DAVID NICHOLS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: March 11, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000634-MR
DAVID NICHOLS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00370
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON AND MINTON, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
David Nichols appeals from the judgment of
the McCracken Circuit Court convicting him of second-degree
abuse and sentencing him to serve five years in prison.
Nichols
alleges that the evidence was both incomplete and insufficient
to support his conviction for abuse of the victim, 11-month-old
Gage Kirk.
He also argues that the trial court made several
evidentiary errors that deprived him of a fair trial.
After a
careful review of the evidence and the applicable law, we
conclude that the trial court erred in excluding evidence
tending to implicate the victim’s babysitter, David Darnell, as
the actual perpetrator of the crime.
Therefore, we vacate and
remand.
On August 7, 2002, Gage Kirk suffered a serious and
painful fracture of his left thigh.
The expert testimony at
trial indicated that the injury was likely to have been caused
by someone’s picking him up by the leg.
Gage was the youngest
of three children living with their mother, Misty Kirk, and her
boyfriend, David Nichols.
Misty and Nichols were both employed.
Misty worked during the day, and Nichols worked the evening
shift.
On the day on which Gage was injured, Misty’s three
children were being cared for by David Darnell, a substitute for
her regular child care provider, who was on vacation.
Misty arrived home from work between 6:00 and 6:30
p.m.
Because she worked at a chemical factory, she needed to
take a shower before coming into contact with her children.
The
evidence presented at trial established that Darnell obtained
permission from Misty to leave before she got into the shower;
however, the evidence was conflicting as to the time that he
actually left the residence.
Misty noticed that Gage was
whining and believed that he needed to be put to bed.
She asked
Nichols to get clean sheets out of the dryer, make Gage’s bed,
and put the child down for a nap.
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While Nichols was in the laundry room gathering the
bed linens, he heard Gage whimpering in the living room.
As he
picked up the child, he heard a loud popping noise come from
Gage’s leg.
He took the child to Misty, who was still in the
shower, and the two proceeded to take Gage to the hospital.
They had not driven far when Gage stopped crying and fell sleep.
Believing that they had perhaps over-reacted, they returned
home.
When Gage awoke two hours later, Misty noticed that he
was not moving as usual.
She and Nichols again set out for the
emergency room.
Dr. Thane DeWeese determined that Gage had sustained a
spiral fracture to his leg, administered narcotic medication to
him for pain, and placed him in a cast.
The history taken by
the doctor from Misty indicated that Gage may have fallen off a
coffee table.
Doubtful that the injury could have happened in
that manner, the doctor contacted the authorities and reported
his suspicions that Gage had been abused.
An investigation was
conducted by Detective Rusty Banks and a social worker, Rebecca
Kinslow.
Nichols was indicted for the crime of first-degree
criminal abuse on November 22, 2002.
On March 11, 2003, the
trial court entered an order setting the matter for trial.
The
order further required any motion in limine to be filed “no
later than twelve (12) days prior to the trial date.”
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However,
on the morning of trial, the court heard the Commonwealth’s oral
motion to exclude evidence in support of Nichols’s defense that
the babysitter, David Darnell, was responsible for breaking
Gage’s leg.
This evidence included the testimony of two
witnesses who had observed Darnell acting inappropriately toward
Gage and his older brother, Jonathon.
The trial court accepted
the Commonwealth’s argument that the admission of Darnell’s bad
acts required analysis under KRE1 404(b).
Over Nichols’s
strenuous objection, the court granted the Commonwealth’s motion
to exclude this evidence in support of his defense.
During a recess, Nichols called one witness who
testified on avowal that she saw Darnell lift Gage’s seven-yearold brother by his thighs and throw him on the floor.
He also
called Misty, who also testified by avowal that after Gage’s
injury, she had observed Darnell lifting Gage by the cast that
covered his injured leg; that she then ordered him from her
home; and that she reported the incident to Ms. Kinslow, the
social worker investigating the abuse of Gage.
