R.V. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, DEPARTMENT FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; AND A.J.V., A CHILD A.V. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, DEPARTMENT FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; AND A.J.V., A CHILD
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RENDERED: AUGUST 24, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001464-ME
R.V.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS R. FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-AD-00020
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
DEPARTMENT FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES; AND A.J.V., A CHILD
AND:
NO. 2006-CA-001551-ME
A.V.
v.
APPELLEES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS R. FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-AD-00020
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
DEPARTMENT FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES; AND A.J.V., A CHILD
OPINION REVERSING
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
APPELLEES
BEFORE: HOWARD AND STUMBO, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HOWARD, JUDGE: R.V. and A.V. appeal the judgment of the Calloway Circuit Court
that involuntarily terminated their parental rights to A.J.V. The appellants contend that
their due process rights were violated and that the findings of fact are not supported by
clear and convincing evidence. We agree as to the due process issue and reverse.
R.V. is the mother of A.J.V. A.V. is the putative father of A.J.V. by virtue
of his being named by R.V. as the biological father and having a positive paternity test.
R.V. and A.V. are not married but lived together at the time of the district and circuit
court proceedings. R.V. did not graduate from high school and she has a hearing
impairment and either borderline cognitive functioning or a learning disability. A.V. has
limited English skills and speaks Spanish as his primary language.
On October 22, 2003, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services
(hereinafter "the cabinet") filed a dependency, neglect, and abuse petition when the child
incurred a black eye after A.V. allegedly hit him. The social worker completing the
dependency petition alleged that A.J.V. was neglected and abused, that A.J.V. told her
that "his daddy caused his black eye," and that there were "ongoing concerns with
chronic neglect." The Calloway District Court placed emergency custody of A.J.V. with
the cabinet, which then placed the child with the foster parents with whom he has stayed
for the duration of these proceedings.
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110 (5) (b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
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On October 28, 2003, the district court entered an order appointing R.V.
and A.V. each an attorney to represent them in the dependency proceedings. The district
court also directed the appellants to undergo a drug evaluation and to complete domestic
violence classes. A family case plan was developed on October 29, 2003, with the
permanency goal of returning A.J.V. to his parents. The adjudication hearing and the
disposition hearing were both conducted together on January 9, 2004. R.V. and A.V.
were each represented by their court-appointed attorneys at this hearing. The court
concluded in the adjudication order that, based on R.V.'s admission of neglect and A.V.'s
admission of neglect and physical abuse, A.J.V. was neglected. In its disposition order,
the district court ordered that the "[p]arents must cooperate w/ CFC & complete all
programs & counseling that CFC requires of them."
During an April 28, 2004, review of the dependency proceeding, the district
court allowed R.V. visitation and A.V. supervised visitation. At this time, the district
court also relieved the attorneys appointed to represent R.V. and A.V. from their duties,
even though crucial decisions remained in the dependency action. On May 13, 2004,
another family case plan was developed which retained the permanency goal of returning
A.J.V. to the appellants and noted that R.V. and A.V. "are slowly progressing on their
goals." However, the cabinet changed its goal from one of returning A.J.V. to the
appellants to one of adoption in a new case plan developed on August 11, 2003. On
August 18, 2004, the district court conducted a permanency hearing. At that permanency
hearing, a guardian ad litem represented A.J.V., but neither appellant was represented by
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counsel. At this hearing, the district court approved the cabinet's goal change to adoption
and recommended that the cabinet "pursue permanency with foster parents." The district
court also found in the August 18 order that A.J.V. "has been in foster care for 15 of the
last 22 months," even though the dependency action was only commenced the preceding
October. The cabinet concedes that this finding was in error.
