WALTER L. THOMAS v. JOHN MOTLEY, WARDEN
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 9, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-000605-MR
WALTER L. THOMAS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL C. LONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00280
v.
JOHN MOTLEY, WARDEN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, HENRY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
HENRY, JUDGE:
Walter L. Thomas appeals from an order of the
Morgan Circuit Court entered on January 14, 2004, which
dismissed his petition for declaration of rights challenging two
prison disciplinary actions filed pursuant to KRS 1 418.04, CR 2
57, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
We believe the action was properly
dismissed because some of the claims were barred by the statute
of limitations and the others failed to state a claim for
relief; thus, we affirm.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
In August 2002, Thomas was an inmate at the Eastern
Kentucky Correctional Complex authorized to work as a legal aide
for inmates at the institution.
On August 2, 2002, following an
investigation, Thomas was cited for violation of Corrections
Policy and Procedure (CPP) 15.2, Category III (Major Violations)
No. 13, charging another inmate for any services, associated
with his receipt of a $100.00 money order from an acquaintance
of another inmate.
In an interview of Thomas about the money
order, he admitted having received the money for assisting the
other inmate in a disciplinary proceeding.
At Thomas’s
disciplinary hearing held on August 12, 2002, he effectively
pled guilty to the charge.
The adjustment officer found Thomas
guilty based on his admissions and a copy of the money order,
and imposed a penalty of 15 days in disciplinary segregation.
In an extensive document appealing the disciplinary action to
the prison warden, Thomas argued the evidence was insufficient
because the money order was sent by a person different from that
alleged by the charging officers, and the action was based
racial bias and retaliation.
On August 29, 2002, the prison
warden rejected the appeal by concurring with the decision of
the Adjustment officer.
On August 12, 2002, prior to his
placement into the segregation unit, Corrections officers
conducted an inventory of Thomas’s possessions in his cell.
The
officers discovered and confiscated a large number of canteen
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items (148 according to Thomas).
Thomas produced receipts for
many of the items but several were not included in the records
from the canteen.
On August 26, 2002, Thomas was charged with
violating CPP 15.2, Category IV No. 26, possession of
unaccountable canteen items.
During the hearing held on
September 9, 2002, Thomas stated that he received some of the
items from other inmates in return for assistance as a legal
aide.
The Adjustment Officer found Thomas guilty and imposed a
penalty of 30 days in disciplinary segregation.
On September
25, 2002, the prison warden concurred with the decision of the
Adjustment Officer.
Between August 20, 2002 and September 10, 2002, Thomas
filed two grievances claiming the prison officials brought the
charges for violation of the prison regulation on possession of
canteen items as an act of retaliation for filing the initial
grievance.
Both on review through informal resolution and by
the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, Thomas’s
claim of retaliation was rejected based on the evidence of the
violation.
In addition, in August and September, 2002, Thomas
filed grievances alleging cruel and unusual punishment in
connection with the failure of prison authorities to allow him
to take a shower on several days and the presence of blood in
his cell while in the segregation unit.
These grievances were
denied because prison physicians had recommended that Thomas
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receive complete bed rest for a sprained ankle and the cell had
been cleaned prior to his placement in the cell.
On September 3, 2003, Thomas filed a petition for
declaration of rights pursuant to KRS 418 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3
Thomas alleged that the actions of the prison officials in
connection with the two disciplinary proceedings violated his
right to due process under the 14th Amendment of the United
States Constitution because of a lack of evidence to support the
findings of violations of the prison regulations, because the
Adjustment officer was biased, and because the Adjustment
Officer’s written findings were inadequate. 4
Thomas also claimed
that the disciplinary charges for improper possession of canteen
items was brought in retaliation for filing grievances and that
he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in connection
with the solitary confinement.
On January 5, 2004, the Department of Corrections on
behalf of the prison officials, filed a response to the petition
for declaration of rights and motion to dismiss the action.
