BOYD FELTNER v. RICHARD D. VANDUZER; UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND; A. THOMAS DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 5, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001070-WC
BOYD FELTNER
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-04-01247
RICHARD D. VANDUZER;
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS’ FUND;
A. THOMAS DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER,1 JUDGE; HUDDLESTON AND PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGES.2
HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
Boyd Feltner petitions for review of
an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board that affirmed an
Administrative Law Judge’s decision that awarded Richard D.
Vanduzer permanent partial occupational disability benefits.3
1
Judge David A. Barber concurred in this opinion prior to the expiration of
his term of office on December 31, 2006. Release of the opinion was delayed
by administrative handling.
2
Senior Judges Joseph R. Huddleston and Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special
Judges by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution and Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 21.580.
3
The Uninsured Employers’ Fund was added as a party in the administrative
proceeding because Feltner has no workers’ compensation insurance coverage.
The Uninsured Employers’ Fund has not filed an appellate brief.
Feltner disputes the ALJ’s findings that Vanduzer was his
employee and that Vanduzer had an average weekly wage of
$250.00.
In June 2003, Raymond Kilburn, who had known Boyd
Feltner since the 1970s, contracted with Feltner for the
construction of a “pole or auction barn,” in part because of
Feltner’s experience in construction and concrete work.
Kilburn
contracted to pay Feltner $13,005.00 and provide the building
materials.
Kilburn, together with his son, Dwight, and his son-
in-law, assisted in constructing the building.
Feltner worked
on the building until September 2003.
On July 25, 2003, Vanduzer sustained bilateral wrist
fractures when he allegedly fell from a ladder while working on
the auction barn.
He was taken to the Hazard Appalachian
Regional Hospital, where Dr. Mukut Sharma diagnosed a grade one
open comminuted fracture at the lower end of the left radius and
a closed displaced fracture at the lower end of the right
radius.
Dr. Sharma operated on Vanduzer the same day, with
placement of bilateral external fixative devices and application
of a MIG bone graft at the left wrist.
Subsequently, Vanduzer
decided to consult Dr. Amit Gupta at Kleinert, Kutz and
Associates Hand Care Center in Louisville.
Dr. Gupta performed
revision surgery on August 4, 2003, removing the external
fixator from the right wrist and placing the wrist in a cast.
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He also inserted volar radial plating on the left wrist.
Vanduzer continued to see Dr. Gupta for several months.
He
continues to complain of pain and numbness in both wrists.
On July 20, 2004, Vanduzer filed his Application for
Resolution of Injury Claim with the Board stating that he had
sustained his wrist injury while working as a carpenter for Boyd
Feltner.
He also claimed that he had a weekly wage of $250.00
at the time of the injury.
On September 17, 2004, Feltner
responded to the notice of claim denying that Vanduzer was his
employee on the date of the injury.
On August 28, 2004, Dr. O.M. Patrick conducted a
functional evaluation examination and assessed a 43% whole body
impairment due to loss of motion and strength in both wrists.
On July 28, 2005, Dr. Gregory Gleis performed an independent
medical examination of Vanduzer.
Dr. Gleis assessed a 19% whole
body impairment rating and opined that Vanduzer could not return
to work as a carpenter because of limitations in using his hands
for repetitive forceful activity.
Dr. Gleis was critical of Dr.
Patrick’s methodology in assessing the impairment rating.
On August 18, 2005, the ALJ conducted a hearing at
which Vanduzer and Feltner testified.
The parties also
submitted the depositions of Raymond Kilburn; Dwight Kilburn;
Chester Feltner, Boyd Feltner’s son; Thomas Teague, an
acquaintance of Felter; Barbara Taylor, an acquaintance of
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Vanduzer; and the prior depositions of Vanduzer and Feltner.
Vanduzer also introduced telephone records from 2002 showing
telephone calls between him and Feltner, and Feltner submitted
his telephone records for three months in 2003.
Vanduzer testified that he had worked for Feltner in
2002 in Lexington and that Feltner had hired him in early summer
of 2003 to work as a carpenter on the Kilburn building.
He
stated that he was paid weekly in cash at the rate of $8.00 per
hour and typically worked 40 hours per week depending on weather
conditions.
