DAVID J. BENNETT, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF DEBORAH A. ORENDUFF, DECEASED v. MICHAEL A. NICHOLAS, PH.D.; ARIBBE A. MARTIN, M.D.; AND BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS, INC., D/B/A WESTERN BAPTIST HOSPITAL
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 7, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001467-MR
DAVID J. BENNETT, ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF DEBORAH A.
ORENDUFF, DECEASED
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-01114
MICHAEL A. NICHOLAS, PH.D.; ARIBBE
A. MARTIN, M.D.; AND BAPTIST
HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS, INC., D/B/A
WESTERN BAPTIST HOSPITAL
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, HOWARD AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
HOWARD, JUDGE: David J. Bennett, as administrator of the estate of the decedent,
Deborah A. Orenduff, appeals the dismissal by the McCracken Circuit Court of his
malpractice claims against Dr. Michael A. Nicholas, Dr. Aribbe A. Martin and Western
Baptist Hospital. For the reasons set out herein, we reverse and remand.
After Deborah A. Orenduff committed suicide, her nephew, David J.
Bennett, petitioned the McCracken District Court for appointment as administrator of her
estate and was granted such appointment. He then brought this wrongful-death action in
the name of the estate, claiming that the defendants' alleged malpractice caused his aunt
to take her own life. In the course of the litigation, the defendants deposed Deborah's
former husband, Richard Orenduff, who testified that before she died, she had executed a
will appointing him as executor of her estate, and that he had that will in his possession.
The appellees then all filed motions to dismiss the complaint, on the
grounds that David J. Bennett was not the proper representative of the estate and
therefore lacked standing to bring this lawsuit. The appellant responded and also
requested leave to petition the district court for probate of the newly found will and for
appointment of an appropriate executor, after which he would seek leave to amend the
complaint in this case to reflect the appropriate change in parties. The circuit court, after
considering the record, including the depositions taken and various affidavits and
documents filed by the parties, granted the motions to dismiss. This appeal followed.
Under Kentucky law, a wrongful-death action can only be brought by the
estate's lawful representative, either the executor or administrator. KRS 411.130(1).1
The appellant has not, in this action, contested the validity of the will produced by Mr.
1
The appellant correctly points out that the proceeds of a wrongful death action go not to the
estate, but to the kindred of the decedent, as specified in KRS 411.130(2). However, the action
must be brought by the personal representative of the estate, for the benefit of those statutorily
designated persons. Furthermore, to the extent that the complaint in this case includes a claim
for pain and suffering, or other claims that would have arisen during Mrs. Orenduff's lifetime and
survived her death pursuant to KRS 411.140, those claims would be for the benefit of the estate,
and that statute provides that they also must be brought by the personal representative.
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Orenduff. It appears, therefore, that it should be probated and Mr. Orenduff appointed
executor of the estate. However, for the reasons set out below, it does not follow that the
lawsuit filed by Mr. Bennett on behalf of the estate should be dismissed.
We note first of all that while the motions to dismiss were filed pursuant to
CR 12.03 and the circuit court's order was styled an “Order Dismissing Complaint,” this
was, in fact, a summary judgment. The circuit court allowed the parties to file various
depositions and affidavits in the record before ruling on the motions to dismiss. CR
12.03 states, “If, on such motion, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment. . . .”
See also Moss v. Robertson, 712 S.W.2d 351 (Ky. App. 1986)
Summary judgment, of course, is appropriate only when the record shows
that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56.03. In considering a motion for summary
judgment, all factual inferences must be drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion.
Fischer v. Jeffries, 697 S.W.2d 159 (Ky. App. 1985); Mitchell v. Jones, 283 S.W.2d 716
(Ky. 1955). A summary judgment should be granted “[o]nly where all the evidence,
viewed in a light most favorable to the opposing party, manifestly reveals that no genuine
issues of material fact exist.” Poe v. Rice, 706 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Ky. App. 1986).
The circuit court did not explain its reasoning, but granted the motions to
dismiss in a two-sentence order. The appellees have attempted to defend the dismissal by
arguing that either the Appellant, David J. Bennett; his attorney, Len W. Ogden, Jr., Esq.;
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and/or other non-party family members knew of the will of the decedent, Deborah A.
