ANDRE WILLIS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JULY 13, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000824-MR
ANDRE WILLIS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDWIN M. WHITE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00183
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; KELLER, JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: Andre Willis appeals from an order of the Christian Circuit
Court that denied his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Kentucky Rules of
Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. After our review, we affirm.
The facts of this case were set forth by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in
Willis v. Commonwealth, No. 1996-SC-0725-MR, slip op. (Ky. Sept. 28, 2000), which
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
dealt with Willis’s direct appeal of his conviction. We repeat a portion of that opinion as
follows:
On April 11, 1995, Appellant was visiting the home of
his friend Fidel Harris, when Harris and Darryl Bonner began
arguing over a missing compact disc. At Bonner’s
prompting, his friend Deandre Brown took up his argument
with Harris. When Appellant attempted to support his friend
Harris, Brown began arguing with him as well, and eventually
threatened to fight Appellant. Fidel Harris’s mother
eventually asked everyone to leave her home, and the parties
dispersed. Later that night, Brown, drunk, belligerent, and
carrying a handgun, returned to the Harris home and began to
cause a disturbance. At one point, he threatened to hurt
Appellant, who was not present. Bonner and several friends
arrived and convinced Brown to leave. A friend called
Appellant at 3 a.m. to tell him of the disturbance, and to
report that Brown had stated he would be waiting for
Appellant at the Harris home, where he intended to “get”
Appellant.
The following day, as Appellant and Harris returned to
Harris’s home following a basketball game, they discovered
Brown and his friends, including Bonner, “hanging out”
nearby. Brown confronted Appellant and asked him what he
intended to do about his threat from the night before.
Appellant stated that he did not want to fight Brown.
Appellant then left, but, upon Harris’s request, promised to
return later that evening. When he returned, Brown and his
friends were still there. Appellant parked his car with the
headlights pointing toward Brown and his friends, then pulled
a gun from his glove compartment. Several witnesses
testified that after he emerged from the car, Appellant yelled,
“How do you want it motherf-----?” and then began firing his
gun at Brown. According to these witnesses, Brown tried to
run, but tripped and fell. Appellant stood over him and
continued to fire shots into his back while he lay on the
ground.
Testifying on his own behalf, Appellant explained he
was afraid of Brown and did not know what to expect. He
was frightened because Brown had indicated he wanted to
have a “showdown” with Appellant. According to Appellant,
-2-
as he approached the Harris home, Brown yelled, “It’s going
to be your death” then pulled out a gun. Without hesitation,
Appellant fired his own gun several times until it jammed.
He then jumped into his car and fled the scene. Both Brown
and Bonner were fatally wounded in the shooting, Bonner
from a single gunshot wound, Brown from multiple gunshot
wounds, four of which were fired into his back. Although a
gun was found on Bonner’s body, none was found on
Brown’s. Appellant turned himself in to authorities ten days
later. At trial, Appellant explained that he fired his gun
because he was afraid Brown would kill him, he did not
intend to kill anyone but only intended to protect himself, and
he did not know Bonner had been killed until he saw a report
of the shooting on television....”
Willis, No. 1996-SC-0725-MR, slip op. at 1-3.
On June 14, 1995, the Christian County Grand Jury indicted Willis on two
counts of murder for the shootings of Deandre Brown and Darryl Bonner. Since the
indictment involved multiple deaths, the Commonwealth sought the death penalty against
Willis. Following a four-day trial, the jury convicted Willis of one count of murder as to
Brown and one count of wanton murder as to Bonner. On August 2, 1996, the trial court
sentenced Willis to life in prison, with a minimum of 25 years to be served without a
chance of parole. Willis appealed this decision as a matter of right to the Supreme Court
of Kentucky, which affirmed his conviction.
On December 13, 2001, Willis, pro se, filed a motion to vacate his
conviction pursuant to RCr 11.42 and requested an evidentiary hearing. In his motion, he
claimed that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The motion was
denied by the trial court without a hearing in an order entered on February 14, 2002. On
June 6, 2003, we rendered an opinion vacating and remanding the case back to the trial
-3-
court for an evidentiary hearing since we determined that there were material issues of
fact that could not be resolved on the face of the record. Upon remand, the trial court
held an evidentiary hearing on December 12, 2005. On March 27, 2006, the court
entered an order that again denied Willis’s claim for RCr 11.42 relief. This appeal
followed.