On
January 14, 2004, the circuit court entered an order granting
3
Thomas filed the action in Franklin Circuit Court but in December 2003, the
Franklin Circuit Court granted the appellee’s motion to transfer the case to
Morgan Circuit Court as the more appropriate venue given the fact that
Eastern Kentucky’s Correctional Complex is located in Morgan County.
4
Thomas also cited the Sixth Amendment but that provision addresses criminal
prosecutions and the Supreme Court has recognized that the full panoply of
procedural rights associated with criminal prosecutions do not apply to
prison disciplinary actions. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct.
2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (l974).
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the respondent’s motion to dismiss on both procedural and
substantive grounds.
The court held that several of the claims
were barred by a one-year statute of limitations under both KRS
413.140(1)(a) and KRS 413.140(1)(k), and that both disciplinary
proceedings complied with the procedural due process
requirements.
The court also found that Thomas failed to
present evidence of retaliation, racial discrimination, or cruel
and unusual punishment.
On January 28, 2004, Thomas filed a
motion to alter, amend or vacate the judgment pursuant to CR
52.02 and 59.05, which the trial court denied.
This appeal
followed.
Thomas utilized the state declaration of rights
procedural mechanism to raise constitutional challenges under
the federal statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 5
Thomas’s primary claims
concern the two prison disciplinary actions.
Thomas alleges
that the two disciplinary proceedings violated his
constitutional right to due process in several procedural
aspects including bias on the part of the Adjustment Officer and
inadequate written findings of fact, as well as substantive
aspects because of a lack of sufficient evidence to support the
disciplinary decision.
5
Thomas mentions Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution in conjunction with
his federal claim to violation of his rights to access to the courts. This
provision was not included in his declaration of rights petition and is
raised for the first time in his brief, and therefore is untimely.
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Generally, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause protects an
inmate’s state-created liberty interest.
See Kentucky
Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109
S.Ct. 1904, 1908, 104 L.Ed. 2d 506 (l989).
In Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-567, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-82, 41
L.Ed.2d 935 (l974), the Supreme Court held that while prison
disciplinary actions are not subject to the full range of
procedural safeguards, inmates are entitled to certain minimum
requirements of procedural due process including advance written
notice of the disciplinary charges, a written statement by the
fact-finders of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the
disciplinary action; the opportunity to call witnesses and
present documentary evidence consistent with institutional
safety and correctional goals; and an impartial decision-making
tribunal.
See also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 n.3, 103
S.Ct. 864, 868 n.3, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (l983).
While Wolff outlines
certain minimal procedures required by due process, in
Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole
v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2773, 86 L.Ed.2d 356
(l985), the Supreme Court set out the substantive quantum of
evidence applicable to prison disciplinary actions in holding
the decision to impose sanctions for violations of prison rules
must be supported by merely “some evidence in the record.”
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Before considering the general procedural and
substantive evidentiary requirements, however, Thomas’s claims
fail because the two disciplinary actions did not affect a due
process interest and the first disciplinary action was not
challenged in a timely manner.
The circuit court held that the
claims concerning the first disciplinary proceeding were barred
by the one year period of limitations in KRS 413.140(1)(k),
which applies to actions “arising out of a detention facility
disciplinary proceeding, whether based upon state or federal
law.”
KRS 413.140(7) further provides that with respect to
actions referred to in subsection (k), “the cause of action
shall be deemed to accrue on the date an appeal of the
disciplinary proceeding is decided by the institutional warden.”
The prison warden officially recorded his decision concurring
with the decision of the Adjustment Committee Officer finding
Thomas guilty of violating the rule prohibiting charging inmates
for services in the first disciplinary proceeding on August 29,
2002.
Thomas’s petition for declaration of rights was initially
received and filed by the Franklin Circuit Court Clerk on
September 3, 2003.
Thus, it fell outside the one-year statutory
time period and was untimely. 6
6
KRS 413.140 was amended by the 2002 General Assembly by adding subsections
(1)(k) and (7) to specifically address actions arising out of prison
disciplinary proceedings and became effective on July 15, 2002. See Ky. Acts
Ch. 11, § 3. We note that the Kentucky Supreme Court, in Million v. Raymer,
139 S.W.3d 914 (Ky. 2004), held that declaration of rights actions involving
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Thomas attempts to avoid the statutory time-bar by
application of the so-called “mailbox rule”.
