CHARLES T. CAHILL AND CHARLOTTE CAHILL v. CITY OF ELIZABETHTOWN, KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 18, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000023-MR
CHARLES T. CAHILL AND
CHARLOTTE CAHILL
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 01-CI-01921 & 02-CI-02022
CITY OF ELIZABETHTOWN, KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a summary judgment
entered in favor of the City of Elizabethtown in an action
claiming that the City’s police falsely imprisoned appellant
when they handcuffed him and put him in a police cruiser while
police were waiting to verify the existence of a warrant for
appellant’s arrest.
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Appellant argues that police used
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
unreasonable restraint to detain him while attempting to verify
the existence of the arrest warrant, which was ultimately found
to not exist.
We disagree with the lower court’s ruling that
the detention was not an arrest, but part of a lawful
investigative stop.
Nevertheless, we affirm based on our
determination that, as a matter of law, the officers were
entitled to qualified immunity where they had reasonable, albeit
mistaken, grounds to believe that a valid warrant for
appellant’s arrest existed.
In 2001, appellant, Charles Cahill and his wife,
Charlotte Cahill maintained a checking account with First
Federal Savings Bank of Elizabethtown, Kentucky (“First
Federal”).
On October 10, 2001, the mobile home the Cahills
were in the process of buying was destroyed by fire.
On October
31, 2001, Charles received a $15,000 check from the insurance
company of the seller of the mobile home to reimburse him for
his down payment and improvements made to the mobile home.
On
November 9, 2001, Charles deposited the check in the Wal-Mart
branch of First Federal in Elizabethtown.
On November 15, 2001,
Charles withdrew the $15,000 from his account.
About a week
after withdrawing the money, a clerk at the Wal-Mart branch of
First Federal told Charles that payment had been stopped on the
check because of an allegation of forgery and that his account
was now overdrawn by $15,139.71.
On December 19, 2001, First
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Federal filed a civil action against the Cahills in the Hardin
Circuit Court to recover the overdrawn amount.
Summonses were
issued on January 7, 2002, and served on the Cahills on January
12, 2002.
On January 29, 2002, the Cahills were shopping at the
Wal-Mart in Elizabethtown.
Upon seeing the Cahills, an employee
of First Federal named Yvonne called the Elizabethtown Police
Department and reported that the bank had issued a warrant for
Charles Cahill’s arrest in Breckenridge County and asked if
Charles could be picked up by police on that warrant.
The
dispatcher responded that the bank would need to call the
Breckenridge County Sheriff’s office and have them fax a copy of
the warrant.
A short time later, Ray Brown, a security officer
with First Federal, also called the Elizabethtown Police
Department to request that an officer pick up Charles Cahill
because the bank had caused a warrant to be issued for him and
his wife.
The dispatcher stated again that the police would
need a copy of the warrant.
When the dispatcher asked Brown if
he knew for sure a warrant had been issued, Brown responded
“yes, sir, I do.
I’m the security officer with First Federal –
and I’m following him right now – I’m out in the parking lot.”
Sometime thereafter, Yvonne from First Federal called the
Elizabethtown Police Department again and stated that she had
called the Breckenridge County Sheriff’s Department and they had
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informed her that they would fax a copy of the warrant as soon
as they had an officer coming in to access the file.
Officer Virgil Willoughby from the Elizabethtown
Police Department received the call from the dispatcher at
approximately 7:30 p.m. that there was an individual in Wal-Mart
for whom First Federal had issued an arrest warrant.
Thereafter, Officer Willoughby located the individual at a
Speedway gas station across from Wal-Mart.
At that time, Brown,
the loan officer from First Federal, pulled into the Speedway
lot also.
Officer Willoughby approached Charles Cahill as he
was pumping his gas and informed him of the report that there
was an outstanding warrant for his arrest.
Charles denied that
an arrest warrant had been issued for him and began trying to
explain the dispute between him and the bank.
Brown, however,
insisted that there was an arrest warrant for Charles.
Officer
Willoughby handcuffed Charles and placed him in the back of his
police cruiser.
In Willoughby’s affidavit, he stated that it
was dark and Charles appeared nervous and fidgety.
Willoughby
further stated that he believed there was a reasonable
possibility that Charles would attempt to flee the scene which
would have placed Cahill, the police and possibly others in
harms way since it was next to a busy intersection.
After Charles was placed in the back of the cruiser,
the officers began calling Breckenridge County, where the
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warrant was purportedly issued, to verify that a warrant had in
fact been issued for Charles’ arrest.
At 7:41 p.m., Willoughby
told the dispatcher that if they could not get an ETA on how
long it was going to take to verify the warrant, they would have
to “cut him loose.”
