CLARK REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER v. LENORA LOVINGS; HON. ANDREW MANNO, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 9, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000965-WC
CLARK REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NOS. WC-97-59112 AND WC-98-94943
LENORA LOVINGS; HON. ANDREW MANNO,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; WORKERS’
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
TAYLOR AND VANMETER, JUDGES; POTTER, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
VANMETER, JUDGE:
Clark Regional Medical Center (CRMC) petitions
for review from an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board
(Board) affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ)
determination that CRMC had failed to provide good cause to show
why CRMC did not timely file a Form 111 in response to Lenora H.
Lovings' motion to reopen her claim for an occupational injury
due to a worsening of her condition.
1
Because the Board, in
Senior Judge John Woods Potter sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
review of the ALJ’s decision, did not overlook or misconstrue
controlling statutes or precedent, or commit error in assessing
the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice, we affirm.
Lovings suffered work-related injuries while working
as a registered nurse for CRMC on August 1, 1997, and again on
September 22, 1997.
Lovings subsequently filed a motion for
workers’ compensation benefits.
On September 13, 1999, the
ALJ/Arbitrator awarded Lovings permanent partial disability
benefits commensurate with a permanent impairment rating of 15%
to the body as a whole.
On July 10, 2003, Lovings filed a motion to reopen her
case, alleging a worsening of condition and increase in both
impairment and disability as a result of her 1997 work-related
injuries.
In the affidavit attached to her motion, Lovings
stated that the pain in her shoulders, ankles, hips, and knees
had become so severe that she was no longer able to work at even
a sedentary job.
In both the motion to reopen and her
affidavit, Lovings alleged “total disability” as a consequence
of her work-related injuries.
She stated also that she is in
need of a total knee replacement on her right knee.
An order sustaining Lovings’ motion to reopen was
entered by Chief ALJ Sheila C. Lowther on August 26, 2003.
When
that order was returned as undeliverable, a corrected order was
sent out by Chief ALJ Lowther on September 18, 2003, and was
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served upon both the employer, CRMC, and CRMC’s self-insurance
administrator, AIK.
The scheduling order was sent out by the
Office of Workers’ Claims on September 25, 2003.
Copies were
sent to both AIK/Attention Cheryl Guidice and the employer,
CRMC.
The scheduling order stated that within 45 days of the
notice CRMC was required to file a Notice of Claim Denial or
Acceptance (Form 111).
The scheduling order further stated that
if CRMC failed to file the Form 111 within 45 days (i.e., by
November 9, 2003), then all allegations contained in Lovings’
motion to reopen would be deemed admitted by the company.
On November 21, 2003, Lovings filed a motion
requesting that the ALJ take judicial notice that CRMC had not
filed its Form 111 within 45 days of the scheduling order and to
accordingly deem as admitted all allegations contained in her
motion to reopen.
Not until December 5, 2003, did CRMC take
action in the matter, at which time W. Kenneth Nevitt, attorney
for CRMC, filed his entry of appearance.
On December 10, 2003,
CRMC filed a “Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to
Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen and Notice of Claim Denial or
Acceptance.”
In the motion CRMC argued that it should be
granted an extension of time in which to file its Form 111
because counsel for the company had not received a copy of the
September 25, 2003, scheduling order until December 3, 2003.
Lovings filed a response to the motion objecting to the
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requested extension of time.
Ultimately, the ALJ overruled
Lovings’ motion to take judicial notice of CRMC’s failure to
timely file its Form 111, and granted CRMC’s motion for
additional time to file its Form 111.
Thereafter, Lovings' claim proceeded on the merits. On
March 1, 2004, the ALJ entered an Opinion and Award dismissing
Lovings’ claim for additional income benefits upon reopening.
The ALJ concluded that Lovings had failed to show an increase in
impairment for any of her work-related injuries.
appealed that decision to the Board.
Lovings
Among the issues raised in
the appeal was that CRMC had failed to timely file a Form 111 in
response to Lovings’ motion to reopen.
On July 23, 2004, the Board entered an opinion
vacating and remanding the ALJ’s March 1, 2004, Opinion and
Award for a determination by the ALJ as to whether there was
good cause for the late filing of the Form 111 by CRMC.
