COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF HIGHWAYS N/K/A THE KENTUCKY TRANSPORTATION CABINET v. EVERETT R. THOMPSON, JR. AND DEBORAH T. HARRIS, AS CO-EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF EVERETT R. THOMPSON
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 12, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001691-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
BUREAU OF HIGHWAYS N/K/A THE
KENTUCKY TRANSPORTATION CABINET
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN COMBS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-CI-01553
v.
EVERETT R. THOMPSON, JR. AND
DEBORAH T. HARRIS, AS CO-EXECUTORS
OF THE ESTATE OF EVERETT R.
THOMPSON
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, GUIDUGLI,1 AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
In 1978, the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Highways2 initiated
1
Judge Daniel T. Guidugli concurred in this opinion prior to the expiration
of his term of office on December 31, 2006. Release of the opinion was
delayed by administrative handling.
condemnation proceedings against real property owned by Everett
and Mary Thompson.
The Cabinet intended to use the property in
conjunction with the construction of US 119 in Pike County,
Kentucky.
Finally, in 1983, the parties reached a settlement
pursuant to which the Thompsons sold 4.869 acres to the Cabinet
for the fair market value of $75,000.00.
The parties’ agreement
gave the Thompsons a first right of refusal to purchase from the
Cabinet any portion of the land that was ultimately unused.
On July 1, 1988, the Cabinet offered to sell back to
the Thompsons 0.89 of undeveloped acreage for the appraised
value of $106,000.00.
In 1993, after failing to reach an
agreement with the Cabinet, the Thompsons filed suit in the Pike
Circuit Court seeking an order requiring the Cabinet to sell
them the 0.89 acres at the same per-acre rate for which the
Cabinet had purchased it ten years earlier.
The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Cabinet and dismissed
the Thompsons’ case.
However, on appeal, the Kentucky Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the matter.3
On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Everett R. Thompson, Jr. and Deborah T. Harris, as coexecutors of the Everett Thompson Estate (collectively the
“Thompson Estate”).
On August 3, 2000, the court ordered the
2
The Appellant is now known as the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet. For
clarity, we shall refer to it simply as the “Cabinet” throughout this
Opinion.
3
Kelly v. Thompson, 983 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1998).
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Cabinet to offer the undeveloped property to the Thompson Estate
at the price the Cabinet paid for it at the time of the original
condemnation.
Once again, the trial court’s decision was
appealed, and, eventually, both this Court and our Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment.
The Supreme Court’s ruling became final
on August 21, 2003.4
On March 9, 2005, the Thompson Estate filed a “Motion
to Enforce Judgment, Damages and Sanctions.”
The Thompson
Estate complained that, in the nineteen months since the Supreme
Court’s August 2003 ruling, the Cabinet had failed to offer and
convey the 0.89-acre tract to it as originally ordered by the
trial court.
The Thompson Estate alleged that it lost lucrative
rental payments that it would have received had the Cabinet
deeded the property in a timely fashion.
The trial court scheduled a hearing on the motion for
March 25, 2005.
Approximately one week prior to the hearing,
the Cabinet conveyed to the Thompson Estate a 1.938 tract of
property consisting of the disputed 0.89-acre tract as well as
additional undeveloped property that had been purchased from the
Thompsons in 1983.
After hearing arguments at the March 2005 hearing, the
trial court scheduled another evidentiary hearing for May 13,
2005 to address whether the Cabinet should be held in contempt
4
Vandertoll v. Commonwealth of Kentucky Transportation Cabinet, 110 S.W.3d
789 (Ky. 2003).
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for the nineteen-month delay in transferring the property.
The
Thompson Estate also wanted to offer proof regarding damages
that it allegedly suffered as a result of this delay.
Following the evidentiary hearing and subsequent
briefing by the parties, the trial court entered a Memorandum,
Opinion and Order on July 19, 2005, finding the Cabinet in
contempt.