Orenduff, before the appellant filed his petition for appointment as administrator; and that
this knowledge makes Bennett's appointment as administrator void ab initio, rather than
merely voidable, so that any action he took under color of the district court order of
appointment, including the filing of this suit, was a nullity. We disagree and reverse the
circuit court order.
There is considerable confusion in the briefs concerning who knew of the
will, so a review of the record on this issue is necessary. It is clear that Richard
Orenduff, the deceased's ex-husband with whom she lived the last two years of her life,
knew of the will. He testified to such himself and produced the will. It is equally clear
and far more significant that there was absolutely no evidence presented that the
appellant, David J. Bennett, the court-appointed administrator, had any such knowledge.
As to the other relatives, Mr. Orenduff testified that he had a telephone
conversation with David C. Bennett, David J. Bennett's father and the brother of the
deceased, about the will and that David C. Bennett told him to take it to the lawyer, Mr.
Ogden. Mr. Bennett, in his affidavit, denied that such a conversation ever took place or
that he had any knowledge of the will. So the evidence as to David C. Bennett can only
be described as contested. The second brother, William K. Bennett, filed an affidavit
stating that he had no knowledge of the will, and there is no evidence in the record to the
contrary.2
2
It is not clear that David C. Bennett or William K. Bennett's knowledge or lack of knowledge,
although argued by the parties, is of any significance, as they were not parties to this action in
any court. They are mentioned here only for completeness.
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The appellees have represented that Mr. Orenduff testified that he took the
will to Mr. Ogden, but this is not entirely accurate. His initial deposition testimony was,
“No, I think he's got it here and it will have the date when we got it done.” After a break
in which Mr. Ogden apparently looked for the will and couldn't find it, Mr. Orenduff then
stated, “I can produce that and I will get it to Mr. Ogden.” Finally, Mr. Orenduff
submitted an affidavit, in response to the motion to dismiss, in which he stated,
At the request of Mr. Ogden, when I returned home after the
deposition, I looked to see if I still had the original Last Will
and Testament of Deborah Ann Orenduff. I found the
original Will at my home, a copy of which was not delivered
to Mr. Ogden until March 15, 2006, . . .
Based on having found the original Will at my home and after
further thought in an effort to remember and recollect, I feel
sure that I neither took Deborah A. Orenduff's Will to Mr.
Ogden before March 15, 2006, nor told him about its
existence prior to my deposition taken by the Defendants on
March 3, 2006.[3]
Mr. Ogden also filed his affidavit, denying that the will had been delivered
to him or that he had any knowledge of it prior to Mr. Orenduff's deposition. Thus, far
from the evidence being uncontradicted that Mr. Ogden knew of the will, it can fairly be
stated that there is no credible evidence of record that Mr. Ogden had such knowledge at
the time David J. Bennett was appointed administrator of the estate. The lack of any
proof that Mr. Ogden knew of the will is significant, as the appellees' next step in their
3
At least one of the appellees has argued that Mr. Orenduff's affidavit should not be considered,
as it contradicted, rather than merely explained, his deposition testimony, citing Lipsteuer v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 732 (Ky. 2000). Whether or not this may be so as to other
assertions contained in that affidavit, it clearly is not the case with regard to the statements
quoted above, which do no more than explain and clarify his deposition testimony.
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argument is to assert that his knowledge, as attorney, should be imputed to his client,
David J. Bennett. Obviously, knowledge that an attorney does not possess cannot be
imputed from him to his client.
The appellees next argue that even if the appellant lacked actual knowledge
of the will, he should be deemed to have had constructive knowledge of its existence.
This argument fails for at least two reasons. First, the record is void of any facts, known
to the appellant, that would lead him to expect that Ms. Orenduff had a will. Second, the
appellees cite no law to support their argument that the mere failure to investigate,
without such facts, will be deemed to constitute constructive knowledge.
