TRAVIS JAY HENDRIX v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 2, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-000842-MR
TRAVIS JAY HENDRIX
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JR., JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 03-CR-00092
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; HENRY AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
HENRY, JUDGE:
Travis Jay Hendrix appeals from his conviction
for second degree arson for starting a fire at the home of Wayne
and Peggy Lewis, a bi-racial couple.
The sole basis for
Hendrix’s appeal is that the trial court erroneously allowed the
introduction of inappropriate KRE 1 404(b) evidence.
we affirm.
1
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
On review,
On October 25, 2002, Deidre Beshear, Ricky Tapp, and
Joe Hayne were setting up a deer stand in the field adjoining
the Tapp/Beshear home.
Beshear was cutting tree limbs with a
chainsaw when Tapp called for her to take a look at a maroonand-white truck that had pulled into the field.
Beshear
recognized the truck as belonging to Chris Cullen, Hendrix’s
step-brother.
Beshear knew both Cullen and Hendrix from her job
as a bus driver for the Hopkins County school system.
Beshear was worried about the truck’s appearance
because the Lewises lived with their sons Chris and Benjamin in
a home located near the Tapp/Beshear residence.
Earlier that
morning, after completing her bus route, she had heard about an
altercation between Cullen and Chris Lewis, and she had
previously heard Cullen make racial slurs against the Lewises.
Beshear had never seen a truck in the field before, as the
terrain was reclaimed strip mine land that was not easily
accessible.
She was so concerned that she called home and asked
her daughter Amy to check on the Lewises.
Amy drove to the
Lewis residence after no one answered the phone there,
discovered that it was on fire, and called the fire department.
A short time later, Beshear, Tapp, and Hayne heard fire engines
coming down the road and discovered that the Lewises’ home was
on fire.
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Tapp also recognized the truck as one that was
regularly driven by Cullen and Hendrix.
When the truck pulled
into the field, Tapp observed the driver remove two containers
from the back of the truck: something resembling a black quart
bottle of oil and a bottle of beer with a silver label.
The
driver then walked into the woods with the containers in a
direction leading towards the Lewis residence.
After
approximately 15 minutes, Tapp saw the driver, who he now
recognized as Hendrix, appear from the woods and run towards the
truck.
Beshear was also able to identify the driver as Hendrix
as he drove away in a hurry, with the truck fishtailing as he
left the field.
Tapp would later observe large footprints in
the woods connecting the field where the truck had been seen and
the Lewises’ yard and also a path of prints and trampled grass
leading from the woods towards the direction of the Lewis house
and then back towards the woods.
Frank Gresham, an arson investigator with the Kentucky
State Police, investigated the fire and recognized a number of
unusual signs that led him to the conclusion that the fire was
the result of arson and was specifically caused by an accelerant
placed into the dryer vent connected to the utility room of the
house.
Subsequent testing would confirm the presence of an
accelerant at the focal point of the fire.
Gresham also
observed a “trail” of footprints and trampled grass leading from
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the woods adjacent to the Lewis home in the direction of its
dryer vent.
He also noticed footprints on a dirt path in the
woods connecting the Lewises’ yard and the field where Hendrix
had been seen.
Gresham ultimately concluded that the fire had
been deliberately set within 20-25 minutes of when it was
discovered.
Deputy Sheriff Otis Chamberlain interviewed Beshear
and Tapp after being informed that a woman had possibly seen the
person who had started the fire.
Tapp took him to the field
where he had seen the truck parked.
Chamberlain noticed that
the grass was knocked down where the truck had been, and he also
recognized footprints and/or trampled grass all along a path
between the spot in the field where the truck had been, through
the woods, and into the Lewises’ yard towards the northwest
corner of the house, where the dryer vent was located.
He also
noticed a similar pattern of footprints and trampled grass going
in the opposite direction back towards the spot where it was
determined that the truck was parked.
Afterwards, Chamberlain
went to Hendrix’s home to find out where he had been that
morning.
Hendrix was asleep when he arrived, but Deputy Sheriff
David Morris found some beer (in bottles with silver labels) in
a cooler in the back of his truck and discovered that the hood
of the truck was still warm.
and grass.
