EDWARD AKERS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 29, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001212-MR
EDWARD AKERS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN D. COMBS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-00002
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART
REVERSING IN PART
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Edward Akers (Akers), appeals, Pro
Se, the Pike Circuit Court’s denial of his motion for relief
filed pursuant to RCr 11.42 without consideration of the merits,
as a successive motion.
We reverse the circuit court’s ruling,
and find that issues were contained in the motion requiring
review.
The case is remanded with instructions that such review
take place.
Akers was convicted of two counts of unlawful
transaction with a minor and sentenced to serve twenty years.
The charges stem from claims that Akers’ female co-defendant had
sex with minor children, and that Akers facilitated that
conduct.
Akers was initially charged with six counts of
unlawful transaction with a minor, but it was later discovered
that the evidence provided by the minor witness to the social
worker was incorrect, and that two of the children named in the
indictment were not actually present at the time of the alleged
wrongdoing.
A jury trial was held on the charges relevant to
the other four minors.
The jury found Akers not-guilty with
regard to the charges against two of the minors.
The co-
defendant admitted to sexual contact between she and one of the
two older boys and received a probated sentence of three years.
Akers was convicted of unlawful transaction with a minor with
regard to those two teenagers.
Akers filed a direct appeal of his conviction.
conviction was affirmed on appeal.
The
Akers then filed an initial
motion under RCr 11.42 in January, 2000.
This motion was denied
by the circuit court, and that denial was affirmed on appeal.
In May, 2004 Akers filed the motion underlying this action.
The
court denied that motion as pertaining to matters which should
have been raised in the earlier RCr 11.42 motion.
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The court did
not address the merits of the underlying motion.
Akers appeals
the denial of his motion without consideration of the merits.
The Commonwealth asserts that the present case is a
successive motion and was properly denied because it raised
issues which should have been raised earlier in his direct
appeal or in his initial RCr 11.42 motion.
Akers claims that
the motion underlying this appeal raised a new issue which could
not have been raised earlier in the proceedings.
He argues that
his appeal is based on the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in
Jordan v. Commonwealth, 74 S.W.3d 263 (Ky. 2002), holding that
social worker reports and testimony cannot be used to show
credibility of a witness or prove the guilt of the accused.
That case was decided after the final determination was made on
Akers’ earlier post-conviction motions.
We find that Akers is correct in asserting that there
was a change and clarification in the law with regard to the
admissibility of social worker testimony with the determination
made in Jordan v. Commonwealth, 74 S.W.3d 263 (Ky. 2002).
The
ruling in that case was a proper basis upon which Akers could
base his new motion under RCr 11.42.
We are not persuaded by
the Commonwealth’s assertion that Jordan was merely a
continuation of earlier caselaw, and therefore could not be
considered a “new” ruling.
Although the Jordan court cited the
Prater v. Cabinet For Human Resources, 954 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1997)
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case, it made its ruling based both on a body of caselaw, and on
the circumstances before it.
The Court was clear in reversing
Jordan’s conviction due to the fact that the case was a
“swearing match” between the complaining witness and the
defendant, and the fact that the social worker’s testimony
improperly bolstered witness credibility.
Similar circumstances are present here.
74 S.W.3d at 269.
The case does form a
basis upon which Akers could make his new motion.
Denial of the
motion without review as a successive motion was in error.
Akers asserts that improper social worker testimony
was admitted at trial.
He claims that this evidence was
admitted in violation of Kentucky law, as detailed in Jordan,
supra.
Where the testimony of a social worker is used to
bolster a witness’ credibility, introduction of that testimony
may be found reversible error.
Prater v. Cabinet for Human
Resources, 954 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1997).
The record contains
discovery responses indicating that Harris, the social worker,
told police that Akers thought it was humorous that his teenaged
sons had sex with the co-defendant, as well as other opinion
evidence of the social worker.
The social worker’s report made part of the record in
the case contains a statement that a minor child, cousin to the
teenagers at issue, claimed that the minor witness asserted that
he and six other children all had sex with the co-defendant, and
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stated that the child’s statement was “a very credible story”
and that the child “has no reason to lie because he is already
in a relative placement.”
In fact, review of the record shows
that the child’s story was in fact, false and incorrect, in that
several of the children he listed as having had contact with the
co-defendant were not even in the home on the weekend in
question.
The record also contains other evidence which
conflicts with the version of the case given by the child to the
social worker.
In addition, the record shows that the child has
a significant speech impediment such that the social worker
could not understand him.
The social worker required the
child’s foster parent to “translate” for him, further
compromising the version of the facts allegedly provided by the
child.
In Jordan v. Commonwealth, 74 S.W.3d 263 (Ky. 2002),
relied upon by Akers as showing that the evidence in this case
constitutes reversible error, the Kentucky Supreme Court held
that admission of a social worker’s statement indicating that
the defendant was guilty of the charges was reversible error.
Id., 74 S.W.3d at 268.
A social worker’s reports are hearsay
evidence and may not be used to substantiate the factual
findings or the witness’ testimony.
74 S.W.2d at 269.
The
records of interviews by a social worker are inadmissible where
those records contain recorded opinions of the social worker.
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Prater v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 954 S.W.2d 954, 958, n.
11 (Ky. 1997).
This Court has held that social worker testimony
and statements allegedly made by a witness to that social worker
cannot be used to bolster the witness’ testimony at trial.
Commonwealth v. M.G., 75 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Ky.App. 2002).
This
case extends that portion of the law which provides that a
social worker cannot vouch for the credibility of a witness.
See:
Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Ky. 1992).
In the present case, the social worker’s record and
evidence admitted at trial may have improperly bolstered the
witness’ credibility.
Under such circumstances the trial
court’s denial of the motion, without making any finding of fact
or review of the record, was in error and must be reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Akers contends that the instructions given to the jury
were erroneous in that they required the jury to find him guilty
if they found that his co-defendant had sexual contact with
either or both of his older sons.
This issue was clearly one
which could have and should have been raised in earlier
proceedings before the appellate courts.
Such successive
appeals are properly denied where no new issues are raised.
McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1997).
For this
reason, the issue raised does not constitute reversible error or
grounds for review.
We affirm that portion of the trial court’s
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ruling which found this issue to be successive, and not
appropriate for review.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
KNOPF, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
Respectfully, I dissent
from the majority opinion because I agree with the trial court
that Akers’s RCr 11.42 motion is successive.
The majority holds
that the motion is not barred because the Kentucky Supreme
Court’s opinion in Jordan v. Commonwealth,1 constituted a change
and clarification of the law which Akers could not have
anticipated when he filed his first RCr 11.42 motion.
However,
the relevant holding in Jordan merely applies the holding of
Prater v. Cabinet for Human Resources.2
In Prater, as in Jordan,
the Kentucky Supreme Court held that “the recorded opinions and
conclusions of social workers are not admissible,”3 and a social
worker’s “professional determination” that an allegation of
abuse is “substantiated” is nothing more than improper opinion
testimony.4
While the holding in Jordan re-emphasizes and
perhaps clarifies the holding of Prater, it does not represent a
1
74 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. 2002).
2
954 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1997).
3
Id. at 958.
4
Jordan, supra at 269.
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significant change in the standard set out in Prater.
Akers
presents no reason why he could not have raised this issue in
his earlier RCr 11.42 motion.
Consequently, I would hold that
the trial court properly dismissed this motion as successive.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edward Akers, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Samuel J. Floyd, Sr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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