He contends that
he placed his petition for declaration of rights in the prison
mail system on August 28, 2002, one day before the one-year time
limitation expired.
The prison mailbox rule is a judicially
created procedural rule which provides that for a prisoner
proceeding pro se, the effective filing date is considered the
day the prisoner delivers the applicable legal document into the
hands of the prison officials for mailing.
See Houston v. Lack,
487 U.S. 266, l08 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988); Sulek v.
Toney County, Mo., 316 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2003), Hall v. Scott,
292 F.3d 1264, 1266 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002); Noble v. Kelly, 246
F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2001); Fed. R. App. P. 4 (c) (involving
notices of appeal).
The prison mailbox rule is a rule developed
and applied in federal courts, but because it is a procedural
rather than a substantive rule of law, is not binding on state
courts.
Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 666-67
(9th Cir.
2005), (listing state courts which have adopted or rejected
prison disciplinary actions grounded in 14th Amendment due process complaints
were governed by a one-year statutory limitations period under KRS 413.140.
The Court’s decision was not based on subdivisions (1)(k) and (7) because
Raymer’s claims arose out of disciplinary proceedings that occurred in 1999
prior to the effective date of the 2002 amendments. The Court stated that
due process claims analogous to federal constitutional claims made under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 were governed by the state one-year limitations period under
KRS 413.140 for personal-injury actions and such claims accrued upon
affirmance of the Adjustment Committee’s decision by the prison Warden.
Consequently, Thomas’ claims alleging procedural due process violations in
the first disciplinary proceeding were barred under either KRS 413.140(1)(k)
or Million v. Raymer.
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federal mailbox rule); see, e.g., Sykes v. State, 757 So.2d 997,
1000 (Miss. 2000) (stating whether to adopt prison mailbox rule
in state proceedings is matter of state procedural law); Setala
v. J. C. Penny Co., 97 Haw. 484, 40 P.3d 886 (2002); Mayer v.
State, 184 Ariz. 242, 284, 908 P.2d 56, 58 (l995); Houston v.
Lack, (based on interpretation of federal appellate rules of
procedure rather than federal constitution so it is not binding
on Arizona); Hamel v. State, 338 Ark. 769, 1 S.W.3d 434 (l999)
(declining to adopt federal prison mailbox rule for state
proceedings).
Consequently, Taylor’s reliance on federal case
law, especially Higginbottom v. McManus, 840 F.Supp. 454 (W.D.
Ky. 1994)(applying prison mail box rule to federal civil rights
complaint), is misplaced.
But see Jackson v. Nicoletti, 875 F.
Supp. 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (disagreeing with Higginbottom and
deciding not to apply the prison mailbox rule to statute of
limitations issue and filing of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint).
CR
3 states that a civil action is “commenced by the filing of a
complaint with the court” and issuance of a summons.
CR 5.05
clarifies the phrase “filing . . . with the court” by
specifically stating “[t]he filing of pleadings and other papers
with the court as required by these rules shall be made by
filing them with the clerk of the court . . . .”
The prison
mailbox rule deviates from these explicit provisions by
providing an exception for a class of litigants, i.e., pro-se
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prisoners, to allow compliance by handing legal papers to prison
officials.
There is no published Kentucky case law adopting the
prison mailbox rule for state proceedings and the cases cited by
Thomas do not require application of that rule under the
circumstances in this case.
The civil rules should be amended,
if at all, by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
As a result, we
decline to apply the prison mailbox rule or to extend to Thomas
the benefits of that rule.
In addition to the time bar of the first disciplinary
proceeding, Thomas’s claims of procedural due process violations
associated with both disciplinary proceedings are subject to
dismissal because they do not impact constitutionally protected
rights.
