JOHN T. YOUNG v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 13, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001137-MR
JOHN T. YOUNG
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00033
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
John T. Young (Young) appeals from a denial of a
motion filed pursuant to CR 60.02 attacking his conviction and
sentence for first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and seconddegree assault.
We affirm.
Young was indicted on February 25, 1997 for the abovementioned crimes.
On May 27, 1997 Young filed a motion to enter
a guilty plea to the charges.
The motion reflects that, in
return for Young’s plea to the charges set forth in the
indictment, the Commonwealth agreed to recommend 12 years on the
rape charge, 12 years on the sodomy charge, and 10 years on the
assault charge.
The Commonwealth also filed a formal offer that
reflected the same recommendation.
On May 27, 1997 the court held a guilty plea hearing.
At the hearing Young acknowledged that his attorney had read the
guilty plea document to him and that he understood its contents.
He also indicated that he understood the nature of the charges
against him and the consequences.
The court asked Young whether
he was satisfied with the services of his attorney and whether
his attorney had done everything that he asked him to do to
which Young replied in the affirmative.
Young denied that he
was sick, his judgment was impaired, or that he was under the
influence of any drugs.
The court reviewed the recommendation
of the Commonwealth on Young’s plea of guilty and Young
acknowledged that his attorney went over that offer with him and
that he signed it.
Further, Young stated in response to
questioning from the court that he understood that he was giving
up the right to have a jury trial, the right to appeal, the
right to cross-examine witnesses, and the right not to
incriminate himself.
The court questioned whether he was
entering into the plea willingly, freely, and voluntarily and
Young said “yes.”
Following this colloquy the court accepted
Young’s plea.
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On July 7, 1997 the court held a sentencing hearing.
At the hearing both Young and his attorney stated that they had
no mitigating evidence to present to the court.
The court
imposed the sentence recommended by the Commonwealth stating on
the record that Young was to receive 12 years on the rape
charge, 12 years on the sodomy charge, and 10 years on the
assault charge to run concurrently for a total of 12 years.
On July 9, 1997 the court’s judgment and sentence was
entered in the record.
However, it incorrectly reflected that
Young was to receive 12 months on the assault charge instead of
10 years.
On August 13, 1997 the court entered an amended order,
sua sponte, correcting the judgment to show that Young was to
receive 10 years on the assault charge.
No direct appeal was prosecuted since Young had pled
guilty and he did not file a motion under RCr 11.42 for which,
he concedes, the time has run.
On December 19, 2003 Young filed
a motion pursuant to CR 60.02 seeking to set aside his
conviction and sentence.
The court denied the motion and also
denied Young’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.
This
appeal followed.
On appeal Young makes three arguments for why his
conviction and sentence should be set aside.
First, he argues
that the court did not have jurisdiction to amend the written
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judgment pertaining to the time he must serve for the assault
charge.
Secondly, Young alleges that both the prosecutor and
his attorney violated his rights by failing to adequately
investigate the charges against him.
He further argues that his
attorney should have bargained for a lesser sentence.
Lastly,
he contends that the court failed to ascertain whether he was
competent to enter a plea of guilty.
Young’s first argument is based on Silverburg v.
Commonwealth, 587 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1979) and its progeny.
Silverburg stands for the general proposition that 10 days after
entry of judgment the trial court loses its jurisdiction, and,
therefore, does not have the power to enter orders modifying its
judgment.
Id. at 244.
However, the recent case of Cardwell v.
Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 672 (Ky. 2000), directs courts to
consider whether a mistake in the judgment, such as happened
here, is judicial or clerical in nature.
Id. at 674.
There the
Court held where the mistake is one in reducing an oral judgment
to writing it is not “the product of judicial reasoning and
determination[;] [i]t is a clerical error.”
Id. at 674-675.
See also Viers v. Commonwealth, 52 S.W.3d 527, 528-529 (Ky.
2001).
In Young’s case the mistake was plainly in reducing
the judgment to writing.
The guilty plea form, the guilty plea
offer, the colloquy at the guilty plea hearing and sentencing
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hearing all make clear that the Commonwealth’s offer on the
second-degree assault charge was 10 years.
Young either signed
or was present and acknowledged the agreement in every instance.
Therefore, the error in the written judgment was clerical in
nature and the court did not lack jurisdiction to correct the
sentence.
Furthermore, we cannot see how this would effect
Young’s incarceration time.
He was sentenced to 12 years on
both the rape and sodomy charges.
concurrently.
The sentences were all to run
Thus, any time to serve on the assault charge is
subsumed.
Young’s allegations that the prosecutor and his
attorney violated his rights by failing to adequately
investigate his case and that his attorney should have bargained
for lesser sentences on the charges are not appropriate matters
to be raised through CR 60.02.
CR 60.02 allows error to be
claimed on the basis of facts that were unknown and could not
have been known through reasonable diligence in time to be
presented to the court.
Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98,
101 (Ky. 1998); McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416
(Ky. 1997); cert.den., McQueen v. Kentucky, 117 S.Ct. 2535, 521
U.S. 1130, 138 L.Ed.2d 1035 (1997).
Further, relief under CR
60.02 is intended for those claims that cannot be presented
through direct appeal or RCr 11.42.
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Barnett 979 S.W.2d at 101.
The facts Young points to do not merit relief under CR
60.02.
Investigation of the facts and circumstances of the
crime were certainly known before Young ever agreed to enter his
guilty plea.
Young had a responsibility to participate in his
defense and make his attorney aware of these issues.
At the
guilty plea hearing he indicated to the court that he had
sufficient opportunity to apprise his attorney of all matters
and was satisfied with his services.
There is no merit to Young’s argument that his
attorney should have bargained for lesser sentences.
The crimes
committed by Young are very serious in nature and carry the
potential, as noted by the trial court at the guilty plea
hearing, of resulting in a maximum sentence of 50 years.
Viewed
in this light, a plea bargain that requires service of 12 years
total appears to be very favorable to Young.
There is simply no
evidence that the prosecutor violated Young’s rights in any way.
Moreover, these issues could have been presented in an
RCr 11.42 action.
Finally, Young contends that the court did not
determine whether he was competent to enter his guilty plea.
Implicit in this assertion is that he was not competent to do
so.
Young’s primary argument on this point is that he suffers
from dyslexia and was illiterate at the time.
The validity of a
guilty plea must be measured considering the totality of the
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circumstances.
Kotas v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky.
1978).
The circumstances of Young’s guilty plea and
sentencing are outlined above.
From a review of the record it
is apparent that the court ascertained through questioning Young
that Young understood the nature and consequences of the charges
against him as well as the recommendation of the Commonwealth in
return for his plea.
The court further made certain that Young,
although illiterate, had been read the documents to be entered
in the record and understood their contents.
At sentencing
Young denied that there were any circumstances that would
prevent the court from pronouncing its sentence.
Considering all the facts and circumstances
surrounding Young’s guilty plea, as well as his sentencing
hearing, there is no doubt that he was competent at the time.
Suffering from dyslexia or illiteracy does not equate with an
inability to understand and appreciate court proceedings.
For the foregoing reasons the decision of the Hopkins
Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John T. Young, Pro Se
Central City, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Wm. Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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