MARCUS BOWEN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 8, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002324-MR
MARCUS BOWEN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 03-CR-00041
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: LAMBERT AND STUMBO, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: Marcus Bowen appeals from an order of the
Greenup Circuit Court denying his motion to suppress evidence found at his residence
pursuant to a search warrant. We affirm.
On May 1, 2003, Bowen was indicted by a Greenup County grand jury on
charges of trafficking in marijuana over 8 ounces, possession of marijuana, possession of
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute
21.580.
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drug paraphernalia, two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine) in the
first degree, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, and persistent felony offender in the first degree.2 The charges stemmed
from a search of Bowen’s residence in Russell, Kentucky, conducted by Fivco Area Drug
Enforcement (FADE) Task Force officers on January 25, 2002, pursuant to a search
warrant.
In the affidavit supporting the search warrant for Bowen’s residence,
Detective David Smith of the Flatwoods Police Department stated that on July 1, 2001,
he received information from:
A concerned citizen that they had observed on numerous
occasions and particularly on weekends, a high volume of
traffic going to and from the BOWEN residence. Persons
would enter the residence, stay only a short period of time,
and exit the residence.
Acting on the information received, affiant conducted the
following independent investigation:
On or between the dates of January 15th, 2002, and January
18th, 2002, officers of the FADE Task Force conducted
surveillance at the residence of MARCUS BOWEN located at
100 Crestview Road, Russell, Kentucky. BOWEN was
observed leaving the residence in a 1995 GEO Prism, baring
[sic] Kentucky registration 993-GBM, where surveillance was
maintained by FADE officers to a location in Greenup
County where BOWEN delivered a quantity of Cocaine to a
known drug dealer; that in turn sold the Cocaine to a FADE
undercover detective. During the course of another
transaction, prior to the aforementioned date, the known drug
dealer stated to a COOPERATING WITNESS that MARCUS
BOWEN delivered the Cocaine that the COOPERATING
See Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1421, KRS 218A.1422, KRS 218A.500, KRS
218A.1412 (two counts), KRS 527.040(handgun), KRS 527.040(firearm), and KRS 532.080,
respectively.
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WITNESS had purchased. This conversation was overheard
and tape-recorded by FADE officers. BOWEN was identified
by FADE detective DAVID SMITH on both of the
aforementioned occasions.
Based on the affidavit, a search warrant was issued for Bowen’s residence on January 25,
2002, and was executed the same day. During the search, police found illegal drugrelated items, including cocaine residue, several individual bags of marijuana, and drug
paraphernalia.
Following the issuance of an indictment, Bowen filed a motion to suppress
the evidence found during the search, alleging that the affidavit supporting the search
warrant lacked probable cause. After holding an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.78, the court entered an order denying the
motion.
Bowen subsequently entered a conditional Alford plea to the two cocaine
charges, two marijuana charges, and to the drug paraphernalia charge. The court
sentenced Bowen to six years’ imprisonment. This appeal by Bowen followed.
“Our review of a search warrant must give great deference to the warrantissuing judge's findings of probable cause and should not be reversed unless arbitrarily
exercised.” Moore v. Commonwealth, 159 S.W.3d 325, 329 (Ky. 2005). “Courts should
review the sufficiency of an affidavit underlying a search warrant in a commonsense,
rather than hypertechnical, manner.” Id. “The traditional standard for reviewing an
issuing judge's finding of probable cause has been that so long as the magistrate had a
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substantial basis for concluding that a search warrant would uncover evidence of
wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more.” Id.
“Whether probable cause exists is determined by examining the totality of
the circumstances.” Id., citing United States v. Hammond, 351 F.3d 765 (6th Cir. 2003).
“Furthermore, the test for probable cause is whether there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. “Probable
cause does not require certainty that a crime has been committed or that evidence will be
present in the place to be searched.” Id.