Recently in Marksberry v. Chandler, 126 S.W. 3d 747
(Ky.App. 2004), this court explained the factors necessary to
raise a due process cause of action associated with prison
disciplinary actions.
Under the United States Supreme Court
decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132
L.Ed.2d 418 (l995), in order to establish a “liberty” interest
protected by the due process clause, an inmate must show both
state statutes or prison regulations restricting the discretion
of prison officials, and sanctions that impose “atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.”
See Marksberry, 126 S.W.3d at 750
(quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300).
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Factors
relevant to determining whether a particular disciplinary
penalty constitutes atypical and significant hardship include:
“(1) the effect of the segregation on the length of prison
confinement under the original sentence; (2) the extent to which
the conditions of the segregation differ from other routine
prison conditions; and (3) the duration of the segregation
imposed.”
2301-02.
Id., citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87, 115 S.Ct. at
In Marksberry, the court held that 15 days
disciplinary segregation with no loss of good time credit did
not constitute atypical and significant hardship and cited to
several cases finding periods significantly longer than 15 days,
including a 30 day period in Sandin, did not rise to the level
of atypical and significant hardship.
Id. at 750-51 and
footnote 16.
In the current case, Thomas was assessed penalties of
disciplinary segregation for 15 days for charging other inmates
for services and 30 days for possession of unaccountable canteen
items, in the first and second disciplinary proceedings,
respectively.
The penalties did not include a loss of good time
service credit or otherwise affect the length of Thomas’s
confinement under the original sentence.
The conditions of
disciplinary segregation are not substantially more restrictive
than other routine prison conditions.
Id. at 750-51.
duration of the segregation was not extraordinary.
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The
Applying the
analysis outlined in Marksberry and Sandin and weighing the
conditions and duration of the segregation, we believe that
Taylor has failed to show that he suffered atypical and
significant hardship resulting from these two disciplinary
actions sufficient to create a protected constitutional due
process liberty interest.
In addition to his procedural due process claims,
Thomas asserts constitutional violations based on alleged
retaliation by the prison authorities.
Thomas claimed that the
first disciplinary charge was in retaliation for a statement
that he made to the investigating corrections officers that they
were merely “pulling his chain” and that if they did not have
clear evidence that he was charging other inmates for services,
he “would take everybody down” with him.
Thomas suggests that
the first disciplinary charge was false and merely an attempt to
punish him for challenging the officers’ authority.
Similarly,
Thomas alleged that the second disciplinary charge for improper
possession of canteen items was in retaliation for his filing of
administrative grievances complaining about the confiscation of
his items as part of the investigation of the disciplinary
charge.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that
there are two categories of prison retaliation claims --general claims of retaliation and claims that allege retaliation
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against the inmate for the exercise of specific constitutional
rights.
2000).
See Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir.
General claims of retaliation are brought under the
concept of substantive due process arising under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
To state a successful
claim of general retaliation under substantive due process, a
prisoner must establish an egregious abuse of governmental power
“or behavior that shocks the conscience”.
125 F.3d 1132, 1136-37 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id.; Leslie v. Doyle,
This is a very demanding
standard that prisoners have rarely been able to support.
See
Herron, 203 F. 3d at 414-15 (noting two rare examples where
prison officials pointed gun at inmate while voicing death
threats); Doyle, supra.
Moreover, a general claim of
retaliation under substantive due process is not available where
the claim implicates more specific provisions of the
Constitution.
As the Supreme Court stated, “[w]here a
particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of
government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized
motion of substantive due process must be the guide for
analyzing these claims’.”
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
273, 144 S.Ct. 807, 813, 127 L.Ed. 2d 114 (1994)(quoting Graham
v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.
2d 443 (l989); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 387 (6th Cir.
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1999) (prisoner retaliation action).
The more common prisoner
retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allege complaints
against government officials for retaliation associated with the
prisoner’s exercise of specific constitutional rights.
See
Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1995) (listing
numerous federal circuits recognizing retaliation actions);
Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001); Farrow v.
West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003).
