MONTIE GUSSLER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JULY 20, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000754-MR
MONTIE GUSSLER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAWRENCE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL SPARKS, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 86-CR-00062 AND 86-CR-00063
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; NICKELL AND WINE, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Montie Gussler (hereinafter “Gussler”) appeals from the Lawrence
Circuit Court's March 10, 2006, order denying his RCr1 11.42 and CR2 60.02 motions
requesting a new sentencing hearing. Gussler further appeals from the March 23, 2006,
denial of his motion to alter, amend, or vacate the March 10, 2006, order. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
On October 10, 1986, Gussler was indicted by a Lawrence County grand
jury for two counts of murder,3 kidnapping,4 burglary in the second degree,5 two counts of
arson in the first degree,6 arson in the second degree,7 theft by unlawful taking over
$100.00,8 and robbery in the first degree.9 A separate indictment entered the same day
charged Gussler with receiving stolen property over $100.00.10 Gussler entered a guilty
plea to all charges on March 30, 1987, and was sentenced on July 14, 1987, to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 25 years.11 Gussler filed a motion for
relief pursuant to RCr 11.42 on February 5, 1993, which the trial court denied in
September 1993. Gussler filed a subsequent RCr 11.42 motion in February 1994 which
was also denied by the trial court. It appears from the record before us that no appeal was
taken from either of these denials. Furthermore, as Gussler entered a guilty plea to all
charges, there was no direct appeal of his conviction.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 507.020.
4
KRS 509.040.
5
KRS 511.030.
6
KRS 513.020.
7
KRS 513.030.
8
KRS 514.030.
9
KRS 515.020.
10
KRS 514.110.
11
As several of the offenses for which Gussler stood charged were capital offenses, he was
eligible to receive the death penalty. Based upon negotiations with the prosecution, Gussler was
able to exclude the death penalty sentence from consideration.
-2-
On February 21, 2006, Gussler moved the circuit court for a new
sentencing hearing pursuant to CR 60.02 and RCr 11.42. The filing of this motion was
predicated upon the rendering of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). Roper overruled the
earlier United States Supreme Court opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109
S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989), which held that death sentences passed
constitutional muster for juveniles between the ages of 15 and 18 who committed capital
crimes. Roper, however, found such sentences to be unconstitutional, reasoning that
juveniles had diminished culpability due to their age. Gussler argued he fell squarely
within the mandates of Roper, thereby entitling him to a new sentencing hearing.
Gussler's motion was denied on March 10, 2006. On March 20, 2006, Gussler filed a
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the March 10, 2006, order, which motion was denied on
March 23, 2006. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Gussler renews his argument presented to the trial court that
Roper mandates he be given a new sentencing hearing. Having reviewed that Opinion
and the record on appeal, we find this argument to be without merit. The Supreme Court
in Roper drew a bright line in stating “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid
imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their
crimes were committed.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. The holding does not affect the
imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility for parole for a
minimum of 25 years, the sentence imposed in the case sub judice. Gussler has presented
-3-
no compelling evidence or argument to justify an extension of the Roper decision, and we
decline to entertain such an expansive reading thereof. We agree with the
Commonwealth that the decision in Roper should be strictly construed and applied.
Gussler contends, without citation to the record, that his guilty plea in the
circuit court was made in order to avoid the imposition of the death penalty. He now
argues the Commonwealth's offer “to recommend a sentence less than death has become
meaningless” as Roper now forbids the imposition of such sentences. In light of this
holding, Gussler contends he has been deprived of the benefit of his bargain. We find
this position to be untenable. Gussler knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered
into a plea agreement in order to receive what was then, and is still today, a
constitutionally valid sentence for his multiple crimes. The mere fact the law has
changed such as to lower the ceiling of possible sentences can in no way be seen to
deprive him of the benefit he received from his bargain. “Generally a plea cannot
automatically be rendered involuntary by a subsequent change in the relevant law.”
Elkins v. Commonwealth, 154 S.W.3d 298, 300 (Ky.App. 2004). See also Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (holding guilty pleas
are not invalid merely if entered to avoid the possibility of the death penalty). The trial
court correctly overruled Gussler's motion for a new sentencing hearing.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lawrence Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
-4-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Rebecca Hobbs
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.