JUDITH GAYLE LINDSEY v. JAMES EDWARD TORGERSON
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 26, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001021-MR
JUDITH GAYLE LINDSEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN M. GEORGE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-501266
JAMES EDWARD TORGERSON
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
Judith Gayle Lindsey appeals from an order
of the Jefferson Family Court in favor of her ex-husband, James
Edward Torgerson, Jr., denying her motion to collect past due
child support obligations allegedly owed by Torgerson.
We
vacate and remand.
Lindsey and Torgerson were married in Tennessee on
February 20, 1965.
They are the parents of two daughters, Karen
and Patricia.
Karen was born on December 5, 1968, and Patricia
was born on September 23, 1971.
Lindsey and Torgerson were divorced by a decree
entered in Bibb County, Georgia, on November 24, 1975.
The
Georgia divorce decree incorporated a settlement agreement
wherein the parties agreed that Torgerson would pay $150 per
month per child, for a total of $300 per month, as child
support.
According to Lindsey, Torgerson failed to meet his
obligations under the Georgia decree.
This led her to file a
U.R.E.S.A. 1 action to enforce Torgerson’s child support
obligations in Jefferson County, Kentucky, the county and state
where she resided, in September 1985.
Pursuant to U.R.E.S.A.,
Lindsay’s complaint was transferred to Sarasota, Florida,
Torgerson’s place of residence, for enforcement of Torgerson’s
support obligations under the Georgia decree.
Torgerson apparently did not defend the action, and a
support order was entered against him by the Florida court on
March 13, 1986. 2
Under the order, the court found that Torgerson
owed $25,000 in past due child support through December 1985.
It also ordered him to pay $75 per month as current support and
$20 per month on the arrearages.
1
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
2
Torgerson testified that he was not served with summons in the case.
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During the years that followed, Lindsey made various
attempts to enforce Torgerson’s child support obligation.
She
maintains that she was unsuccessful because she was unaware of
his whereabouts.
In support of her position, she points to
documents from state child support agencies in Kentucky and
Florida covering the period from April 1989 to December 1993
that indicate the various addresses at which the agencies
unsuccessfully attempted to locate Torgerson.
There is no
indication that Lindsey made further attempts to enforce
Torgerson’s obligation after 1993 until she initiated the
present action approximately ten years later. 3
On April 2, 2003, Lindsey filed a petition in the
Jefferson Family Court to register the Georgia divorce decree
setting Torgerson’s child support obligation.
filed pursuant to KRS 4 407.5601. 5
This action was
The petition requested the
court to enter an order of child support arrearage against
Torgerson.
Lindsey also filed a motion seeking to compel
Torgerson to respond to her discovery request for bank records.
In that motion, she claimed that Torgerson had not responded to
3
Lindsey stated in an affidavit that sometime around 1993 she received a tip
advising her of Torgerson’s whereabouts.
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
5
This statute is part of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
(U.I.F.S.A) that replaced U.R.E.S.A.
-3-
her request for production of documents and that such documents
would demonstrate that Torgerson had not paid child support in
the past to the extent he claimed.
Further, she moved the court
to hold Torgerson in contempt for failing to meet his support
obligations.
Torgerson moved to dismiss the action against him on
the ground that the statute of limitations for the enforcement
of any child support obligation that might have been owing by
him had run.
9, 2004.
The court held an evidentiary hearing on January
In addition to the parties, an assistant county
attorney testified for Lindsey, and Paula Torgerson, Torgerson’s
second ex-wife, testified for Torgerson.
At the hearing,
Lindsey brought the court’s attention to the Florida support
order for the first time.
On April 23, 2004, the court entered an order wherein
it rejected Lindsey’s action to hold Torgerson in contempt and
for a common law judgment for child support arrearages.
After
the court denied Lindsey’s motion to vacate, she filed a notice
of appeal.
In its order dismissing Lindsey’s claim, the court
ruled in three parts.
First, the court ruled that enforcement
of the March 13, 1986, Florida order was barred by the 15-year
statute of limitations for the enforcement of judgments in KRS
413.090(1) because Lindsey’s action had not been commenced until
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April 2, 2003, more than 15 years after the entry of the order.
Further, the court found that Torgerson had not concealed
himself so as to toll the limitations period.
See KRS
413.190(2). 6
Second, citing Harvey v. McGuire, 635 S.W.2d 8
(Ky.App. 1982) 7 , the court held that the statute of limitations
for any support accruing after the date of the Florida order
began to run once the children turned 18 years of age.
Because
Karen was born on December 5, 1968, the court reasoned that any
action for child support arrearages for her should have
commenced prior to December 5, 2001.
