HARRY HAMILTON, AN INTERESTED PARTY v. MICHAEL WASHINGTON; JANICE WASHINGTON HAMILTON, AN INTERESTED PARTY
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RENDERED: July 15, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001705-ME
AND
NO. 2004-CA-001948-ME
HARRY HAMILTON, AN INTERESTED PARTY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE T. STEVEN BLAND, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-01880
v.
MICHAEL WASHINGTON; JANICE WASHINGTON
(NOW WARREN); AND SHERRILYN WASHINGTONHAMILTON, AN INTERESTED PARTY
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM AND JOHNSON, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Harry Hamilton, pro se, has appealed from the
July 23, 2004, order of the Hardin Family Court modifying a
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
Pennsylvania custody decree and terminating Harry’s visitation
rights with his niece, Shiann Washington.
Having concluded that
the family court failed to properly determine whether Kentucky
or Pennsylvania had jurisdiction, and that the family court’s
findings regarding Shiann’s best interests were not sufficient,
we vacate the order terminating visitation and remand this
matter for further proceedings.
Shiann, the minor child involved in this appeal, was
born on October 23, 1995, to Michael Washington and Janice
Washington.
On August 22, 1996, the Superior Court of Liberty
County, Georgia, entered a divorce decree between Michael and
Janice.
Custody of their five minor children (including Shiann)
was awarded to Michael.
From May 1996 to August 1996, the five children lived
in Pennsylvania with their paternal aunt, Sherrilyn WashingtonHamilton, and her husband, Harry Hamilton.2
In August 1996 the
children left Pennsylvania to live with Michael in Kentucky.
However, in September 1996, Shiann returned to Pennsylvania, and
lived with Sherrilyn and Harry for the next four years.
other children remained with Michael.
2
Harry and Sherrilyn were married in June 1996.
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The
On December 18, 1996, Michael filed a petition in the
Hardin Family Court3 to recognize and modify the divorce decree
entered in Georgia.
In the petition, Michael asked the family
court to restrict Janice’s visitation and to order her to pay
child support.
On September 1, 1998, the family court
determined that Janice, who lived in South Carolina, had not
been properly served, and that it lacked personal jurisdiction
over Janice.
petition.
The family court accordingly dismissed the
The matter was reopened and restored to the docket on
July 14, 1999.4
On November 1, 1999, Harry sent a letter to the
Domestic Relations Commissioner, Deborah Shaw, asking that he
and Sherrilyn be found as de facto custodians of Shiann, and
stated that he “should be included and should receive all
pleadings and Notices [sic] and do hereby submit [to the]
personal jurisdiction [of] the Court for that purpose.”
He also
requested that the family court determine whether Kentucky had
jurisdiction, since Shiann had lived in Pennsylvania since
September 1996.
3
In some, but not all family courts, a Domestic Relations Commissioner
initially hears the action. The Commissioner makes a recommendation to the
trial judge as to the appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.
After a ten-day period in which the parties may file exceptions, the family
court, at its discretion, may then reject, modify, or adopt the
Commissioner’s recommendations.
4
Eventually, Janice was located in Kentucky and service of process was
completed.
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The Commissioner noted in her findings that Shiann
resided in Pennsylvania and that the “matter really concern[ed]
the four older children.”
Subsequently, the family court
entered an order on December 22, 1999, granting Janice
visitation with the four older children.
mentioned in the order.
Shiann was not
Subsequently, an agreed order was
entered on May 25, 2000, addressing Janice’s visitation rights,
again mentioning only the four older children.5
While the litigation concerning the four older
children was ongoing in Kentucky, litigation concerning the
custody of Shiann was simultaneously taking place in
Pennsylvania.
On July 8, 1999, the Court of Common Pleas in
Centre County, Pennsylvania, granted temporary custody of Shiann
to Harry and Sherrilyn and awarded visitation rights to Michael.
On December 3, 1999, the Pennsylvania court modified its custody
order6 and gave specific visitation rights to Michael.
The order
noted that Michael had stipulated that “all issues of custody,
as it relates [sic] to the minor child, SHIANNE [sic]
WASHINGTON, shall be properly resolved in the state of
5
While Kentucky exercised jurisdiction pertaining to the custody of the four
older children, the immediate action concerns only Shiann. Kentucky had not
exercised jurisdiction over matters concerning Shiann until the family court
modified the Pennsylvania custody decree.
