DANNY BUSTLE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY and DANNY BUSTLE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 2, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001721-MR
DANNY BUSTLE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT E. GILLUM, CIRCUIT JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 03-CR-00014
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
APPELLEE
No. 2004-CA-002396-MR
DANNY BUSTLE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROCKCASTLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT E. GILLUM, CIRCUIT JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 03-CR-00002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DIXON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE:
In this consolidated appeal, Danny Bustle appeals
pro se from the denial of Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
60.02 post-conviction relief from Pulaski and Rockcastle Circuit
Courts.
On January 10, 2003, Bustle was indicted by a
Rockcastle County grand jury for Manufacture of Methamphetamine,
First Offense and three counts of Receiving Stolen Property
valued over $300.00.
Subsequently, on January 22, 2003, Bustle
was indicted in Pulaski County on one count of Receiving Stolen
Property over $300.00 and Manufacture of Methamphetamine, First
Offense.
On March 23, 2003, Bustle appeared in Rockcastle
Circuit Court and pleaded guilty to the charges in all of his
pending indictments.2
The trial court sentenced Bustle to ten
years’ imprisonment on the Pulaski County indictment and ten
years’ imprisonment on the Rockcastle County indictments, with
the sentences running concurrently.
In May 2004, Bustle filed identical motions for relief
pursuant to CR 60.02 in Pulaski and Rockcastle Circuit Courts.
Both motions were denied, and this consolidated appeal followed.
We first address the Commonwealth’s argument that
Bustle’s appeal should be dismissed due to procedural infirmity.
The Commonwealth is correct that Bustle should have sought
relief under Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42
2
Although not at issue in the present appeal, Bustle had a second indictment
pending in Rockcastle Circuit Court for First Degree Unlawful Imprisonment,
Fourth Degree Assault, and Custodial Interference. This indictment was also
resolved by a guilty plea on March 23, 2003.
-2-
rather than CR 60.02.
857 (Ky. 1983).
Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853,
However, in this case, we decline to dismiss
this appeal on procedural grounds, as we can succinctly address
the merits of Bustle’s claims.
Bustle contends his due process rights were violated
because there was insufficient evidence to convict him of
manufacturing methamphetamine.
Bustle relies on Kotila v.
Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 226 (Ky. 2003), which was abrogated by
the Supreme Court in Matheny v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W. 3d 599
(Ky. 2006)3.
Kotila had held that KRS 218A.1432 required
possession of either all of the chemical precursors or all of
the equipment required to produce methamphetamine.
41.
The Court in Matheny held otherwise.
Id. at 240-
Id. at 603.
Bustle also relies on Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225,
121 S.Ct. 712, 148 L.Ed.2d 629 (2001), which held that a state
cannot, “consistently with the Federal Due Process Clause,
convict [a defendant] for conduct that its criminal statute, as
properly interpreted, does not prohibit.”
at 714.
Id. at 228, 121 S.Ct.
Accordingly, Bustle contends his due process rights
were violated because, under the Court’s interpretation of
Kotila, he was not in violation of the statute since there was
no evidence he possessed all of the methamphetamine precursors.
3
After the Kotila decision was rendered in 2003, the legislature amended KRS
218A.1432 in 2005. Following the amendment, violation of the statute
requires possession of at least two precursor chemicals or two pieces of
equipment used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
-3-
Bustle’s reliance on these cases is misplaced.
He
pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine and therefore
forfeited any collateral attack as to the sufficiency of the
evidence against him.
Entry of a voluntary, intelligent plea of
guilty has long been held by Kentucky Courts
to preclude a post-judgment challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. The reasoning
behind such a conclusion is obvious. A
defendant who elects to unconditionally
plead guilty admits the factual accuracy of
the various elements of the offenses with
which he is charged. By such an admission,
a convicted appellant forfeits the right to
protest at some later date that the state
could not have proven that he committed the
crimes to which he pled guilty. To permit a
convicted defendant to do so would result in
a double benefit in that defendants who
elect to plead guilty would receive the
benefit of the plea bargain which ordinarily
precedes such a plea along with the
advantage of later challenging the sentence
resulting from the plea on grounds normally
arising in the very trial which defendant
elected to forego.
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 724 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Ky.App. 1986)
(citations omitted).
After review of the record, we conclude that Bustle
entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea after a lengthy plea
colloquy pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct.
1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
Consequently, relief pursuant to
CR 60.02 is not warranted.
-4-
For the foregoing reasons, the orders denying Bustle’s
motions for CR 60.02 relief are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
Danny Bustle, Pro Se
Fredonia, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jeffrey A. Cross
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-
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