In the
event the ALJ determined that there was good cause for the late
filing, then the prior determination denying Lovings benefits
was to stand; if, on the other hand, the ALJ determined that
there was not good cause for the late filing, then all
allegations contained in Lovings’ motion to reopen and attached
affidavit were to be deemed admitted by the company.
Upon remand, by Opinion and Order dated October 29,
2004, the ALJ determined that there was not good cause for
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CRMC’s late filing.
As the allegations contained in Lovings’
motion to reopen and affidavit attached thereto contained
allegations that Lovings was totally disabled due to her
work-related injury, and those allegations were deemed admitted,
the ALJ awarded her total permanent disability benefits.
On
April 8, 2005, the Board issued an opinion upholding the ALJ’s
determination.
This petition for review followed.
The ALJ determined that CRMC did not show good cause
for failing to timely file its Form 111 in response to Lovings’
motion to reopen.
The ALJ addressed the good cause issue as
follows:
The first issue before the undersigned
Administrative Law Judge is whether or not
the Defendant-Employer had good cause for
its late filing of a Form 111. The best
source for information concerning the late
filing of the Form 111 is found in
Defendant’s Motion for Extension of Time to
File a Form 111. The only reasoning
contained in that motion was that the
counsel for the Defendant-Employer did not
receive a copy of the scheduling order of
September 25, 2003 until December 3, 2003.
Counsel also stated he did not receive until
December 5, 2003, a copy of the Motion to
Reopen that was filed on July 10, 2003. The
Workers’ Compensation Board, in its opinion,
held that relief from the requirement for
filing a Form 111 within 45 days following
an order sustaining a motion to reopen an
injury claim may be had upon good cause
shown, in the same manner as relief from a
default judgment in a civil action.
Generally, when a party is seeking relief
from a default judgment in a civil action,
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it must show good cause. Good cause
generally means a reasonable excuse for the
delay in answering while establishing that
the party is not guilty of unreasonable
delay or neglect. Terrafirma, Inc. v.
Krogdahl, 380 S.W.2d 86 (Ky. 1964). If a
party has a valid excuse for the default, a
meritorious defense to the claim, and there
is no prejudice to the non-defaulting party,
relief may be granted. Perry v. Central
Bank & Trust Co., 812 S.W.2d 166 (Ky.App.
1991). In the case at bar, the DefendantEmployer was required to file a form 111 on
or before November 9, 2004. A motion for
extension of time to file the Form 111 was
filed on December 10, 2004. The Form 111
itself was filed on December 18, 2003. In
Howard v. Fountain, 749 S.W.2d 690 (Ky.App.
1988), a motion to set aside a default
judgment was denied where the “good cause”
shown was mere inattention on the part of
the Defendant or his attorney. In the
Howard case, the basis for the late filing
of a responsive pleading was that the
attorney was not contacted regarding the
summons and complaint until December 5,
1985. The complaint had been filed on
November 13, 1985.
In the case at bar, this ALJ finds that the
Defendant-Employer has not provided any good
cause to show why the Form 111 was not filed
in a timely manner. The only reason given
was that the attorney for the
Defendant-Employer was not notified of the
scheduling order by the Defendant-Employer
until December 3, 2003. Therefore,
according to the opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board, all allegations
contained in the Plaintiff’s Motion to
Reopen and her affidavit incorporated
therein by reference, are deemed admitted.
This includes the allegation that
Plaintiff’s pain in both shoulders, both
ankles, both hips and both knees is the
result of her work injury.
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Before us, CRMC does not take issue with the ALJ’s
findings concerning the late filing or, for that matter, his
conclusion that the company did not show good cause for failing
to timely file its Form 111.
Rather, CRMC argues (1) that the
matter should be remanded back to the ALJ to determine “what
prejudice, if any, the employee suffered as a result, and
whether less extreme sanctions are warranted,” and (2) that even
if it is determined that the matters in Lovings’ motion to
reopen are deemed admitted, then such does not result in the
conclusion that the employee’s medical problems are due to the
work injury.
The Board addressed these two issues as follows:
CRMC also argues that the ALJ should have
considered whether or not Lovings suffered
any prejudice when ALJ King granted CRMC’s
motion for extension of time to file its
notice of claim denial or acceptance. It
submits that since proof was allowed to be
taken, Lovings did not suffer any prejudice.
