ELISSA THACKER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: OCTOBER 19, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000626-MR
ELISSA THACKER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00237
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ABRAMSON1 AND HOWARD, JUDGES; GUIDUGLI,2 SENIOR JUDGE.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE: Elissa Thacker appeals from a Pike Circuit Court judgment
entered on March 17, 2006, convicting her of Second-Degree Robbery, in accord with a
jury verdict, and sentencing her to eight years in prison. Thacker contends that the trial
court erred by denying her motion for a directed verdict. Thacker further argues that the
1
Judge Lisabeth H. Abramson completed this opinion prior to her appointment to the Supreme
Court effective September 10, 2007. Release of this opinion was delayed by administrative
handling.
2
Senior Judge Daniel T. Guidugli sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct thereby substantially impairing her right
to due process and a fair trial. The Commonwealth maintains that sufficient evidence
was presented to withstand the motion for a directed verdict, the allegations of
misconduct were not preserved for appeal, and in the alternative, the prosecutor's conduct
throughout the trial was proper. Finding that the trial court did not err in denying
Thacker's motion for a directed verdict and that Thacker's right to a fair trial was not
impaired by prosecutorial misconduct, we affirm.
I. MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
On the evening of February 20, 2003, Deanna Michelle Keene and another
woman robbed Archie Goble in his Pike County home. Keene was arrested and charged
with First-Degree Robbery soon after the offense was committed. In March 2004, Keene
pled guilty to the charge of Second-Degree Robbery and in April 2004, was sentenced to
eight years in prison. In July 2004, Keene gave a written statement to Officer Hunt, the
investigating officer in the case, naming Elissa Thacker as the other woman who
participated in the robbery. Thacker was indicted for First-Degree Robbery on
September 22, 2004, and her trial began in February 2006. At trial, Thacker claimed that
she had nothing to do with the robbery and was with her parents when the offense
occurred. The prosecution offered the testimony of Keene, Officer Hunt, and Keene's
attorney to show that Thacker was the unidentified woman who robbed Goble with
Keene. The first issue on appeal is whether this evidence was sufficient to withstand
Thacker's motion for a directed verdict.
-2-
The majority of the evidence in this case linking Thacker to the robbery
comes from Deanna Michelle Keene. Keene testified that she and Thacker had spent the
whole day together on February 20, 2003, riding around, taking pills, and getting high.
Once they returned to Keene's house, they walked across the street to Archie Goble's
residence so they could use his phone. According to Keene, after using the phone,
Thacker told her she was going to rob Goble. Keene agreed to rob him, but denied
knowing that Thacker intended to use violence. Then, Keene saw Thacker strike Goble
in the head with a hammer and search his pockets for money. After finding nothing, the
two women left and drove to Thacker's aunt's house.
Keene's statements are confirmed by the testimony of Officer Hunt, the
investigating officer in this robbery, and Robert Wright, Keene's attorney. Officer Hunt
testified that after an initial investigation, he learned that Goble had been struck on the
back of the head and taken to the hospital. Goble later told Officer Hunt that “Michelle”
(Deanna Michelle Keene) and another girl, who he thought was Michelle's roommate,
had come over to use his phone, but while they were inside, the other girl hit him in the
head. Officer Hunt also stated that after Keene pled guilty and was sentenced, she told
him that Thacker was the other woman who robbed Goble. In order to refute Thacker's
claim that Keene was lying, the prosecution called Keene's attorney, Robert Wright.
Wright testified that he had known about Thacker all along because when Keene was
charged in February 2003, she had told him that Thacker was the other woman involved
in the robbery.
-3-
To refute this evidence, Thacker offered the testimony of her mother, Patsy
Thacker; her father, Gregg Thacker; her aunt, Marie Lowe; as well as her own testimony.
Her mother testified that earlier in the evening on February 20, 2003, Thacker's husband,
Robert Smith, had called her from an Ohio jail, but she was not in. Her father testified
that he went to pick up Thacker around 7:30 or 8:00 p.m. so that she would be at their
house when her husband called back. According to the parents' testimony, Smith called
back around 9:15 p.m., and he talked with Thacker till around 9:45 p.m. When Thacker's
father took her home, Keene was waiting for Thacker at her house. Keene then gave
Thacker a ride to her aunt's house where Thacker spent the night.