See also Crawford-El
v. Briton, 523 U.S. 574, 600, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 1597-98, 140 L.
Ed. 2d 759 (1998) (discussing standard of proof for summary
judgment in prisoner retaliation action).
Given the
requirements of incarceration, prison officials are allowed to
infringe on prisoners’ rights as long as the infringement is
rationally related to a legitimate penological concern.
See
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64
(1987).
A prisoner suing prison officials under § 1983 for
retaliation must prove that he was retaliated against for
exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory
action does not advance legitimate penological concerns such as
preserving institutional order and discipline.
Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994).
Barnett v.
A prisoner retains
First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status
as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of
the corrections system.
See Safley, 482 U.S. at 84-89, 107 S.
-14-
Ct. at 2259-61; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800,
41 L.Ed.2d 495 (l974).
Among prisoners’ First Amendment rights
is the rights to seek redress by filing grievances.
See Bruce
v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003); Toolasprashad v.
Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Herron v.
Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000).
In adjudicating retaliation claims in the prison
context, the federal courts have recognized that “courts must
approach prisoner claims of retaliation with skepticism and
particular care –-- because virtually any adverse action taken
against a prisoner by a prison official –-- even those otherwise
not rising to the level of a constitutional violation --- can be
characterized as a constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act.”
Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2001), partially
overruled on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Adams v. Rice, 40
F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994); Sisneros v. Nix, 95 F.3d 749, 752
(8th Cir. 1996).
The federal courts vary somewhat in their analysis and
requirements for establishing a prison retaliation claim.
Generally the federal courts require evidence that (l) the
inmate engaged in conduct protected by the Constitution; (2)
prison officials took adverse action against the inmate; (3)
there is a causal connection in that the adverse action was
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motivated because of the protected activity for a retaliatory
purpose; and usually (4) the adverse action would not have been
taken in the absence of the protected conduct for reasons
related to penological interest.
See, e.g., McDonald v. Hall,
610 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1979); Gayle v. Gonyea, 313 F.3d 677,
682 (2d Cir. 2002); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir.
2003); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994); Freeman v.
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir.
2004); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999);
Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 1996); Moore v.
Plaster, 266 F.3d 928, 93l (8th Cir. 2001).
Protected conduct
involves actions recognized as protected by some specific
provision of the Constitution within the more restrictive prison
setting and deference afforded prison authorities.
For
instance, “if a prisoner violates a legitimate prison
regulation, he is not engaged in ‘protected conduct’ and cannot
proceed beyond step one.”
395.
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d at
In addition, while an inmate has a general First Amendment
right to file grievances against prison officials, that right is
protected conduct only if the grievances are not frivolous.
See
Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000).
The alleged adverse action necessary to support a
retaliation claim must be sufficient to deter a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights or
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continuing to engage in the protected conduct.
See Thaddeus-X
v. Blatter, 175 F.3d at 396-98; Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346,
353 (2d Cir. 2003); Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir.
2001); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000); Brown
v. Crowley, 312 F.3d 782, 789 (6th Cir. 2002) (placing prisoner
in or subjecting him to the risk of segregation is sufficient to
constitute adverse action).
Factors relevant to raising an
inference or establishing a causal connection include the
temporal proximity between the protected activity and the
adverse action, a chronology of events suggesting retaliatory
animus, direct statements by the prison officials regarding
their motivations, and disparate treatment of similarly situated
individuals.
See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872-73 (2d
Cir. 1995); Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1038 (6th Cir.
2001); Thaddeus-X, 175 F. 3d at 399.
The federal circuits
differ in allocating the burdens of these elements.
For
instance, the Second, Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuits apply a
burden shifting approach whereby once the prisoner has raised an
inference that the protected conduct was a substantial factor
motivating the adverse action, the burden of production of
evidence shifts to the prison officials to show that they would
have taken the same action even in the absence of the protected
conduct.