On appeal, Willis presents a number of arguments in support of his
generalized contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After
reviewing the evidence as a whole, however, we do not agree that counsel’s performance
was deficient; nor do we conclude that Willis was somehow prejudiced in a manner that
would undermine the reliability of his conviction. Nevertheless, we have considered each
of his arguments.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under RCr 11.42, a movant
must satisfy a two-part test by showing: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and
(2) that the deficiency caused actual prejudice causing the proceeding to be
fundamentally unfair and producing a result that was unreliable. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984);
Commonwealth v. Tamme, 83 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Ky. 2002). In assessing counsel’s
performance, we must examine whether the alleged acts or omissions were outside the
wide range of prevailing professional norms based on an objective standard of
reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65. “Counsel is
constitutionally ineffective only if performance below professional standards caused the
-4-
defendant to lose what he otherwise would probably have won.” Haight v.
Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 441 (Ky. 2001), quoting United States v. Morrow, 977
F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992). Counsel is not held to a standard of infallibility. Rather,
“[t]he critical issue is not whether counsel made errors but whether counsel was so
thoroughly ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable victory.” Id.
In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we are required
to focus on the totality of evidence that was presented to the judge or jury and to assess
the overall performance of counsel throughout the case. We must then determine
whether the acts or omissions in question overcome a presumption that counsel rendered
reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 441-42. That presumption of competence is to
be afforded a high level of deference by a reviewing court. Harper v. Commonwealth,
978 S.W.2d 311, 315 (Ky. 1998). “A defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel, or
counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel likely to render and rendering
reasonably effective assistance.” Haight, 41 S.W.3d. at 442; see also Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 911 (Ky. 1998). In any RCr 11.42 proceeding, the
defendant bears the burden of establishing convincingly that he was deprived of some
substantial right that would justify the extraordinary relief entailed in RCr 11.42
proceedings. Haight, 41 S.W.3d at 442; Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118
(Ky. 1968).
Willis first argues that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel because they were unable to “correctly articulate appropriate questions” that
-5-
would have solicited admissible testimony from him as to his fear of Brown. However,
Willis admits in his brief that he was asked at trial why he was afraid of Brown. He
testified that Brown had previously stated that he had shot and beaten people before, that
he had spent time in prison, and that he was not afraid of going back to prison. This
testimony was corroborated by witness Fidel Harris. Moreover, a number of witnesses
presented testimony indicating that Brown had made threatening comments to Willis
before the shooting and that Brown and Bonner had been known to own and carry guns,
were seen with guns just prior to the shooting, were drug-dealers, and frequented highdrug and high-crime areas. The jury was presented with substantial evidence addressing
the victims’ questionable lifestyles and the fact that Willis had ample reason to fear them.
Indeed, the Supreme Court agreed, noting in its opinion on Willis’s direct appeal that “no
fewer than five witnesses, including Appellant himself, were permitted to testify they
heard Brown threaten to fight, kill, or otherwise harm Appellant.” Willis, No. 1996-SC0725-MR, slip op. at 4. Accordingly, the evidence strongly refutes Willis’s allegations
that the performance of his attorneys was deficient in this respect, and his argument must
be rejected.
Willis also raises a related complaint about the trial court’s refusal to admit
a number of additional evidentiary items. However, an alleged trial error that should
have been raised on direct appeal is not an appropriate basis for RCr 11.42 relief. See
Brown v. Commonwealth, 788 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Ky. 1990); Bronston v. Commonwealth,
481 S.W.2d 666, 667 (Ky. 1972). Additionally, the Supreme Court rejected this
-6-
argument after considering it on direct appeal. See Willis, No. 1996-SC-0725-MR, slip
op. at 5. Thus, we may not consider this portion of Willis’s argument.
