, that fully
described the terms of the plea bargain. Bourne also signed a “Motion to Enter Guilty
Plea” on the same day that stated he had reviewed the indictment, told his attorney the
facts of the case, and understood the charges against him as well as any possible defenses
to the charges. The form further states that the plea was freely, knowingly, and
voluntarily entered. Bourne’s signature on the forms indicates that he fully understood
the consequences of entering the plea agreement and that his attorney fully informed him
of these consequences.
Bourne also claims that his attorney failed to prepare a defense or conduct
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any pretrial investigation so as to establish a defense. However, Bourne has not
specifically identified any exculpatory evidence that would have been discovered by
additional investigation. Nor has he shown how any such failure prejudiced his case.
Absent evidence of specific instances of trial counsel’s failure to investigate his case or
prepare a defense and the prejudicial effect thereof, Bourne cannot meet the standard as
set forth in Strickland required to show ineffective assistance of counsel.
Bourne’s argument that his attorney's failure and/or refusal to file a motion
to suppress evidence concerning the statements of the alleged victim constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel likewise falls short under the Strickland test. Bourne
fails to set forth sufficient information to show that, had the motion been made, there
would have been a different outcome or that he would not have pled guilty but, instead,
would have insisted upon going to trial.
Bourne next argues that it was error for the trial court to refuse to conduct
an evidentiary hearing on his RCr 11.42 motion. We disagree.
A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on an RCr 11.42 motion
only if the issues raised in the motion reasonably require such a hearing for
determination. On the other hand, a hearing is not required if the motion, on its face,
does not allege facts that would entitle the defendant to a new trial even if true or if the
allegations are refuted by the record itself. Maggard v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 893,
894 (Ky. 1965).
Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, we find no error
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in the circuit court’s order. As the court found, each of Bourne’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel was refuted on the record and, therefore, no evidentiary hearing was
required. At any rate, as we have noted, Bourne's motion was properly denied without a
hearing pursuant to RCr 11.42(3) as an improper successive motion.
The order of the Boyle Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joseph M. Bourne
LaGrange, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Rickie L. Pearson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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