Constructive knowledge (or usually, “constructive notice”) is a legal
concept by which notice of some fact is imputed to one who, by his knowledge of other
facts, should have expected the fact in question to be true, or at least have conducted
further inquiry. In each of the cases cited by the appellees, the necessity of facts giving
rise to the duty to investigate further is expressly stated. For instance, in Mitchell v. First
National Bank of Hopkinsville, 203 Ky. 770, 263 S.W. 15, 17 (1924), the court stated,
If a person has knowledge of such facts as would lead a fair
and prudent man, using ordinary care and thoughtfulness, to
make further inquiry, and he fails to do so, he is chargeable
with the knowledge which by ordinary diligence he would
have acquired.
Yet in this case, appellees have cited no facts known to the appellant from
which he should have expected that his aunt had a will. There is no evidence of record
whether or not she ever previously had a will; whether it was customary in that family to
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make wills; whether she had talked about making one or whether she had been advised to
do so. The claim is that the appellant should have gone to Mr. Orenduff and asked him if
he knew whether or not his ex-wife had a will, but the record is void of any evidence
explaining why he would have thought that to be appropriate or necessary.
It is further significant that none of the cases cited to us, nor any others that
we have found, have ever imposed on a party constructive knowledge of the existence of
an unrecorded will. The closest case on point is one cited by the appellees regarding
constructive notice, Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (1944), and it
tends to support, by analogy, the opposite conclusion. In that case, it was argued that a
second wife should be held to have constructive notice of her husband's divorce
settlement agreement with his first wife, in which he agreed to make a will providing for
the first wife. The court rejected this argument, first distinguishing the situation from
those involving constructive notice of recorded instruments and then stating:
Nor do we think the circumstances show any negligence on
the part of the second wife to investigate the judgment record
in the circuit court for some unusual provision affecting her
husband's property rights.
Id., at 584.
To impute constructive knowledge of this will to the appellant requires both
drawing factual inferences against him, rather than in his favor, as a court is required to
do before granting a summary judgment against him, and also extending the law of
constructive notice to an area where it has never before been applied. The first is
contrary to the law, and we are offered no legal or policy arguments for the second.
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However, there is an even greater problem with the appellees' argument
supporting the dismissal in this case. The second prong of that argument is that, if the
appellant can be said to have had either actual or constructive knowledge of the will, his
appointment is therefore void, and all acts taken by him as administrator, including the
filing of this lawsuit, are nullities. We neither have been cited, nor can we find, any law
to this effect. In fact, the established law is to the contrary.
KRS 395.040 governs the appointment of administrators when there is no
will, and subsection (4) of that statute reads,
If a will is afterwards produced and proved, the
administration shall cease, and the court may grant a
certificate of the probate of the will, or, in the proper case,
letters of administration with the will annexed.
It is not unusual for a will to be discovered after an estate is opened as
intestate, nor for a later will to be found after an earlier one has been probated. The
legislature specifically recognized this possibility with the above provision. Yet nothing
in this statute suggests that the earlier appointment of the administrator would be
considered void, nor that the actions taken by the administrator under the authority of the
prior court order would not stand. Rather, KRS 395.330 specifically provides,
Where an order of administration is set aside or letters of
administration revoked, or where any executor or
administrator is removed, or the will under which he acted is
declared invalid, all previous sales of personal estate made
lawfully by the executor or administrator and with good faith
on the part of the purchaser and all other lawful acts done by
the executor or administrator, shall remain valid and
effectual.
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Neither are there any cases holding or even suggesting that such an
appointment would be void ab initio. Rather, in Rabold v. Roberts, 444 S.W.2d 536 (Ky.
1969), the court held, in this very situation, where an administrator was appointed to
handle an apparently intestate estate and a will was later found, that the appointment was
“voidable, not void.” Id. at 538. The appellees make much of the fact that the
administrator in Rabold was apparently unaware of the will at the time she was appointed
(as was Mr. Bennett, so far as the record in this case reflects). However, there is nothing
in the language of that opinion which would suggest that the court thought her ignorance
of the will to be significant, or that the result would have been different and the
appointment would be void ab initio, if she had such knowledge.
In Ellwanger v. Ellwanger's Adm'r, 278 Ky. 574, 129 S.W.2d 127 (1939), a
creditor went into court the very day after the decedent died and was appointed
administrator, apparently without notice to any of the heirs. Nonetheless, the court
stated,
The appointment of Johnson as administrator on June 14th, the
day after John G. Ellwanger died, even though made with no
small degree of haste, and which haste is not explained in the
record, was voidable and not void.
