WHITEHALL FURNITURE v. MARY WILKINS; WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD; AND HON. RICHARD M. JOINER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 18, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000953-WC
WHITEHALL FURNITURE
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-03-01992
v.
MARY WILKINS;
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD;
AND HON. RICHARD M. JOINER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
The Appellant, Whitehall Furniture (Whitehall),
petitions for review of a decision of the Workers’ Compensation
Board (WCB) that affirmed a determination by the Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) that Appellee, Mary Wilkins (Wilkins), had
timely filed her claim and her injuries were work related.
affirm the decision of the WCB because substantial evidence
supports the finding of the ALJ.
Wilkins began working for Whitehall in 1972 as a
seamstress upholstering office furniture.
In 1983, she
We
developed carpal tunnel syndrome in her right wrist.
tunnel syndrome was corrected through surgery.
The carpal
Later, in 1988,
Wilkins developed carpal tunnel syndrome in her left wrist.
Wilkins was again treated with surgery and the condition was
corrected.
Each of these surgeries required Wilkins to be off
work approximately six weeks.
During that time, Whitehall paid
for Wilkins’ medical expenses and temporary total disability for
the surgeries and time off work.
Wilkins did not formally file
a workers’ compensation claim for either incident of carpal
tunnel syndrome.
Prior to the development of the carpal tunnel syndrome
in Wilkins’ left wrist, she was diagnosed with Kienbock’s
disease in that wrist in 1993 by Dr. William Reid.
Kienbock’s
disease is a rare disease that causes deterioration of the
lunate bone, the wrist bone that is second from the thumb side
and is shaped like a crescent moon.
Wilkins informed Pat
Mulligan 1 of Whitehall about her Kienbock’s disease.
paid for Dr. Reed’s medical bills.
Whitehall
The workers’ compensation
insurance carrier ended payment of medical bills in 1995;
however, Whitehall agreed to pay any related medical expenses
not covered by Wilkins’ health insurance.
Despite her
Kienbock’s Disease, Wilkins continued to work at Whitehall until
the plant closed December 13, 2001.
1
One of Pat Mulligan’s duties for Whitehall was to handle workers’
compensation claims.
-2-
After the closure, Wilkins attempted to work at two
other jobs during March 2002.
The first was at Unifirst where
she sewed decals onto uniforms.
The pain in Wilkins’ wrist made
it difficult for her to work and she left Unifirst after only
three days.
Later that same month, Wilkins obtained a position
at Field Packing Co. packing meat into boxes.
Again, the pain
in Wilkins’ wrist resulted in her quitting after one eleven-hour
shift.
In April 2002, Dr. William Milnor 2 told Wilkins that
her left wrist bone had crumbled due to the Kienbock’s Disease
and recommended bone fusion in her left wrist.
Wilkins then
returned to Whitehall and informed Mr. Mulligan 3 of what Dr.
Milnor had told her and asked if the company would pay for her
anticipated medical expenses.
Mr. Mulligan said he would have
to discuss it with the new owner, Paoli Furniture.
Wilkins was
later informed that Paoli Furniture agreed to pay medical
expenses not covered by her medical insurance.
Dr. Milnor fused Wilkins’ left wrist bone in August
2002.
The surgery resulted in Wilkins’ left wrist being
permanently immobilized.
However, after the surgery, Wilkins
did retain movement of the fingers on her left hand.
Paoli
2
Dr. Milnor took over the practice of Dr. Reed following Dr. Reed’s
retirement.
3
Mr. Mulligan was the only person remaining at Whitehall to wrap-up
operations.
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Furniture did not pay for all of Wilkins’ excess medical
expenses. 4
Wilkins then filed a formal workers’ compensation
claim based on her Kienbock’s disease in October 2002.
After two final hearings, 5 the ALJ awarded benefits to
Wilkins 6 for a TTD for August 1, 2002 (date of fusion) until
February 18, 2004 (date Dr. Milnor opined that Wilkins had
reached maximum medical improvement).
The ALJ also awarded
benefits to Wilkins for PPD for the subsequent period of
continued disability not to exceed 425 weeks.
Each party filed
a motion requesting the ALJ to reconsider his decision, but both
motions were denied.
Whitehall appealed to the WCB and the WCB
affirmed the ALJ’s Opinion and Award in its entirety.
Whitehall
now appeals the WCB’s determination.
Whitehall presents two primary arguments in its
appeal.
First, Whitehall claims that the ALJ’s finding that
Wilkins’ Kienbock’s disease is work-related is not supported by
the evidence.
Second, Whitehall claims that the ALJ erred when
he awarded TTD and PPD since Wilkins’ claim was untimely and not
work-related.
4
Wilkins stated that Paoli Furniture paid for about three bills totaling
approximately $150 in her January 26, 2004 deposition.
5
The first hearing on April 26, 2004 was presided by ALJ Kevin King. ALJ
King was subsequently replaced in June 2004. The second hearing on October
12, 2004 was presided by ALJ Richard M. Joiner.