In this trial, the parties presented two different versions of the events of
February 20, 2003. Deciding whose version to believe and weighing witness credibility
is entirely within the jury's discretion. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 269
(Ky. 2006). A reviewing court cannot disturb the fact finder's verdict unless it was
clearly unreasonable for the jury to reach that conclusion. Commonwealth v. Benham,
816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). In this case, for a reasonable jury to find Thacker
guilty, the prosecution had to prove that Thacker violated KRS 515.030, which states that
A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when, in
the course of committing theft, he uses or threatens the
immediate use of physical force upon another person with
intent to accomplish the theft.
Officer Hunt, the investigating officer, confirmed that Goble was struck on the head by
the girl who came into his house with Keene. The prosecution's key witness, Deanna
Keene, described how Thacker entered Goble's residence, expressed an intent to rob him,
-4-
and then hit him on the head with a hammer. The truthfulness of Keene's statement was
bolstered by her lawyer's testimony. He stated that Keene had told him about Thacker's
involvement when Keene herself was originally charged. With this evidence, the
prosecution showed that Thacker used force against Goble in order to commit a theft.
Even though Thacker put forth her own version of what happened that night, the jury
chose to believe Keene. As stated above, assigning greater weight to the testimony of
one witness over others is within the jury's discretion. Commonwealth v. Suttles, 80
S.W.3d 424, 426 (Ky. 2002). Because the prosecution put forth sufficient evidence to
show that Thacker violated KRS 515.030, a reasonable jury could find her guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. The trial court did not err in denying Thacker's motion for a directed
verdict.
II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Thacker also alleges several instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
However, the only objection raised at trial was in response to one part of the prosecutor's
closing argument. A party who desires an issue to be reviewed by an appellate court,
must make a timely objection during trial noting the error and requesting relief. West v.
Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1989); RCr 9.22. Failure to abide by this rule
results in the issue not being preserved for appellate review. Bowers v. Commonwealth,
555 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Ky. 1977). Although allegations of error not objected to at trial
may still be reviewed for palpable error under RCr 10.26, we will first address the issue
-5-
of whether overruling Thacker's objection to the prosecutor's closing argument was
reversible error.
A court will reverse for "prosecutorial misconduct in a closing argument
only if the misconduct is flagrant or if each of the following three conditions is satisfied:
(1) proof of defendant's guilt is not overwhelming; (2) defense counsel objected; and (3)
the trial court failed to cure the error with a sufficient admonishment to the jury." Barnes
v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Ky. 2002) (emphasis in text) (citing references
omitted). In this case, there is no need to discuss whether the prosecutor's misconduct
was flagrant because after a thorough review of the trial record, it is clear that there was
no misconduct on the part of the prosecutor.
Thacker's preserved allegation of flagrant misconduct is that during the
Commonwealth's closing argument, the prosecutor implied that Thacker's witnesses were
lying because they had not told anyone about Thacker's alibi until the day of trial. The
prosecutor compared Thacker's witnesses to so-called “squirrel hunters” who appear for
the first time at trial, come forward, and say they saw everything. It is well-established
that a prosecutor may criticize the defense's theory of the case, point out its flaws, and
“comment as to the falsity of a defense position.” Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744
S.W.2d 407, 412 (Ky. 1987). In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit has held that under certain circumstances, a “witness' delay in providing an
alibi” for the defendant “is an appropriate subject of inquiry.” United States v. Aguwa,
123 F.3d 418, 420-21 (6th Cir. 1997).
The circumstances of the current case match those
-6-
described in Aguwa: as Thacker's family, her witnesses would have known of the
charges against her; they would have known the importance of Thacker having an alibi;
Thacker never gave the prosecution formal notice of her alibi; and since Thacker never
gave an explanation for the delay, there was no risk that the prosecution's statements
would be misleading or prejudicial. Id. at 421. Thus, since it was proper in this case to
comment on the witness' delay in coming forward, there was no prosecutorial misconduct
and the trial court did not err in overruling Thacker's objection.
Thacker asks that her other, unpreserved allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct be reviewed for palpable error. RCr 10.26 allows an appellate court to grant
relief for an unpreserved error if “manifest injustice has resulted from the error.” Thacker
argues that the Commonwealth engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by: 1) giving
personal opinions about witness credibility; 2) asking the jury to “take a stand” in its
closing argument; 3) implying that Thacker was represented by a public defender; 4)
improperly cross-examining defense witnesses; 5) cross-examining Thacker about her
pre-arrest and post-arrest silence; and 6) introducing evidence of a co-indictee's guilty
plea. Thacker's first five allegations are without merit because no error was committed
by the prosecutor. Although we agree that her sixth accusation did constitute actual error,
the error was mitigated by defense counsel's conduct, making it clear that Thacker was
not prejudiced and did not suffer manifest injustice. Thus, reversal is not justified.