The truck was also covered in mud
Hendrix admitted that he had been drinking that
-4-
morning and, after first telling Chamberlain that he hadn’t been
anywhere that morning, then stated that he may have driven to
Dawson Springs to return a video and get something to eat.
On April 29, 2003, Hendrix was indicted by the Hopkins
County Grand Jury pursuant to KRS 2 513.030 on a charge of seconddegree arson for “starting a fire with the intent to destroy or
damage the (building) owned by Julius & Hildegard Lewis.”
The
indictment also indicated that the arson count would be charged
as a “hate crime” pursuant to KRS 532.031.
Hendrix was
subsequently arrested and released under the terms of a real
estate bond and a “no contact” order.
He entered a “not guilty”
plea to the charges against him, and the matter ultimately
proceeded to trial, where the jury found him guilty of seconddegree arson and sentenced him to 13 years’ imprisonment.
Hendrix subsequently filed a motion for a new trial that was
denied by the trial court, and on April 12, 2004, a judgment and
sentence was entered in accordance with the jury verdict.
The
trial court, however, did conclude that there was not enough
evidence to classify Hendrix’s offense as a “hate crime.”
This
appeal followed.
On appeal, Hendrix’s general argument is that the
trial court erroneously allowed the introduction of unfairly
prejudicial “other bad acts/bad character” KRE 404(b) evidence.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Hendrix specifically takes issue with the following items: (1)
testimony from Christopher Lewis, former Deputy Sheriff David
Morris, and Belle Davis, a retired Hopkins County school bus
driver, about a school bus fight between Lewis and Cullen on the
morning of October 25, 2002—before the fire—and what led up to
it, including an earlier incident in which Cullen pulled into
the Lewises’ driveway, blew his horn, and called Lewis a
vulgarity, and which included a number of racial slurs directed
at Lewis by Cullen and a threat that Cullen “wasn’t finished
with him”; (2) testimony from Wayne Lewis and Chris Lewis that,
during the summer of 2002, someone had smashed the family
mailbox, egged the house, left a “hate letter” in the new
mailbox, and repeatedly pulled into the driveway and sounded his
horn; and (3) testimony from Deputy Sheriff Jeremy Crick and
Benjamin Lewis about the “hate letter” sent to the Lewis
address, in which the family was “invited” to 1020 Huckleberry
Road, the address of a local cemetery.
At least one of the
horn-blowing incidents, occurring in the days before the fire,
was discovered by Wayne Lewis to have been perpetrated by
Cullen, and after he and his son attempted to find the Cullen
residence to obtain the street address to notify the police,
they were confronted by Hendrix, who directed obscenities at
them and told them not to go anywhere near his house and that if
they ever went near his house again, he would kill them.
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Hendrix argues that none of these incidents were shown to have
been committed by him or to connect him with the Lewis fire, and
they accordingly should have been excluded as evidence.
“It is a well-settled principle of Kentucky law that a
trial court ruling with respect to the admission of evidence
will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.”
Commonwealth v. King, 950 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Ky. 1997) (Citation
omitted).
“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the
trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (Citations omitted).
Accordingly, we will adhere to these standards in reviewing the
trial court’s decision to admit the evidence in question.
On February 6, 2004, just prior to trial, the
Commonwealth, “in an abundance of caution,” filed a KRE 404(b)
notice with the trial court that it would be using the evidence
noted above at trial.
However, the Commonwealth indicated in
the notice that it did not believe that the proposed evidence
was actually KRE 404(b) evidence, and it maintains that position
here.
The Commonwealth specifically argued in the notice that
the incidents in question were part of a specific pattern of
harassing conduct leading up to October 25, 2002, and that
Hendrix was a participant in some of these acts.
The
Commonwealth also noted that the incidents provided a motive for
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the burning of the Lewis home.
In response, Hendrix took the
position that the evidence did fit within the boundaries of KRE
404(b), and that it should be excluded because of its
prejudicial nature and the fact that Hendrix was not shown to be
involved in all of the incidents in question.
The trial court
ultimately concluded that the evidence did tend to establish
motive and specifically held that the prejudice of said evidence
did not outweigh its probative value.
We acknowledge that the evidence in issue—with the
possible exception of Hendrix’s threat towards Wayne and Chris
Lewis—does not fit within the common framework of KRE 404(b)
evidence given that Hendrix was not directly involved in the
incidents in question.