6
The ALJ’s Opinion and Award were dated November 17, 2004.
-4-
Whitehall first argues that the medical evidence does
not support the finding by the ALJ that Wilkins’ Kienbock’s
disease is work-related.
When a claimant succeeds in his burden
of proof in a workers compensation claim and an adverse party
appeals, the question before the court is whether the decision
of the board is supported by substantial evidence.
Transportation Cabinet v. Poe, 69 S.W.3d 60, 62 (Ky. 2001),
(citing Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Ky.
1984)).
Substantial evidence is evidence of relevant
consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds
of reasonable people.
Id.
(citing Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich
Chemical Co., 474 S.W.2d 367, (Ky. 1971)).
The ALJ has the sole
authority to determine the weight, credibility, and substance of
the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from the
evidence.
Id., see also KRS 342.285.
The ALJ has the
discretion to choose whom and what to believe.
Id., (citing
Pruitt v. Bugg Brothers, 547 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Ky. 1977)).
The
ALJ, as fact-finder, may reject any testimony and believe or
disbelieve various parts of the evidence, regardless of whether
it comes from the same witness or the same adversary party’s
total proof.
Burton v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 72 S.W.3d 925, 929
(Ky. 2002), (citing Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, 560
S.W.2d 15, 16 (Ky. 1977)).
-5-
The medical evidence submitted in this matter
consisted of an independent medical examination (IME) by Dr.
Timothy Scott Prince; 7 medical records from Dr. William Milnor
from April 2, 2002 to February 18, 2004; 8 September 15, 2004
deposition of Dr. Prince; 9 and records of the Office of Workers’
Claims regarding injuries on July 31, 1998 and December 13,
2001 10 .
The ALJ stated the following in his Opinion and Award:
In 1993, she was diagnosed with [K]ienbock’s
disease of the left wrist. This condition
degenerated and resulted in surgical treatment on
August 1, 2002. Dr. Prince testified that the
Kienbock’s disease would have been at least
significantly aggravated, if not, in fact, caused
by the repetitive activity of her wrist. This is
the only opinion concerning causation in the
record. Therefore, I conclude that Ms. Wilkins
has had cumulative trauma arising out of and in
the course of her employment which is the
proximate cause producing a worsening of the
Kienbock’s disease as evidenced by objective
medical evidence.
The ALJ correctly stated that the only opinion
concerning the actual cause of Wilkins’ Kienbock’s disease was
presented by Dr. Prince.
The following pertinent statements about Wilkins’
Kienbock’s disease causation were made by Dr. Prince during his
September 15, 2004 deposition:
7
Submitted by Wilkins.
8
Submitted by Wilkins.
9
Submitted by Whitehall.
10
Submitted by Whitehall.
-6-
Q.
Now, is Kienbock’s disease something that
the general public gets or is this something that
is peculiar to factory workers or people who do
repetitive-type tasks?
A.
Members of the general public can get it.
It’s not – the genesis of it is not well
understood at all. There is not clear – one
reason, because it’s so very rare, it’s not clear
what factors lead to it. There certainly is some
fault among the people that treat it that trauma
may make it even more symptomatic or may make it
show up earlier. No one really knows if trauma
is an initiating cause of it or not.
. . .
Q.
Over that period of time, and given that she
had been working there since 1972, is the
Kienbock’s disease related to her repetitive work
activities?
A.
With the – what I said earlier about no one
knows, maybe, what initiates it, certainly I
would think – given it’s a rare condition, I
would think that the general opinion of most
people, including myself – most people who treat
this, including myself is, that it is in this
kind of case, that it would have been at least
significantly aggravated, if not, in fact, caused
by the repetitive activity of her wrist.
. . .
Q.
Given this woman’s history of having
continued to work and wanting to work after that
initial diagnoses, would you attribute the
progress of the condition, the worsening of the
condition to her work activities after that?
A.
I would certainly say that her work
activities aggravated the condition, yes.
-7-
Also, Dr. Prince stated in his report 11 that “Wilkins’
wrist symptoms began and were aggravated by work conditions.
While Kienbock’s syndrome is not completely understood, it is
generally felt to be consistent with trauma, including
repetitive trauma, causing the destruction of the bone.”
Medical causation must be proved to a reasonable
medical probability with expert medical testimony, but KRS
342.0011(1) does not require it to be proved with objective
medical findings.
Brown-Forman Corp. v. Upchurch, 127 S.W.3d
615, 621 (Ky. 2004), (citing Staples, Inc. v. Konvelski, 56
S.W.3d 412, 415 (Ky. 2001)).
It is the quality and substance of
a physician’s testimony, not the use of particular “magic
words,” that determines whether it rises to the level of
reasonable medical probability, i.e., to the level necessary to
Id., (citing Turner v.
prove a particular medical fact.
Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 119, 122-123 (Ky. 1999)).
Whitehall did
not challenge Dr. Prince’s credibility at any time nor did they
present an alternate theory of causation.
As stated above, the ALJ has the sole authority to
determine the weight, credibility, and substance of the evidence
and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.
supra 72 S.W.3d at 929.