Because Lindsey did not
file this action until April 2003, the court concluded that any
claim for unpaid child support owed for Karen was barred by the
statute of limitations.
6
KRS 413.190(2) provides in relevant part that:
When a cause of action mentioned in KRS
413.090 to 413.160 accrues against a
resident of this state, and he by absconding
or concealing himself or by any other
indirect means obstructs the prosecution of
the action, the time of the continuance of
the absence from the state or obstruction
shall not be computed as any part of the
period within which the action shall be
commenced.
7
In Bollengier v. Charlet, 141 S.W.3d 14, 16 (Ky.App. 2004), this court held
that the Harvey case had been “effectively overruled” by Stewart v. Raikes,
627 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1982).
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Third, as to Lindsey’s claim for arrearages owed for
Patricia, the court concluded that Torgerson had met his burden
of proving that the payments had been made.
The court based
this finding on the testimony of Torgerson and his ex-wife,
Paula Torgerson.
Although Torgerson did not present any
documents supporting his assertion that he had paid his child
support, the court concluded that it was “unreasonable to expect
Mr. Torgerson to have retained records of every child support
payment he made as the parties have been divorced for almost
thirty years and their youngest child is now thirty-two years
old.” 8
We immediately note several problems in this case.
First, we see a problem with the way the court treated the
Florida U.R.E.S.A. order.
When Lindsey filed this action
against Torgerson in April 2003, she sought to register the
Georgia divorce decree and to have it enforced.
made of the Florida U.R.E.S.A. order.
No mention was
At the evidentiary
hearing before the circuit court, Lindsey brought up the Florida
U.R.E.S.A. order, which she claimed was “newly discovered
evidence that there is a Florida judgment.”
Torgerson
apparently did not object to the introduction of the Florida
order for the court’s consideration, and he urged the court to
8
Torgerson also testified that his apartment was destroyed by fire in 2000,
causing him to lose all records of child support payments.
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accept the order as a judgment and to hold that the enforcement
of it was barred by the 15-year statute of limitation.
The
court accepted the order as a judgment and accepted Torgerson’s
argument that the enforcement of it was barred by the statute.
In our view, the circuit court should not have
considered the Florida U.R.E.S.A. order as a judgment for two
reasons.
First, if the Florida order was truly a judgment
subject to enforcement in Kentucky, then Lindsey should have
complied with the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
set forth in KRS 426.950-.990 before seeking to have it enforced
by the court.
Specifically, KRS 426.955 requires that a copy of
the judgment, authenticated in accordance with the act of
Congress or the statutes of this state, must be filed before the
judgment may be enforced.
Although Lindsey filed a copy of the
Florida order, it was not properly authenticated as required by
the statute.
Thus, it was not subject to enforcement.
Regardless, we believe the parties and the court
improperly accepted the Florida U.R.E.S.A. order as a judgment.
The judgment setting forth Torgerson’s support obligations was
the Georgia divorce decree.
The U.R.E.S.A. proceeding
instituted by Lindsey in Kentucky and transferred to Florida was
merely a proceeding to enforce the George decree.
The order
entered by the Florida court was an enforcement order and not a
judgment.
Nevertheless, although the Florida order was not a
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judgment, Torgerson is precluded from challenging the arrearage
determination made therein based on res judicata.
Black, 655 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Ky.App. 1983).
See Jaynes v.
As a consequence, to
the extent Lindsey may be able to collect support for months
prior to and including December 1985, Torgerson cannot now
relitigate the issue of payment for those months.
The second problem we note concerns the manner in
which the court dealt with the statute of limitations issue.
As
we have noted, the court held that the statute of limitations
for enforcing Torgerson’s past due support obligations began to
run when each child turned 18 years of age.
this determination on the Harvey case.
The court based
However, one month after
the family court entered its order, this court rendered an
opinion in Bollengier, 141 S.W.3d at 16, that held that the
Kentucky Supreme Court had “effectively overruled” the Harvey
case in Stewart, 627 S.W.2d at 586.
The Stewart case held that
“each installment of child support becomes a lump sum judgment,
unchangeable by the trial court when it becomes due and is
unpaid.”
Id. at 589.
In other words, it is unnecessary to
reduce a claim for support arrearages to a lump sum judgment for
purposes of enforcement.
Id. at 589.
In short, for purposes of
determining whether Lindsey’s enforcement of Torgerson’s
allegedly delinquent support payments was barred by the statute
of limitations, the court should have examined the issue in a
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manner consistent with the Stewart case rather than the Harvey
case. 9
Thus, as we consider the statute of limitations issue on
appeal, we do so in accordance with Stewart rather than Harvey.
