EDDIE DANTE PATTERSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 2, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001449-MR
EDDIE DANTE PATTERSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 99-CR-00317,
00-CR-00224, 01-CR-00284, AND
01-CR-00439
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; HENRY AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
Eddie Dante Patterson appeals from an order
of the Hardin Circuit Court entered on June 18, 2004, which
summarily denied his pro se motion filed pursuant to RCr 1 11.42.
Patterson contends that his conviction for attempted murder
should be set aside due to the deficient performance of his
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
counsel and that the trial court erred in failing to grant him
an evidentiary hearing to develop his contention.
As we agree
that Patterson was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, we vacate
and remand for additional proceedings.
As a result of several separate incidents, Patterson
was indicted by the Hardin County Grand Jury on the following
charges:
(1) indictment 99-CR-00317 -- criminal attempt to
commit murder; (2) indictment 00-CR-00224 -- trafficking in
marijuana within 1,000 yards of a school; (3) indictment 01-CR00284 -- second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO); and (4)
indictment 01-CR-00439 -- fleeing or evading police in the first
degree, receiving stolen property over $300, first-degree
possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug
paraphernalia, complicity to commit theft by unlawful taking
over $300, two driving violations (speeding and driving side to
side), and first-degree PFO.
The only offense involved in Patterson’s RCr 11.42
motion concerns the charge of attempted murder.
On July 24,
1999, Officer David Lowe of the Radcliff Police Department was
dispatched to Patterson’s residence after a report of a fight
between Patterson and Lorenzo Shannon.
Upon his arrival,
Officer Lowe obtained written statements from three persons who
witnessed the incident from a nearby business.
They stated that
in the course of the altercation, Patterson got into his car,
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intentionally accelerated the car in the direction of Shannon,
and struck him.
Shannon was taken to Hardin Memorial Hospital
and was treated for a broken arm and cuts to his body.
Patterson was placed under arrest.
On May 1, 2001, the Commonwealth filed a motion
seeking to amend the charge of attempted murder (a Class “B”
felony offense) to second-degree assault (a Class “C” felony).
Patterson then filed a motion to enter a guilty plea to the
amended charge in exchange for the Commonwealth’s recommended
sentence of ten years -- probated for five years.
The trial
court accepted the plea but awaited the receipt of a presentence investigation (PSI) before entering a judgment imposing
sentence.
After reviewing the PSI report, the trial court
informed Patterson that it would not accept the Commonwealth’s
recommendation with respect to probating the sentence.
Accordingly, it allowed Patterson to withdraw his guilty plea
and to proceed to trial.
On October 9, 2001, Patterson and the
Commonwealth entered into another plea agreement which
encompassed the charges in all four indictments.
Pursuant to
the new agreement, Patterson pled guilty to attempted murder (15
years to serve); to trafficking in marijuana (3 years to be
served consecutively to the 15-year sentence); and to firstdegree fleeing or evading police, receiving stolen property over
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$300, possession of cocaine, and complicity to commit theft by
unlawful taking over $300.
He received a sentence of ten years
on each of these counts, enhanced by his admission to being a
first-degree PFO, to be served concurrently with each other but
consecutively as to the other two cases.
Patterson’s guilty
plea resulted in a total sentence of twenty-eight years.
The
charge of PFO in the second degree was dismissed as were the
minor charges of possession of drug paraphernalia and the two
moving violations.
Prior to accepting Patterson’s second plea, the trial
court conducted a thorough colloquy to verify whether it was
being entered voluntarily and intelligently.
Counsel informed
the court that he and Patterson had discussed the violent
offender statute, KRS 2 439.3401, which requires extended periods
of prison time to be served prior to parole eligibility:
(3) A violent offender who has been
convicted of a capital offense or Class A
felony with a sentence of a term of years or
Class B felony who is a violent offender
shall not be released on parole until he has
served at least eighty-five percent (85%) of
the sentence imposed. (Emphasis added.)
Counsel indicated that Patterson agreed to stipulate that
Shannon had sustained serious physical injuries, thereby
activating the statute’s implications as to parole eligibility.
In its final judgment accepting the plea and the recommended
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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sentences, the court found that Patterson was a violent offender
with respect to the attempted murder charge and that his victim
suffered serious bodily injury.
On March 20, 2003, Patterson, pro se, filed a motion
pursuant to RCr 11.42, alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel.