Burton
Dr. Prince’s testimony could have
provided a basis for the conclusion sought by Whitehall, but it
11
Form 107.
-8-
also provided a basis for the determination of Wilkins’
condition being work-related.
The ALJ may choose which evidence
to believe when it is conflicting, even when it is from the same
witness.
Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, 560 S.W.2d 15,
16 (Ky. 1977).
The ALJ chose to believe Dr. Prince’s opinion
that Wilkins’ Kienbock’s Disease was caused by her position at
Whitehall.
We believe the ALJ’s finding of work-relatedness was
supported by substantial evidence.
Whitehall’s next argument is that the ALJ erred when
he awarded TTD and PPD since Wilkins’ claim was untimely and not
work-related.
Despite the number of gradual injury claims and
the difficulties encountered in attempting to apply KRS 342.185
to those claims, the legislature has not chosen to create
special rules to govern the period of limitations for claims for
gradual injury.
Alcan Foil Products v. Huff, 2 S.W.3d 96, 100
(Ky. 1999).
In cases where the injury is the result of many minitraumas, the date for giving notice and the date for clocking a
statute of limitations begins when the disabling reality of the
injuries becomes manifest.
687, 688 (Ky.App. 1989).
Randall Co. v. Pendland, 770 S.W.2d
“Manifestation of disability” refers
to physically and/or occupationally disabling symptoms which
lead the worker to discover that a work-related injury has been
sustained.
Special Fund v. Clark, 998 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Ky.
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1999).
It follows that where a claim is not filed until more
than two years after the worker’s discovery of an injury and the
fact that it was caused by work, KRS 342.185 would operate to
prohibit compensation for whatever occupational disability is
attributable to trauma incurred more than two years preceding
the filing of the claim.
Id.
The ALJ found that a portion of Wilkins’ claim was in
fact time barred.
In his report, Dr. Prince assigned an 18%
whole body impairment rating to Wilkins in her post-operative
state.
Dr. Milnor assigned a 19% whole body impairment rating
to Wilkins in her post-operative state in his medical records.
The ALJ found that there must be an exclusion for any impairment
which existed before two years prior to the claim.
Based on
medical records, Dr. Prince found Ms. Wilkins to have a 6% whole
body impairment rating in 1993.
Immediately prior to the fusion
operation, Dr. Prince found there was an 8% impairment.
Based
on this information, the ALJ found that the compensable portion
of Wilkins’ claim was a PPD based on 10% whole body impairment.
Based on the record, we believe the ALJ’s finding was supported
by substantial evidence.
In awarding TTD, the ALJ noted that Wilkins had
surgery on August 1, 2002 and reached maximum medical
improvement therefrom on February 18, 2004 according to the
medical records of Dr. Milnor.
The ALJ found that the surgery
-10-
which was performed on August 1, 2002 was performed for
worsening of her condition, which had occurred in the last two
years.
Based on this, the ALJ awarded Wilkins TTD for the
period August 1, 2002 through February 18, 2004.
We believe
that this finding is supported by substantial evidence contained
in the record.
Whitehall also argues that it did not receive timely
notice from Wilkins as required under KRS 342.185(1).
The ALJ
found that Whitehall clearly had notice of “the accident” based
upon the circumstances.
Wilkins testified that she first
notified Mr. Mulligan at Whitehall of her Kienbock’s disease
diagnoses in 1993.
Notice of a physical injury carries with it
notice of all those things which may reasonably be anticipated
to result from it.
Dawkins Lumber Co. v. Hale, 299 S.W. 991,
992 (Ky. 1927); see also Reliance Diecasting Co. v. Freeman, 471
S.W.2d 311, 313 (Ky. 1971).
by Dr. Reid at that time.
Whitehall paid for treatment given
Even when the workers compensation
insurance company ceased payment in 1995, Whitehall agreed to
pay Wilkins’ medical expenses not covered by her health
insurance.
Wilkins also spoke with Whitehall in April 2002, 12
prior to receiving the fusion surgery on her left wrist, to see
if they would agree to help with the upcoming medical expenses.
12
Wilkins spoke to Pat Mulligan at the plant.
-11-
The purchasing company, Paoli Furniture, agreed to pay for any
medical expenses associated with the fusion surgery not covered
by Wilkins’ medical insurance.
None of Wilkins’ testimony in
relation to notification of her condition was disputed by
Whitehall during the proceedings.
Based on the record, we
believe the ALJ’s conclusion that Whitehall had notice of the
accident was supported by substantial evidence.
Whitehall lastly argues that the ALJ erred when he
awarded TTD and PPD benefits to Wilkins because her Kienbock’s
disease was not work-related.
As stated earlier, we believe
there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s
finding that Wilkins’ Kienbock’s disease was work-related;
therefore, it is not necessary to address the merits of this
argument.
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the WCB is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
C.A. Dudley Shanks
Louisville, Kentucky
Daniel Caslin
M. Michele Cecil
Owensboro, Kentucky
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