Vanduzer indicated that Feltner, Raymond Kilburn,
and Chester Kilburn were present at the time of his accident and
that Feltner dropped him off at the hospital.
Vanduzer stated
that Feltner would use the telephone to contact him about the
work schedule.
Boyd Feltner denied having hired Vanduzer to work on
the Kilburn building.
Feltner stated that he only knew Vanduzer
by another name when both were employed by a concrete company
sometime in 2001.
Feltner denied having had any personal
contact, including telephone calls or conversations, with
Vanduzer in 2002 or 2003.
In his deposition, Feltner reiterated
that he had not hired Vanduzer and the only persons who worked
on the auction barn were Raymond Kilburn and his two helpers.
He indicated that he first heard of the incident when someone
from the Office of Workers’ Claims contacted him.
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In her deposition, Barbara Taylor said she became
acquainted with Vanduzer because her son and Vanduzer’s step-son
were in Headstart pre-school together and Vanduzer had done some
odd jobs for her.
Taylor testified that she had visited
Vanduzer on the jobsite for the Kilburn building and had visited
him in the hospital following the accident in July 2003.
Taylor
stated that Vanduzer told her that he was working for Feltner
and that Feltner took him to the hospital after he was injured.
Raymond Kilburn testified in his deposition that he
hired Feltner to work on and oversee construction of the auction
barn.
He said that he did not know Vanduzer and that he, his
son, and his son-in-law were the only other persons who worked
on the project, but admitted that they usually worked later in
the day after Feltner had left the site.
Feltner on an irregular basis by check.
Kilburn said he paid
Finally, he denied
knowing that anyone had been injured on the job site.
Dwight
Kilburn’s deposition testimony supported his father’s testimony.
In his deposition, Thomas Teague testified that he had employed
Vanduzer for a few weeks in 2001 before firing him.
Teague also
stated that he had known both Feltner and Raymond Kilburn for
several years and had never known about either having employed
Vanduzer.
On October 10, 2005, the ALJ handed down an opinion
finding an employment relationship between Vanduzer and Feltner.
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The ALJ awarded Vanduzer permanent partial disability benefits
based on a 19% whole person permanent partial impairment, an
average weekly wage of $250.00, and a multiplier under KRS
342.730 (1)(k) because Vanduzer cannot return to the same type
of work that he was performing at the time of his injury.
Feltner’s petition for reconsideration was denied.
2006, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision.
On April 14,
This appeal
followed.
In a workers’ compensation action, the employee bears
the burden of proving every essential element of a claim.4
As
the fact-finder, the ALJ has the authority to determine the
quality, character, and substance of the evidence.5
Similarly,
the ALJ has the sole authority to determine the weight to be
given to and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.6
The
ALJ as fact-finder also may reject any testimony and believe or
disbelieve various parts of the evidence even if it came from
the same witness.7
The claimant has the burden of establishing
the existence of an employment relationship, but once he
4
Lane v. S & S Tire, Inc. No. 15, 182 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Ky. 2005); Burton v.
Foster Wheeler Corp., 72 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Ky. 2002); Gibbs v. Premier Scale
Co./Indiana Scale Co., 50 S.W.3d 754, 763 (Ky. 2001).
5
Garrett Mining Co. v. Nye, 122 S.W.3d 513, 518 (Ky. 2003); Square D Co. v.
Tipton, 862 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Ky. 1993).
6
Miller v. East Kentucky Beverage/Pepsico, Inc., 951 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky.
1997); Carnes v. Parton Bros. Contracting, Inc., 171 S.W.3d 60, 66 (Ky. App.
2005).
7
Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, 19 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Ky. 2000); Whittaker v. Rowland,
998 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Ky. 1999).