6
It is unclear from the record whether this modification applied to the order
of temporary physical custody, or a subsequent custody determination. We
mention it here only to show the Pennsylvania court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over the matter.
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Pennsylvania, and that jurisdiction of this issue shall lie
solely with the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County in that
regard[.]”
On September 13, 2000, the Pennsylvania court awarded
Michael primary custody of Shiann, ordered that Shiann live with
Michael in Kentucky, and awarded visitation to Sherrilyn.
On
September 2, 2003, the Pennsylvania court granted “partial
physical custody”7 to Harry and Sherrilyn and awarded them
visitation.8
Michael, who was in the United States military and was
stationed in Georgia from June 2002 to April 2004, filed a
petition in the Georgia court to terminate Harry’s and
Sherrilyn’s visitation rights.
On November 17, 2003, the
Georgia court held a hearing and determined that Sherrilyn was a
“‘person acting as a parent’” and that only Pennsylvania had
jurisdiction over the matter.
On January 6, 2004, the
7
Despite the term “partial physical custody,” the order did not create a
joint custody relationship. The term employed by the Pennsylvania court
simply means that Harry and Sherrilyn were permitted to take Shiann out of
Michael’s physical possession for periods of time as specified by the order,
rather than simply visit Shiann while in the physical possession and control
of Michael. See 23 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 5302 (2003). Joint custody necessarily
involves shared decision-making authority on issues relative to the child’s
best interests. Aton v. Aton, 911 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Ky.App. 1995); Chalupa v.
Chalupa, 830 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Ky.App. 1992). The order of the Pennsylvania
court does not grant shared decision-making authority in any way. We
therefore consider it to be, in effect, a visitation order, and will treat it
accordingly.
8
Though the September 13, 2000, order mentions only Sherrilyn, the September
2, 2003, order specifically grants partial physical custody to both Sherrilyn
and Harry.
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Pennsylvania court determined that it no longer had exclusive
and continuing jurisdiction over matters involving Shiann, and
that the Georgia court would be a more convenient forum.
The
Pennsylvania court accordingly ordered that the case be
transferred to the Georgia court.
Michael returned to live in Kentucky in April 2004.
On June 2, 2004, he filed a motion in the Hardin Family Court to
modify the Pennsylvania order and to terminate Harry’s and
Sherrilyn’s visitation privileges.9
The motion was filed under
the original Kentucky action in which Michael had petitioned to
have the Georgia divorce decree recognized and modified.
family court scheduled a hearing for June 8, 2004.
The
On the day
of the hearing, Sherrilyn sent a letter to the family court, via
facsimile, indicating that on the preceding day she had received
the notice and motion of the hearing, and asked for a
continuance.
Harry also faxed a letter to the family court on
June 8, 2004, indicating that he had just learned that day of
the proceedings.
In his letter, Harry objected to the family
9
Michael’s motion did not expressly state which Pennsylvania order he sought
to modify. In his brief, Harry asserts that the order Michael sought to
modify was the September 2, 2003, order. It appears however, that Michael’s
motion was to terminate all visitation, which necessarily includes the
original September 13, 2000, order. If the September 13, 2000, order were
the only order for which Michael sought modification, Harry would have no
standing to challenge the modification, because he is not named in the
September 13, 2000, order granting visitation to Sherrilyn. However, since
the modification of the September 13, 2000, order effectively terminated and
modified the September 2, 2003, order, Harry does have standing to challenge
the modification, because it terminated his rights as granted in the
September 2, 2003, order.
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court’s jurisdiction in the matter, and notified the court of
ongoing proceedings in the Pennsylvania court.
The family court
granted a continuance, and rescheduled the hearing for July 9,
2004.
On July 9, 2004, neither Harry nor Sherrilyn appeared
at the hearing.
Michael presented the deposition of Ronald
Everson, a marriage and family therapist and counselor, who had
met with Shiann on several occasions.10
The family court noted
that there appeared to be a “reasonable basis [that] it would be
in the best interests of the child to terminate the visitation,”
and “based upon the evidence in the deposition” the family court
found that it was in the best interests of Shiann to terminate
visitation.
