CURTIS MCGRUDER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 20, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002556-MR
CURTIS MCGRUDER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-002808
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: DIXON AND THOMPSON; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Curtis McGruder appeals from an order of the Jefferson Circuit
Court denying post-conviction relief pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
(RCr) 11.42. We affirm.
On October 30, 2001, McGruder was observed stealing property from a
residence in Jefferson County. After being observed, McGruder drove away but was
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Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to
Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
pursued by police. As McGruder fled, his attempts to evade police resulted in a highspeed chase. Unfortunately, the high-speed chase terminated when McGruder lost
control of his vehicle and collided with three other vehicles. Mary Scharre, who drove
one of the vehicles, was injured as a result of the collision.
A Jefferson County grand jury indicted McGruder on December 5, 2001,
charging him with first-degree assault, second-degree burglary, two counts of first-degree
wanton endangerment, first-degree fleeing or evading police, second-degree escape, theft
by unlawful taking over $300, failure to transfer registration of a motor vehicle, reckless
driving, and operating a motor vehicle without insurance.
On February 22, 2002, McGruder entered into a plea agreement to the
charges specified in the indictment. In exchange for his guilty plea, the Commonwealth
recommended that he be sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for the assault charge and
to lesser sentences for the other charges. All sentences were to be served concurrently for
a total ten-year sentence. Following a plea colloquy with McGruder, the trial court
accepted the plea after finding that McGruder’s guilty plea was made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. On April 17, 2002, the trial court sentenced McGruder in
accordance with the plea agreement.
On February 6, 2003, McGruder filed a motion to vacate his judgment of
conviction pursuant to RCr 11.42. In his motion, McGruder alleged that his guilty plea
was not intelligently and voluntarily entered because he was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel. Subsequently, the trial court appointed counsel for McGruder and
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conducted an evidentiary hearing. On January 13, 2005, the trial court denied the motion
and made extensive findings of fact concerning the allegations made in McGruder’s
motion. This appeal followed.
On appeal, McGruder raises two grounds for relief: (1) that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel when his defense counsel gave him erroneous advice
regarding minimum parole eligibility; and (2) that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel when his defense counsel failed to adequately investigate the facts of the case
and the law as it applied to the facts of his case.
As an introductory matter, the standard employed on judicial review to
determine the merit of ineffective assistance of counsel claims has been set out in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
However, the Strickland test is modified when the ineffective assistance of counsel is
alleged to have resulted in the entering of a guilty plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Under the modified test, the movant must “show
(1) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel's performance fell outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance as the counsel was not performing as
counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and (2) that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense by so seriously affecting the process that there is a reasonable
probability that the defendant would not have pled guilty, and the outcome would have
been different.” Centers v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 55 (Ky.App.1990).
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“In determining whether the degree of skill exercised by the attorney meets
the proper standard of care, the attorney's performance is judged by the degree of its
departure from the quality of conduct customarily provided by the legal profession.” Id.
Moreover, “[i]n considering ineffective assistance, the reviewing court must focus on the
totality of evidence before the judge or jury and assess the overall performance of counsel
throughout the case in order to determine whether the identified acts or omissions
overcome the presumption that counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance.”
Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 441-442 (Ky. 2001). Appellate courts must
indulge a “strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 442. With this standard of review, we now
consider McGruder’s allegations of error.
McGruder first alleges that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
when his defense counsel grossly misadvised him concerning his minimum parole
eligibility. Specifically, McGruder alleges that his defense counsel advised him that his
acceptance of the plea agreement would permit him to become eligible for parole after
serving twenty (20) percent of his sentence. However, pursuant to KRS 508.010, when
McGruder pled guilty to first-degree assault, he admitted that he caused a “serious
physical injury to another person” during the commission of a Class B felony. In
pertinent part, KRS 439.3401(1) provides that any person who pleads guilty to the
commission of a Class B felony involving the serious physical injury to another person is
a “violent offender.” Finally, KRS 439.3401(3) provides that a violent offender who has
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been convicted of a Class B felony shall not be released on probation or parole until he
has served at least eighty-five percent (85%) of his sentence. Consequently, when
McGruder accepted the plea agreement containing a first-degree assault charge,
McGruder became ineligible for parole until eighty-five percent of his sentence is served.