Id. at 128.
Indeed, the only case cited to us in which an appointment of a personal
representative has been declared void illustrates why the appellant's appointment in this
case is only voidable. In Landrum v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 290 Ky. 724,
162 S.W.2d 543 (1942), a second appointment of an administrator, made without
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knowledge by the court that a previous administrator was already in place, was held to be
void. The court first held that once the appointment of a personal representative had been
made, the county [now district] court lacked jurisdiction to appoint a successor
representative until the first appointee was removed from office. The court in Landrum
noted that it appeared that the first appointee may well have been guilty of fraud in
obtaining his appointment, but quoted 21 Am. Jur. 450, §127, to state,
. . . as long as letters of administration previously granted are
still in force, a second grant of letters of administration is
void and open to collateral attack, and it has been held that
this is true although the letters first issued were fraudulently
obtained.
Landrum, supra, at 545.
The court in Landrum then held that the first appointment, though possibly
fraudulent, was not open to collateral attack, and cited 23 C.J. 1053, §142, to indicate that
the first appointment was merely “voidable, although not void.” Id. at 545.
The reasons for such a rule are obvious. First of all, the representative
appointed by the court carries with him, until he is removed, the authority of the court
order appointing him. Persons dealing with him have the right to assume that his
authority is valid. Secondly, if when he is removed, all acts that he has performed on
behalf of the estate become nullities, as is urged in this case, sales of both real estate and
personalty would have to be set aside. Judgments both for or against the estate would
have to be vacated. What of legitimate debts of the estate that had been paid?
Undoubtedly, such a rule would cause far more harm to innocent persons than the
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opposite rule. But we need not rely on policy considerations for our ruling. The law is
clear, in both the statutes and the cases cited above. A duly appointed representative of
an estate, even if he should not rightfully be in that office, serves with authority until he
is removed; his appointment is voidable, not void.
The appellees argue that “Kentucky is committed to the doctrine of
“testatorial absolutism,” by which “the privilege of the citizens of the Commonwealth to
draft wills to dispose of their property is zealously guarded by the courts. . . .” Bye v.
Mattingly, 975 S.W. 2d 451, 455 (Ky. 1998); and that, “it is the duty of the court to
permit the named executor to qualify unless he is disqualified under the statu[t]e, or other
good and substantial reasons be clearly established.” Kuechler v. Rubbathen, 266 Ky.
390, 99 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Ky. 1936). These are accurate statements of the law, but they
miss the point. The will produced by Mr. Orenduff, if valid, should be probated and Mr.
Orenduff, if he is otherwise qualified, should be appointed executor of the estate. But
David J. Bennett's appointment was "effective with the signing of an order by the
[district] judge." KRS 395.105. His administration will not cease until the putative will is
"produced and proved[.]" KRS 395.040(4). This has not occurred. Mr Bennett remains
the duly appointed administrator of the estate of Deborah A. Orenduff.
Appellees' motions constituted a collateral attack on the district court's
order. However, the order appointing Mr. Bennett is "not subject to collateral attack."
Reidinger v. Murphy, 337 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Ky. 1960); Landrum, supra.
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We believe that the circuit court should have granted the motion of the
appellant for leave to seek probate of the will and the appointment of an executor in the
district court and then for leave to file an amended complaint, substituting parties in this
action.
The Order Dismissing Complaint entered by the McCracken Circuit Court
is hereby reversed and set aside. This matter is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Len W. Ogden, Jr.
Paducah, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE MICHAEL A.
NICHOLAS, PH.D.:
Harry K. Herren
Elizabeth Ullmer Mendel
Rebecca L. Didat
Woodward, Hobson & Fulton, L.L.P.
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ARIBBE A.
MARTIN, M.D.:
E. Frederick Straub, Jr.
James R. Coltharp, Jr.
Whitlow Roberts Houston & Straub, PLLC
Paducah, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, BAPTIST
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC., D/B/A
WESTERN BAPTIST HOSPITAL:
L. Miller Grumley
Bradley & Freed, P.S.C.
Paducah, Kentucky
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