Willis next contends that his counsel was ineffective in cross-examining
witness Andrea Vernon and “clarifying” her testimony. Vernon testified that she was in
the vicinity of Diane Harris’s apartment on the evening of April 12, 1995, when Willis
drove up and parked his car facing the apartment. According to Vernon, she heard Willis
say something to Brown, and then she saw Willis walking toward him. When she heard
shots fired, she retreated into the apartment. When she came back outside, Willis was
gone and Brown was on the ground. Willis claims that Vernon gave “vastly conflicting”
testimony because she also indicated that she did not see the shooting. He notes that
unlike other witnesses, she did not recall that Willis said, “How do you want it,
motherf*****?” Willis argues that his counsel should have done a better job pointing out
these inconsistencies in questioning Vernon.
After reviewing Vernon’s testimony at trial, we fail to see the alleged
contradiction. It is entirely possible that Vernon could have heard an argument and shots
being fired without seeing exactly what happened. Moreover, from our review of the
record as a whole, we fail to see how this testimony is substantially inconsistent or in
conflict with that of the other witnesses at trial. Vernon testified that Willis got out of his
car and said something to Brown; then shots were fired. Every other person who
witnessed the incident in question testified to the same general facts. We also note that
Willis fails to point out that his counsel ably attacked the credibility of Vernon’s
-7-
testimony. He was able to elicit an admission from her that she was “strung out” on
crack cocaine and alcohol at the time of the shooting and that she had not slept for four
days. She also admitted that she had seen Brown carrying a gun on a number of
occasions in the past – evidence that supported Willis’s claim of self-defense.
Consequently, we fail to see any evidence of deficient performance as to this witness.
Willis next argues that his attorneys were ineffective during closing
arguments in failing to address the allegedly “false testimony” of witness Raymond
Thomas. He claims that Thomas “essentially lied during trial and twisted the story
around to make appellant appear to be the aggressor and the villain.” However,
Thomas’s testimony was consistent with that of other witnesses at trial. This argument
(and Willis's complaints as to all witnesses in general) essentially amounts to an
expression of his dissatisfaction with the fact that Thomas testified to a version of events
different from his own. He claims that counsel had a duty to develop or manipulate this
testimony to reveal a favorable outcome; i.e., the “truth” according to Willis. We do not
agree, and we find no deficiency on this point.
For similar reasons, we reject Willis’s contention that his lawyers were
deficient in their examination of witness Brian Harris. Willis argues that Harris also gave
false testimony at trial. He cites two statements that Harris allegedly gave to the police
indicating that he was not at the scene of the shooting when it occurred. However, Willis
admits that there is nothing in the record to support these alleged statements other than
his own assertions that they had been made. The record reflects instead that Harris
-8-
testified – consistently with other witnesses – that Willis shot Brown and Bonner with a
black automatic handgun after getting out of his car. We also note that defense counsel
ably elicited testimony from Harris about the previous arguments between Willis and
Brown as well as the threats made by Brown towards Willis. This testimony was
consistent with Willis’s theory of self-defense. Consequently, there was no deficiency of
counsel's performance with respect to this witness.
Willis next argues that his attorneys were ineffective because they did not
present evidence concerning James Foster. He claims that Foster gave a statement to
police indicating that he saw Willis driving a truck bearing Chicago tags and gang signs
on the night of the shooting. One of Willis’s attorneys testified at the evidentiary hearing
that he did not introduce evidence of this statement because it was “ridiculous” and he
did not think anyone would believe it. We agree. The statement was inconsistent with
the testimony of every other witness at trial who placed Willis at the scene of the
shooting. Additionally, it would have tended to contradict Willis’s claim of self-defense
and would have injected the detrimental element of associating Willis with gang activity.
Accordingly, we believe that the decision not to introduce the statement made by Willis’s
counsel falls within the realm of “sound trial strategy” and does not reflect deficient
performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; Moore v.
Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Ky. 1998).