Accordingly, the family court entered an order on
July 23, 2004, terminating Harry’s and Sherrilyn’s11 visitation
rights.
On July 28, 2004, Harry filed a motion to alter,
amend, or vacate the family court’s order terminating
10
In a letter received from Harry, which was received by the family court on
July 9, 2004, Harry complained that he had received notice of the deposition
only after the date and time for the deposition had occurred. Harry
reiterated this complaint in his written objections following the hearing
held on August 4, 2004. However, Harry’s failure to appear at the July 9,
2004, hearing resulted in his waiving any objection to the deposition.
11
It is unclear from the record whether Harry and Sherrilyn are cooperating
in this appeal. In his notice of appeal, Harry named Sherrilyn as an
appellee. Furthermore, Harry and Sherrilyn have used different addresses in
their correspondence with the family court. However, our holding in this
case is not dependent upon this fact, as this appeal concerns only Harry’s
rights. Sherrilyn has not appeared before the family court or submitted an
appeal before this Court, and has thus failed to preserve her rights to
litigate this issue.
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visitation, and the family court conducted a hearing on the
matter on August 3, 2004.
At the hearing, Harry appeared and
told the family court that proceedings were pending in
Pennsylvania, and that the Pennsylvania court was still
exercising jurisdiction on the matter.
The
family court entered
an order on August 19, 2004, denying Harry’s motion to alter,
amend, or vacate the July 23, 2004, order.
This appeal
followed.12
Harry claims the following five specific assignments
of error:
(1) Harry should have been named as a party, either
by the filing of a new action or by naming him as a real party
in interest; (2) the family court erred in modifying the custody
order because such modification did not comply with KRS13 403.340
and KRS 403.350; (3) Harry was given neither proper service nor
notice of the hearing in the family court; (4) the family court
should not have exercised jurisdiction to modify the
Pennsylvania custody order; and (5) the family court failed to
make sufficient specific findings regarding the child’s best
12
On August 23, 2004, Harry timely filed a notice of appeal of the family
court’s July 23, 2004, order terminating visitation. On September 21, 2004,
Harry filed a separate notice of appeal, appealing the August 19, 2004, order
denying his motion to alter, amend, or vacate. Harry filed motions for
intermediate relief in both appeals, which were denied. Harry also filed a
motion in this Court for emergency relief, which was denied on December 30,
2004. By order entered January 13, 2005, this Court ordered, sua sponte,
that the appeals be consolidated. Harry moved for reconsideration of the
consolidation, which was also denied by order entered April 6, 2005.
13
Unless otherwise noted or context so indicates, all references herein to
KRS sections are to the statutes as current through the 2003 regular season,
as in effect at the time the order appealed from was entered.
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interests.
We find no merit in Harry’s first three assignments
of error, and will discuss them only briefly.
However, we find
the final two arguments persuasive.
First, Harry asserts that he is a real party in
interest and that Michael’s failure to either commence a new
action or to name him as a real party in interest renders the
order of the family court void.
However, we do not think it was
improper for the family court to allow the motion to terminate
visitation to proceed under the original action filed in 1996,
because that action dealt in part with the custody of Shiann.
Harry argues in the alternative that he should have
been named as a real party in interest.
CR14 24.01 and CR 24.02
provide a mechanism for an interested party to intervene in an
action,15 and CR 24.03 requires that a party wishing to intervene
14
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
15
CR 24.01 addresses intervention of right, and states in part as follows:
[U]pon timely application anyone shall be permitted
to intervene in an action . . . when the applicant
claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and is
so situated that the disposition of the action may as
a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s
ability to protect that interest, unless that
interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.
CR 24.02 addresses permissive intervention, and allows a person to be
permitted to intervene in an action when they have a statutory conditional
right to intervene, or “when the applicant’s claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common.” We make no determination
as to whether Harry would prevail under either of these sections, but discuss
them here to show that Harry had a remedy and that he did not pursue that
remedy.
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file a motion in order to do so.16
motion.
Harry at no time filed such a
Nonetheless, Harry has been allowed to proceed in the
action as though he were a party, including the filing of
motions, the filing of this appeal, and even proceeding pro se.
All relevant documentation was sent to Harry during the pendency
of the action.