803 KAR 25:010 Section 5(2), the
administrative regulation in question,
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Defendant shall file a notice of
claim denial or acceptance on a Form
111 – Injury and Hearing Loss claim
within forty-five (45) days after the
notice of the scheduling order or
within forty-five (45) days following
an order sustaining a motion to reopen
a claim.
(b) If a Form 111 is not filed, all
allegations of the application shall be
deemed admitted.
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We agree with CRMC that Lovings did not
suffer any actual prejudice because she was
allowed to fully prosecute her motion to
reopen before the original ALJ and was not
denied the opportunity to introduce any
evidence in support of her motion to reopen.
However, that is not the issue. The
sanction authorized by the above cited
regulation relieves the employee from the
burden of proving her claim to the extent
the allegations contained in the motion to
reopen or the Form are deemed admitted. In
other words, the sanction for the failure to
file a Form 111 precludes the opportunity of
the employer to produce proof in support of
its defenses. As a practical matter,
application of the “deemed admitted”
language contained in the regulation inures
to the benefit of a claimant. On the other
hand, if the ALJ allows the employer the
opportunity to file a late Form 111, the
injured claimant would still be granted the
opportunity to present and maintain the
claim. In other words, in the arena of
workers’ compensation it is highly unlikely,
absent extraordinary circumstances, that a
claimant could ever make a showing of actual
prejudice.
. . . .
CRMC also argues that even if the matters in
Lovings’ motion to reopen are deemed
admitted such admission does not result in
the conclusion that her medical problems are
due to a work injury. It contends Lovings
did not attach any medical opinion to her
motion to reopen that her work injury caused
any increased disability, nor was it the
cause of any needed medical treatment. CRMC
submits the question of causation is one for
medical experts and Lovings’ testimony alone
does not support a finding of causation.
As explained, the failure to file a timely
Form 111 rendered the matters alleged in
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Lovings’ motion to reopen deemed admitted.
Among these allegations were
work-relatedness and extent and
duration – no further proof was necessary.
The function of this Court when reviewing opinions of
the Workers' Compensation Board is to correct the Board only
where it has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or
precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so
flagrant as to cause gross injustice. 2
In the present case, this
did not occur upon the Board’s review of the ALJ’s decision.
We agree with the Board’s determination that if the
employer fails to establish good cause for failing to timely
file a Form 111, the claimant need not establish actual
prejudice in order to avail herself of the sanction prescribed
in 803 KAR 25:010 Section 5(2).
As determined by the Board, by
analogy, the procedures contained in CR 3 55 for the granting and
setting aside of a default judgment provide appropriate
guidelines for an employer’s failure to timely file a Form 111. 4
To set aside a default judgment, as a threshold matter, “good
cause” must be shown. 5
As CRMC failed to establish good cause as
2
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Ky. 1992).
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
4
If anything, the Board’s construction of 803 KAR 25:010 Section 5(2) is
lenient toward the employer. The regulation is phrased in the mandatory
“shall”; however, the Board construed the regulation to provide an exception
if the failure to file was for good cause by analogy to CR 55.02. The issue
of whether there is such an exception is not before us.
5
CR 55.02; Howard v. Fountain, 749 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Ky.App. 1988).
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a threshold matter, it follows that Lovings need not demonstrate
actual prejudice to avail herself of the sanction prescribed in
803 KAR 25:010 Section 5(2).
Further, as Lovings’ allegations of a total disability
in connection with a work-related injury as stated in her motion
to reopen are deemed as admitted by CRMC, all elements necessary
for an award of total permanent disability benefits are
satisfied, 6 and there is no need for additional medical proof.
For the foregoing reasons the opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, CONCURS.
POTTER, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT AND FILES
SEPARATE OPINION.
POTTER, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURRING IN RESULT:
with the result.
I agree
However, I reach that result primarily by
giving deference to the Workers’ Compensation Board’s
interpretation of its own regulation rather than by relying on
an analogy to Civil Rule 55.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
W. Kenneth Nevitt
Louisville, Kentucky
James D. Howes
Louisville, Kentucky
6
See Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp., 65 S.W.3d 503, 508 (Ky. 2001).
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