KEVIN MICHAEL POE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
JULY 22, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000747-DG
KEVIN MICHAEL POE
v.
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN L. ATKINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-XX-00010
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
BARBER, JUDGE:
Kevin Michael Poe (Poe) entered a conditional
guilty plea on September 25, 2003 to the offenses of driving
under the influence, first offense, and possession of marijuana
after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence
seized as a result of, what Poe argues, was an illegal stop.
The circuit court affirmed the district court’s ruling and Poe’s
request for discretionary review by this Court was granted on
June 14, 2004.
1
We reverse.
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
On December 21, 2002 an officer with the Hopkinsville
Police Department observed Poe driving up and down the same
streets around 1:30 a.m.
The citation notes a “courtesy stop
was made to possibly offer directions.”
The officer effected
the stop by pulling behind Poe and activating his emergency
lights.
Once the stop was made the officer noticed Poe had
bloodshot eyes, a carefree attitude, and was not wearing a
seatbelt.
Poe admitted upon questioning that he had been
smoking marijuana.
Poe was arrested and charged with operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs, no
insurance, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug
paraphernalia, first offense.
Poe filed a motion to suppress all evidence based on
the allegation that the officer did not have a reasonable and
articulable suspicion upon which to believe any criminal
activity was afoot, thus, the stop did not meet the
constitutional standards required by Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).
On January 23, 2003 the district court held a
suppression hearing on Poe’s motion.
At the hearing the officer
testified regarding the stop he made of Poe as follows:
Haggard:
[Poe’s attorney]
The basis for pulling him
[Poe] over was that as a courtesy?
[Officer] Marszalek:
Yes, sir.
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Haggard:
Okay. There was no criminal
activity that you saw being
committed was there?
Marszalek:
No, sir.
Haggard:
You basically just assumed he
might be lost and so you pulled
him over.
Marszalek:
Correct.
Haggard:
As we stand here, you can’t
articulate any criminal activity
that you thought was being
committed?
Marszalek:
No, sir.
*
*
*
Adams:
[Prosecutor]
Is there or was there any
other basis for this stop?
Marszalek:
Other than the courtesy stop I
figured the subject was lost. He
was observed driving numerous
times around Mechanic’s Street, up
and down Howell, Hayes, and
Younglove. It is a very high drug
activity area. I noticed Mr. Poe
driving, noticed him driving
without a seatbelt. Each time I
passed him by Mr. Poe had pretty
much been smiling and then I got
him stopped. I didn’t know if
something was wrong or he was lost
or he was looking for something.
I made the stop to offer
assistance. . . .
Officer Marszalek acknowledged that he activated his
emergency lights to pull Poe over and he admitted he did not
cite Poe for failing to wear a seatbelt although he gave him a
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verbal warning.
In his testimony the officer insisted he had
observed Poe’s failure to wear a seatbelt prior to pulling him
over but admitted he did not stop Poe for this reason.
The district court made the following factual finding,
“I think what we’ve got here is the intent for him to stop was
not based upon criminal activity.
courtesy stop.”
It was, as you indicated, a
The district court then ruled that once Poe was
stopped Officer Marszalek could, upon the observation of
circumstances leading to a reasonable belief of criminal
activity, investigate further and take appropriate measures.
Thus, Poe’s motion to suppress was denied.
Poe subsequently
entered a conditional guilty plea as noted above and appealed
the district court’s ruling on the motion to suppress to circuit
court.
The circuit court affirmed the district court’s ruling
expressly relying on United States v. Baxter, 361 F.2d 116 (6th
Cir. 1966) cert. den. Baxter v. U.S., 385 U.S. 834, 87 S.Ct. 79,
17 L.Ed.2d 69 (1966).
In Baxter an officer stopped a vehicle
with a trailer that appeared to be having difficulty.
Once
stopped, Baxter exited the vehicle, told the officer he had a
flat tire, and requested the officer’s assistance.
When the
officer approached the side of Baxter’s trailer he noticed a
strong smell of whisky mash.
Id. at 117.
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The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held the subsequent search of the trailer and
arrest of Baxter to be constitutionally sound.
Id. at 120.
Poe’s petition for discretionary review was granted by
this Court and in his argument for reversal of the lower courts’
decisions Poe continues to assert there was no reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, thus, no basis for
him to be stopped.
The Commonwealth does not dispute Poe’s argument; in
fact, it admits in its response to Poe’s petition for
discretionary review that, “there is no question of fact or law
surrounding the lack of criminal activity as a basis for the
stop in this case.”
Instead, the Commonwealth relies on the
“community caretaking function” of police officers endorsed by
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706
(1973), to justify the stop of Poe in this case.
