GREGORY D. SPEARS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 16, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001206-MR
GREGORY D. SPEARS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. SHADOAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00100
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BARBER1 AND DIXON, JUDGES; PAISLEY,2 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, Gregory Spears, appeals as a matter of right from the
Fulton Circuit Court’s denial of his motion for RCr 11.42 relief. Appellant claims that he
is entitled to relief due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. We conclude that
the allegations contained in Appellant’s motion can be refuted from the face of the record
and thus, the trial court properly denied the motion.
1
Judge David A. Barber concurred in this opinion prior to the expiration of his term of office on
December 31, 2006. Release of the opinion was delayed by administrative handling.
2
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to
Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
In October 2001, a Fulton County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on two
counts of first-degree robbery, one count of first-degree rape, and one count of firstdegree burglary. The indictment charged that Appellant unlawfully entered the Kentucky
Farm Bureau Agency in Hickman, Kentucky, while armed with a gun. After stealing
money from the agency, Appellant robbed and forcibly raped an employee, who was
seven months pregnant at the time.
On March 21, 2002, Appellant pled guilty to all charges and was sentenced
to a total of sixty years’ imprisonment. His convictions and sentence were subsequently
affirmed on direct appeal. Spears v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 12(Ky. 2003).
On April 7, 2005, Appellant filed a motion in the Fulton Circuit Court to
vacate or set aside the judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42. Appellant claimed that he was
entitled to a new trial due to the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. After consideration
of the record, argument and evidence before the trial court, including an affidavit from
Appellant’s trial counsel directly refuting the majority of Appellant’s claims3, the trial
court denied the motion. This appeal ensued.
Appellant claims herein that the trial court erred in refusing to hold an
evidentiary hearing to resolve his claim that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness rendered
Appellant’s guilty plea involuntary. Specifically, Appellant alleges that trial counsel (1)
failed to conduct adequate investigation; (2) failed to sufficiently interact with Appellant;
(3) failed to file a motion for a change of venue; (4) provided inaccurate information as to
3
We note that trial counsel’s affidavit was not signed at the time the Commonwealth’s response was
filed on May 13, 2005. In fact, counsel did not sign the affidavit until June 22, 2005. Nevertheless, we
are of the opinion that such does not impact the appropriateness of the trial court’s ruling.
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Appellant’s potential sentence and parole eligibility; and (5) failed to investigate and
present mitigation evidence.
The two-prong test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims is
well established. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984), mandates that a defendant first show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at
2064. The defendant must then show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the
defense, i.e., that “counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. As our Supreme Court noted in McQueen v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Ky. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987),
the defendant must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable possibility that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the trial would have been different.”
A defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel, but only counsel likely to
render reasonably effective assistance. McQueen v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 70(Ky.
1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1130 (1997). As such, the critical issue in the context of an
RCr 11.42 motion is not whether counsel made any errors, but instead whether counsel
was so thoroughly ineffective that “defeat was snatched from the hands of probable
victory.” Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 441 (Ky. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 998 (2001). Further, in an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the movant has the burden of
establishing that he was deprived of some substantial right that would justify the
extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction proceeding. As stated in Wahl v.
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Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Ky. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 976 (1966),
“[T]he moving party on a motion under RCr 11.42 undertakes a heavy burden to
overcome the regularity of the conviction. The motion is not a substitute for appeal, and
it does not permit a review of all the alleged errors surrounding the trial.”
In considering an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a reviewing court
must consider the totality of the evidence before the court and assess the overall
performance of counsel throughout the case in order to determine whether the identified
acts or omissions overcome the presumption that counsel rendered reasonable
professional assistance. See United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 975 (1993). And a reviewing court must be “highly deferential in
scrutinizing counsel’s performance” in determining whether counsel rendered ineffective
assistance. Harper v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311, 315 (Ky. 1998), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1056 (1999).
In the instant case, Appellant has an even more stringent burden in that he
entered a valid guilty plea to the charges. Appellant must not only demonstrate that
counsel was deficient, but that the deficient performance so seriously affected the
outcome of the plea process that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable
probability that the defendant would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on
going to trial. Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2001); See also Centers v.
Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. App. 1990).
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A review of the record in this case clearly confirms that Appellant’s
allegations of ineffective counsel were refuted from the face of the record, and in
particular, from the plea colloquy.
Appellant stated during his plea colloquy that he had received no promises
in exchange for his plea, and that he understood he could face up to eighty years’
imprisonment. Further, Appellant stated that he had adequate time to speak with his
attorney, that he felt comfortable entering the plea, that his attorney had answered all of
his questions and had looked into the aspects of the case he had asked him to, and that he
was satisfied with his attorney’s representation. While Appellant’s plea was a straight
plea, in that there was no agreement as to punishment, Appellant understood that given
the nature of the crimes and the overwhelming evidence against him, including his
confession, he had a better chance of avoiding the maximum penalty with trial court
sentencing than if he went before a jury. And in fact, Appellant received sixty years,
rather than the potential maximum of eighty years imprisonment.
The trial court noted in its order denying RCr 11.42 relief, that while
Appellant made many bald assertions about counsel’s performance, he failed to plead
with any specificity what he thought counsel could have or should have done differently.
The court noted:
[B]ased upon a review of the video record maintained
by the clerk, there is no question but that Defendant’s guilty
plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. This
Court takes great lengths to establish to its satisfaction that
Defendant is aware of his rights, those he is giving up, and
the consequences of his guilty plea when accepting a
defendant’s plea of guilty. Further, the Court finds that
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Defendant was adequately afforded the opportunity to present
mitigation evidence at his sentencing, but that those persons
who could most favorably speak on behalf of defendant, i.e.,
his family members, declined to do so. No special
preparation should be required to stand before the Court and
plead for some form of mercy for one’s child, sibling,
grandchild, etc.
The Court ruled that the record directly refuted Appellant’s claims that
counsel failed to conduct adequate investigation and failed to interact with Appellant.
Further, as evidenced above, the trial court was satisfied that Appellant’s plea was
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made.
With respect to the allegation that counsel failed to file a motion for a
change of venue, the trial court commented that Appellant’s guilty plea waived his claim.
Nevertheless, the record reveals that Appellant did, in fact, file a pro se motion for a
change of venue, so he cannot now argue that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to
do so.
Finally, the record indicates that the issue of parole eligibility was
discussed at the sentencing hearing, at which time trial counsel argued for the minimum
and concurrent sentences because of the application of the violent offender statute, which
would require Appellant to serve 85% percent of his sentence before being eligible for
parole. In any event, the failure to inform a defendant of parole eligibility does not
render a guilty plea involuntary under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709,
23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). See also Turner v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.2d 500 (Ky. App.
1982).
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An evidentiary hearing is not required if the issues raised are refuted by the
record. Strickland at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2064. Further, conclusory allegations that are not
supported by specific facts do not justify a hearing “because RCr 11.42 does not require a
hearing to serve the function of a discovery deposition.” Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975
S.W.2d 905, 909 (Ky. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1025 (1999). A hearing is only
required if the motion raises an issue that cannot be determined on the face of the record.
RCr 11.42(5); Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742 (Ky. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1049 (1994).
Kentucky law contains a strong presumption that trial counsel’s
performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Commonwealth v. Pelphrey, 998 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1999). The trial court properly
determined that all of Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were refuted
from the face of the record and he was not entitled to post-conviction relief.
The Fulton Circuit Court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for RCr 11.42
relief is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Amy E. Robinson
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Damon Preston
Frankfort, Kentucky
Tami Allen Stetler
Frankfort, Kentucky
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