Thacker argues that in the prosecutor's closing argument, he improperly
gave personal opinions about the credibility of witnesses in violation of Kentucky law.
-7-
Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Ky. 2002); United States v. Carroll, 26
F.3d 1380, 1388-1389 (6th Cir. 1994). Although the prosecutor asked the jury to judge
witness credibility in this case by reading between the lines, he never asserted personal
opinions about the witnesses and never engaged in improper vouching. Thus, no error
was committed on this basis.
Thacker also urges that the prosecutor's “take a stand” message in his
closing argument went beyond what is permitted. The prosecutor asked the jury to “step
out and do what jurors that have good common sense do” and to “look at the evidence
and take a stand . . . and say one of them accepted responsibility, you're going to have to
also.” Thacker's argument is again without merit. It has been held that a prosecutor can
tell a jury that it is their “time to deal with justice.” Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744
S.W.2d 407, 412 (Ky. 1987). A prosecutor can ask the jury not to “let the officer down,”
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 446 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Ky1969), and can tell the jury that
since all the other officers of the court have done their jobs, “that it was now the jury's
turn.” Dean v. Commonwealth, 844 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Ky. 1993). The prosecutor's
comments in this case are well-within the acceptable parameters. Asking the jury to
“take a stand” is similar to telling them that it is now their time to deal with justice or
their turn to fulfill their duty. The prosecutor did not commit error in this instance.
Thacker alleges that it was improper for the prosecutor to reference that
Thacker was represented by a public defender in his closing argument. On crossexamination, Keene's private attorney stated that he had not written in his file Keene's
-8-
statement that Thacker was the other woman involved in the robbery. When arguing why
it was unlikely that Keene's attorney would lie for her on the stand, the prosecutor stated
Why would he [Wright] come in here and commit perjury.
No, he don't write down everything. He's not a public
defender, don't work for the state. He can run his office
anyway he wants to. If he don't want to write down anything
in his file, he don't have to.
After reviewing the record, it is clear that the prosecutor's statement was made to enhance
his witness' credibility, not to prejudice Thacker in any way by suggesting that she was
represented by a public defender. This statement simply was not unfairly prejudicial
towards Thacker.
Thacker contends that the prosecutor also erred when he cross-examined
her witnesses regarding their failure to report Thacker's alibi to the authorities. As stated
earlier, it was appropriate for the prosecution to question a witness about a previously
undisclosed alibi under the circumstances of this case. United States v. Aguwa, 123 F.3d
418, 420-421 (6th Cir. 1997).
Thacker additionally stresses that her own cross-examination was improper
because it violated her constitutionally-protected right to remain silent. In crossexamining Thacker, the prosecution asked her why she had not made her alibi known to
the police after the robbery occurred. She responded that she “didn't see the need to”
since there was not a warrant out for her arrest and she was not hiding herself when she
came to Pike County for the holidays. The prosecution then asked if she ever made her
alibi known after becoming a suspect and having an arrest warrant issued. Thacker
-9-
replied that she did not and agreed that the first time she had brought it up was while
testifying.
The Supreme Court has stated that the prosecution may use a defendant's
pre-arrest silence in certain circumstances for impeachment. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447
U.S. 231, 239 (1980). The Sixth Circuit has also held that a defendant's pre-arrest silence
may be used for impeachment purposes but not as substantive evidence of guilt. Combs
v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir. 2000); Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 560 (6th
Cir. 2000). In this case, the prosecution clearly used Thacker's pre-arrest silence to
undermine her testimony that she was with her parents on the night of the robbery. Since
the prosecution used Thacker's prior silence to impeach her alibi and not as substantive
evidence of her guilt, these questions were proper.
Concerning the use of a defendant's post-arrest silence, the Supreme Court
has held that if this evidence is used against a defendant, his Fifth Amendment rights are
infringed only when the government, through the Miranda warnings, has induced silence
by assuring him that his silence will not be used against him. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S.