Next, in determining whether Lindsey’s action to
enforce the George divorce decree is barred by the applicable
statute of limitations, we must consider whether the statute of
limitations in Kentucky or the statute of limitations in Georgia
applies.
This matter is directly addressed in KRS 407.5604(2),
which provides that “[i]n a proceeding for arrearages, the
statute of limitation under the laws of this state or of the
issuing state, whichever is longer, applies.”
As we have noted,
Kentucky has a 15-year statute of limitations for the
enforcement of judgments.
See KRS 413.090(1).
The statute of
limitations in Georgia for the enforcement of child support
arrearages is ten years.
See Bryant v. Bryant, 205 S.E.2d 223
(Ga. 1974), and Owens v. Dep’t. of Human Resources, 566 S.E.2d
403, 405 (Ga.Ct.App. 2002).
Therefore, the Kentucky 15-year
statute of limitations applies.
As these legal principles apply to the facts of this
case, the statute of limitations as to support obligations for
Karen has run unless the statute was tolled pursuant to KRS
413.190(2).
Because the last support obligation for Karen was
due just before her 18th birthday in December 1986, Lindsey had
9
It is understandable that the family court applied the wrong analysis since
Bollengier had not been rendered when the family court entered its order.
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until December 2001 to enforce the unpaid child support
obligations.
Because Lindsey did not file this action until
April 2003, the statute had run as to all monthly obligations
unless there was tolling.
As for Torgerson’s support obligation for Patricia,
the 15-year period expired in September 2004 unless there was
tolling.
Thus, since Lindsey filed this action in April 2003,
any unpaid monthly support obligations for the last
approximately 18 months before Patricia turned 18 were still
enforceable regardless of whether the statute had been tolled.
The first argument raised by Lindsey in this appeal is
that the circuit court erred when it determined that the tolling
statute, KRS 413.190(2), did not apply because “Mr. Torgerson
did not conceal his whereabouts from Miss Lindsey.”
findings were based on two determinations.
The court’s
First, the court
noted that the evidence indicated Lindsey made no effort to
enforce Torgerson’s child support obligations after 1993.
Second, the court reasoned that Patricia lived with Torgerson
pursuant to Lindsey’s consent during the 1984-85 school year and
that “[i]t is hard for this Court to believe that Miss Lindsey
sent their teenage daughter to Florida without knowing where the
child would be residing or without speaking to her during her
entire stay with her father.”
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This court may “set aside the trial court’s findings
[of fact] only if those findings are clearly erroneous.”
Moore
v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 353-54 (Ky. 2003), citing CR 10 52.01.
When determining whether such findings are clearly erroneous,
“due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”
CR 52.01.
“[J]udging the credibility of witnesses and weighing evidence
are tasks within the exclusive province of the trial court.”
Moore, 110 S.W.3d at 354.
A finding of fact is said to be clearly erroneous if
it is not supported by substantial evidence.
Id.
Substantial
evidence “is evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id.
Further, substantial
evidence is evidence that, “when taken alone or in light of all
the evidence,. . . has sufficient probative value to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable men.”
Id.
This is so,
regardless of whether there is conflicting evidence or whether
the reviewing court would have reached a contrary finding based
on the evidence as a whole.
Id.
The above two reasons cited by the family court to
support its finding that Torgerson did not conceal himself to
avoid enforcement of his child support obligations do not
constitute substantial evidence.
10
First, although Lindsey may
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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have known of Torgerson’s whereabouts between 1993 and the
filing of her action in 2003, that fact covers only a 10-year
time period and is not dispositive of whether she knew his
whereabouts between April 1989 and December 1993.
The records
of the Jefferson County Attorney’s Child Support Division are
evidence that Torgerson could not be located during this fouryear period.
Second, the fact that Lindsey may have known where
Torgerson was residing in 1984-85 when Patricia was living with
him also is not dispositive of the question of whether Lindsey
knew of Torgerson’s whereabouts during the 1989-93 period.
In
short, neither of these reasons constitutes substantial evidence
to support the finding that Torgerson did not conceal himself
during the 1989-93 period.
When evidence was presented to the court on the issue
of tolling, it was not restricted to the period from April 1989
to December 1993.
Therefore, the court did not address the
issue as it related only to that period of time.
In fact, the
two reasons cited by the court to support its finding that
Torgerson did not conceal himself do constitute sufficient
evidence to support its findings as to periods of time before
1989 and after 1993.
They are not, however, relevant to the
1989-93 period.