See Gayle, 313 F.3d at 682 (2d Cir. 2002); Rauser, 241
F.3d at 333 (3d Cir. 2001); Thaddeus–X, 175 F. 3d at 399 (6th
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Cir. 1999); Babcock, 102 F.3d at 275 (7th Cir. 1996).
This
burden shifting approach is an adaptation of the analysis
delineated in a retaliation case in the employment context by
the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).
Several
other circuits including the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth,
noting the deference accorded prison officials in the
administration of prisons have declined to adopt the burdenshifting approach and place the burden on the prisoner to show
that the prison officials would not have taken the adverse
action “but for” the protected conduct.
See, e.g., McDonald,
610 F.2d at 18 (lst Cir. 1979); Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d ll61,
1166 (5th Cir. 1995); Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir.
1993); Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998).
For instance, the Eighth Circuit has held that where
the adverse action involves disciplinary punishment imposed
through an administrative prison disciplinary proceeding, a
prisoner has no claim for retaliation if the disciplinary action
was legitimate and supported by “some evidence”.
See Moore v.
Plaster, 266 F.3d 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2001) (“a defendant may
successfully defend a retaliatory discipline claim by showing
‘some evidence’ that the inmate actually committed a rule
violation.”); Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir.
1994) (finding of actual violation of prison rules based on
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“some evidence” defeats claim of retaliation associated with
prison discipline); Orebaugh v. Caspari, 910 F.2d 526, 528 (8th
Cir. 1990)(“no claim can be stated when the alleged retaliation
arose from discipline imparted for acts that a prisoner was not
entitled to perform.”); Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir.
1993)(“if discipline which the prisoner claims to have been
retaliatory was in fact imposed for an actual violation of
prisoner rules or regulations, then the prisoner’s claim that
the discipline was retaliatory in nature must fail.”); Cowens v.
Warren, 150 F.3d 910, 912 (8th Cir. 1998) (no cause of action for
alleged retaliation for filing a grievance by bringing
disciplinary charges related to grievance procedure when the
disciplinary charges were supported by some evidence).
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have not expressly
adopted either the burden-shifting or “but for” approach, but
rather conduct a general ad hoc analysis.
See, e.g., Bruce v.
Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283 (9th Cir. 2003); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d
559 (9th Cir. 2004); Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235 (llth Cir.
2003).
But see Pate v. Peel, 256 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1339 (N.D.
Fla. 2003)(applying burden-shifting approach to prisoner
retaliation claim while noting Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
had not expressly adopted that analysis).
While prisoners
pursuing a retaliation claim cannot be held to a heightened
standard of proof or persuasion as to prison officials’ intent,
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they still must present “specific, non-conclusory factual
allegations that establish improper motive causing cognizable
injury.”
Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 594, 118 S.Ct. at 1595, 1598
(holding prisoner raising retaliation claim could not be
required to show unconstitutional motive by clear and convincing
evidence).
However, appropriate deference should be afforded
prison officials in the evaluation of proffered legitimate
penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory.
See
Pratt, 65 F. 3d at 807.
In the current case, Thomas maintains that both of the
disciplinary sanctions were retaliatory actions against him.
The question of which approach to apply to prisoner retaliation
actions is one of first impression in Kentucky.
The circuit
court relied on the line of cases from the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals that deny a cause of action for alleged retaliation
based on adverse action consisting of disciplinary punishment
where the claimant has been found guilty in a prison
disciplinary proceeding supported by “some evidence”.
This
approach effectively creates an irrebutable presumption that a
valid disciplinary action was motivated for legitimate
penological reasons and not improper retaliatory animus.
The
two disciplinary actions were supported by “some evidence”, so
the circuit court’s dismissal of Thomas’s retaliation claim
under this approach was justifiable.
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However, this approach
appears to be an extreme minority position that has not been
adopted outside of the Eighth Circuit.
Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d
at 1164-65 (declining to accept the Eighth Circuit approach
stating that existence of legitimate prison disciplinary report
is not an absolute bar to a retaliation claim but is probative
potent evidence refuting such a claim); Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d
at 1289 (rejecting “some evidence” approach).