After contacting Breckenridge County and
Hardin County and determining there was no such outstanding
warrant, the police apologized and immediately let Charles go.
Charles testified that he was in the police cruiser for less
than ten minutes while the police were checking on the warrant.
Charles further admitted that during the encounter, the police
never raised their voices to him, did not manhandle him, and did
not activate the sirens or lights on the police cruiser.
According to the Cahills, the only individuals that they knew
who witnessed the incident were their children who were in the
Cahills’ vehicle and allegedly became upset to see their father
being handcuffed and put into the police cruiser.
The Cahills filed a false imprisonment action against
First Federal and the City of Elizabethtown.
First Federal was settled.
The claim against
The City of Elizabethtown moved for
summary judgment on grounds that the detention of Charles by
police was reasonable.
The trial court granted the City’s
motion for summary judgment, adjudging that the detention of
Charles did not amount to an arrest, but was a reasonable
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restraint pursuant to a lawful investigatory stop.
This appeal
by Charles followed.
Summary judgment is proper only where the trial court,
drawing all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party,
can conclude that there are no issues as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
Fischer v. Jeffries, 697 S.W.2d 159 (Ky.App. 1985).
Summary judgment should only be used to terminate litigation
when, as a matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible
for the respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting a
judgment in his favor and against the movant.
Steelvest, Inc.
v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991).
The tort of false imprisonment is defined in Kentucky as:
any deprivation of the liberty of one person
by another or detention for however short a
time without such person’s consent and
against his will, whether done by actual
violence, threats or otherwise.
Furthermore, false imprisonment requires
that the restraint be wrongful, improper, or
without a claim of reasonable justification,
authority or privilege.
Banks v. Fritsch, 39 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Ky.App. 2001) (footnotes
omitted).
Charles argues that the trial court erred in
adjudging, as a matter of law, that the police’s restraint of
him in handcuffs in the police cruiser was reasonably justified
as a lawful investigatory stop.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
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88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), the United States
Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer may briefly
detain an individual for investigatory purposes without
violating the Fourth Amendment if the officer possesses a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual has
committed a crime.
However, the scope of this brief
investigatory detention must be limited to the “least intrusive
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s
suspicion in a short period of time.”
Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983).
“Officers cannot seek to verify their suspicions by means that
approach the conditions of arrest.”
Id. at 500.
“But there is
no bright line that distinguishes an investigative detention
from an arrest.”
United States v. Lopez-Arias, 344 F.3d 623,
628 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 506).
In the instant case, Charles was detained because the
police were informed that there existed an outstanding warrant
for his arrest.
Charles does not challenge the fact that the
initial investigatory stop was lawful, and indeed it has been
established that officers may make an investigatory stop of an
individual “if there are reasonable grounds to believe that
person is wanted for past criminal conduct.”
United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227, 105 S. Ct. 675, 679, 83 L. Ed. 2d
604 (1985) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417,
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n. 2, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, n. 2, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981)).
Rather, Charles contends that handcuffing him and placing him in
the police cruiser exceeded the permissible scope of the
investigatory stop and amounted to an arrest.
When officers make an investigative stop, they are
authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to
protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo.
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 235.
In determining whether an
investigative detention has crossed the line and become an
arrest, the court should consider such factors as whether the
detainee has been transported to another location, significant
restraints on the detainee’s freedom of movement, and the use of
weapons or bodily force.
Lopez-Arias, 344 F.3d at 627.
The
scope of the intrusion will vary as to the circumstances of the
case and the justification for the initial stop.
Royer, 460
U.S. at 500, 103 S. Ct. at 1325.
It has been held that the use of handcuffs, if
reasonably necessary, does not automatically convert a Terry
stop into an arrest.
Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy
John Does 1-5, 174 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Taylor,
716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1983).
However, in all of the above
cases, the Court found that circumstances in the case warranted
the intrusion of handcuffing the suspect during the
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investigatory stop.
In Houston, the officers who handcuffed the
suspects and placed them in their cruiser believed they may have
been involved in the shooting of a police officer and, further,
the suspects initially refused to comply with the officers’
orders to throw out their keys and get out of the car.
In
Taylor, the suspect twice disobeyed orders to raise his hands
and made furtive movements inside the truck where his hands
could not be seen.
And in Perdue, guns had been found on the
property where the marijuana the defendant was suspected of
cultivating was located.
In the instant case, the alleged
warrant for Charles’ arrest was not for a violent crime.
The
officers knew from the information provided by the security
officer, Brown, that the alleged warrant involved a monetary
dispute between Charles and the bank.