During Misty’s avowal testimony relating to Darnell,
the prosecutor suggested that the court should alert her to the
potential for self-incrimination.
Misty had testified before
the grand jury without invoking her Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
1
Additionally, she had been in the
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
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shower when Gage’s injury was discovered.
However, the court
warned her of the possibility that she could be charged in
relation to the abuse of Gage and advised her that she could
refuse to answer any questions that might tend to incriminate
her.
Misty continued to testify about Darnell without invoking
the privilege.
Later in the trial, during the presentation of the
evidence for the defense, Nichols’s attorney informed the court
that Misty might invoke her privilege during cross-examination.
Outside the presence of the jury, the court asked her if she had
any concerns about testifying.
Misty responded that she feared
losing her children if she testified.
Based on that exchange,
the trial court ruled that Nichols could not call Misty as a
witness.
Recognizing the possibility that Misty might not rely
on her Fifth Amendment privilege, the court suggested that the
better procedure would be to take Misty’s testimony by avowal
before the jury retired to deliberate.
Neither the prosecutor
nor Nichols’s attorney stated any preference about the timing of
the avowal.
Due to time considerations, however, the court
decided to postpone taking Misty’s testimony for the record
until after the jury began deliberating.
Misty did not invoke
her Fifth Amendment privilege, answering all of the questions
posed by the attorneys for Nichols and the Commonwealth.
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In moving for a mistrial, Nichols contended that he
was improperly and unfairly deprived of the benefit of Misty’s
exculpatory testimony.
The court delayed ruling on his motion
until after the jury reached its verdict.
verdict, the court denied the motion.
Following the guilty
Nichols was sentenced on
March 4, 2004, and this appeal followed.
Nichols first argues that the trial court erred in
excluding his proffer of evidence of bad acts performed by
Darnell –- conduct that was highly similar to that which caused
Gage’s injury.
This evidence clearly supported his defense that
it was Darnell who had abused and injured Gage.
The factual evidence placed David Darnell at
the home after Misty got in the shower, the
time the Commonwealth alleges the injury
occurred. Therefore, testimony that David
Darnell subsequently abused Gage and
Jonathan Kirk was relevant to establish he
reasonably could have caused Gage’s spiral
fracture.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The Commonwealth maintains that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
evidence.
It argues that there was “insufficient information
. . . to establish any similarities or relevant connections”
between Gage’s injury and the subsequent acts committed by
Darnell.
(Appellee’s brief, p. 8.)
The exclusion of evidence in support of a defendant’s
alternative perpetrator theory was recently addressed in Beaty
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v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 196 (Ky. 2004), and Blair v.
Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 801 (Ky. 2004).
In Beaty, the
defendant’s conviction on methamphetamine-related charges was
reversed because he was denied the opportunity to present
evidence that another person had planted the drugs in the car
that he was operating.
In concluding that the trial court erred
in excluding the evidence, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
discussed the defense theory of an alternate perpetrator as
being essentially integral to the Sixth Amendment right to
present an adequate defense:
The right of an accused in a criminal trial
to due process is, in essence, the right to
a fair opportunity to defend against the
State’s accusations.” Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct.
1038, 1045, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). This
right, often termed the “right to present a
defense,” is firmly ingrained in Kentucky
jurisprudence, e.g., Rogers v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 86 S.W.3d 29, 39-40 (2002); Holloman v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 37 S.W.3d 764, 767
(2001); Mills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 996
S.W.2d 473, 489 (1999); McGregor v. Hines,
Ky., 995 S.W.2d 384, 388 (1999); Barnett v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 361 363
(1992), and has been recognized repeatedly
by the United States Supreme Court. See
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303,
308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1264, 140 L.Ed.2d 413
(1998)[.] [Additional citations omitted.] An
exclusion of evidence will almost invariably
be declared unconstitutional when it
“significantly undermine[s] fundamental
elements of the defendant’s defense.”
