T.R.V. AND L.V. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES AND S.V., A CHILD
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 26, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002068-ME
T.R.V. AND L.V.
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BALLARD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CYNTHIA E. SANDERSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-AD-00010
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES
AS NEXT FRIEND OF J.S.V., A CHILD,
AND S.V., A CHILD
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON AND DIXON, JUDGES; HOWARD,1 SPECIAL JUDGE.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
T.R.V. and L.V., husband and wife, appeal from
August 16, 2005, orders of the Ballard Circuit Court terminating
their parental rights with respect to their natural daughters
S.V. (d.o.b. 6/25/91) and J.S.V. (d.o.b. 10/5/96).
The court
assigned those rights to the Cabinet for Health and Family
1
Judge James I Howard sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief
Justice pursuant to Section 110 (5) (b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
Services (CHFS) so that the children can be adopted.
The
parents contend that the elder daughter’s allegations of sexual
abuse have not been adequately substantiated to justify
termination of rights.
Because the trial court’s contrary
findings are supported by the record, we affirm its termination
orders.
This matter began in late February 2003 when S.V.,
eleven years-old at the time, reported to one of her school
teachers that her thirteen year-old brother, T.L.V., had reached
beneath her clothes and touched her genitals.
The teacher
reported the allegation to the Cabinet, which immediately took
emergency custody of S.V. and her younger sister, J.S.V.
The
next day the parents took S.V. for a medical exam, which
revealed no lesions, bruises, or other physical signs of abuse.
The parents, the father in particular, thereupon became openly
skeptical of S.V.’s report and defended the son.
Concerned that
the parents would not protect the girls, the Cabinet retained
custody pending further investigation.
The girls were observed
on several occasions and interviewed by qualified social workers
and a family therapist.
S.V. described the son’s abuse in what
these professionals believed was convincing detail, and both
girls exhibited symptoms associated with sexual abuse and posttraumatic stress.
S.V. was painfully withdrawn, suffered from
abuse-related nightmares and flashbacks, and was prone to long
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spells of crying for no apparent reason.
She expressed a desire
not to have contact with her parents, and her symptoms
intensified immediately before and after visits with them.
J.S.V. was less verbal than S.V., but using dolls and
figures she too accurately represented sexual abuse.
J.S.V. was
also prone to long crying spells, had frequent temper tantrums,
engaged in feces smearing, touched other children in foster care
in a sexual manner, and otherwise engaged in sexual behavior
untypical of a six year old.
The Cabinet’s experts believed
that the feces smearing and sexual behaviors, in particular,
strongly indicated that J.S.V. had also been sexually abused.
In light of this evidence, the Cabinet deemed S.V.’s abuse
allegation substantiated.
The McCracken Family Court agreed,
and because the parents had failed to protect the girls from
this abuse, that court, by order entered April 3, 2003, found
that the girls were “abused or neglected child[ren]” for the
purposes of KRS 600.020, and that the Cabinet was entitled to
retain their custody pursuant to KRS Chapter 610.
The Cabinet then began working with the parents on a
case plan for reunification.
Key elements of the plan included
protecting the girls from future abuse by their brother,
improving T.R.V. and L.V.’s parenting skills, and attempting to
mitigate the girls’ psychological injuries through family
therapy.
To address the first element, the parents removed the
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son from their home by sending him to live with relatives in
North Carolina.
Both parents then passed a parenting class, the
Cabinet’s requirement with respect to the second element.
third element was more difficult.
The
Apparently, the mental health
workers sought to prepare the girls for family therapy by
providing them with individual therapy and with a series of
supervised visits with the parents.
The Cabinet’s experts
testified that the girls continued to find the visits stressful
and that in conjunction with the visits the girls’ behavior
often regressed.
Nevertheless, the case plan remained family
therapy leading to reunification.
Family therapy sessions began
in the fall of 2003, but the therapists found the parents’
attitude disconcerting.
The parents continued to deny and to
depreciate S.V.’s abuse allegations, and indicated their desire
simply to return their household to the way it had been prior to
the Cabinet’s intervention.
After only four family sessions, in early October
2003, S.V. revealed to her therapists that she had been sexually
abused by her father as well as her brother.
This revelation
caused the suspension of family therapy sessions and the
initiation of a new investigation.
In December 2003, Cabinet
investigators notified the parents that they deemed this
allegation substantiated.
By then, the parents had moved from
Kentucky to Illinois, to escape the Cabinet’s jurisdiction; had
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withdrawn their request for reunification; and had sought
instead to have their daughters placed with relatives in North
Carolina or Georgia.
For much of 2004, apparently, the Cabinet
waited for its counterparts in those states to evaluate the five
proposed relatives.
When the evaluations all came back
negative, because the relatives declined or were found to be
already taking care of all the children they could handle, the
Cabinet’s goal for the children became adoption.
Accordingly, in October 2004, the Cabinet brought the
present action in McCracken Family Court to terminate the
parents’ rights.
