MICHAEL G. STATHIS v. UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY; UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF MEDICINE; SUE FOSSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ASSISTANT DEAN FOR STUDENT AFFAIRS, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY CHANDLER MEDICAL CENTER; EMERY WILSON, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS DEAN, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY CHANDLER MEDICAL CENTER
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RENDERED: MAY 13, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000556-MR
MICHAEL G. STATHIS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-04033
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY;
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE
OF MEDICINE; SUE FOSSON,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ASSISTANT
DEAN FOR STUDENT AFFAIRS,
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
CHANDLER MEDICAL CENTER;
EMERY WILSON, INDIVIDUALLY,
AND AS DEAN, UNIVERSITY OF
KENTUCKY CHANDLER MEDICAL CENTER
APPELLEES
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TACKETT AND VANMETER, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
Michael G. Stathis appeals from orders of
the Fayette Circuit Court granting summary judgment to the
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110.(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
defendants in this proceeding in which the appellant alleges
causes of action based upon race, gender, and disability
discrimination and breach of contract.
Stathis raises issues of
denial of due process of law at the administrative level.
Additionally, he claims that he was denied adequate discovery by
the trial court.
We reverse and remand as to the contract claim
only, and affirm as to the remaining issues.
HISTORY
Stathis enrolled in the University of Kentucky Medical
School in 1994 and completed his first and second years of study
with distinction.
In the fall of 1997 Stathis began his third
year of Medical School.
During his endeavors as a student, various allegations
of hostile and improper conduct were made against Stathis.
On
November 12, 1997, Stathis had a verbal altercation with a
fellow medical student, Sharon Steele.
Steele, and witnesses to
the altercation, perceived some of the comments made by Stathis
as threats of physical harm against her.
Medical School
administrators were concerned that Stathis had threatened a
colleague in a clinical environment.
Stathis was suspended from
his clinical activities pending investigation as to whether he
posed a danger to patients, the public, colleagues, or others in
the college environment, and could continue to function in a
medical setting.
2
On February 11, 1998, Stathis was informed that
because of the November 12, 1997, incident; the results of the
investigation; and other factors that had become known, he was
being charged with violations of the Health Sciences Student
Professional Behavior Code (HSSPBC).
Specifically, he was
charged with violation of the following standards:
(1) any
condition or behavior which may endanger clients, patients, or
the public, including failure to carry out the appropriate or
assigned duties where lack of doing so may endanger the health
or well-being of a patient or client; (2) obtaining any fee by
fraud or misrepresentation;2 and (3) having been previously
removed or suspended from a clinical setting by appropriate
administrative authority for unprofessional conduct.
Stathis elected a hearing on the charges, which was
held on April 8, 1998.
The Hearing Committee determined that
Stathis did “physically threaten a fellow student while engaged
in clinical activities” in violation of the HSSPBC.
The
Committee found this to be a serious violation and concluded:
We believe that Mr. Stathis’ threatening
behavior was extreme and disproportionate to
any aggravating stimulus, that threats
continued to be voiced after the threatened
student had left the vicinity, and that
there was no credible explanation for the
behavior. Mr. Stathis continues to minimize
the seriousness of this behavior. Based on
the review of all the written documents and
2
Prior to the hearing on the violations, Stathis was exonerated of this
charge.
3
witnesses, the committee also determined
that the incident of November 12 was not an
isolated incident, and that Mr. Stathis has
exhibited inappropriate hostile behavior on
several occasions. A review of the
psychiatric report suggests that this type
of behavior is not easily treated, even
should Mr. Stathis reconsider his expressed
unwillingness to consider treatment. After
reviewing the total evidence presented,
considering the seriousness of the offense,
and weighing the College’s responsibility to
ensure a safe and non-threatening
educational and clinical environment for
staff, students, faculty, and patients, the
committee unanimously recommends as a
sanction Mr. Stathis termination as a
student in the College of Medicine without
possibility of readmission to that College.
By letter dated April 22, 1998, the Dean of the
Medical School informed Stathis that he was accepting the
Committee’s recommendation of termination of enrollment.