Bowen first argues that the trial court erred in not excising portions of the
warrant that were stale and materially false. We disagree.
Bowen notes that the affidavit signed by Officer Smith contained
information gathered from an anonymous tip from a concerned citizen on July 1, 2001,
seven months prior to the actual request for a warrant. Bowen contends that the sevenmonth delay renders the search invalid because the information therein was too “stale to
be relevant.” He further contends that the evidence gathered during the surveillance of
Bowen's residence prior to January 2002 did not reveal any suspicious activity.
Regarding the January 2002 surveillance, Officer Smith, the affiant,
testified at the suppression hearing that he received information from a confidential
informant3 (CI) that he could buy cocaine from a Timothy Riggs4. Based on this
information, Officer Smith arranged for the CI to make a controlled buy, monitored by
The confidential informant is also referred to as a “cooperating witness” in the search warrant
affidavit, as well as in testimony presented at the suppression hearing.
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Riggs is identified as a “known drug dealer” in the search warrant affidavit.
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the police with audio and video recording equipment, from the unsuspecting Riggs.
When the CI entered Riggs's residence to make the purchase, Riggs stated he did not
have the cocaine on him, but that he would call his supplier and have it delivered by him.
Riggs took the CI's money with the understanding that Riggs would use it to pay his
supplier and that the CI would return later for the cocaine. While waiting, Officer Smith
observed Bowen drive up and enter Riggs's apartment, leaving one or two minutes later.
Shortly thereafter, the CI met with Riggs outside the residence and was given the
cocaine. While speaking with the CI, Riggs verbally identified Bowen as the cocaine
supplier.
A few days later, an undercover FADE Task Force officer, Detective Roy
Ison, made another controlled buy. At the suppression hearing, Detective Ison testified
that he made this buy directly from Riggs without using the CI as a go-between,
although the circumstances were similar. Detective Ison provided cash to Riggs and
then waited for Riggs's supplier to bring the cocaine. During the wait, Bowen drove up
and entered Riggs's residence, staying only a few minutes. Shortly thereafter, Riggs
delivered the cocaine to Detective Ison, telling Ison that Bowen had supplied the
cocaine.
Regarding the anonymous tip information from the concerned citizen,
although it was received eight months before the affidavit and search warrant5, it was
Concerning whether the anonymous tip was stale, “it is important to look at the nature of the
offense and the length of criminal activity, not the simple number of days that have elapsed.
Where the offense in question is continuing and ongoing, the passage of time is not of critical
importance.” Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 583-84 (Ky. 2006). “[W]here the
affidavit properly recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature, a course
of conduct, the passage of time becomes less significance.” Id. at 584. Here, the affidavit stated
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corroborated by information gathered from the two drug transactions with Riggs. See
U.S. v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 924 (6th Cir. 1998)(“where recent information corroborates
otherwise stale information, probable cause may be found”). The information from
Riggs provided a sufficient nexus between the anonymous tip from the concerned citizen
and Bowen’s residence. Regardless, even if the anonymous tip information was
considered too stale and even if it was excised from the search warrant affidavit, ample
other evidence from the drug transactions with Riggs provided probable cause to believe
Bowen was engaged in illegal drug dealing6.
Under the totality of the circumstances, substantial evidence supported a
finding of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. The considerable
testimony of Officers Smith and Ison at the suppression hearing provided ample evidence
to support the court’s findings. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of
the motion to suppress.
The order of the Greenup Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
that the affiant had information from a “concerned citizen” that indicated evidence of illegal drug
activity (numerous occasions of high volume traffic to Bowen residence and persons entering
and leaving after short period), an activity of an ongoing and continuous nature.
Bowen's apartment was under surveillance at the time of the second transaction. Police
testimony revealed that Bowen left his apartment immediately before driving to Riggs's
apartment to deliver the cocaine. This provided probable cause to support the search of Bowen's
residence.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robin L. Webb
Grayson, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
David W. Barr
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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