In the case at bar, the Transportation
Department was Ordered to “offer the
property to the Plaintiffs at the price paid
by the Commonwealth at the time of
condemnation.” The Department argues that
the Plaintiffs should have come back to the
Court after publication of the Opinion to
seek a time frame upon which the property
must be offered back to them by the
Department, and until that was done, it was
not required to act on the Court’s Order.
While a definite time period in which to
comply with the Court’s Order was not
specifically set forth in the Order, a
reasonable time period to allow for
compliance is fair, just and proper to be
allowed in such circumstances and is
appropriate to be applied in this case.
By taking 19 months, and requiring the
Plaintiff’s [sic] to seek assistance from
the Court, by way of a Motion to Enforce
Judgment and for Damages and Sanctions, to
formally offer the property or deliver a
deed to the Plaintiffs pursuant to an order
from this Court and a Supreme Court Opinion
confirming that Order, the Department of
Transportation caused the Plaintiffs to lose
the value of the lease income during that
time. A reasonable time in which to survey,
prepare and execute the deed is
understandable, but 19 months goes well
beyond what this Court deems reasonable.
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. . .
Despite the fact that the Department of
Transportation knew or should have known
that the plaintiffs had potential tenants
interested in executing the lease agreements
for the subject property, and despite the
fact that it had a Pike Circuit Court Order
and a Supreme Court Opinion directing it to
offer the property to the Plaintiffs, it
still failed to comply with the Court’s
Order until 19 months after the Supreme
Court Opinion was published and after the
Plaintiffs were forced to file a Motion to
Enforce the Judgment with this Court. This
Court is of the opinion that the Department
of Transportation’s failure to comply with
the Court’s orders in a timely fashion is
inappropriate. The Court recognizes that a
reasonable amount of time must be allowed to
comply with any order and believes that 4
months is a more than reasonable amount of
time in which to obtain a survey
description, draft the deed, and have the
deed signed and delivered.
Memorandum, Opinion and Order, Record on Appeal (R.A.) pp. 17577 (emphasis in original).
Though the Cabinet had transferred the subject
property prior to the trial court’s finding of contempt, the
court nonetheless found that the Thompson Estate was entitled to
compensatory damages in the amount of $75,000.00 ($5,000.00 lost
rent per month x 15 months of unreasonable delay).
This appeal
followed.
The Cabinet first argues that the trial court abused
its discretion because the August 3, 2000, order requiring the
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Cabinet to “offer the property to the [Thompson Estate] at the
price paid by the Commonwealth at the time of condemnation” was
silent as to any required time for compliance.
Thus, according
to the Cabinet, the order was not sufficiently precise to put it
on notice that compliance was required within four months
following the finality of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision.
Kentucky law imposes no requirement that a judgment
set forth a deadline for compliance.
Rather, the party against
whom a judgment is rendered has a duty to comply with the
judgment in good faith.
Barrett v. Barrett, 152 S.W.2d 610 (Ky.
1941) (contempt not warranted where party makes good faith
attempt to comply with judgment but it is impossible to do so).
If a party attempts to comply in good faith but finds it is
unable to do so, it must “clearly and categorically” demonstrate
the impossibility and prove that it took all reasonable steps
within its power to insure compliance.
Blakeman v. Schneider,
864 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1993); Campbell County v. Commonwealth of
Kentucky, Corrections Cabinet, 762 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Ky. 1988);
Commonwealth ex rel. Bailey v. Bailey, 970 S.W.2d 818 (Ky. App.
1998).
In the present matter, the trial court conducted a
full evidentiary hearing for the specific purpose of allowing
the parties to support their respective positions concerning the
length of time involved in offering and transferring the subject
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property.
Based on the evidence presented to it, the trial was
required to decide at what point, if any, the Cabinet’s failure
to transfer the property became unreasonable.
The trial court’s
decision on this question is a factual finding which will not be
set aside unless it is clearly erroneous.
Campbell County,
supra at 15 (whether Kentucky Correction Cabinet’s compliance
with orders to take prisoners into custody was impossible was a
factual determination reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard).
Granting the trial court the deference to which it is
entitled, we find no error in its decision.