On the other hand, we believe that Thomas’s
retaliation claim lacks merit under the “but for” and burdenshifting approaches as well.
While not imposing an absolute
barrier, the courts employing these other approaches recognize
presumptions in favor of the prison authorities especially in
matters of discipline.
First, the retaliation claim involving
the first disciplinary action did not implicate constitutionally
protected conduct.
Thomas contends that the charges for
charging other inmates for services were retaliation for his
comments to the corrections officers warning them not to “pull
his chain”, and stating that he would “take everybody down with
me” if they could not substantiate the charges.
Thomas has no
recognized constitutional right that protects his making these
comments.
Moreover, Thomas admitted receiving money for his
legal services in violation of a valid prison regulation, so he
has not shown that “but for” protected conduct he would have
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received the disciplinary penalties or that the disciplinary
action was substantially motivated by any protected conduct.
With respect to the second disciplinary action
involving unauthorized possession of canteen items, Thomas
alleges the charges were brought in retaliation for filing his
grievance complaining about the confiscation of the items.
The
grievance was rejected because it involved the same issues
raised in the disciplinary proceeding and challenges to the
disciplinary decision had to be raised through the disciplinary
procedures under CPP 15.6, rather than the grievance procedures
under CPP 14.6.
See CPP 14.6, II (C) (4) (listing Adjustment
Committee decision as non-grievable issue).
Thomas’s attempt to
use the grievance procedure for non-grievable complaints
rendered the grievance frivolous removing it from the realm of
“protected conduct” under the First Amendment.
Additionally,
even assuming the grievance was “protected conduct”, Thomas has
not presented sufficient specific facts to raise an inference of
a causal connection between the adverse action and the protected
conduct.
Thomas’s claim consists primarily of conclusory
allegations except for the superficial temporal proximity
between the filing of the grievance on August 20, 2002, and the
filing of the disciplinary report on August 26, 2002, charging
Thomas with the violation.
See Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d at 1166
(“Mere conclusionary allegations of retaliation will not
-22-
withstand a summary judgment challenge.
The inmate must produce
direct evidence of motivation or, the more probable scenario,
‘allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may
plausibly be inferred.’”)(applying but-for standard); however,
the actual inventory and confiscation of the canteen items
occurred on August 12, 2002, and the filing of charges was
delayed for an investigation of Thomas’s canteen purchases.
In
other words, the genesis of the charges occurred prior to the
initiation of the grievance thereby severely weakening any
inference that the disciplinary action was motivated by
retaliation for Thomas’s having filed the grievance.
Thomas has
not carried his burden of presenting evidence that the
disciplinary action was substantially motivated by Thomas’s use
of the grievance procedure.
Finally, the Commonwealth asserts that the
disciplinary action would have been taken even in the absence of
any protected conduct.
“The conclusion that the state action
would have been taken in the absence of improper motives is
readily drawn in the context of prison administration where we
have been cautioned to recognize that prison officials have
broad administrative and discretionary authority over the
institutions they manage.”
Hynes v. Squillace, 143 F.3d 653,
657 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Lowrance v. Actyl, 20 F.3d 529, 535
(2d Cir. 1994)).
Under the majority burden-shifting approach,
-23-
once the inmate demonstrates that the exercise of a
constitutional right was a substantial or motivating factor in
the adverse action, the prison officials may still prevail by
showing that they would have taken the same action absent the
protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest.
Cir. 2001).
Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d
In the current case, Thomas has stated that he had
receipts for most but not all of the canteen items, and some of
the items were obtained in barter for legal services.
These
facts support the prison officials’ contention that they acted
for legitimate non-retaliatory penological reasons in enforcing
the disciplinary prison regulation.
See Graham v. Henderson, 89
F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1996) (even assuming retaliatory motive,
prison officials are entitled to summary judgment if there were
proper, non-retaliatory reasons for the disciplinary
punishment), McGrath v. Johnson, 155 F.Supp.2d 294, 302 (E.D.Pa.
2001).
Thomas has not countered or presented evidence to rebut
the proffered legitimate non-retaliatory reason.