This Court finds no basis to conclude that he
has been prejudiced by Michael’s failure to name him as a party
to the action, and thus we find no merit in this argument.
Second, Harry argues that Michael’s motion to
terminate visitation did not meet the requirements of KRS
403.340 and KRS 403.350.
Section (2) of KRS 403.340 states as
follows:
No motion to modify a
shall be made earlier than
after its date, unless the
to be made on the basis of
there is reason to believe
custody decree
two (2) years
court permits it
affidavits that
that:
(a)
The child's present environment may
endanger seriously his physical,
mental, moral, or emotional health; or
(b)
The custodian appointed under the
prior decree has placed the child with
a de facto custodian.
In turn, KRS 403.350 requires that an affidavit
accompany a motion for temporary custody or a modification of a
custody decree.
16
Harry’s reliance on these statutes is
Stovall v. Ford, 661 S.W.2d 467, 470 (1983).
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misplaced.
Harry argues that Fenwick v. Fenwick,17 “established
that modification falls exclusively within the purview of KRS
403.340 and KRS 403.350.”
Fenwick held that a joint custody
decree was a “custody decree” and was thus subject to the
modification requirements of those statutes.18
However, it did
not hold that a visitation order was a custody decree, nor that
modification of a visitation order was subject to KRS 403.340
and KRS 403.350.19
The interpretation of the statutes argued by Harry
would create a direct conflict with the text of KRS 403.320,
which allows a court to “modify an order granting or denying
visitation rights whenever modification would serve the best
interests of the child” [emphasis added].
Statutes should be
construed so that no part of them becomes meaningless or
ineffectual,20 and in doing so, a court must give effect to the
17
114 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2003).
18
Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d at 783.
19
It is also important to note that in 2001 subsection (1) was added to KRS
403.340, defining the term “custody” as both joint and sole custody. Before
this change was made, some cases had held that KRS 403.340 applied only to
sole custody awards, and not to awards of joint custody. While the addition
of the definition expressly extended the statute to joint custody, it has not
been applied to visitation privileges. Furthermore, although KRS 403.410
defines a custody determination as “a court decision and court orders and
instructions providing for the custody of a child, including visitation
rights[,]” by its terms, that definition applies only to KRS 403.420 through
KRS 403.620.
20
Commonwealth v. Phon, 17 S.W.3d 106, 108 (Ky. 2000); Allen v. McClendon,
967 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ky. 1998).
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Legislature’s intent.21
It is clear from the text of the
statutes that the Legislature intended KRS 403.320 to apply to
modification of visitation orders, and for KRS 403.340 and KRS
403.350 to apply to modifications of actual custody.
Neither
KRS 403.340 nor KRS 403.350 contemplates modification of
visitation in any way.
There is no overlap between the
sections.22
In addition, KRS 403.340 and KRS 403.350 apply only to
modification of permanent awards of custody.23
The September 2,
2003, order of the Pennsylvania court is not a permanent award
of custody, but only orders “partial physical custody” be given
to Harry and Sherrilyn, and directs the parties to set dates for
visitation in accordance with the earlier September 13, 2000,
order.
The September 13, 2000, order is a permanent award of
custody, and it is this order to which KRS 403.340 and KRS
403.350 would apply; but only if modification of the actual
custody were sought.24
KRS 403.320 is the applicable statute
21
Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 983
S.W.2d 493, 500 (Ky. 1998).
22
See Crossfield v. Crossfield, 155 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Ky.App. 2005) (noting
that whether KRS 403.320 or KRS 403.340 through KRS 403.350 apply depends on
whether the modification sought is that of visitation or custody).
23
Shifflet v. Shifflet, 891 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Ky. 1995).
24
Michael’s motion did not seek a modification of custody, but of visitation,
and thus KRS 403.320 is still the applicable statute.
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when modifying visitation, and KRS 403.340 and KRS 403.350 are
not applicable to this case.
Third, Harry argues that he did not receive proper
service of process and notice of the proceedings in the family
court.
The purpose of service is to make the party served aware
of the proceedings instituted or about to be initiated against
that party, and is satisfied when a party appears with knowledge
of the proceedings and participates in them.25
Service upon a
party may be made by mailing to his last known address.26
The record shows that a copy of the motion to
terminate visitation and notice of the hearing thereon were
mailed to Harry’s and Sherrilyn’s last known address on June 2,
2004, the same day the notice and motion were filed with the
family court.