In its order denying the RCr 11.42 motion, the trial court noted that there
was “…no credible evidence that defense counsel affirmatively and erroneously
represented to Defendant that he would be eligible for parole after serving 20% of his
sentence.” The trial court based its finding on two occurrences that took place during
McGruder’s sentencing hearing and from McGruder’s RCr 11.42 brief filed on February
6, 2003.
First, during the sentencing hearing, McGruder’s counsel informed the
court that he had been unable to determine McGruder’s parole eligibility. The trial
court’s order noted that “[i]f, in fact, Mr. Carr [McGruder’s defense counsel] had
previously represented to Defendant that he would be eligible for parole after serving
20% of his sentence, it is hard, if not impossible, to reconcile that with his statements to
the Court.” The court further noted that McGruder made no attempt during the
sentencing hearing to inform the court that his defense counsel had “previously and
repeatedly” informed him that he would be eligible for parole after serving 20 percent of
his sentence.
Next, the trial court noted that Mr. Schuler, then-Assistant Commonwealth
Attorney, made clear that McGruder would have to serve 85 percent of the ten-year
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sentence before he would become eligible for parole. The court noted that “Defendant
did nothing at that time to suggest that this flatly contradicted the advice which he had
been given by his counsel.” Lastly, the court noted that McGruder did not claim that his
defense counsel had misadvised him when he filed his RCr 11.42 brief on February 6,
2003. The court noted that in this brief that McGruder argued that his defense counsel
was ineffective because he “‘failed to discover the correct parole eligibility date prior to
advising and allowing the movant to plead guilty.’” The court concluded that “at no
point, significantly, does Defendant allege that Mr. Carr affirmatively represented to him
that he would be eligible for parole after serving 20% of the ten (10) year sentence.”
Accordingly, the court concluded that McGruder had not been misadvised.
On appellate review of a trial court’s findings in an RCr 11.42 case, we will
not set aside a trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Ivey v.
Commonwealth, 655 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Ky.App. 1983). In Commonwealth v. Harrelson,
14 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Ky. 2000), the Court held “due deference is given to the findings of
the trial court.” “Mere doubt as to the correctness of a finding would not justify reversal,
and the appellate court does not consider and weigh evidence de novo. However, if a
finding is without adequate evidentiary support or occasioned by erroneous application of
the law, the reviewing court may regard it as clearly erroneous.” Id. at 548-549. After
reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence contained in the record adequately
supported the trial court’s finding. Consequently, McGruder was not deprived of his
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
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McGruder next alleges that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
when his defense counsel failed to adequately investigate the facts of the case and the law
as it applied to the facts of his case. He alleges that his defense counsel did not conduct
an independent investigation of the injuries suffered by the victim in the case.
Consequently, he argues that his defense counsel was not able to present an adequate
defense to the first-degree assault charge.
First, although McGruder alleges that his counsel failed to adequately
investigate his case, he fails to offer any specific evidence of what his counsel would
have found had he adequately investigated the case. He also fails to demonstrate how
such purported evidence could have potentially improved the outcome of his case.
Lastly, as the trial court noted, even with the help of his appointed counsel for the RCr
11.42 hearing, McGruder failed to produce any evidence that casted doubt on the
seriousness of the victim’s injury. Put simply, McGruder’s claim amounts to no more
than a vague allegation of constitutional error that does not warrant relief pursuant to RCr
11.42. Mills v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 310, 330 (Ky. 2005) (holding that “we have
previously held that vague allegations, including those of failure to investigate, do not
warrant an evidentiary hearing and warrant summary dismissal of the RCr 11.42
motion.”).
Second, McGruder’s allegation that his attorney failed to properly
investigate the facts of his case is refuted by the record. At the RCr 11.42 evidentiary
hearing, Schuler testified that he had several conversations with McGruder’s counsel
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prior to the acceptance of the plea agreement. Schuler testified that he informed defense
counsel that the victim was physically incapable of coming to court because of the
injuries that she sustained as a result of the collision. Schuler further testified that he told
defense counsel that he was unwilling to amend the first-degree assault charge to a
reduced offense because of the seriousness of the victim’s injuries. Based on these facts,
we agree with the trial court that the quality of defense counsel’s investigation did not
result in the deprivation of McGruder’s constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel.
For the forgoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying
McGruder’s motion for post-conviction relief under RCr 11.42 is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis James Burke
Assistant Public Advocate
LaGrange, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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