As we have noted, there is evidence that Torgerson
could not be located during that time period.
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Although Lindsey
provided addresses and phone numbers for Torgerson to the
authorities in an attempt to collect child support pursuant to
U.R.E.S.A., the documents indicate that Torgerson was not
located at those addresses.
While these facts are some evidence
of concealment during this time, the court may have relied on
other facts in determining there was no concealment.
In short,
we conclude that this matter should be remanded to the family
court for the entry of additional findings and determinations
directly addressing whether the statute should be tolled for the
April 1989 to December 1993 period.
Furthermore, the court was premature in its finding
that Torgerson had presented evidence, sufficient under Raymer,
supra, to show he had met his support obligation from January
1986 on. 11
While the court was free to accept the evidence
presented by Torgerson on this issue, Lindsey was entitled to
present evidence to rebut it.
By failing to grant Lindsey’s
motion to compel discovery of bank records, Lindsey was denied
the right to discover and present such evidence.
It appears
from the record that at the time her motion to compel was before
the court, the court was focused only on the issue surrounding
the statute of limitations and tolling.
11
On remand, Lindsey
As we previously noted, to the extent tolling applies and allows Lindsey to
recover child support due prior to December 1995, Torgerson is precluded by
res judicata from relitigating his obligation for those months.
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should be allowed the opportunity to discover and present such
records.
The order of the Jefferson Family Court is vacated and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART AND
FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART:
While I agree with much of the reasoning contained in the
majority opinion, I must dissent from the majority’s decision to
remand this case for additional findings concerning tolling of
the statute of limitations.
KRS 413.190 provides that the
statute of limitations is tolled during any period that the
defendant absconds or conceals himself “or by any other direct
means obstructs the prosecution of the action.”
The trial court
found no evidence that Torgerson concealed his whereabouts from
Lindsey.
The majority agrees that there was evidence that
Lindsey knew Torgerson’s whereabouts during the period from 1984
until at least 1989.
Likewise, there was no evidence that
Lindsey made any effort to locate Torgerson after 1993 or that
he concealed his location after that time.
Regarding the period
from 1989 to 1993, Torgerson moved back and forth between
Kentucky and Florida during that period.
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There were records
introduced showing that the Jefferson County Attorney had
contacted the Florida child-support agency requesting assistance
in locating Torgerson.
On the other hand, both children had
reached the age of majority after 1989 and Torgerson’s on-going
obligation to pay child support had ended.
Therefore, it is not
clear that Torgerson had any duty to keep Lindsey apprised of
his whereabouts during that period.
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense
that Torgerson bore the burden of proving.
CR 8.03; Lynn Mining
Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Ky., 1965).
The trial court
found that the fifteen-year statute of limitations had lapsed
with respect to all of the arrearages owed for Karen and most of
the arrearages owed for Patricia.
The majority agrees that this
conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.
Consequently, the burden then shifted to Lindsey to
prove such facts that would toll the statute.
Southeastern
Kentucky Baptist Hospital, Inc. v. Gaylor, 756 S.W.2d 467, 469
(Ky. 1988).
Moreover, Lindsey bore the risk of non-persuasion
on this issue.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary
hearing, at which Lindsey was given an opportunity to present
evidence.
Following that hearing, the trial court found
insufficient evidence to show that Torgerson had concealed
himself during the limitations period.
-15-
The majority, however, shifts the burden to Torgerson
to prove that he did not conceal himself.
Although there was
some evidence that would support a contrary determination, the
trial court was not obliged to accept Lindsey’s evidence.
Furthermore, there is no indication in the record that Lindsey
requested more specific findings concerning the period from 1989
to 1993.
CR 52.04.
Therefore, I do not believe that it is
necessary to remand this matter for additional findings on this
issue.
Finally, the trial court found that Torgerson has met
his burden of proving that he has paid all enforceable
arrearages owed for Patricia.
I agree with the majority that
Lindsey should have been given an opportunity to discover and
present evidence to rebut this proof.
However, the trial court
correctly noted that Lindsey’s lack of diligence has made proof
on this issue difficult.
Torgerson testified that many of his
personal records were destroyed in a fire in 2000.
Likewise, it
is unlikely that twenty-year-old bank records will be available.
The purpose of the statute of limitations is to avoid precisely
the type of problems with obtaining proof as are presented in
this case.
Subject to this understanding, however, I agree with
the majority that this matter should be remanded for additional
findings concerning the amount of the enforceable arrearage
which remains owed by Torgerson.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Allen McKee Dodd
Louisville, Kentucky
G. Phillip Deeb, Sr.
Louisville, Kentucky
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