DONNA NANNY v. JENNIFER SMITH
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 13, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
SUPREME COURT GRANTED DISCRETIONARY REVIEW MARCH 14, 2007
(FILE NO. 2006-SC-0833-DG)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002083-MR
DONNA NANNY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. STARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00529
v.
JENNIFER SMITH
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DIXON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE:
This personal injury action arises out of an
automobile accident between Appellant, Donna Nanny,2 and
Appellee, Jennifer Smith, which occurred on August 22, 2001, in
Graves County, Kentucky.
At the time of the accident, Nanny was
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
2
Appellant’s last name is also spelled Nanney throughout the record. Her
signature on a document filed in the court below indicates that the correct
spelling is Nanny.
insured under a policy with Kentucky Farm Bureau Insurance
Company that provided basic reparations benefits (BRB), as well
as additional personal injury protection coverage (PIP).
Farm
Bureau thereafter paid Nanny basic reparations benefits, the
last payment being a check in the amount of $132.00 that was
issued on October 18, 2001.
Pursuant to KRS 304.39-230(6), Nanny was required to
file her action for tort liability arising out of the accident
not later than two years after the injury or the last basic or
added reparations benefits made, whichever occurred later.
Thus, the statute of limitations would have otherwise expired on
Saturday October 18, 2003, but for it falling on a weekend.
On
Friday October 17, 2003, Nanny personally delivered a civil
complaint to the Graves County Clerk.
A time date stamp
indicates that the complaint was received at 2:35 p.m.
However,
the Clerk did not file the complaint or issue a summons on Smith
until Tuesday October 21, 2003, one-day after the two-year
statute of limitations had expired.
KRS 304.39-230(6).
Smith thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
in the Graves Circuit Court.
The Court, treating the pleading
as a motion to dismiss, ruled that the action was not commenced
within the applicable statute of limitations and entered an
order of dismissal.
of right.
Nanny now appeals to this Court as a matter
As it is undisputed that the complaint was timely
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delivered to the circuit court clerk, the sole issue is whether
mere delivery to the clerk is sufficient or whether a plaintiff
has an affirmative duty to see that a summons is issued within
the limitations period.
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 3 provides that “[a]
civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint with the
court and the issuance of a summons or warning order thereon in
good faith.” (Emphasis added).
Kentucky case law dictates that
the requirements of CR 3.01 be strictly enforced.
Asher v.
Bishop, 482 S.W.2d 769 (Ky. 1972); Osborne v. Kenacre Land
Corp., 65 S.W.3d 534 (Ky. App. 2001); Gibson v. E.P.I. Corp.,
940 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. App. 1997); DeLong v. DeLong, 335 S.W.2d 895
(Ky. 1960) (If the complaint is filed prior to the expiration of
the period of limitations but the summons is not issued until
the period of limitations has expired, the action is barred.)
In comparing our civil rule to Federal Rule 4(a), the trial
court herein noted:
West Kentucky Practice, Volume 6 at page 12,
points out that there is a difference between
the Kentucky Rule and the Federal Rule. There
it is stated “it has been held under FRCP 4(a)
that the failure of the Clerk to issue the
summons as required by that rule is not
attributable to the Plaintiff, does not deprive
the Court of a jurisdiction, and does not
warrant dismissal of the Complaint,” citing
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil 2d §1063. However, CR 3.01
differs from FCRP because it includes statutory
language from KRS 413.250 which provides “an
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action shall be deemed commenced on the date of
the first summons or process issued in good
faith from the Court having jurisdiction of the
cause of the action.” Commencement of an
action may be procedural, but the matter of
setting a limitation period is legislative, and
the Court has adopted in its procedure the
legislative determination as to when an action
commences.
In Wm. H. McGee Co. v. Liebherr America, Inc., 789 F.
Supp. 861 (E.D. Ky. 1992), the Federal District Court, applying
state law, held that the plaintiff’s action was barred where the
complaint was filed within the statutory period but the summons
was not issued until the limitations period had expired.
In so
holding, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
Kentucky requirement that an action is not commenced until
process is issued is not integral to the state's statute of
limitations.
“The Kentucky courts have consistently held that
whatever statute of limitations applies, it is not tolled until
summons is issued.
Thus, the state courts have implicitly
recognized the issuance of summons requirement as central to the
tolling of the statute.”
Id. at 866 (Citations omitted).
See
also Eades v. Clark Distributing Co., Inc., 70 F.3d 441 (6th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1157 (1996) (Under Kentucky Civil
Rule 3 “[a]n action is deemed commenced not at the time of
filing, but rather on the date of the first summons or process
issued in good faith. . . .”)
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Nanny relies on a line of cases wherein it was held
that although the process was defective, such defect was allowed
to be corrected because the plaintiffs had acted in good faith.
Jones v. Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 805 (Ky.
App. 1997); Blue Grass Mining Co. v. Stamper, 267 Ky. 643, 103
S.W.2d 112 (1937); Crowe v. Miller, 467 S.W.2d 330 (Ky. 1971).