Willis also complains that he was prejudiced by the performance of his
attorneys because they did not interview or depose Diane Harris, whom he characterizes
-9-
as “the central figure in the case” because she was “the sole reason for appellant’s
involvement” in the events leading up to the incident in question. Mrs. Harris was the
mother of witnesses Brian and Fidel Harris, and the shooting took place in front of her
residence. She died of cancer prior to trial and was, therefore, unable to testify. Both of
Willis’s attorneys agreed at the RCr 11.42 evidentiary hearing that Mrs. Harris’s
testimony would have been important. However, beyond Willis’s vague assertions that
Mrs. Harris was allegedly the motive for his involvement in the events in question, he
presents no specific argument or reason as to why her testimony would have been so
crucial to the case as to merit reversal. Fidel Harris testified that Willis was like a “big
brother” to him and that he had a close association with Mrs. Harris. Willis himself gave
testimony about his relationship with the Harris family. Consequently, we must conclude
that any testimony that might have been given by Mrs. Harris as to her association with
Willis would have been cumulative in nature and likely would not have changed the
result at trial. Therefore, this argument must fail.
Willis next raises a number of complaints as to testimony given by witness
Jamal Brown. None of these allegations merits extensive discussion. We simply note
that none of them remotely supports the argument that “counsel was so thoroughly
ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable victory.” Haight, 41
S.W.3d at 441.
Willis contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
present an adequate closing argument. He provides no specific basis for this contention,
- 10 -
offering only general assertions that counsel “failed to address adverse testimony and
such,” “allowed incompetent evidence to become the law of the land,” and “allow[ed]
eyewitnesses to lie and embellish testimony, subsequently making appellant appear to be
the initial aggressor as well as a senseless killer.” Claims for post-conviction relief must
be supported by specific facts. See RCr 11.42(2); Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 803 S.W.2d
573, 576 (Ky. 1990). Therefore, a “[f]ailure to provide factual support as required by
RCr 11.42 provides the basis for summary dismissal of that part of his claim.” Sanders v.
Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 390 (Ky. 2002).
Willis also argues that his attorneys were deficient because they failed to
object to certain statements made by the Commonwealth during its closing argument.
Specifically, Willis contends that counsel should have objected to the Commonwealth’s
assertions that Brown had “humiliated” him and that “no witnesses saw Deandre Brown
with a gun.”
As to the first assertion, a number of witnesses testified that Brown and
Willis had had confrontations in the past and that on one occasion, Willis refused to fight
Brown following a challenge. Therefore, we agree with the Commonwealth that the first
assertion as to humiliation “was simply a reasonable comment on the evidence, well
within the limits of acceptable conduct.” Maxie v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 860, 866
(Ky. 2002). Defense counsel’s failure to object to it did not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel. As for the second assertion concerning the gun, Willis complains
that multiple witnesses testified that Brown had a gun on the day of the shooting.
- 11 -
However, there was no evidence presented that Brown had a gun at the time of the
shooting. No gun was found on Brown’s body, and no witness testified that Brown was
armed when he was shot. Accordingly, we again find that this observation by the
Commonwealth was a reasonable comment on the evidence. The matter was fully
presented to the jury for its resolution of any implied contradictions. We find no
deficiency by counsel.
Willis next contends that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to question witness Stephanie Bussell, his former girlfriend, about her statements to
police that Willis was “not quick to pull the trigger” and that for him to have shot
someone, “he must really have been threatened.” Bussell admitted to making these
statements to police at the evidentiary hearing. After considering the record as a whole,
however, we are unconvinced that questioning Bussell about these statements would have
had a reasonable probability of changing the result at trial. Both statements were highly
speculative in nature. We cannot premise an alleged deficiency on this argument.
Willis next asserts a vague complaint about the evidence presented during
the penalty portion of his trial. However, that objection appears to be focused more upon
counsel’s performance prior to the jury’s finding that he was guilty of the subject
murders. We also note that Willis’s counsel presented a number of family members who
testified on Willis’s behalf during the penalty phase and that Willis ultimately was spared
the death penalty. Accordingly, he clearly was not prejudiced by his counsel’s
- 12 -
performance as to this issue. Therefore, we reject the complaint as to the penalty portion
of the trial.
After reviewing all of the allegations underlying this RCr 11.42 appeal, we
have found no evidence of deficient performance by counsel. The judgment of the
Christian Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Andre Willis
Burgin, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
- 13 -
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.