-6-
introduces competent evidence of probative value, the ALJ may
accept it.8
When the ALJ’s decision favors the party with the
burden of proof, the issue on appeal is whether the ALJ’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence, that is, evidence
of substance and consequence sufficient to induce conviction in
the minds of reasonable people.9
The ALJ has broad discretion in
determining the extent of occupational disability.10
A party challenging the ALJ’s factual finding, as
Feltner does, must do more than present some evidence supporting
a contrary conclusion to justify reversal.11
Upon review of the
Board’s decision, our function is limited to correcting the
Board only in those instances where we perceive that “the Board
has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or
precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so
flagrant as to cause gross injustice.”12
Feltner raises two issues on appeal by challenging the
ALJ’s findings on the existence of an employment relationship
and the assessment of a $250.00 average weekly wage.
8
The
Uninsured Employers’ Fund v. Brewster, 818 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Ky. 1991).
9
Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways v. Poe, 69 S.W.3d 60, 62 (Ky.
2001); Whittaker, supra, note 6 at 481.
10
Cal Glo Coal Co. v. Mahan, 729 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Ky. App. 1987); Thompson v.
Fischer Packing Co., 883 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Ky. App. 1994).
11
Poe, supra, note 8 at 62; Ira A. Watson Department Store v. Hamilton, 34
S.W.3d 48, 52 (Ky. 2000).
12
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Ky. 1992). See
also McNutt Construction v. Scott, 40 S.W.3d 854 (Ky. 2001); Butler’s Fleet
Service v. Martin, 173 S.W.3d 628, 631 (Ky. App. 2005).
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primary issue in this appeal involves the finding that Vanduzer
was employed by Feltner to work on the auction barn at the time
of his injury.
There was conflicting, indeed diametrically
opposed, evidence on this issue.
The ALJ analyzed this issue as
follows:
[Vanduzer] has testified to severe
memory problems. The ALJ is persuaded that
[Vanduzer’s] work history made of record
is suspect or incomplete. The record suggests
the possibility that [Vanduzer] spent a
portion of his employment life in illegal
activities. The ALJ believes that though
the legal requirements of notice are met,
many problems of this case were caused
because [Vanduzer] did not contact Boyd
Feltner after the injury.
In this case it is determined that the
material facts have more weight and are more
credible than the testimony. Material facts
include medical records that [Vanduzer]
suffered a severe injury and phone records.
It is alleged that [Vanduzer] injured
both arms and wrists when he fell from a
12-foot ladder.
The ALJ believes that the viability
of [Vanduzer’s] case turns on the
implications from [Feltner’s] home
telephone records. Less than a month
before [Vanduzer’s] severe injury,
calls were made from [Feltner’s] home
to the home of [Vanduzer’s] girlfriend.
This tends to discredit several of [Feltner’s]
contentions.
Telephone records of [Vanduzer]
and [Feltner] were filed into evidence.
The telephone records submitted by [Vanduzer]
were from 2002, and the records from
2003 were unobtainable. From April to
June, 2002, [Vanduzer] called [Feltner]
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approximately 24 times. [Feltner’s]
telephone records from 2003
were filed. The best interpretation of the
evidence is that [Feltner] called [Vanduzer]
on two occasions less than one
month before the injury. Though it is
credible that [Feltner] was not
familiar with the name under which [Vanduzer]
brought his claim, it was the general
thrust of [Feltner’s] defense
that he had no or very minimal contact
with [Vanduzer] before the injury and
thereafter until this claim was filed.
[Feltner’s] contention that [Vanduzer]
did not work for him and that [Feltner]
did not know [Vanduzer], when examined
in light of the telephone evidence
and other evidence and testimony in the
record, is not credible.
When the evidence is examined in this
light, it becomes apparent that an
employment relationship existed between
[Vanduzer] and [Feltner]. Barbara
Taylor, a guardian or fiduciary of [Vanduzer]
testified that she did see [Vanduzer] working
at the site, and she knew that they were
working on a “pole barn,” which the
owner of the property,
Mr. Kilbourne (sic)13 verified. She also
witnessed [Vanduzer] being paid in cash.
It was customary for an employee in a
position such as [Vanduzer’s] to be paid
in cash. [Vanduzer’s] former employer,
Mr. Teague, admitted that he also paid
in cash. The ALJ believes the best evidence
is that [Vanduzer] was paid in cash by
[Feltner] at a rate of $8.00 an hour.