The Cabinet offered
testimony regarding its reasons for taking nineteen months to
transfer the subject property to the Thompson Estate.
These
reasons included a change in the Cabinet’s executive leadership
during an election year and the difficulty in devising new
procedures relative to the resale of property.
After taking all
of the evidence into consideration, the trial court found that
“4 months [was] a more than reasonable amount of time in which
to obtain a survey description, draft the deed, and have the
deed signed and delivered.”
p. 177.
Memorandum, Opinion and Order, R.A.
The mere fact that the Cabinet disagrees with this
conclusion does not render it clearly erroneous, and we find no
evidence of record which would require us to set it aside as
clearly erroneous.
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The Cabinet further argues that the trial court was
without authority to award damages to the Thompson Estate after
the Cabinet had already purged itself of the matter that formed
the basis of the contempt charge.
However, a civil contempt
proceeding can serve two distinct purposes.
First, the court
can use its contempt power to coerce compliance with the court’s
orders.
See, e.g., Blakeman v. Schneider, supra.
Second, as
this Court held in White v. Sullivan, 667 S.W.2d 385 (Ky. App.
1983), a trial court has the authority to award compensatory
damages in a civil contempt proceeding to a party who has
suffered financial injury as a result of the contemnor’s
actions.
Such is the case now before us.
Having acknowledged that a trial court may award
compensatory damages in a contempt proceeding, the question then
becomes whether that court may impose such a sanction after the
contemnor has already purged itself of the contempt.
The
Cabinet argues that because it conveyed the property at issue
prior to the trial court’s finding of contempt, the court abused
its discretion in awarding damages to the Thompson Estate5.
Notably, the Cabinet cites no case authority for the proposition
that compliance, however late, precludes a compensatory damage
award.
If a contemnor could avoid liability for compensatory
5
As noted above, the Cabinet conveyed the property approximately one week
before the hearing on the Thompson Estate’s Motion to Enforce Judgment,
Damages and Sanctions.”
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damages by waiting until the injured party seeks judicial
intervention and then obeying the outstanding order, the trial
court’s contempt powers would be seriously undermined.
Moreover, in Smith v. City of Loyall, 702 S.W.2d 838-39 (Ky.
App. 1986), this Court held:
The purpose of civil contempt authority is
to provide courts with a means for enforcing
their judgments and orders, and trial courts
have almost unlimited discretion in applying
this power.
In that case, the issue presented was whether a trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to impose contempt sanctions
as the result of a city’s tardy compliance with an order to
repair a sidewalk.
This Court ultimately found no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s decision not to impose sanctions
for contempt, noting:
“[c]ourts possess inherent discretionary
powers enabling them to gain compliance with their orders.”
Id.
at 839.
In this matter, the Cabinet did not comply with the
trial court’s order for nineteen months after it became final.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that
four months was a reasonable time for compliance.
The court
further found that the Cabinet’s failure to comply resulted in
the Thompson Estate being deprived of rental amounts to which it
would have been entitled had it received title to the property
in a timely manner.
Under these circumstances, where one party
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(the Thompson Estate) was injured due to an unreasonably lengthy
failure of the other (the Cabinet) to comply with a judgment,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding
compensatory damages after the contempt had been purged.
The Cabinet further argues that the trial court erred
by awarding compensatory damages to the Thompson Estate because
it was the Thompson-owned S-corporation, Sped, Inc.6 which
suffered financial injury as the result of the delayed property
transfer.
When the Thompson heirs eventually repurchased the
property, they transferred it to Sped, Inc., which then leased
the property to Community Trust Bank.
As lessor, Sped, Inc.
would have received the earlier rental payments for which
damages were awarded to the Thompson Estate.
Cabinet’s position misses the point.
However, the
While a corporation must
sue or be sued in its own name, KRS 271B.3-020, the issue herein
is not the assertion of a claim either on behalf of or against a
corporation, but rather the authority of the trial court to
compensate litigants for injuries they sustained as a direct
result of dilatory compliance with the court’s order.