Stathis exercised his right of appeal to Dr. James Holsinger,
Chancellor, who upheld the decision of the Dean.
THE INSTANT LITIGATION
On November 12, 1998, Stathis filed a Complaint in
Fayette Circuit Court alleging gender and racial discrimination.
He also alleged breach of contract.
The Complaint was later
amended to include discrimination based upon disability or
perceived disability.
Stathis additionally claimed denial of
procedural due process at the administrative level.
prayed the injunctive remedy of reinstatement.
Stathis
Stathis also
sought monetary damages for loss of income resulting from his
4
expulsion, compensatory damages for humiliation, embarrassment,
and mental and physical anguish, and punitive damages.
Named as defendants were the University of Kentucky;
the University of Kentucky College of Medicine; Emery Wilson,
Individually and as Dean, University of Kentucky Chandler
Medical Center; and Sue Fosson, Individually and as Assistant
Dean for Student Affairs, University of Kentucky Chandler
Medical Center.
On April 7, 1999, the trial court summarily rejected
his claim of denial of due process and dismissed his claim for
breach of contract.3
On February 26, 2004, the circuit court
granted the University and the College of Medicine summary
judgment on Stathis’ remaining claims of discrimination.
termination from the College of Medicine was upheld.
His
This
appeal followed.
DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS
Stathis contends that the circuit court erred in
rejecting his claim that he had been deprived of due process of
law.
Specifically, he contends that he was improperly denied a
predeprivation hearing prior to his suspension; that he was
denied the opportunity to meaningfully confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses at the post-suspension hearing; that
3
The circuit court also dismissed Stathis’ claims against Fosson and Wilson
in their individual capacities as to the discrimination counts. Stathis
raises no issues on appeal regarding these dismissals.
5
he was denied adequate notice of issues to be heard at the
administrative hearing; and that he was denied an impartial
decision maker at the administrative hearing.
Section 2 of our Constitution provides that this
Commonwealth shall be free of arbitrary state action.
With
respect to adjudications, whether judicial or administrative,
this guarantee is generally understood as a due process
provision whereby Kentucky citizens may be assured of
fundamentally fair and unbiased procedures.
S.W.2d 353, 357 (Ky.App. 1997).
Smith v. O'Dea, 939
Under Kentucky law no less than
under federal law, the concept of procedural due process is
flexible.
Id.
We accordingly believe that Federal authorities
in the area of school disciplinary cases are relevant to our
discussion.
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that "a
school is an academic institution, not a courtroom or
administrative hearing room" and due process is a flexible
concept therein.
Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz,
435 U.S. 78, 89, 98 S.Ct. 948, 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978).
In Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975), the
Supreme Court held that due process requires, in connection with
the suspension of a student from public school for disciplinary
reasons, "that the student be given oral or written notice of
the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation
6
of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to
present his side of the story."
Id., 419 U.S. at 581, 95 S.Ct.
All that Goss requires is an "informal give-and-take"
at 740.
between the student and the administrative body dismissing him
that would, at least, give the student "the opportunity to
characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper
context."
Id., 419 U.S. at 584, 95 S.Ct. at 741.
This case was, of course, a disciplinary proceeding.
It seems to us that Stathis was given reasonable notice of the
charges against him and the opportunity to respond to those
charges.
Further, he was afforded a hearing on the charges, and
while not permitted to cross-examine witnesses, he was presented
with the opportunity to submit questions to the witnesses in
advance of the hearing, and those questions were, in fact, so
submitted.
As such, we cannot conclude, in this regard, that
due process was lacking.
Stathis also contends that the hearing was not
conducted by an impartial tribunal.
However, he has failed to
present affirmative evidence demonstrating that the Hearing
Committee was prejudiced against his interests such that he did
not receive a fair hearing on the charges.
See Nicholson v.
Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission, 562 S.W.2d 306, 309
(Ky. 1978).
(Observing that “[t]he case law, both federal and
state, generally rejects the idea that the combination (of)
7
judging (and) investigating functions is a denial of due process
. . .").
Lastly, Stathis alleges that he was denied due process
because he was not provided with a presuspension hearing.
has failed to cite us to preservation of this issue.