603, 606-607 (1982). In Thacker's case, however, there was no mention in the record of
when or if Thacker received Miranda warnings and no indication that the government
had induced her silence. Similarly, Thacker's silence is distinguishable from that in
Niemeyer v. Commonwealth, 533 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1976), because in Thacker's case, the
prosecutor's questions and evidence did not involve Thacker's silence at the time of her
arrest after having been given Miranda warnings. Rather, the prosecutor merely
- 10 -
questioned Thacker as to whether at any point leading up to the trial, she had made her
alibi known. Thus, it was proper for the prosecution to cross-examine Thacker as to her
post-arrest silence in not disclosing her alibi.
Lastly, Thacker argues that it was reversible error for the prosecution to
introduce evidence of Keene's guilty plea. In his opening statement, the prosecutor stated
that Keene had pled guilty to Second-Degree Robbery and noted that she “pled guilty
with no promises . . . she's accepted responsibility for what she's done and she just wants
the other person to accept her responsibility.” The prosecution also elicited from Keene
on direct examination that she had previously entered a guilty plea. In his closing
argument, the prosecutor discussed Keene's guilty plea again, stating that “I pled her and
recommended eight years because I felt, and still do, that she was less culpable.” It is
well-established in Kentucky that introducing a co-indictee's guilty plea against a
defendant is improper and may justify a reversal. Martin v. Commonwealth, 477 S.W.2d
506, 508 (Ky. 1972); Parido v. Commonwealth, 547 S.W.2d 125, 127 (Ky. 1977). Thus,
the prosecutor erred when he introduced Keene's guilty plea. However, if defense
counsel fails to object to this evidence due to a trial strategy, he cannot later claim that
the introduction of a co-indictee's guilty plea constitutes reversible error. Brock v.
Commonwealth, 627 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Ky. App. 1982).
In this case, not only did Thacker's counsel never object to the introduction
of Keene's guilty plea, but also, he discussed this evidence as much as, if not more than
the prosecution. In his opening statement, defense counsel challenged Keene's credibility
- 11 -
by reminding the jury that it took her over a year after she was charged to give her
statement implicating Thacker in the robbery. Thacker's attorney stated
the fact is that she [Keene] pled guilty, she was sentenced in
April, and she didn't tell the police then, she didn't tell them in
May, she didn't tell them in June. Finally in July, after about
four months in prison, she decided Oh well, they've come to
talk to me and now I'll tell them that Elissa Thacker is the one
who did this.
He also argued that Keene's testimony boiled down to her alleging that
“I [Keene] was just there [during the robbery], it wasn't me
who did it, but I'm gonna plead guilty and I'm gonna take
eight years in prison. That's awful convenient for her [Keene]
to now come back and say well, I'm gonna go before my
parole board, I got other things that may happen . . . that I
need to make up some kind of story and tell these people that
someone else did it.”
On his cross-examination of Keene, defense counsel asked, “Now, you pled guilty, do
you recall when that was?” After Keene stated the specific day, he asked “And did you
tell the judge or the court . . . did you tell Officer Hunt that Elissa Thacker was with you
that night?” Lastly, in emphasizing again Keene's delay in telling the police about
Thacker, defense counsel stated in his closing argument that “when she [Keene] got
caught . . . she came in and pled guilty in March of '04 . . . but the first time Officer Hunt
took a statement from Keene was July of '04.”
Clearly, it was defense counsel's strategy to use Keene's then two-year old
guilty plea to further the defense's theory that she only recently fabricated her story
implicating Thacker. Although it was error for the prosecution to introduce this evidence
initially, since Thacker's attorney failed to object and actually used the plea to his client's
- 12 -
advantage, it certainly was not prejudicial to Thacker and did not result in a violation of
her right to a fair trial. Because defense counsel cannot use a co-indictee's guilty plea as
an integral part of his argument then expect to get a reversal based on its introduction, we
find that the prosecutor's error did not result in manifest injustice. Brock, 627 S.W.2d at
44.
Of the seven total instances of misconduct alleged by Thacker, the only one
that constituted an error was the prosecution's introduction of Keene's guilty plea.
However, this error did not prejudice Thacker and did not create manifest injustice. In
sum, because no reversible error occurred and the limited prosecutorial misconduct that
did occur did not result in manifest injustice, the Pike Circuit Court's judgment of March
17, 2006, is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Roy Alyette Durham II
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
- 13 -
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.