Scheffer, supra, at 315, 118 S.Ct. at 126768.
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Id. at 206-207.
Beaty holds that when a defendant offers
evidence suggesting that another committed the crime with which
he is charged, exclusion of that evidence will only be permitted
when “the defense theory is ‘unsupported, speculat[ive], and
far-fetched’ and could thereby confuse or mislead the jury.”
Id. at 207, citing Commonwealth v. Maddox, 955 S.W.2d 718, 721
(Ky. 1997).
“No matter how credible [the alleged alternative
perpetrator] defense, our system of justice guarantees the right
to present it and be judged by it.”
Id. at 210, citing
Pettyjohn v. Hall, 599 F.2d 476, 480 (1st Cir.1979).
Expanding on the principles articulated in Beaty,
supra, the court in Blair, supra, focused on the admissibility
of other crimes or bad acts committed by the alleged alternative
perpetrator, analyzing it as “reverse 404(b) evidence.”
S.W.3d at 810.
144
In Blair, the appellant had been convicted of
murdering his victim during the course of robbing her.
The
court held that he should have been allowed to present evidence
that the police officer who investigated the murder had
previously been involved in the theft of property from the
police evidence room.
Exclusion of evidence that an “aaltperp”
[alleged alternative perpetrator] had both
the motive and the opportunity to commit the
act for which the accused is charged
deprives the accused of the Due Process
right to present a defense. . . . We
recognize that the similarity between the
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two acts in question (theft of a VCR from
the evidence room and theft of money from a
crime scene) would not satisfy the high
standard of admissibility established for
KRE 404(b) evidence offered against an
accused. See Billings v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
843 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1992) (prior acts must
be so sufficiently similar to demonstrate a
modus operandi). However, as pointed out in
the leading case of United States v.
Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380 (3rd Cir.1991), “a
lower standard of similarity should govern
‘reverse 404(b)’ evidence because prejudice
to the defendant is not a factor.” Id. at
1404. “It is well established that a
defendant may use similar ‘other crimes’
evidence defensively if in reason it tends,
alone or with other evidence, to negate his
guilt of the crime charged against him.”
Id. . . . If the evidence has relevance,
then it should be excluded only upon
application of KRE 403 principles, i.e.,
that its probative value is substantially
outweighed by considerations of confusion of
the issues, misleading the jury, or undue
delay. Stevens, supra at 1405. None of
those factors militate [sic] against
admission of the evidence in this case.
(Emphasis added.)
Id.
Thus, according to the reasoning of Blair, the
exclusion of the bad acts evidence might arguably be appropriate
under KRE 404(b) in a prosecution of Darnell.
However, Nichols
should not have been deprived of the defensive use of evidence
that Darnell had harmed Gage and his brother on other subsequent
occasions.
An analysis of the issue pursuant to KRE 403 reveals
that the evidence was relevant to show Darnell’s propensity to
commit the offense.
The Commonwealth does not counter that
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probative value by suggesting how its admission would have
resulted in confusion, misled the jury, or caused delay.
However, without the evidence, Nichols was not allowed to
develop his defense, and the jury lacked direction as to the
possible motive that Darnell would have had for harming Gage.
Pursuant to Beaty, supra, and Blair, supra, we
conclude that the trial court erred in excluding evidence
indicating Darnell to have been the true perpetrator of the
crime.
A trial is at its most profound essence a quest for
truth.
In denying Nichols the opportunity to present a complete
defense, the court not only impaired his right to a fair trial,
but it also may have deprived the public of the opportunity to
identify, to punish, and to deter the true perpetrator of a
crime that as a matter of public policy is particularly heinous
as its victim was a very young child.
Because we are remanding the matter for a new trial,
we will discuss the other issues raised by Nichols.
Nichols
contends that the trial court committed reversible error by
excluding the testimony of Misty Kirk.