Therefore, service was proper.
Implicit in this argument is that Kentucky lacked
personal jurisdiction over Harry.
However in Johnson v. Holt’s
Adm’r,27 it is stated as follows:
[A]n appearance of the defendant in court
for any purpose other than to object to the
sufficiency of the service of summons by a
motion to quash or other appropriate
proceedings will be treated as a general
appearance to the action. . . . If he goes
into court and invokes its action for any
25
Messer v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Ky.App. 1988).
26
CR 5.02.
27
235 Ky. 518, 521-22, 31 S.W.2d 895, 897 (1930).
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purpose incompatible with the theory that
the court has no power or jurisdiction on
account of defective service of process, he
thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction
of the court for all purposes, and cannot
insist thereafter that the court had no
jurisdiction.
A party appearing generally, rather than specifically, to
challenge exercise of personal jurisdiction cannot later argue
that the court had no jurisdiction over him.28
A defense of lack
of personal jurisdiction is waived if not raised by motion or
responsive pleading.29
Harry did not raise any objection to the family
court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in his letters to the
family court or when he appeared at the August 4, 2004, hearing.
Instead, he appeared generally and argued the merits of the
case.
Furthermore, in his November 1, 1999, letter to
Commissioner Shaw, Harry expressly stated “I [ ] do hereby
submit personal jurisdiction to [Hardin Family Court].”
Harry
cannot now argue that the family court lacked personal
jurisdiction.
Harry stated in his facsimile letter to the family
court on June 8, 2004, that he had learned of the proceedings on
that day, and thus had received actual notice of the motion to
28
Williams v. Indiana Refrigerator Lines, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 350, 351 (Ky.App.
1981).
29
CR 12.08.
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terminate his visitation rights.
On July 9, 2004, the day of
the rescheduled hearing, the family court received another
letter from Harry.
Harry’s correspondence with the family court
is further evidence of a continuing familiarity with the
proceedings in the family court.
The family court found that
notice of the proceedings was mailed to Harry, and that his
correspondence with the family court was evidence that he had
notice of the proceedings.
We agree.
Fourth, Harry challenges the family court’s exercise
of jurisdiction.
Whether Kentucky may properly exercise
jurisdiction must be evaluated through a three-part inquiry:
(1) does Kentucky have jurisdiction under the law of this
Commonwealth;30 (2) do the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA)31 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)32
allow Kentucky to exercise jurisdiction; and (3) is Kentucky the
most appropriate forum?33
For a Kentucky court to have jurisdiction in a child
custody proceeding, it must have jurisdiction under the UCCJA.
30
KRS 403.420.
31
The UCCJA, found at KRS 403.400 through KRS 403.620, was in effect at the
time the family court entered its order modifying the Pennsylvania decree.
The Legislature subsequently repealed the UCCJA and enacted Kentucky’s
version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA),
which took effect on July 13, 2004. While the UCCJA is applicable to this
case, neither our reasoning nor our holding would be different under the
UCCJEA.
32
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1980 & Supp. 2005).
33
KRS 403.460.
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Kentucky’s version of the UCCJA found at KRS 403.420(1) allows
jurisdiction as follows:
(a) This state is the home state of the
child at the time of commencement of the
proceeding, or had been the child's home
state within six (6) months before
commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from this state because
of his removal or retention by a person
claiming his custody or for other
reasons, and a parent or person acting as
parent continues to live in this state;
or
(b) It is in the best interest of the child
that a court of this state assume
jurisdiction because the child and his
parents, or the child and at least one
(1) contestant, have a significant
connection with this state, and there is
available in this state substantial
evidence concerning the child's present
or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships[.]
As used in KRS 403.420, “‘[h]ome state’ means the
state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved
lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent,
for at least six (6) consecutive months[.]”34
Kentucky was not
the home state of Shiann at the time Michael filed the motion to
terminate visitation.