He requested an evidentiary hearing and the
appointment of counsel to assist him in perfecting his motion.
As grounds for the motion, Patterson alleged that trial counsel
failed to contact two individuals whose testimony as to the true
nature of the altercation would have supplied him with a defense
at trial by contradicting the testimony of the witnesses
identified in the police report:
These two witnesses would have corroborated
the movant’s testimony, that the alleged
victim punched his fist into the windshield
of the movant’s car as the movant attempted
to leave the scene of [the] altercation
between the movant and alleged victim. The
two witnesses, Tiffany Williams and Ms.
Hatty were known to the defense counsel and
the movant charges that the defense
counsel’s failure to investigate movant’s
claims and to secure witness testimony,
shows that the defense counsel did not act
as a “reasonably competent attorney.”
(Memorandum of Law in support of motion,
Record at p. 112.)
Patterson contended that if his counsel had secured the
testimony of these two witnesses as a predicate for a viable
defense strategy, he would not have pled guilty.
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Patterson also claimed that counsel’s performance was
constitutionally deficient due to his failure to discover the
medical records of the victim or to hire an accident
reconstruction expert.
He alleged that the medical reports and
an expert’s opinion would have:
been consistent with the alleged victim
having punched the movant’s windshield as he
drove away from the scene of the
altercation. This testimony would have
helped the defense counsel form a sound
defense. The fact that the defense counsel
did not attempt to secure funding for an
expert witness shows that the defense
counsel did not act as a “reasonably
competent attorney.” (Record, at p. 114.)
Patterson alleged a series of omissions as to failure
of counsel to advise him concerning relevant law, including:
(1) that the Commonwealth would be required to prove each
element of every charge pending against him; (2) that a jury
could find him guilty of a lesser-included offense; and (3) that
the case law applicable to the violent offender statute
implicated prolonged postponement of parole eligibility.
Patterson contended that counsel’s deficiencies created a
cumulative effect serious enough to implicate his constitutional
rights to due process.
(Record at p. 116.)
Patterson made no
claims related to counsel’s representation of him on the other
charges.
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In its order denying Patterson’s RCr 11.42 motion, the
court directly addressed many of the issues raised by Patterson
as alleged errors:
The Court has reviewed the entire
record. The allegations pertaining to
[Patterson’s] not understanding certain
aspects of the plea are refuted by the
record. For example, [Patterson] states
that he did not appreciate his opportunity
to plead to lesser charges. In fact, on
Indictment 99-CR-00317 [Patterson] entered a
plea to an amended charge and was offered
probation. . . . The court rejected that
plea on June 5, 2001. . . Thus, on October
9, 2001, when [Patterson] entered the guilty
plea which he now attacks, he was fully
aware of the various options which might
have been employed.
The record of the plea discussion among
the Court, [Patterson] and counsel also
dispels the other allegations in this same
regard. The Court explained [Patterson’s]
right to have a trial at which he would have
to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, and he was also advised of his right
to require the attendance of witnesses who
might have testified on his behalf. . . .
The violent offender status was also
specifically discussed. It was explained
that the violent offender status was related
to a finding of serious physical injury.
[Patterson’s] counsel indicated that the
matter had been discussed with [Patterson].
[Patterson] never refuted this or asked any
question on this subject during the
presentation of the plea. . . .
There may be circumstances where
counsel’s failure to investigate a case
could lead to a finding of an uninformed
plea. The allegations by [Patterson] here
do not rise to that level. [Patterson]
complains about matters which were within
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his personal knowledge. In other words, he
knew what he did or did not do. He knew who
witnessed the events. Even if defense
counsel did not interview eyewitnesses who
may have corroborated [Patterson’s] version,
[Patterson] was aware of their existence and
that they could have corroborated his
version. Furthermore, [Patterson] was
specifically aware that he could have
required these people to be brought to court
to testify at a trial. Instead, [Patterson]
entered a guilty plea.
The same logic may be applied to the
complaint relating to the alleged failure to
obtain medical records and to request the
hiring of expert witnesses. [Patterson] was
aware of what occurred at the scene of the
vehicular assault. There was discussion
during his plea of a serious physical
injury. If [Patterson] was going to deny
these things, he had an opportunity to do
that by not entering a guilty plea. It
cannot be said, based upon this record, that
there is any factual dispute. [Patterson’s]
guilty plea was a knowing, intelligent and
voluntary plea. In these circumstances,
[Patterson] is not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing or to the appointment of
counsel.
