AMY PADGETT (NOW HATFIELD) v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 18, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED:
DECEMBER 9, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-001943-MR
AMY PADGETT (NOW HATFIELD)
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM H. MONARCH, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 98-CR-00034
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY AND VANMETER, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
HENRY, JUDGE:
Amy Padgett (now Hatfield) appeals from an April
30, 2004 order of the Meade Circuit Court denying her motion for
CR 2 60.02 relief.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Padgett is the mother of R.R., her son from a previous
marriage.
During 1997, R. R. (now approximately seventeen (17)
years old) was living with his father and stepmother in Colorado
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110.(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 21.580.
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
after spending the previous year living with his mother in Meade
County, Kentucky.
While in Colorado, R. R. told his stepmother
that Padgett had sexually abused him while he was living in
Kentucky.
In February 1998, R. R. was interviewed by an Adams
County, Colorado detective and gave graphic and explicit details
of an apparent sexual relationship between him and his mother
when R. R. was eight (8) years old.
Because of these allegations, on April 9, 1998, the
Meade County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Padgett
charging her with seven (7) counts of first-degree rape in
violation of KRS 510.040.
Padgett subsequently waived formal
arraignment and entered a plea of “not guilty.”
On April 2, 1999, the Commonwealth made a plea offer
to Padgett that would amend the rape charges to second-degree
assault and would give a recommendation of concurrent ten-year
probated sentences on those charges, in exchange for a guilty
plea.
The offer also would require Padgett to refrain from
unsupervised contact with anyone less than sixteen (16) years of
age, and to execute any documents necessary to effectuate a
termination of her parental rights to R. R.
Padgett agreed to this offer and filed a “motion to
enter guilty plea” on April 22, 1999.
This motion included
acknowledgments by Padgett that her judgment was not impaired by
drugs, alcohol, or medication; that she had fully disclosed all
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facts of the case to her attorney, who was fully informed and
offered competent representation; that she understood the
substance of the charges against her and any possible defenses
against them; that she was waiving her Constitutional rights by
pleading guilty; and that her plea was freely, knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily made.
The motion also contained
acknowledgments by Padgett’s counsel that Padgett understood the
charges pending against her, any possible defenses, and the
Constitutional rights that would be waived; that her plea was
being made freely, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily;
and that the plea was consistent with counsel’s advice and
recommendations.
On April 28, 1999, the trial court entered an order
accepting Padgett’s guilty plea and finding her guilty of seven
(7) counts of second-degree assault.
In doing so, the court
noted that, upon questioning Padgett, it had concluded that she
understood the charges pending against her; that she had
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her right to a
jury trial, her privilege against self-incrimination, and her
right to confront witnesses; and that there was a factual basis
for her guilty plea.
On May 28, 1999, the court entered a
judgment and sentence on plea of guilty that was consistent with
the Commonwealth’s recommendations, and Padgett was given a tenyear probated sentence.
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On April 3, 2003, the trial court entered an order,
upon a motion filed by Padgett, modifying her probation to the
extent that she could now have unsupervised contact with her
children under the age of sixteen (16).
The order also
instructed Padgett and R. R. to attend monthly counseling until
he turned sixteen (16).
On October 31, 2003, Padgett submitted a “motion to
vacate judgment and permit Defendant to withdraw guilty plea,”
pursuant to CR 60.02.
As grounds for this motion, Padgett
stated that R. R. had recently told her defense counsel that the
prior testimony and statement that he had given concerning the
allegations against his mother were false and had no factual
basis.
Allegedly attached to this motion was an affidavit from
R. R. 3
On August 10, 2004, the trial court conducted a
hearing on Padgett’s motion.
At the hearing, R. R. testified
that he made false statements against his mother concerning the
sexual abuse, and he specifically indicated that his mother had
never had intercourse with him or participated in any other act
of a sexual nature with him.
R. R. further testified that his
motivation for accusing his mother of sexual abuse was that he
wanted to get his stepmother off his back and be able to return
3
We say “allegedly” because this affidavit is not contained in the record
before this court. As R. R. would go on to testify as to the matters
purported to be contained in the affidavit, however, this fact is of little
importance and has no bearing on our ultimate decision.
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to live with his paternal grandparents in Kentucky.
R. R. and
his stepmother had apparently had an argument in which R. R.
referred to her by a sexually explicit term.
R. R. explained
that he told his stepmother that he had learned the word from
his cousin, but that she did not believe him; he subsequently
told her the sexual abuse story, which she apparently believed.
Padgett also testified at the hearing and denied ever
having a sexual relationship with her son.
She indicated that
she pled guilty because she believed that it would be in the
best interest of both R. R. and her at the time.
Padgett also
testified that she did not understand that in pleading guilty
she was making a “straight-up” guilty plea; she instead thought
that she was just taking an offer.
On August 30, 2004, the trial court entered an order
denying Padgett’s motion to vacate her judgment and to withdraw
her guilty plea.
The court noted R. R.’s testimony “that he had
not been telling the truth in the information he gave originally
in this case, and that there had been no inappropriate activity
on the part of this Defendant.”
However, the court further
noted:
In this situation, it is quite difficult for
the Court to determine in the face of
conflicting testimony whether the
complaining witness was originally telling
the truth. The Court has reviewed the case
file, including the transcript in the file
of the original interview with the juvenile,
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which contained very detailed allegations
about the Defendant’s alleged behavior.