Michael was stationed in Georgia from
34
KRS 403.410(5). Also, see David Carl Minneman, J.D., Annotation, Home
State Jurisdiction of Court Under § 3(a)(1) of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28
USCS § 1738A(c)(2)(A), 6 A.L.R.5th 1, 36-39 (1992) for a discussion of cases
deciding that for purposes of determining the six-month period, the immediate
action (for modification, enforcement, etc.) is the one in question, not the
original decree. Otherwise, a court in Georgia, the state entering the
divorce decree, would have perpetual home state jurisdiction, allowing it to
exercise jurisdiction until it determined that it no longer wished to do so.
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June 2002 to April 2004.35
The immediate action was filed in the
Hardin Family Court on June 2, 2004; only two months later.
Thus, Shiann and Michael had not lived in Kentucky for the
requisite six months immediately preceding the commencement of
the action and Kentucky does not have home state jurisdiction.
However, we hold that Kentucky does have jurisdiction
under the UCCJA, pursuant to KRS 403.420(1)(b).
Since both
Shiann and Michael now live in Kentucky, we conclude that the
facts support a finding that “substantial evidence concerning
[Shiann’s] present or future care, protection, training and
personal relationships”36 is available in Kentucky.
For these
reasons, we hold that Kentucky has jurisdiction under the UCCJA,
even though Kentucky was not Shiann’s home state at the time
Michael filed the motion to terminate visitation.
But even if a state does in fact have jurisdiction,
both the UCCJA and the PKPA place restrictions on a state’s
exercise of that jurisdiction.
Thus, while a court of Kentucky
may actually have jurisdiction under KRS 403.420, that court may
be prohibited from exercising that jurisdiction under the UCCJA,
the PKPA, or both.
Under the UCCJA, Kentucky may not exercise
35
We presume, though it is not clear from the record, that Shiann lived in
Georgia with her father at that time. Furthermore, even if Shiann lived in
Kentucky in the absence of her father, there is no evidence that she lived
with a “parent, or a person acting as a parent” during that time, as required
by KRS 403.410(5).
36
KRS 403.420(1)(b).
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its jurisdiction to modify another state’s custody decree “if at
the time of filing the petition a proceeding concerning the
custody of the child was pending in a court of another state
exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with KRS
403.420 to 403.620, unless the proceeding is stayed by the court
of the other state because this state is a more appropriate
forum or for other reasons.”37
The PKPA similarly forbids a state from exercising
jurisdiction if the proceeding is “commenced during the pendency
of a proceeding in a court of another State where such court of
that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with
the provisions of this section to make a custody
determination.”38
In addition, both the UCCJA and the PKPA favor
continuing and exclusive jurisdiction by the state entering a
custody decree by forbidding other states from modifying that
decree unless the state entering the decree either (1) no longer
has jurisdiction, or (2) has declined to exercise its
jurisdiction to modify that decree.39
It appears that after the Pennsylvania court’s January
6, 2004, order finding Georgia to be the more appropriate forum,
Harry sought special relief and a stay of that order on June 15,
37
KRS 403.450(1).
38
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g).
39
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) and (h); KRS 403.530(1).
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2004.
Several courts have held that for the purposes of the
UCCJA, where a lower court renders an adverse decision, an
action is still pending in that state if it is before the
appellate court; this applies if the time period in which the
appeal must be filed has not run, regardless of whether the
party has actually filed that appeal.40
Harry informed the
family court that Pennsylvania was still exercising jurisdiction
over the matter, even providing the family court with the
specific case numbers for the pending matters.
Unfortunately,
the record41 does not reflect that the family court made any
effort to determine whether proceedings were pending in either
Georgia or Pennsylvania, and if so, what those proceedings were.
Such an inquiry is required by the UCCJA.42
Furthermore, the
40
Foster v. Stein, 454 N.W.2d 244 (Mich.App. 1990); Levinson ex rel. Levinson
v. Levinson, 512 A.2d 14 (Pa.Super. 1986). See also Williams v. Richardson,
281 S.E.2d 777 (N.C.App. 1981) (holding that a proceeding was no longer
pending where time for appeal from adverse decision in Virginia had not run,
but instead a petition to modify was filed in North Carolina. The filing of
the action in North Carolina was evidence of the intent to abandon the right
to an appeal in Virginia).