On September 10, 2004, the cabinet filed a petition for involuntary
termination of parental rights in the Calloway Circuit Court. By order entered on
October 27, 2004, the circuit court appointed separate attorneys for R.V. and A.V. They
were each represented by counsel throughout the circuit court proceedings and have been
ably represented throughout all proceedings before this court. The circuit court
conducted a bench trial, spread over numerous sessions. The cabinet contended at trial
that the appellants' parental rights should be terminated, even though by the time of trial
A.V. and R.V. had complied with all of their expectations, or “tasks,” in the family case
plan. In its order terminating the appellants' parental rights, the circuit court stated the
following:
The parents seem to sincerely want reunification; however the
Court is convinced that they will never fully appreciate the
steps needed to achieve that goal, nor will they work
consistently to do so. They are simply incapable of doing so.
...
It is also somewhat troublesome, not to mention a likely
violation of due process, when the parents are not appointed
counsel, or their court appointed counsel is relieved as
counsel of record with no alternative counsel in place. This
Court understands the frustration that a court can have when
individuals do not seem to be able to understand the message
-4-
that is being sent. However, when their capacity for
understanding is somewhat limited, mixed signals are akin to
a misleading situation which in some instances might border
on fraud. . . .
While the Court expressed its concerns with the due process
issue regarding lack of counsel during the goal change
hearing, the testimony that was presented in this trial
indicated that the social workers suggested to the parents that
they request appointed counsel again. The problem with this
is that it is not the responsibility of the social workers to do
so. . . .
Regardless, the Court does not believe that the failure of the
District Court to appoint counsel is fatal to the
Commonwealth's case, but it is a factor which the Court must
consider in determining whether reasonable efforts really
were made to reunite the family. In this instance, the Court
believes that despite the procedural shortcomings, the Cabinet
did act in good faith and essentially did all it could do. Also
the Cabinet is not the Court, and has no control over the
actions of the District Court.
R.V. and A.V. maintain on appeal that the final judgment of termination
must be reversed because their lack of counsel at the goal change hearing and other
critical stages of the dependency action detrimentally affected the termination
proceeding. We agree and hold that indigent parents are entitled to representation during
the entire dependency proceedings.
We begin with the proposition that parental rights are “essential” and
“basic” civil rights, “far more precious . . . than property rights.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
-5-
In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-754, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-1395,
71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), the United States Supreme Court stated,
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody and management of their child does not evaporate
simply because they have not been model parents or have lost
temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when
blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest
in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.
If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their
parental rights have a more critical need for procedural
protections than do those resisting state intervention into
ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy
weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with
fundamentally fair procedures.
The United States Supreme Court has also held, however, that no absolute
due process right to counsel exists in termination of parental rights actions, but that, from
a constitutional standpoint, appointment of counsel may be determined on a case-by-case
basis. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18,
101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct.
555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996).
Our state's legislature alleviated the need for a court to make case-by-case
determinations, however, by providing in KRS 625.080(3) for routine appointment of
counsel to represent indigent parents in termination cases. Likewise, in dependency
cases, KRS 620.100(1) states,
If the court determines, as a result of a temporary removal
hearing, that further proceedings are required, the court shall
advise the child and his parent or other person exercising
custodial control or supervision of their right to appointment
of separate counsel. . . .
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(b) The court shall appoint separate counsel for the parent
who exercises custodial control or supervision if the parent is
unable to afford counsel pursuant to KRS Chapter 31.
Thus, the custodial parent or parents2 were absolutely entitled to counsel in
both the district court and the circuit court, pursuant to KRS 620.100 and 625.080. The
circuit court provided both R.V. and A.V. with counsel at all stages of the proceedings
before that court. However, in the dependency proceedings, the district court appointed
counsel for both R.V. and A.V., but then relieved those attorneys of their duties of
representation after the initial disposition order was entered but when critical stages of
the dependency action remained.