However, the language of the rule
contains nothing to limit itself only to “other crimes, wrongs,
or acts” committed by the defendant in question. 3 Indeed,
commentators have noted that the rule “is applicable to crimes,
wrongs or acts committed by persons other than a criminal
defendant.”
See Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law
3
KRE 404(b) reads in its entirety as follows:
“Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible:
(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident; or
(2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case
that separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished without serious
adverse effect on the offering party.”
-8-
Handbook, § 2.25[2], pgs. 125-26 (4th ed. 2003).
With this said,
we are of the opinion that the evidence in question here fits
within the boundaries of KRE 404(b) and it will be examined
accordingly.
We do not believe that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting the testimonial evidence relating to the
fight between Chris Cullen and Chris Lewis on the day of the
fire or the testimonial evidence relating to the horn-blowing
incidents leading up to the fight.
Even though Hendrix was only
shown to be directly involved in one of those incidents, we
believe that they could reasonably be considered relevant to
establishing a possible motive for the arson of the Lewis home,
particularly given that a member of Hendrix’s family was
involved in each incident.
The incidents occurred shortly
before the fire, and they demonstrated a clear animus towards
the Lewises on the part of the Cullen/Hendrix family. 4
KRE
404(b)(1) specifically recognizes “motive” as one of the grounds
under which “other bad acts” evidence may be admissible.
Moreover, our courts have consistently held that prosecutors are
afforded wide latitude in determining the motive that actuated
the commission of a charged crime.
4
See Brainard v.
We include the horn-blowing incidents that were not directly connected to
Cullen or Hendrix in this category because, while the decision whether or not
to allow them into evidence presents a close question, they were similar
enough in nature to the one in which Cullen was implicated for a jury to
infer that he was the culprit and for us to conclude that the trial judge did
not abuse his discretion in allowing them into evidence.
-9-
Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Ky.App. 1977); Rake v.
Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Ky. 1970).
Furthermore,
given the general rule that “[r]elevancy is established by any
showing of probativeness, however slight,”
Springer v.
Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 449 (Ky. 1999); see also Tuttle v.
Perry, 82 S.W.3d 920, 922 (Ky. 2002), we believe that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
aforementioned items to be introduced into evidence.
We are inclined to believe, however, that the
testimony relating to the cemetery invitation letter, the houseegging, or the mailbox-bashing should not have been admitted
into evidence as none of these incidents was demonstrated to
have been perpetrated by Hendrix or anyone else in his family.
Indeed, the trial judge specifically acknowledged that admission
of the letter was probably a mistake in a post-trial hearing.
Nevertheless, even assuming, arguendo, that admission of this
evidence was error, after reviewing the entire record we believe
any such error was harmless.
“Under RCr 5 9.24, any error or
defect must be disregarded if it ‘does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.’"
S.W.3d 508, 511 (Ky.App. 2004).
Smith v. Commonwealth, 164
“An error is deemed harmless
if, upon consideration of the entire case, there appears to be
no likely possibility that the result would have been different
5
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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in the absence of error.”
Id. (Citations omitted).
As to
evidentiary issues in particular, the relevant inquiry under the
harmless error doctrine “is whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of might have
contributed to the conviction.”
Ernst v. Commonwealth, 160
S.W.3d 744, 756 (Ky. 2005) (Internal quotations and citations
omitted).
Here, other evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly
implicated Hendrix in starting the fire in question.
For
example, eyewitnesses saw Hendrix walk to the Lewis house with a
container and then return and leave in a hurry during the
timeframe in which the fire was determined to have been started.
Moreover, testimony from the arson investigator who handled the
case clearly demonstrated that the fire was the result of arson.
We also note that the trial judge did not find Hendrix’s actions
here to be in the nature of a “hate crime” pursuant to KRS
532.031, so no argument can be made that the evidence in
question was prejudicial in that respect.
Given these facts, we
cannot say that there is a “likely possibility that the result
would have been different in the absence of error” as to the
improper items admitted into evidence.
For the same reasons, we reject Hendrix’s other
related contentions set forth in his brief.
Accordingly, the
judgment of the Hopkins Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Julia K. Pearson
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Office of Attorney General
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
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