41
Under the UCCJA, a court is required to preserve “pertinent documents” in
any custody decree. KRS 403.600. Undoubtedly, documents requested from
courts of other states under KRS 403.610 or the other pertinent provisions of
Kentucky’s UCCJA would qualify as “pertinent documents.” Subsequently, in
enacting the UCCJEA to replace the UCCJA, this requirement was embodied even
more explicitly in KRS 403.816, which requires a court to keep a record of
all substantive communications with a court of another state.
42
KRS 403.450(2) requires that “[i]f the court has reason to believe that
proceedings may be pending in another state it shall direct an inquiry to the
state court administrator or other appropriate official of the other state.”
In addition, KRS 403.450(3) states as follows:
If the court is informed during the course of
the proceeding that a proceeding concerning the
custody of the child was pending in another state
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UCCJA requires that a Kentucky court considering modification of
another court’s decree must request copies of and consider the
record in that other state.43
Upon request, a court is required
to furnish a court of another state with any and all parts of
the record so requested.44
This practice of requesting pertinent
before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay
the proceeding and communicate with the court in
which the other proceeding is pending to the end that
the issue may be litigated in the more appropriate
forum and that information be exchanged in accordance
with KRS 403.580 to 403.610. If a court of this
state has made a custody decree before being informed
of a pending proceeding in a court of another state
it shall immediately inform that court of the fact.
If the court is informed that a proceeding was
commenced in another state after it assumed
jurisdiction it shall likewise inform the other court
to the end that the issues may be litigated in the
more appropriate forum [emphases added].
43
KRS 403.530(2) states as follows:
If a court of this state is authorized . . . to
modify a custody decree of another state it shall
give due consideration to the transcript of the
record and other documents of all previous
proceedings submitted to it in accordance with KRS
403.610.
In turn, KRS 403.610 provides:
If a custody decree has been rendered in
another state concerning a child involved in a
custody proceeding pending in a court of this state,
the court of this state upon taking jurisdiction of
the case shall request of the court of the other
state a certified copy of the transcript of any court
record and other documents mentioned in KRS 403.600.
44
In this case, the pertinent provision would be under Pennsylvania law,
because it would be a Pennsylvania court which was required to provide a
Kentucky court with documents. Therefore, that requirement would be created
specifically by Pennsylvania law. While not imperative to the determination
of this case (since the Hardin Family Court was required under Kentucky law
to at least request the documents), it is important to note that had the
family court actually requested documents from the Pennsylvania court,
Pennsylvania’s version of the UCCJA, like Kentucky’s, would mandate the
Pennsylvania court to furnish those documents to the family court. Both KRS
403.600 and 23 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 5362 (2003) provide that “[u]pon appropriate
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documents from the court of another state has been implemented
in order to advance the underlying purposes of the UCCJA, which
are, inter alia, to avoid jurisdictional competition between
states, to promote cooperation between states in custody
determinations, and to avoid re-litigation of custody
determinations.45
It does not appear that the family court made
such an inquiry in this case.
Even if a Kentucky court has jurisdiction under KRS
403.420, and neither the UCCJA nor the PKPA prevents the court
from exercising that jurisdiction, a further inquiry is
required.
KRS 403.460 allows a court to decline to exercise its
jurisdiction if it finds that a court of another state is a more
appropriate forum.
In determining the most convenient forum, a
court must consider the interests of the child, and it may take
into account such factors as whether another state is or was
recently the child’s home state, whether another state has a
closer connection with the child and a contestant and/or the
child’s family, and whether the parties have agreed upon another
forum.46
In determining whether Kentucky is the most appropriate
request of the court of another state, the court shall forward to the other
court certified copies of any or all such documents.”
45
See KRS 403.400.
46
KRS 403.460(3).
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forum, a court is again encouraged to communicate with courts of
other states.47
Furthermore, even when a Kentucky court is informed
that a proceeding was commenced in another state after Kentucky
has assumed jurisdiction, it is required to communicate with the
court of that other state, so that the issues may be litigated
in the more appropriate forum.48
Thus, even after Kentucky has
properly exercised jurisdiction, when a party initiates a
proceeding in another state, a court of this state must conduct
an inquiry to determine whether it should continue to exercise
that jurisdiction, or whether it should dismiss or stay the
proceedings.49
Once again, the family court failed to perform
its duties under the UCCJA when it failed to conduct an inquiry
regarding the proceedings in the Pennsylvania court.