In conclusion,
Thomas has not presented sufficient evidence showing that the
filing of his grievance was the substantial or motivating factor
for the second disciplinary action, or regardless of a possible
retaliatory motivation, the prison officials had sufficient
evidence to pursue the disciplinary action.
retaliation claim was properly rejected.
-24-
Thus, Thomas’s
Thomas also has raised a claim of racial
discrimination in violation of his right to equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment in connection with the two
disciplinary actions.
Thomas, who is African-American, alleges
that the prison officials unconstitutionally discriminated
against him by penalizing him more severely than white inmates
associated with violating the prison regulations.
The equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners
from racial discrimination except for “’the necessities of
prison security and discipline’”.
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,
321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972) (per curiam)
(quoting Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19
L.Ed.2d 1212 (1968) (Per curiam)).
In reviewing prisoner
complaints, the Supreme Court has recognized that prisoner’s
constitutional rights must be balanced against deference
accorded prison officials to manage and administer prison rules
and regulations.
See Pecunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.
Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed. 2d 224 (1974).
In the prison context,
actions by prison officials impinging fundamental rights such as
the right to equal protection are not subjected to the strict
scrutiny normally applicable, but rather are reviewed on a
reasonableness standard based on the relationship to legitimate
penological interests.
See Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 974
(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct.
-25-
2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987).
In addition, Thomas’ complaint
protests differential treatment or administration of the prison
regulation rather than the regulation itself.
As such, this
claim is similar to complaints of selective enforcement of
neutral laws under the equal protection clause.
As with prison
administration, the courts accord government officials deference
and discretion by acknowledging “a strong presumption that state
actors have properly discharged their official duties “that can
be overcome only by “clear evidence to the contrary.”
v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873 (6th Cir. 1997).
Stemler
See also
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480,
1486, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (l996)(the presumption of regularity
supports prosecutorial decisions, but can be rebutted by clear
evidence to the contrary).
At the same time, selective
enforcement claims are judged according to the ordinary equal
protection standards, which require the claimant to show both a
discriminatory motive or purpose and a discriminatory effect.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465, 116 S.Ct. at 1487; McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1767, 95 L.Ed.2d 262
(l987).
To establish a discriminatory effect, a claimant must
show that he was treated differently than similarly situated
individuals.
Armstrong, supra; Gardenshire v. Schubert, 205 F.
3d 303, 319 (6th Cir. 2000); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313
-26-
(1985); (Weiand v. Board of Trustees of Ky. Retirement Systems,
25 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Ky. 2000).
Several courts have recognized
that the equal protection clause protects prisoners from racial
discrimination associated with disciplinary punishment.
See
Propst v. Leapley, 886 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1989); Giles v. Henry,
841 F.Supp. 270 (S.D. Iowa l993); Shabazz v. Cole, 69 F.Supp.2d
177 (D. Mass. 1999) (involving lodging of false disciplinary
charge).
A finding of intentional discriminatory purpose may be
inferred from the totality of the circumstances.
F.Supp. at 274; Shabazz, 69 F.Supp.2d at 209.
Giles, 841
Although a
claimant need not show that the discriminatory purpose was the
only reason for the decision, he has to demonstrate through
direct or circumstantial evidence that intentional
discrimination was “a motivating factor in the decision.”
Shabazz, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 209 (quoting Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429
U.S. 252, 265-66, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)).
Evidence of discriminatory intent includes the historical
background of the decision, substantive departures from normal
procedures or considerations, verbal abuse or racial slurs, and
disparate treatment.
Supp.2d at 209.
Giles, 841 F.Supp. at 275; Shabazz, 69 F.
See also Propst, 886 F.2d at 1070 (“Evidence of
disparate treatment is highly probative of discriminatory intent
in civil rights cases.”).
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Morgan Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Walter L. Thomas, Pro Se
Louisville, Kentucky
Rebecca Baylous
Justice and Public Safety
Cabinet
Frankfort, Kentucky
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