WALTER BRUNE LONG v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 5, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000861-MR
WALTER BRUNE LONG
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANTHONY FROHLICH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00017
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES;1 MILLER,2 SPECIAL JUDGE.
MILLER, SPECIAL JUDGE:
Walter Long brings this appeal after
having entered a conditional guilty plea3 in Boone Circuit Court
on March 23, 2005.
The issues on appeal concern whether Long
was afforded sufficient opportunity to controvert the
1
Judges Daniel T. Guidugli and Wilfrid A. Schroder concurred in this opinion
prior to the expiration of their terms of office on December 31, 2006.
Release of the opinion was delayed by administrative handling.
2
Retired Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
3
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09.
information contained in his Pre-Sentence Investigation Report4
(PSI), and whether trial courts are obligated to make factual
findings with respect to disputed portions.
For the following
reasons, we affirm.
Appellant was charged on October 25, 2003, with
Fraudulent Use of a Credit Card over $100 within a six-month
period,5 a Class D Felony.
He was also charged with being a
persistent felony offender (PFO) First Degree.6
Long was
indicted on January 6, 2004, but the PFO charge was dismissed
after he entered a plea agreement on December 22, 2004.
During the sentencing hearing on January 26, 2005,
Long informed the circuit court that he had objections to his
PSI report.
Long asserted that the PSI report inaccurately
described his criminal past and also contained irrelevant,
prejudicial information.
The alleged deficiencies in the PSI
report include, inter alia, the final dispositions of prior
criminal cases in which Long was a defendant.
On March 23, 2005, the circuit court held a hearing
during which Long was given the opportunity to controvert the
contested elements of his PSI report.
Long began his
presentation of proof by introducing copies of past cases in
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 532.050 and RCr 11.02 require that courts
consider a PSI report before sentencing a convicted felon.
5
KRS 434.650.
6
KRS 532.080.
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which he was involved.
Next, Long testified on the stand as to
the alleged inaccuracies.
The Court then noted the
discrepancies in the report and sentenced Long to two and onehalf years in prison, which was the same sentence negotiated for
in his plea agreement with the Commonwealth.
Long, however, was denied his request to cross-examine
witnesses who prepared the PSI report.
Long also failed in his
endeavor to persuade the circuit court that the trial courts
must make factual findings with respect to discrepancies in PSI
reports.
This appeal followed.
Trial courts have broad discretion in determining what
constitutes a “meaningful opportunity to controvert” the
contents of a PSI report.
Fields v. Commonwealth, 123 S.W.3d
914 (Ky.App. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 95 S.W.3d
60 (Ky. 2002)).
In the matter at hand, Long was given the opportunity
to dispute certain portions of his PSI on March 23, 2005.
At
the conclusion of this proceeding, Circuit Court Judge Frohlich
noted the alleged discrepancies inside the PSI report and
initialed his comments.
Appellant, however, contends that he
should have been afforded the chance to cross-examine the
preparers of the report.
We disagree.
Neither the U.S. Constitution, nor any Kentucky
statute, mandates that convicted felons be given the opportunity
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to conduct mini-trials, so to speak, with respect to their PSI
reports at sentencing hearings.
This Court held in Fields:
The process due at sentencing is less, of
course, than that due at the culpability
trial, notwithstanding the sentencing
court's need for and use of additional
information and the significance of its
decisions. The due-process clauses of the
federal constitution require that sentences
not be imposed on the basis of material
misinformation, and that facts relied on by
the sentencing court "have some minimal
indicium of reliability beyond mere
allegation." Specific procedures, however,
such as discovery, cross-examination of
adverse witnesses, and fact-finding by a
jury, as required at trial, "are simply not
constitutionally mandated." (Emphasis
added).
Fields, supra, at 917.
Cross-examination of Probation and Parole Officers
regarding the PSI report, as suggested by Long, is not required
and would be an insufficient use of judicial resources.
For
example, one of the disputed segments of Long's PSI report
pertains to a matter dating back twenty-nine years ago, and
resolution of the issue would be impractical in any event.
The trial court acknowledged that it gives more
deference to the facts of the specific case at hand rather than
a felon's PSI report.
Accordingly, it is unlikely that the
resolution of the disputed portions of Long's PSI report, even
if resolved in his favor, would have altered the outcome of his
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sentence.7
Indeed, Long was sentenced in full accordance with
his plea agreement.
Accordingly, we find that Long was given
sufficient opportunity to controvert the disputed portions of
his PSI.
We next address whether trial courts are tasked with
the responsibility to make factual findings with respect to
disputed portions of a PSI report.
The Commonwealth asserts,
inter alia, that the plain meaning of KRS 532.050 does not
require the trial court to make findings of fact with regard to
PSI discrepancies.
We agree.
Kentucky law does not mandate that trial courts make
specific findings as alleged errors in PSI reports of convicted
felons.
KRS 532.050(6) provides:
Before imposing sentence, the court shall
advise the defendant or his counsel of the
factual contents and conclusions of any
presentence investigation or psychiatric
examinations and afford a fair opportunity
and a reasonable period of time, if the
defendant so requests, to controvert them.
The court shall provide the defendant's
counsel a copy of the presentence
investigation report. It shall not be
necessary to disclose the sources of
confidential information.
A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that courts
attempt to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly based on
the clear language of the law.
Stogner v. Commonwealth, 35
7
RCr 9.24 states: “The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard
any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.
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S.W.3d 831 (Ky.App. 2000).
Unambiguous language of statutes
must be given their plain meaning, and we are unable to add or
subtract words from the legislative enactment.
Id.
Judges are
required to give "due consideration" to PSI reports and the
allegation of errors therein.
However, to require judges to go
through an entire fact-finding process regarding those errors,
particularly when the disputed portions will have little to no
effect on the sentence, is unnecessary.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Boone
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Angela Johnson
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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