Nanny argues that she certainly acted in good faith and with
diligence in personally delivering the complaint to the circuit
clerk on Friday October 17, 2003.
While we may agree that Nanny
timely delivered the complaint and presumably acted in good
faith in doing so, the cases she relies upon are simply not
dispositive of the issue presented herein.
In Jones v. Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc., supra,
the plaintiff successfully had the summons issued within the
limitations period, but thereafter failed to attempt service of
summons on the correct agent.
Similarly, in Blue Grass Mining
Co. v. Stamper, supra, the issue concerned the service of
process, not the issuance of the summons.
In fact, the Court in
Stamper held, “When a party has caused the summons to issue in
good faith, he has complied with the law and saved his right of
action in respect of time, for it is the official duty of the
clerk to see that process is delivered to the sheriff for
service . . . .”
Id. at 113 (Emphasis added).
Finally, in
Crowe v. Miller, supra, the complaint was filed and the summons
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was issued within the limitations period, but the plaintiff
thereafter mistakenly attempted to halt service of process
because the named defendant was a minor.
Quite simply, Nanny’s cases stand for the proposition
enunciated in Roehrig v. Merchants and Businessmen’s Mutual Ins.
Co., 391 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Ky. 1965): “[I]f, when the summons was
issued, the plaintiff had a bona fide, unequivocal intention of
having it served presently or in due course or without
abandonment, the summons was issued in good faith.”
Thus, law
is settled that good faith may save a defective summons issued
within the limitations period.
Here, however, no summons,
defective or otherwise, was issued before the statute of
limitations expired on October 20, 2003.
Because Kentucky CR 3
measures commencement from the date of the filing of the
complaint and the issuance of a summons in good faith,
Appellant’s action cannot be deemed to have commenced within the
two-year statute of limitations period set forth in KRS 304.39230(6).
We are mindful that dismissal of an action is the
harshest result.
Even the trial court herein expressed the
opinion that Nanny should have been able to rely upon CR 4.013 to
cause the issuance of process.
However, as the trial court so
3
CR 4.01(1) provides, in pertinent part: “Upon the filing of the complaint
(or other initiating document) the clerk shall forthwith issue the required
summons . . . .”
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found, the law in Kentucky is well-established, going back in
excess of 150 years.
314 (Ky. 1847).
Pindell v. Maydwell, 46 Ky. 314, 7 B. Mon.
We are compelled to conclude that the
determination of the limitations period is legislative in
nature, and clearly does not provide discretion.
As such, the
trial court correctly determined that Nanny’s action was not
deemed commenced on the date the complaint was delivered to the
clerk, but was, in fact, time barred as a result of the summons
being issued after the expiration of the limitations period.
The Graves Circuit Court’s Order of Dismissal is
hereby affirmed.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
I respectfully dissent.
I believe
that Nanny has complied totally with the spirit and legislative
intent of KRS 304.39-230(6) and should not be punished for the
failure of the circuit clerk to perform her statutory duties and
other duties as may be set out in our procedural rules.
The majority relies upon an archaic rule regarding
“issuance of summons” whose purpose and usefulness has long
passed in modern litigation.
In olden days, attorneys prepared
their own summons, and were able to obtain their issuance
directly from the clerk at the time that the complaint was
filed.
Today, most clerks mechanically issue summons in their
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computer when a complaint is filed and some will even reject a
summons prepared by an attorney when filing the complaint.
An
attorney is thus placed at the mercy of the circuit clerk to
perform ministerial tasks in accordance with applicable law.
As concerns applicable law, circuit clerks are state
officers whose duties are co-extensive with the Commonwealth and
who are subject to the administrative control of the Chief
Justice.
KRS 30A.010(2).
In other words, they are one of us –
part of the entire court system that is based upon the
administration of justice in a fair and equitable manner.
Effectively, application of this archaic rule requires attorneys
not only to perform their jobs, but also to oversee the job
performance of our circuit clerks.
I submit that this is a
responsibility of the Kentucky Supreme Court, not the attorneys.
Since our highest Court has created this rule, now is the time
for our Courts to revisit and abandon the rule.
As Justice Palmore often said, “common sense must not
be a stranger in the house of the law.”
Cantrell v. Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commission, 450 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Ky.
1970).
It makes absolutely no sense for attorneys and their
clients to be punished upon timely filing complaints in the
clerk’s office, due to the failure of clerks to promptly perform
their duties.
Simply put, an attorney who has delivered a
complaint to a circuit clerk in timely fashion has done his or
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her job – they and their client should not be penalized for a
failure by our court system.
The outcome is simply manifest
injustice which cannot be tolerated.
If our courts are not willing to change this archaic
rule at this time, then attorneys should be entitled (and
encouraged) to pursue their claims (and resulting damages) on
behalf of their clients against clerks who fail to faithfully
perform their duties in accordance with KRS 30A.030.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daryl T. Dixon
Paducah, Kentucky
Mike Moore
Paducah, Kentucky
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