The standard of review on a motion to suppress is a
two step process that requires an appellate court to review the
trial court’s findings of fact under a clearly erroneous
standard and its conclusions of law de novo.
Welch v.
Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 407, 409 (Ky. 2004).
The Commonwealth admits that the stop of Poe was not
based on any reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal
activity and the circuit court’s ruling also recognizes that the
stop of Poe was not based on this principle, thus, it cannot be
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justified pursuant to the doctrines expressed in Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660
(1979) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
See also, Simpson v. Commonwealth,
834 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Ky.App. 1992).
Essentially the
Commonwealth is admitting the stop of Poe was illegal unless the
community caretaking function exception applies.
Thus, we are presented only with the narrow question
of whether Officer Marszalek’s stop of Poe qualifies under the
community caretaking function.
The community caretaking function was first
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973).
The Court explained the idea in the context of a case where the
police had searched a vehicle without a warrant that had been
removed from an accident scene.
The search occurred later in
time from the accident and was made to locate the driver’s, who
was a Chicago police officer, service revolver.
437, 93 S.Ct. at 2526.
Id. 413 U.S. at
The Court found the search not to
violate Constitutional principles stating:
Because of the extensive regulation of motor
vehicles and traffic, and also because of the
frequency with which a vehicle can become
disabled or involved in an accident on public
highways, the extent of police-citizen contact
involving automobiles will be substantially
greater than police-citizen contact in a home or
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office. Some such contacts will occur because
the officer may believe the operator has violated
a criminal statute, but many more will not be of
that nature. Local police officers, unlike
federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle
accidents in which there is no claim of criminal
liability and engage in what, for want of a
better term, may be described as community
caretaking functions, totally divorced from the
detection, investigation, or acquisition of
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute.
Id. 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S.Ct. at 2528.
Since Cady v. Dombrowski, supra was decided, courts
across the country have considered the community caretaking
function and whether it applies in a variety of situations.
Most jurisdictions have adopted the doctrine in some form
although a few have declined to consider it where the facts
presented did not rise to a level sufficient to show that a
vehicle’s operator required police assistance.
Rowe v. State,
363 Md. 424, 445, 769 A.2d 879, 891 (2001); Barrett v.
Commonwealth, 250 Va. 243, 248, 462 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1995).
The Rowe and Barrett courts viewed the doctrine
applied in the context of one needing police assistance as an
extension of the United States Supreme Court’s holdings since
Cady and its progeny only considered the community caretaking
function of police officers where an inventory search of
property properly in custody was conducted without a warrant.
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Rowe, supra 363 Md. at 444, 769 A.2d at 890-891 (quoting
Barrett, supra 250 Va. at 246-248, 462 S.E.2d at 111-112).
Most other courts that have had occasion to determine
whether the community caretaking function of police officers
applies in a given situation have required the officer’s stop to
be based on specific and articulable facts that lead to a
reasonable conclusion that the individual requires assistance or
is necessary for the public’s safety.
State v. Marcello, 157
Vt. 657, 658, 599 A.2d 357, 358 (1991).
See also, Crauthers v.
State, 727 P.2d 9, 11 (Alaska 1986)(observation of facts and
circumstances that lead to reasonable conclusion driver is
requesting assistance); State v. Harrison, 111 Ariz. 508, 509,
533 P.2d 1143, 1145 (stopped because tire “bouncing” off the
road); State v. Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 818, 748 P.2d 401, 402
(1988)(approached because vehicle in parking lot with engine and
lights on in the early morning while operator’s head was slumped
forward); State v. Moore, 609 N.W.2d 502, 503 (Iowa
2000)(stopped by Park Ranger to tell driver to slow down in park
because of number of people in proximity to road at the time);
State v. Pinkham, 565 A.2d 318, 319 (Maine 1989)(safety reasons
alone may be sufficient to justify stop if based on specific
articulable facts); Commonwealth v. Evans, 436 Mass. 369, 373,
764 N.E.2d 841, 844 (2002)(approaching vehicle in breakdown lane
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to check on status of vehicle and occupants permissible under
community caretaking function).
There have been no published cases in Kentucky
considering the application of the community caretaking function
to a stop made by a police officer.
Cady v. Dombrowski, supra
has only been cited and relied on twice: once in City of
Danville v. Dawson, 528 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1975) which has since
been reversed by Estep v. Commonwealth, 663 S.W.2d 213 (Ky.
1983).
And the other Kentucky case citing to Cady v.
Dombrowski, supra is Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 740 S.W.2d 164
(Ky.App. 1987).
Blankenship held that an officer’s search of a
vehicle of a person who had been shot and was unconscious in
order to seek his identity was proper.
