DONALD ROGERS AND DONNA ROGERS v. TAD DAVENPORT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 11, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002594-MR
DONALD ROGERS AND DONNA ROGERS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BILL CUNNINGHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00092
TAD DAVENPORT
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; PAISLEY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Donald Rogers and Donna Rogers bring this appeal from a
September 20, 2005, order of the Livingston Circuit Court dismissing their counterclaim
against Tad Davenport for breach of a promise to marry and for services rendered under
the quantum meruit doctrine. We affirm.
1
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
21.580.
Donna Rogers and Tad Davenport were engaged to be married and had
lived together in Livingston County at Tad's home for more than fifteen years. During
this time, Tad began a seal coating business for which Donna provided bookkeeping and
secretarial services. Tad apparently ended the relationship unexpectedly and forced
Donna to move from his residence on Thanksgiving weekend in 2001. Tad initiated this
action by filing a complaint in the Livingston Circuit Court on May 22, 2002. Tad
alleged in his complaint that Donna and her father, Donald Rogers, committed against
Tad tortuous acts of intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, assault and
battery, trespass and conversion, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. Donna and
Donald answered. Relevant to this appeal, Donna also asserted a counterclaim against
Tad.2 Therein, Donna alleged she was entitled to payment for services performed on
behalf of Tad's business and for reimbursement of money invested in real estate with Tad.
A bench trial was conducted on July 21, 2005. At trial, Tad proceeded pro
se and made a motion to dismiss his complaint against Donna and Donald. The circuit
court granted Tad's motion and dismissed the complaint. The case proceeded on Donna's
counterclaim against Tad. Following the trial, the court permitted the parties to submit
memorandums and proposed findings. On September 20, 2005, the court entered an
order dismissing Donna's counterclaim against Tad. On November 23, 2005, the circuit
court entered an order denying Donna's motion for a new trial. This appeal follows.
2
Donald Rogers, Donna Roger's father, also asserted a counterclaim against Tad Davenport for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault. Those claims were not tried by the circuit
court nor have they been raised as issues on appeal. Accordingly, Donald's counterclaim will be
deemed abandoned and not addressed in this appeal.
-2-
This case was tried by the court without a jury. Accordingly, in our review,
the circuit court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and its
conclusions of law will be reviewed de novo. Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 52.01; Gosney v.
Glenn, 163 S.W.3d 894 (Ky.App. 2005).
Donna contends the circuit court erred by dismissing her counterclaim
against Tad. Specifically, Donna asserts that the circuit court erred by dismissing her
claim for damages for the bookkeeping and secretarial services she performed in Tad's
business. Donna is alleging entitlement to payment for the services based upon Tad's
breach of the contract to marry and the doctrine of quantum meruit.
It is well-established that an action for breach of the promise to marry is no
longer recognized as a viable cause of action in this Commonwealth. Gilbert v. Barkes,
987 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1999). Eliminating this cause of action did not, however, eradicate
the ability of a party to seek a remedy for such a wrong. Id. Rather, the form of the
remedy has merely been altered. A remedy may still be available for an aggrieved party
for breach of a contract or intentional infliction of emotional distress, if a party is able to
prove such a case. Id. However, in breach of contract cases, only direct economic losses
such as the “normal expenses attendant to a wedding” may be recoverable. Id. at 776.
Similarly, under the proper circumstances, emotional damages may be recovered in an
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
In the case sub judice, the circuit court correctly concluded that an action
for the breach of the promise to marry is no longer recognized in Kentucky, and, as such,
-3-
Donna could not recover based upon a breach of that promise. As Donna has neither
asserted a claim for the “normal expenses attendant to a wedding” nor has she asserted a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Donna is precluded from recovering
damages for the services rendered to Tad's business under the theory attributable to the
breach of a promise to marry.
Donna alternatively contends she was entitled to reimbursement for the
services she rendered to Tad's business under the doctrine of quantum meruit. Quantum
meruit is an equitable doctrine and literally means “as much as he has deserved.” Black's
Law Dictionary 1255 (7th ed. 1999). To recover upon a claim based upon quantum
meruit, one must show:
1. that valuable services were rendered, or materials
furnished;
2. to the person from whom recovery is sought;
3. which services were accepted by that person, or at least
were received by that person, or were rendered with
the knowledge and consent of that person; and
4. under such circumstances as reasonably notified the
person that the plaintiff expected to be paid by that
person.
66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 38 (2001).
In the the case sub judice, the circuit court concluded that Donna failed to
prove Tad was reasonably notified that she expected to be paid for the services rendered.
The circuit court also found that under the circumstances presented, Donna provided the
services to Tad's business based upon natural affection or mutuality of benefit; thus, there
-4-
is a presumption that the services were rendered gratuitously. See Corbin's Executor's v.
Corbin, 302 Ky. 208, 194 S.W.2d 65 (1964). Thus, we do not believe that the circuit
court's findings were clearly erroneous or that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in
dismissing Donna's claim under a theory of quantum meruit.
Donna next contends that the circuit court erred by dismissing her claim
against Tad for the theft or conversion of various vehicles, including a 4-wheeler that she
purchased during their relationship. Donna claims that the vehicles were either not
returned to her by Tad or were returned to her in a deteriorated condition. As concluded
by the circuit court, Donna did not assert a claim in her counterclaim related to the
vehicles. Donna's counterclaim only sought payment for work performed in Tad's
business and reimbursement for money invested in real estate with Tad. Moreover,
Donna never amended the counterclaim to assert a cause of action for recovery of the
vehicles. In short, Donna has failed to assert a cause of action for recovery of the
vehicles. See CR 8.01; Security Trust Co. v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d 401 (Ky.App. 1963).
Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in dismissing the counterclaim.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Livingston Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.
Tod D. Megibow
Paducah, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.