[Vanduzer] has a history of
irresponsibility that has affected the
presentation of his case. Nevertheless,
[Feltner’s] admitted inconsistency in
his testimony makes [Feltner] a less
believable witness on certain issues.
13
The correct spelling is Kilburn.
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[Feltner] has supplied several corroborating
witnesses, but the ALJ believes that they
are not impartial witnesses. The sons of
[Feltner] and of Mr. Kilbourne (sic),
the building owner, testified that
[Vanduzer] was not an employee. However,
they were not at the job site on a regular
basis. They could not know if someone else
was there working. The ALJ believes
[Vanduzer] was an employee of [Feltner]
on the date of his injury. [Vanduzer]
was performing his job when he was required
to climb a 12-foot ladder. He was at the
top of the ladder when it slipped and fell,
taking him down with it. He landed on
concrete on his arms, which caused him to
break both of his wrists. He immediately
went to the emergency room, and underwent
surgery later that same day.
On appeal, Feltner contends the ALJ’s decision is not
supported by substantial evidence.
Feltner points to several
apparent inconsistencies and contradictions in Vanduzer’s
testimony including his work history and his use of aliases.
Feltner also notes that Vanduzer failed to produce evidence in
his control that he initially agreed to provide.
He contends
that Barbara Taylor was biased and her testimony conflicted with
Vanduzer’s testimony as to his work history.
The record indicates that much of the testimony of the
witnesses is in direct conflict.
The ALJ acknowledged the
inconsistent and contradictory aspect of the evidence presented
by Vanduzer and major conflicts in the testimony.
As a result,
he relied heavily on the documentary evidence contained in the
telephone records to assess the credibility of the witnesses.
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The ALJ determined that the telephone records impugned Feltner’s
testimony that he only knew Vanduzer by another name, that he
had had no contact with Vanduzer for several years prior to the
accident, and that Vanduzer was not working with Feltner in July
2003.
Feltner criticizes the ALJ’s reliance on the two short
telephone calls from Feltner to Vanduzer’s number on July 2,
2003, arguing that at that time Vanduzer allegedly had separated
from his ex-wife and was not living at the address where the
telephone was located.
Feltner also states the “two calls were
made within a two-minute period and were of such a short
duration as to preclude any inference that any conversation
actually took place.”
Regardless of whether Feltner actually
spoke with Vanduzer, the fact that Feltner made a telephone call
to the telephone used by Vanduzer suggests some intent by
Feltner to attempt to contact Vanduzer and clearly undermines
his testimony.
We agree with the Board that the ALJ’s decision
to discredit Feltner’s testimony was based on reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence.
The ALJ also gave greater weight to Vanduzer’s
corroborating witness than Feltner’s witnesses.
He noted that
Barbara Taylor’s testimony was consistent with that of Thomas
Teague and Raymond Kilburn; whereas, Kilburn admitted that he
worked on the barn primarily late in the day after Feltner had
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left, so he would have been less likely to see Vanduzer at the
worksite.
The ALJ is authorized to assess the credibility of the
witnesses and assign the weight accorded the evidence.
His
analysis properly accounted for the discrepancies in the
testimony and drew reasonable inferences from the documentary
evidence.
In sum, the ALJ’s finding of an employment
relationship between Feltner and Vanduzer was supported by
substantial evidence.
Feltner also challenges the ALJ’s finding that
Vanduzer earned an average weekly wage of $250.00.
He claims
that Vanduzer failed to provide any evidence to support his
claim on wages and that the evidence suggests that Vanduzer was
only a seasonal employee.
Feltner points out that Vanduzer did
not submit any tax returns and had no IRS W2 or 1099 forms to
verify his wages.
As the claimant, Vanduzer had the burden of proving
each and every element of his claim including his average weekly
wage.14
Vanduzer testified that he was paid $8.00 per hour on
this job and generally worked a 40-hour week, depending on
weather conditions, which results in a weekly wage of $320.00.
His failure to provide tax records is understandable given the
common practice of paying persons in construction, especially on
14
See Fawbush v. Gwinn, 103 S.W.3d 5, 10 (Ky. 2003).
-12-
jobs of short duration, in cash, which Vanduzer claimed occurred
with Feltner.