Id. at 166.
In the
process the officer found incriminating evidence in plain view –
the Court held the evidence admissible.
Id.
The circumstances in these cases are dissimilar from
the facts here.
In Poe’s case the issue is not whether an
inventory search meets the constitutional standard, but whether
the stop itself qualifies under the community caretaking
function.
All courts that have considered the community
caretaking function have required, at a minimum, that the
officer’s actions must be measured by a standard of
reasonableness.
One court described this determination as
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“balancing the public need and interest furthered by the police
conduct against the degree and nature of the intrusion upon the
privacy of the citizen.”
State v. Ellenbecker, 159 Wis.2d 91,
96, 464 N.W.2d 427, 429 (Wis.App. 1990), rev. den., 468 N.W.2d
28 (Wis. 1991).
Ellenbecker applied this test in the context of a
police officer requesting the license of an operator of a
disabled vehicle.
Id. 159 Wis.2d at 96-97, 464 N.W.2d at 429.
But its principle is equally applicable to Poe’s case because
when Officer Marszalek stopped Poe using his emergency lights he
effectively seized him.
That is, any reasonable person in Poe’s
situation would not have felt free to walk, or drive, away.
Terry v. Ohio, supra 392 U.S. at 16, 88 S.Ct. 1877.
See also,
State v. Jestice, 861 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Vt. 2004)(stop is a
shorthand way of referring to a seizure).
The question is was Officer Marszalek’s stop of Poe
reasonable in the circumstances.
We hold it was not.
public need in this case is slight.
The
People commonly become
lost, if in fact Officer Marszalek’s assumption about Poe’s
driving was correct.
Police officers do not normally pull
someone over because they believe the operator of the vehicle
needs directions.
however, is great.
The intrusion on the privacy of the citizen,
The ordinary citizen would not expect a
police officer to activate his emergency lights and effect a
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stop with which the citizen must comply without the stop being
supported by some sort of traffic violation or criminal
activity.
Poe, of course, was free to stop the officer and ask
directions.
If he had initiated the stop, we would have a
different situation.
As others have noted, for the community caretaking
function to apply there must be some specific and articulable
facts that would lead the officer to reasonably believe the
citizen is in need of assistance.
1064.
Id.
Jestice, supra 861 A.2d at
An officer’s practice cannot provide reasonable grounds.
In this respect we agree with the observation that:
An officer’s subjective explanation for
stopping or detaining a driver does not
control Fourth Amendment analysis. Courts
are required to “make an objective
assessment of the officer’s actions” when
determining if a stop was reasonable.
State v. Rinehart, 617 N.W.2d 842, 845 (S.D. 2000)(Sabers, J.
dissenting)(quoting United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501
(8th Cir. 1990)(citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136,
98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168, 177 (1978)).
Such an objective assessment must also be applied in
the context of an argument for the community caretaking
function, otherwise, the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment would quickly be eroded.
Court approval of any reason
related to “public need” for stopping and detaining a citizen
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based on the subjective beliefs of police officers is
constitutionally insufficient.
In this case the district court found as a fact that
Poe was stopped as a courtesy.
directions.
That is, to possibly offer
After reviewing the testimony and arguments of the
suppression hearing it cannot be held that this finding is
clearly erroneous.
Officer Marszalek himself stated he stopped
Poe because he thought he might be lost.2
But the legal conclusion drawn by the district court
and upheld by the circuit court cannot stand.3
Officer
Marszalek’s belief that Poe may need directions is not a valid
basis to stop him in these circumstances.
Officer Marszalek
observed no traffic violations, no criminal activity, and no
evidence such as a flat tire, flashing lights, jumper cables, a
raised hood or any other indication that Poe required
assistance.
The community caretaking function does not provide
justification for the stop in this case.
Whether it would
provide justification in other circumstances we leave for
another day.
2
The fact that Officer Marszalek also testified Poe was not wearing his
seatbelt cannot provide an independent grounds to support the stop in this
case because Officer Marszalek admitted he did not stop Poe for this reason
nor write a citation for the violation. Further, the district court found as
a fact that the stop was made as a courtesy and the Commonwealth asserts the
justification for the stop is based on community caretaking functions, not on
law enforcement.
3
United States v. Baxter, 361 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1966) cert. den. Baxter v.
U.S., 385 U.S. 834, 87 S.Ct. 79, 17 L.Ed.2d 69 (1966), relied on by the
circuit court here, is simply not applicable. Baxter concerned the
constitutionality of a search, not the legality of a stop.
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The decision of the circuit court is reversed and the
case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth R. Haggard
Hopkinsville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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