Following the parents’ successful change of
venue motion, the Ballard Circuit Court heard the matter in July
2005.
As previously indicated, the Cabinet offered proof
tending to show that both girls have suffered significant
psychological injuries strongly corroborative of S.V.’s
substantiated allegations of sexual abuse perpetrated by her
brother and her father.
The Cabinet’s proof and the parents’
own testimony also confirmed that the parents continue to deny
S.V.’s allegations and that they remain skeptical about the
girls’ needs for empathy and understanding and for therapy.
Finally, the Cabinet offered proof that in their current foster
home, where there is a good chance that both of them will be
adopted, the girls’ symptoms of crying, withdrawing, and acting
out have abated somewhat; that they have become better able to
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articulate their feelings; and that their schooling has gone
fairly well.
Emphasizing the parents’ failure to face up to the
calamity that has befallen their daughters, their failure to
provide any financial support for them while in foster care,
their failure to make provision for financial support in the
future, and their unwillingness and inability to provide the
sort of psychological protection and nurturing that the girls
require, the circuit court granted the Cabinet’s petition and
ordered the termination of T.R.V. and L.V.’s parental rights.
Appealing from that order, the parents contend that without
physical proof of abuse any finding of abuse against L.V. or
T.L.V. remains speculative and does not amount to the sort of
clear and convincing evidence that would justify the termination
of a parent’s right to his or her child.
We disagree.
As it pertains to this case, KRS 625.090 permits the
termination of parental rights only upon a finding, by clear and
convincing evidence, of all of the following: (1) that the child
has been adjudged or shown to be abused or neglected; (2) that
termination would be in the child’s best interest; and (3) the
existence of at least one of the grounds listed in KRS
625.090(2), such as the parents’ causing or allowing the child
to be sexually abused, KRS 625.090(2)(f), or the parents’
failing to provide essential care and protection for a period of
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at least six months with no reasonable expectation of timely
improvement, KRS 625.090(2)(e).
If one accepts the Cabinet’s
allegations either that the parents allowed the girls to be
sexually abused by their brother or that L.V. himself abused his
daughters, then there can be no dispute that all of these
elements are satisfied.
Sexual abuse is a ground for finding
“abuse and neglect” under KRS 600.020 as well as a ground for
termination under KRS 625.090(2).
It is clearly in the girls’
best interest, moreover, to be removed from the home where they
have suffered such abuse and to be placed in a home where their
psychological needs will be respected.
The trial court found
that both girls had been abused by their brother and that the
parents had failed both to protect them from that abuse and to
provide for their physical and emotional needs in its aftermath.
This Court must uphold the trial court’s findings if they are
supported by substantial evidence.
M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human
Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. App. 1998).
In this context,
substantial evidence is evidence a rational fact finder could
deem clear and convincing.
Id.
The parents contend that the
trial court erred by accepting the Cabinet’s abuse allegations
because those allegations were not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence.
In particular, although the trial court did not base
its conclusions on a finding that L.V. had abused his daughters,
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the parents maintain that the Cabinet fabricated the allegation
against L.V. to derail the case plan.
They note that S.V.
allegedly revealed L.V.’s abuse on October 2, 2003, and yet at a
status hearing on October 16, 2003, their social worker did not
mention it, but instead represented to the court that the case
plan was progressing and that visitation in the home was the
next step.
They conclude that the Cabinet manufactured the
allegation some time after October 16.
When asked at trial
about the apparent discrepancy, the parents’ social worker
explained that at the time of the October 16, 2003, status
hearing S.V.’s new allegation regarding her father had not been
investigated or substantiated and that until it was the case
plan remained a viable possibility.
The trial court did not err
by crediting this explanation and concluding that the Cabinet
had not falsely reported S.V.’s allegation against her father.
Even if S.V. made allegations against her brother and
her father, the parents next contend, her allegations should not
be credited because they were not substantiated by physical
signs of abuse.
Sexual abuse need not cause physical injury,
however, and there are other ways to substantiate it.
Here, as
the Cabinet showed, both girls displayed knowledge of sexual
facts they could not have acquired except through sexual contact
like that S.V. alleged.
The girls also behaved in ways—
withdrawing, prolonged crying, raging, feces smearing, sexual
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acting out—highly unusual for their young ages and significantly
associated with the victims of sexual abuse.
A rational fact
finder could believe that this evidence clearly and convincingly
corroborated S.V.’s allegations.
The trial court did not err,
therefore, by finding that the parents had failed to protect the
girls from sexual abuse and that the girls’ best interest would
be served by the severance of T.R.V. and L.V.’s parental rights
so that S.V. and J.S.V. may be adopted.
Accordingly, we affirm
the August 16, 2005, parental rights termination orders of the
Ballard Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
T.R.V. and L.V., pro se
Cairo, Illinois
Dilissa G. Milburn
Cabinet for Health and Family
Services
Mayfield, Kentucky
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