Teague testified that he paid Vanduzer $9.00–
$10.00 per hour in cash when Vanduzer worked for him.
Despite
the lack of hard documentary evidence on Vanduzer’s wage
history, the ALJ’s calculation of $250.00 as the average weekly
wage represented a realistic estimation under the circumstances.
Additionally, Feltner’s assertion that Vanduzer should
be considered a “seasonal employee” was properly rejected by the
Board.
While judicial review of an ALJ’s decision on factual
issues is limited, statutory interpretation is a question of law
subject to de novo review and the courts are not bound by the
Board’s interpretation of a statute.15
The cardinal rule of
statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the
statute’s intent.16
The policy and purpose of a statute should
be considered from a review of the entire statute in determining
the meaning of the words used.17
Generally, average weekly wage for workers employed
for a short period of time is calculated based on earnings over
15
See AK Steel Corp v. Childers, 167 S.W.3d 672, 675 (Ky. App. 2005); Hall’s
Hardwood Floor Co. v. Stapleton, 16 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Ky. App. 2000).
16
Hale v. Combs, 30 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Ky. 2000); Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, supra,
note 6, at 94.
17
Bowling v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 172 S.W.3d 333, 341 (Ky.
2005); Cabinet for Families and Children v. Cummings, 163 S.W.3d 425, 430
(Ky. 2005).
-13-
a 13-week period.18
However, average weekly wage is determined
based on a different formula for seasonal employees.
KRS
342.140(2) provides that “[i]n occupations which are exclusively
seasonal and therefore cannot be carried on throughout the year,
the average weekly wage shall be taken to be one-fiftieth (1/50)
of the total wages which the employee has earned from all
occupations during the twelve (12) calendar months immediately
preceding the injury.”
In Department of Parks v. Kinslow,19 which involved a
general maintenance worker at a state park who worked from April
to October but not the rest of the year, the Supreme Court
indicated that the apparent intent of the statute was to reduce
a worker’s recovery if the employment was “with a business that
carried on naturally for only a particular season of the year,”20
so that seasonal workers should not receive the same level of
benefits as a year-round worker.
In Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Duvall,21 the Supreme Court held that work performed by a paving
company employee was not seasonal despite the fact that filling
pot-holes was affected by the weather, especially during the
winter months, because the employee performed other services in
18
See KRS 342.140(1)(e).
19
481 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1972).
20
Id. at 688.
21
884 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1994).
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the winter and other paving companies worked year-round.
Finally, in Desa International, Inc. v. Barlow,22 the Supreme
Court found that KRS 342.140(2) applied to a worker who worked
only seven to eight months a year for a manufacturer of
residential heating units that shut down for the remainder of
the year.
The Court stated that “[t]he purpose of KRS 342.140
is to determine a given worker’s wage-earning capacity so that
the resulting income benefit will be based upon a realistic
estimation of what the worker would have expected to earn had
the injury not occurred.”23
The Court concluded that an employee
whose job involved only seven to eight months of work per year
would not earn as much as a year-round worker and should not
receive the same level of disability benefits.
Vanduzer was working as a framing carpenter on the
auction barn at the time of his injury.
He testified that he
worked a variety of jobs primarily in construction and
carpentry, and that he generally stayed employed throughout most
of the year.
Despite the paucity of documentary evidence
concerning Vanduzer’s work-history, he need not be characterized
as a seasonal employee under KRS 342.140(2).
Although
construction and carpentry work is affected by the weather, it
generally is performed year-round and includes duties that can
22
59 S.W.3d 872 (Ky. 2001).
23
Id. at 875.
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be performed inside during the winter months.
Also, Vanduzer
did work throughout the year performing handyman jobs as well as
traditional construction work.
While Vanduzer’s employment may
have been intermittent, it was not restricted to a particular
portion of the year.
Under these facts, the policy of reducing
the compensation for a seasonal employee is not appropriate in
this case.
Because the Board did not overlook or misconstrue
controlling statutes or err in assessing the evidence so as to
cause gross injustice, its opinion is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen N. Calvert
Compton, Kentucky
McKinnley Morgan
MORGAN, MADDEN, BRASHEAR &
COLLINS
London, Kentucky
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