And, there was no
evidence that Charles presented a threat to the officers at any
time during the stop.
There was no allegation that Charles
refused to comply with any of the orders given by police or that
he made any furtive movements indicating he might try to flee
the scene.
Officer Willoughby stated only that Charles appeared
nervous and fidgety, which, in our view, anyone would be in that
situation.
In Lopez-Arias, 344 F.3d at 628, the Court found that
police crossed the line from an investigative detention into an
arrest when they stopped the defendants, who were suspected only
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of possessing illegal drugs, handcuffed them, placed them in the
back of police cars, transported them from the scene, read them
their Miranda rights, and questioned them.
While the suspect in
the case at hand was not transported to another area or
questioned by police, we nonetheless believe the detention
amounted to an arrest under the circumstances.
The test for determining whether a suspect is under
arrest is whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position
“would have felt that he was under arrest or ‘otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way.’”
United
States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 289 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1019, 109 S. Ct. 1742, 104 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1989)
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477, 86 S. Ct. 1602,
16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966)).
In United States v. Richardson, 949
F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Butler, 223 F.3d
368 (6th Cir. 2000), the Courts held that the actions of police
were tantamount to an arrest when they placed the suspects in
the back of their police cars.
The Court in Richardson viewed
the move from defendant’s car to the police car as so severely
restricting the defendant’s freedom of movement that it elevated
the detention to an arrest.
Richardson, 949 F.2d at 857.
In
the present case, Charles was stopped on an alleged arrest
warrant for a non-violent crime and gave the officers no reason
to believe he was a threat to them or that he might flee.
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Nevertheless, he was handcuffed and moved to the officers’
cruiser.
We believe at that point Charles’ freedom of movement
was restricted such that he was effectively placed under arrest.
Accordingly, the lower court erred in ruling that the police
lawfully detained Charles pursuant to an investigative stop.
We must now decide whether the summary judgment was
nonetheless proper given our ruling above that Charles’
detention constituted an arrest.
A police officer may make an
arrest when he has an arrest warrant, or has reasonable ground
for believing a felony has been committed, or if an offense has
occurred in his presence.
215 S.W.2d 989 (1948).
Cowan v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 842,
Clearly, the police would have been
authorized to arrest Charles had there existed a valid warrant
for his arrest.
But there was no arrest warrant in this case.
However, the evidence established that the officers relied in
good faith on the dispatcher’s information that there was an
outstanding arrest warrant for Charles and Brown’s claim at the
scene that such a warrant existed, and detained Charles only to
verify the existence of that warrant.
It has been held that probable cause determinations by
police officers, even if they are wrong, are not actionable as
long as such determinations pass the test of reasonableness, and
reasonableness is a question of law to be decided by the court.
Jeffers v. Heavrin, 10 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Hunter v.
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Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 112 S. Ct. 534, 116 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1991)).
In Hunter, the United States Supreme Court held that police
officers are entitled to qualified immunity for probable cause
determinations, even if such determinations are mistaken, if
their determinations are based on the facts and circumstances
within their knowledge at the time and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information.
Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228;
see also Fultz v. Whittaker, 187 F. Supp. 2d 695 (W.D.Ky. 2001)
and Crockett v. Cumberland College, 316 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2003).
In the instant case, the determination was not a probable cause
determination, but an assessment of whether a warrant for
Charles’ arrest existed, and we see no reason why the same
rationale for qualified immunity would not be applied to that
assessment.
Since the report of the warrant was based on
reasonably trustworthy information – the representation by the
dispatcher that an arrest warrant existed and the statement of
Brown, the security officer of the bank who was on the scene we believe the officers’ actions passed the test of
reasonableness when they arrested Charles only for the short
time it took them to verify the existence (here, nonexistence)
of the warrant.
Our ruling is in line with Dugger v. Off 2nd, Inc.,
612 S.W.2d 756 (Ky.App. 1980), wherein police officers were sued
for false imprisonment for an arrest based on a warrant which
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mistakenly identified the wrong individual to be arrested.
In
upholding the dismissal of the action against the police
officers, this Court stated:
Police officers must have some immunity from
liability when they are carrying out the
duties of their office. The arrest was made
pursuant to a warrant which, at worst, was
latently defective.
Id. at 757.
Similarly, in the present case the officers had
reasonable, albeit mistaken, grounds to believe that a valid
warrant existed for Charles’ arrest.
Accordingly, the City of
Elizabethtown is immune from liability in this case.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the
Hardin Circuit Court is affirmed.
ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE OPINION.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James T. Kelley
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
J. Peter Cassidy, Jr.
Lucy A. Pett
Lexington, Kentucky
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