On appeal, Patterson argues that the record does not
show what -- if any -- investigation his attorney conducted.
Therefore, he contends that the record cannot serve to refute
conclusively his allegations.
He also argues that the record
does not show whether or not counsel obtained or reviewed
Shannon’s medical records in order to determine whether his
injuries actually were sufficiently serious to satisfy the
elements of the violent offender statute.
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He alleges as error
the fact that the trial court relied on what he “did or did not
tell his attorney” rather than ascertaining “what counsel did to
investigate his client’s case.”
7.)
(Appellant’s brief, at pp. 6-
He contends that the trial court “totally misunderstood”
his claim that counsel wholly failed to advise him that a jury
could have found him guilty of a lesser-included offense.
at p. 8.)
(Id.
Thus, he believes that he is entitled to a remand
with directions that he be afforded an evidentiary hearing with
the aid of appointed counsel.
Because the trial court dismissed the petition without
a hearing, our review is limited to examining the record to
determine whether Patterson has alleged facts which are not
conclusively refuted by the existing record and which, if true,
would justify relief.
(Ky. 2001).
Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448
Our analysis entails the two-part test set forth in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
First, Patterson must establish that
counsel made serious errors falling “outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance.”
721 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Ky.App. 1986).
Sparks v. Commonwealth,
In the context of a plea,
he must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.”
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Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); Bronk v.
Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2001).
In the order before us, the trial judge relied
primarily on the Boykin 3 colloquy conducted by his predecessor.
We have reviewed the tape of that proceeding, and we agree that
Patterson expressed no dissatisfaction with this attorney before
the court.
The court meticulously explored the implications of
his plea with Patterson.
However, a guilty plea must be
analyzed in terms of all the facts underlying Boykin
recitations.
We note that “[t]he validity of a guilty plea
depends ‘upon the particular facts and circumstances’”
surrounding the plea and may not be determined “by reference to
some magic incantation recited at the time it is taken.”
Kotas
v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky. 1978), quoting Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461
(1938), and citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749, 90
S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970).
After our review of the record, we are persuaded that
Patterson is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Patterson’s
attorney was indeed required to conduct a reasonable
investigation into the facts of his case.
Strickland, supra,
466 U.S. at 691; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527,
156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003).
3
If there were eyewitnesses available to
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
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support a theory of self-defense as Patterson claims, his
attorney should have explored the possibility of going to trial
and presenting such a defense.
Patterson’s counsel may have
made such an investigation and may have advised Patterson to
plead guilty for strategic reasons.
However, the record before
us is devoid of any information as to whether Patterson’s
attorney made any attempts to contact the witnesses allegedly
possessing key evidence favorable to his client.
Although Patterson did receive a reduced sentence by
pleading guilty (fifteen years instead of the possible maximum
of twenty years), we are not permitted to presume that Patterson
may not have been prejudiced by taking the Commonwealth’s plea
offer rather than electing to go to trial.
The record
demonstrates that the Commonwealth was willing to allow
Patterson to plead to an amended charge of assault and to
receive a probated sentence.
It is equally possible that a
jury, evaluating conflicting versions of the altercation, might
conclude that Patterson’s conduct constituted something less
than attempted murder as did the prosecutor in amending the
charge.
We conclude that Patterson’s motion has raised issues
meeting the test for ineffective assistance of counsel based on
inadequate performance of counsel and prejudice as set forth in
Strickland and Hill.
Thus, an evidentiary hearing and the
appointment of counsel are required.
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Additionally, the true nature and extent of the
injuries suffered by Shannon are material as to a proper
resolution of the charge against Patterson.
We agree that
counsel was deficient in failing to secure the victim’s medical
records or to obtain other evidence revealing the degree of the
injuries.
Although this issue was raised during the plea
colloquy, it was not a part of the written plea agreement.
However, since a stipulation was made as to the seriousness of
the injuries, the trial court was at liberty to find that
Patterson came within the purview of KRS 439.3401, activating
the requirement that he serve 85% of his sentence before seeking
parole.
Thus, another possibility of counsel’s error and
resulting prejudice becomes apparent without any clarification
appearing on the fact of the record.
Thus, the order of the Hardin Circuit Court is
vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Julia K. Pearson
Frankfort, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Rickie L. Pearson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Rickie L. Pearson
Frankfort, KY
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