He argues that Misty was
willing to testify on his behalf until the prosecutor improperly
employed a “clear tactic of intimidation [that] was
inappropriate for a witness who had no intention of asserting
the Fifth Amendment.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)
Under these
circumstances, he contends that the court erred in excluding her
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testimony without questioning her to determine whether she had a
valid basis for invoking the privilege against selfincrimination or whether she had simply been scared into
silence.
The exclusion of a defense witness’s testimony is a
“drastic remedy,” and for that reason, a trial court has limited
discretion in disallowing the evidence.
74 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Ky. 2002).
Combs v. Commonwealth,
Prior to deciding whether or not
to permit Nichols to call Misty as a witness, the court had a
duty to conduct a preliminary inquiry (a “dry run”) into the
proposed testimony outside the presence of the jury.
745.
Id. at
Nichols properly tendered his prepared questions to the
trial court for that very purpose.
Nevertheless, the court
ignored counsel’s request and ruled without inquiry that she
could not be called as a witness.
It was improper for the court “to assume that [the
witness] would invoke the privilege as to questions she was
never asked.”
Id.
In Commonwealth v. Gettys, 610 S.W.2d 899,
900-901 (Ky.App. 1980), this Court outlined the duties of a
trial court to examine and to determine whether there is a
reasonable basis for a witness to fear self-incrimination.
In
the case before us, the error could have been cured if Nichols
had accepted the trial court’s initial invitation to call Misty
on avowal before the jury retired to deliberate.
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When the court
postponed the avowal, Nichols failed to object.
Therefore, he
waived the right to complain about the ruling on appeal.
See,
e.g., Hardy v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1986).
We hold
that the lack of preservation prevents us from finding error.
However, should this situation repeat itself, the court is
hereby advised of the technique prescribed in Gettys, supra, to
address her testimony.
Next, Nichols argues that Deputy Banks was wrongfully
allowed to testify about the timing of Gage’s injury -– a
medical opinion that he was unqualified to offer.
He
acknowledges that this error was not preserved for review.
On
remand, the trial court should take care to restrict expert
medical testimony to properly qualified medical experts.
Nichols also complains about testimony given by Gage’s
treating doctor.
The doctor testified that there was no reason
for Nichols to lie about how the injury occurred unless he was
attempting to “cover up some type of abuse.”
Nichols contends
that Dr. Deweese was allowed to speculate and thereby to invade
the province of the jury with this comment.
We disagree.
As
the Commonwealth correctly argues, the jury was aware that Dr.
Deweese suspected abuse by the fact that he involved the police
and social workers.
His opinion did not indicate his belief in
the guilt or innocence of Nichols, a matter that was left intact
for jury determination:
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Generally, expert opinion testimony is
admitted when the issue upon which the
evidence is offered is one of science and
skill, Greer’s Adm’r v. Harrell’s Adm’r, 306
Ky. 209, 206 S.W.2d 943 (1947), and when the
subject matter is outside the common
knowledge of jurors. O’Connor & Raque Co.
v. Bill, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 344 (1971).
Presumably, jurors do not need assistance in
the form of an expert opinion that the
defendant is guilty or not guilty. However,
they usually do need the assistance of a
medical expert in determining the cause of a
physical condition in order to understand
the evidence and determine the ultimate fact
in issue. KRE 401; KRE 702.
Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883, 889-90 (Ky. 1997).
Finally, Nichols contends that the trial court erred
in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal.
We disagree.
It
was not “clearly unreasonable” for the jury to have found
Nichols guilty of the abuse of Gage in light of the limited
evidence that it heard and evaluated.
816 S.W.2d 187 (Ky. 1991).
Commonwealth v. Benham,
Therefore, while a directed verdict
was not warranted, a new trial is required.
The judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court is
vacated, and this matter is remanded for a new trial consistent
with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Emily Ward Roark
Paducah, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
George G. Seelig
Frankfort, KY
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