The trial court added:
Most important in the opinion of this Court,
however, is the fact that the Defendant
appears to have entered a fully informed
guilty plea in this case. The Court has
also reviewed the transcript in the file of
the very extensive dialogue between the
Defendant and the Court at the time that
plea was entered, and it appears that the
Defendant pled guilty after being duly
sworn.
Accordingly, the court concluded:
In view of her plea of guilty, it is the
opinion of this Court that it is not now
appropriate for the Court to set aside that
guilty plea. Therefore, the Defendant’s
motion to vacate the judgment and withdraw
the guilty plea be and it is hereby
OVERRULED.
This appeal followed.
Padgett’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial
court committed reversible error in denying her motion for CR
60.02 relief in light of her son’s admission that his previous
statements and testimony were false.
“Given the high standard
for granting a CR 60.02 motion, a trial court’s ruling on the
motion receives great deference on appeal and will not be
overturned except for an abuse of discretion.”
Barnett v.
Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Ky. 1998) (Citations omitted).
After careful review of the record and the arguments presented
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by both parties, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Padgett’s CR 60.02 motion.
In reaching this conclusion, we agree with the trial
court that the key factor in our consideration here is the fact
that Padgett entered a guilty plea to the charges against her.
It is well-established that an unconditional guilty plea waives
all defenses except that the indictment charged no offense.
Quarles v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 693, 694 (Ky. 1970)
(Citations omitted); Centers v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 55
(Ky.App. 1990) (Citations omitted).
Indeed, this court has
specifically held that “[e]ntry of a voluntary, intelligent plea
of guilty has long been held by Kentucky Courts to preclude a
post-judgment challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.”
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 724 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Ky.App. 1986)
(Citations omitted).
As we further explained in Taylor:
The reasoning behind such a conclusion is
obvious. A defendant who elects to
unconditionally plead guilty admits the
factual accuracy of the various elements of
the offenses with which he is charged. By
such an admission, a convicted appellant
forfeits the right to protest at some later
date that the state could not have proven
that he committed the crimes to which he
pled guilty. To permit a convicted
defendant to do so would result in a double
benefit in that defendants who elect to
plead guilty would receive the benefit of
the plea bargain which ordinarily precedes
such a plea along with the advantage of
later challenging the sentence resulting
from the plea on grounds normally arising in
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the very trial which defendant elected to
forego.
Id.
We believe that Padgett’s motion here clearly constitutes a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in light of her
son’s decision to recant his previous statements to his
stepmother and police accusing her of sexual abuse.
Accordingly, the relevant inquiry at this point
becomes whether Padgett’s guilty plea was voluntary and
intelligent.
2004).
Thompson v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Ky.
In reviewing the validity of a guilty plea, we must
examine the totality of the circumstances and determine whether
an intelligent plea was entered voluntarily and with
understanding of the charges.
Id.
(Citations omitted).
After reviewing the record, we are not persuaded that
Padgett lacked a full understanding of the charges against her.
As previously noted, she signed a motion to enter a guilty plea
indicating that she voluntarily and knowingly waived her rights
as a criminal defendant.
Her attorney also indicated that
Padgett was fully aware of what she was doing in signing the
motion and had a complete understanding of her rights and the
charges against her.
We also note that the record contains a
transcript of an extensive plea colloquy between Padgett and the
trial court, in which Padgett acknowledged that her actions were
voluntary, that she was satisfied with her counsel, and that she
-8-
fully understood the ramifications of pleading guilty.
The
court also verified that Padgett understood that she was giving
up her right to a jury trial, her right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, and her right to remain silent, and that she
understood each of the rights that she was forfeiting.
In light of the foregoing facts, we are satisfied that
Padgett entered her guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily.
Therefore, she may not now challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence against her.
Consequently, we find that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Padgett’s motion
to set aside her plea.
We also note that the trial court was well within its
discretion to decline to vacate its judgment and to allow
Padgett to withdraw her guilty plea even in light of the fact
that R. R. recanted his previous statements.
Our courts have
held that “there are special rules for situations of recanted
testimony.”
1970).
Thacker v. Commonwealth, 453 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Ky.
Specifically, as was noted in Thacker:
The general rules are that recanting
testimony is viewed with suspicion; mere
recantation of testimony does not alone
require the granting of a new trial; only in
extraordinary and unusual circumstances will
a new trial be granted because of recanting
statements; such statements will form the
basis for a new trial only when the court is
satisfied of their truth; the trial judge is
in the best position to make the
determination because he has observed the
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witnesses and can often discern and assay
the incidents, the influences and the
motives that prompted the recantation; and
his rejection of the recanting testimony
will not lightly be set aside by an
appellate court.
Id.; see also Hensley v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Ky.
1972) (“Affidavits in which witnesses recant their testimony are
quite naturally regarded with great distrust and usually given
very little weight.”) (Citation omitted).
Here, the trial court, while not explicitly rejecting
R. R.’s testimony, indicated that it was unable to determine the
truthfulness of his testimony in light of R. R.’s previous
statements.
The court particularly noted that those statements
contained “very detailed allegations about [Padgett’s] alleged
behavior.”
After reviewing the record, we see no grounds for
finding that the trial court abused its considerable discretion
in failing to vacate judgment and to allow Padgett to withdraw
her guilty plea simply because of R. R.’s recanting testimony.
The judgment of the Meade Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis Hardin
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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