The
Thompson Estate (and thus the Thompson heirs), not Sped, Inc.,
6
Sped, Inc., a subchapter S corporation, was incorporated on November 13,
2002. Everett Thompson, Jr. and Deborah T. Harris, the co-executors of the
“Thompson Estate”, are two of the officers and shareholders of the
corporation. We are unable to discern from the record whether these two
individuals are the sole owners of Sped, Inc. In fact, the record is devoid
of evidence that they own any Sped, Inc. stock. However, as the Cabinet does
not dispute that Thompson and Harris are shareholders, we likewise find no
reason to question this.
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was deprived of the opportunity to purchase the property in a
timely manner.
The Thompson heirs’ decision to create an S-
corporation for purposes of the ground lease with Community
Trust Bank has no bearing on the fact that they were the parties
entitled to a timely conveyance of the property and thus were
the injured parties entitled to compensatory damages.
The trial
court did not err in awarding damages to the Thompson Estate.
Although the trial court properly awarded damages to
the Thompson Estate, the damages awarded were excessive.
As the
Cabinet correctly notes, the measure of contempt damages adopted
by the trial court was derived from the terms of the lease to
Community Trust Bank.
The ten-year lease from Sped, Inc. to the
bank provided for $5,000.00 monthly rental payments.
However,
the lease also provided that Community Trust Bank, Inc. would
pay only a $1,500.00 stipend for the eight-month period
preceding the ten-year lease.
Thus, because the lease terms
providing the basis for the court’s damage award specifically
included the initial stipend period, we find that the trial
court erred in assessing damages at $5,000.00 per month for the
first eight months of the delay period when the “lost” rental
amount for that entire period actually totaled only $1,500.00.
For this reason, we reverse that portion of the court’s
judgment.
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Additionally, as the Cabinet correctly argues, while
the total size of the property conveyed to the Thompson Estate
(and subsequently leased to Community Trust Bank, Inc.) was
1.938 acres, the property which was the subject of the trial
court’s August 3, 2000, judgment and which later formed the
basis of the court’s contempt order was only 0.89 acres.
Because of this, it was error for the court to subsequently
award contempt damages based on a lease value applicable to the
entire 1.938-acre parcel of property, instead of 45.9% of that
parcel (.89 divided by 1.938 = 45.9%).
The Cabinet was under no
order to sell any property in excess of the original 0.89 acres,
and it cannot be held in contempt for any delay relative to
transferring the additional 1.048 acres.
The trial court erred
by failing to award contempt damages relative only to the
original 0.89 acres that was the subject of the court’s August
3, 2000, order.
Consequently, on remand the judgment must be
modified to reflect not only the reduction in damages for the
first eight months, but also the 45.9% of the total damages
attributable to the .89 acres which the Cabinet belatedly
conveyed.
As a final matter, the Cabinet asserts that sovereign
immunity bars an award of interest on the damages awarded by the
trial court.
It is well established in Kentucky that KRS
360.040, the statute providing for interest on judgments, does
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not apply to judgments against the Commonwealth or any of its
subdivisions.
Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transportation, Bureau of
Highways v. Lamb, 549 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1976); Kenton County
Fiscal Court v. Elfers, 981 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. App. 1998); Powell
v. Board of Educ. of Harrodsburg, 829 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. App.
1991).
State agencies are not liable for interest “unless there
is statutory authority or a contractual provision authorizing
the payment of interest.”
Powell, supra at 941.
In this matter
we can find no authority that would allow a circuit court to
require the Commonwealth to pay interest on an award of contempt
sanctions.
For this reason, to the extent that the trial
court’s judgment against the Cabinet provides for such interest,
it must be reversed.
For the reasons set forth above, the order of the Pike
Circuit Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this
case is remanded for entry of a judgment in conformity with this
Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Randall L. Gardner
Ayala Golding
Borowitz & Goldsmith, PLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Christian R. Harris
Williamson, West Virginia
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Randall L. Gardner
Louisville, Kentucky
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