Finally, we deal with Harry’s claim regarding specific
findings of fact relative to the best interests of Shiann.
When
determining whether to modify an existing visitation order, a
47
KRS 403.460(4) provides as follows:
Before determining whether to decline or retain
jurisdiction the court may communicate with a court
of another state and exchange information pertinent
to the assumption of jurisdiction by either court
with a view to assuring that jurisdiction will be
exercised by the more appropriate court and that a
forum will be available to the parties.
48
KRS 403.450(3).
49
KRS 403.460(5).
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court must take into account the best interests of the child.50
Without a finding that a change in visitation is in the best
interests of the child, a court may not modify an order granting
visitation.51
The standards for modifying a visitation order to
terminate visitation are no less stringent than the standards
for denying a change in visitation at the outset of the case.52
We hold that the family court’s finding that the best
interests of the child were served by terminating Harry’s and
Sherrilyn’s visitation was not supported by sufficient evidence
or the appropriate findings.
While KRS 403.320 does not
specifically list the factors a court must consider in
determining whether visitation is in the best interests of the
child, the list of factors found in KRS 403.270 (addressing
custody) is exemplary.
It is clear that in determining custody,
the court must base its determination of the best interests of
the child on the statutory factors, and not merely on
psychological evaluations.53
We hold that a determination of the
best interests of the child in deciding visitation privileges is
50
KRS 403.320.
51
See Hornback v. Hornback, 636 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Ky.App. 1982).
52
Hornback, 636 S.W.2d at 26.
53
Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Ky. 1986).
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no different.
The court must consider any and all factors that
are relevant to that determination.54
This Court’s holding in Vibbert v. Vibbert,55 dealing
with grandparent visitation rights, provides further support for
such a holding.
This Court stated the appropriate test under
KRS 405.021 as follows:
[T]he courts must consider a broad
array of factors in determining whether the
visitation is in the child’s best interest,
including but not limited to: the nature
and stability of the relationship between
the child and the grandparent seeking
visitation; the amount of time spent
together; the potential detriments and
benefits to the child from granting
visitation; the effect granting visitation
would have on the child's relationship with
the parents; the physical and emotional
health of all the adults involved, parents
and grandparents alike; the stability of the
child's living and schooling arrangements;
the wishes and preferences of the child.56
Accordingly, we hold that the family court’s findings
that there was a “reasonable basis it would be in the best
interests of the child to terminate the visitation,” and that
“based upon the evidence in the deposition” it was in the
child’s best interests to terminate the visitation, were
54
While we recognize that Harry’s and Sherrilyn’s failure to appear before
the family court on July 9, 2004, prevented the family court from considering
evidence which Harry and Sherrilyn may have introduced at that time, this
does not allow the family court to enter what is in effect a default judgment
in determining the child’s best interests.
55
144 S.W.3d 292 (Ky.App. 2004).
56
Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d at 295.
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insufficient grounds to support the termination.
Just as it is
improper in a custody determination to rely solely on
psychological evaluations, it was likewise improper for the
family court to base its determination of the best interests of
the child solely upon the deposition of a single counselor.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the order of the
Hardin Family Court terminating Harry’s visitation rights is
hereby vacated and this matter is remanded with instructions
that the family court (1) communicate with the Court of Common
Pleas in Centre County, Pennsylvania as required by Kentucky’s
version of the UCCJA, (2) determine what proceedings, if any,
were pending in Pennsylvania at the time the immediate action
was filed, and whether those proceedings would restrict its
exercise of jurisdiction under the UCCJA and/or the PKPA, and
(3) determine, in consultation with the Court of Common Pleas in
Centre County, Pennsylvania, whether that court or the Hardin
Family Court would be the more appropriate forum.
Finally,
should the family court determine that it is proper for it to
exercise jurisdiction, it is instructed to conduct further
proceedings for the purpose of obtaining the necessary evidence
to make a proper determination of Shiann’s best interests, based
upon a consideration of all relevant factors, and to make
sufficient findings in support of the determination.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Harry Hamilton, Pro Se
Glen Lyon, Pennsylvania
Carol B. Meinhart
Radcliff, Kentucky
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