Kentucky's statutory scheme to protect children and to adjudicate parental
rights provides a continuum of proceedings, even though a dependency action is not
required prior to the filing of a termination petition. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health
and Family Services v. C.V., 192 S.W.3d 703 (Ky.App. 2006). Clearly, the proceedings
in a dependency action greatly affect any subsequent termination proceeding. Indeed, in
the case at bar, the cabinet changed its goal from returning A.J.V. to his parents to
permanent placement with his foster family. The district court approved that goal
change. Although, in theory, the goal could change again, back to reunification, it is
clear that a district court's approving adoption as a permanency goal significantly
increases the risk that parental ties will be severed. Parents are entitled to a meaningful
2
It is unclear in this case whether the district court considered both R.V. and A.V. as custodial
parents, or just R.V. They lived together with the child. However, it appears that A.V. was
listed as a putative father, apparently because no paternity judgment had ever been entered.
While the constitutional requirements of due process would apply to both, the statutory
requirement of KRS 620.100 would apply only to the custodial parent(s).
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opportunity to be heard, including the right to consult with counsel, at goal change and
permanency hearings.3
We therefore hold, pursuant to both the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and KRS 625.080(3) and 620.100(1), that
the parental rights of a child may not be terminated unless that parent has been
represented by counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings. This includes all critical
stages of an underlying dependency proceeding in district court, unless it can be shown
that such proceeding had no effect on the subsequent circuit court termination case.
The circuit court recognized the due process problem created by the district
court's action in relieving counsel of their obligations before all critical stages of the
dependency proceeding were completed, calling this “troublesome” and “a likely
violation of due process.” However, the circuit court found that this problem was not
“fatal to the Commonwealth's case, but it is a factor which the Court must consider in
determining whether reasonable efforts really were made to reunite the family.” The
court noted that it “believes that despite the procedural shortcomings, the Cabinet did act
in good faith and essentially did all it could do.”
We certainly do not disagree that the cabinet acted in good faith. However,
it is not the cabinet's good faith that is at issue. It is the failure of the district court to
provide to the parents the protections to which they were entitled under the Due Process
Clause and KRS 625.100. Furthermore, we cannot say that this failure made no
3
The appellants also appear to argue that they were entitled to representation at case planning
conferences, between them and the cabinet. We do not go so far, and limit this ruling only to incourt hearings.
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difference in the circuit court termination proceeding. At the very hearing in district
court at which R.V. and A.V. were unrepresented, the permanency hearing of August 18,
2004, the court made an erroneous finding of fact that the child, A.J.V., had been in foster
care for 15 of the preceding 22 months, a finding that was directly significant to the later
termination of their parental rights pursuant to KRS 625.090(2)(j).4
We are not ruling that this child should be returned to his parents' custody,
or even that their parental rights may not ultimately be terminated. We only hold that this
termination proceeding was incurably tainted by the failure of the district court to provide
counsel for the parents at all critical stages of the underlying dependency proceeding.
Because we are reversing and remanding for the failure of the district court
to provide counsel, as set out above, it is unnecessary for us to consider the appellants'
other arguments.
The circuit court judgment terminating the parental rights of R.V. and A.V.
is reversed and this action is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
4
That the child have been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months is one of ten factors
set out in KRS 625.090(2), one or more of which must be proved to terminate a parent's parental
rights, along with a finding of neglect or abuse and a finding that termination is in the child's best
interests. The circuit court made all of the required findings, including finding at least three of
the factors set out in KRS 625.090(2). By the time this case got to the termination hearing in
circuit court, the statement that the child had been in foster care for 15 of 22 months was true
(“almost three years,” according to the circuit court). However, we cannot say that the district
court's erroneous finding, and its corresponding approval of the cabinet's goal change to
adoption, did not contribute to this fact, particularly in light of the fact that it was also true that
the parents in this case had, by the time of the termination hearing, completed all of their
assigned “tasks” to achieve reunification.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
R.V.:
BRIEF FOR THE CABINET FOR
HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES:
William C. Adams, III
Murray, Kentucky
Kristy Abel Fulkerson
Owensboro, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
A.V.:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
THE CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES:
Gregory Taylor
Murray, Kentucky
Dilissa Milburn
Mayfield, Kentucky
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