He
It is
elementary that a reviewing court will not consider for the
first time an issue not raised in the trial court.
General Elec. Co., 608 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Ky.App. 1980).
Caslin v.
As such,
this issue is not preserved for our review.
In summary, we find no merit in Stathis’ various
claims that he was denied due process in the procedures
culminating in his dismissal from Medical School.
LIMITATION OF DISCOVERY
Stathis contends that the circuit court erred in
denying his motion for additional discovery and in ruling on the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment when discovery had not
been completed.
He filed a motion to compel the production of the
student records of four former minority medical students who
attended the medical school during the same period as Stathis.
Stathis sought the entire record of each student.
On April 25, 2001, the circuit court entered an order
directing the University and the Medical School to produce the
students’ records insofar as they related to any discipline,
8
conduct, or behavioral issues while a student at the College of
Medicine.
On December 8, 2003, Stathis filed a motion requesting
that the circuit court reconsider its April 25, 2001, order so
as to require the disclosure of the full record of each of the
four students.
The circuit court apparently did not rule on the
motion prior to granting summary judgment on the remaining
claims in its order of February 26, 2004.
Following the circuit
court’s order granting summary judgment, it appears that Stathis
did not thereafter raise the issue of the trial court’s failure
to rule on his outstanding motion.
"It goes without saying that
errors to be considered for appellate review must be precisely
preserved and identified in the lower court."
Skaggs v. Assad,
By and Through Assad, 712 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Ky. 1986); Forester
v. Forester, 979 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Ky.App. 1998).
Hence, we do
not believe that Stathis has properly preserved this issue for
appellate review.
Nevertheless, we will briefly address, in
general, the circuit court’s initial limitation on discovery of
the records of the four minority students identified by Stathis.
Generally, control of discovery is a matter of
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dickinson, 29
judicial discretion.
S.W.3d 796 (Ky. 2000);
Morrow v. Brown, Todd & Heyburn, 957
9
S.W.2d 722 (Ky. 1997).
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
26.02, Scope of discovery, provides, in part:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense
of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition and location of
any books, documents, or other tangible
things and the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of any discoverable
matter. It is not ground for objection that
the information sought will be inadmissible
at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
It is well settled that discovery rules are to be
liberally construed so as to provide both parties with relevant
information fundamental to proper litigation.
Primm v. Isaac,
127 S.W.3d 630, 634 (Ky. 2004).
We are of the opinion that the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion by limiting discovery to the four minority
students’ records.
The discovery order required disclosure of
the records insofar as they related to any discipline, conduct,
or behavioral issues while students at the College of Medicine;
all records for the four students concerning faculty evaluations
occurring during the 16 week pediatrics/OB/GYN rotation
occurring in the fall semester of 1997; and all records
pertaining to Sharon Steele relating to her involvement in the
10
November 12, 1997, incident with Stathis.
There was excepted
only medical treatment and/or mental-health/counseling-related
records, information of a highly personal nature.
As to this
excepted material, Stathis has failed to demonstrate its
cruciality to his various claims.
We are of the opinion that the circuit court’s order
provided Stathis with the opportunity to pursue his theory that
these minority students were treated more favorably than he for
similar conduct.
We particularly note that all records of
Sharon Steele relating to the November 12, 1997, order were
required to be disclosed.
We find no abuse of discretion in the
circuit court’s limitation on discovery.
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Stathis next contends that the circuit court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees on his claim
of racial discrimination.
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court
grants a motion for summary judgment is whether the trial court
correctly found there were no genuine issues as to any material
fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
Palmer v. International Ass’n of Machinists, 882
S.W.2d 117, 120 (Ky. 1994); Stewart v. University of Louisville,
65 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Ky.App. 2001); CR 56.03.
The movant bears
the initial burden of convincing the court by evidence of record
11
that no genuine issue of fact is in dispute, and then the burden
shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to present "at
least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine
issue of material fact for trial."
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel
Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky. 1991); see also
City of Florence, Kentucky v. Chipman, 38 S.W.3d 387, 390 (Ky.
2001).
The court must view the record in the light most
favorable to the non-movant and resolve all doubts in his favor.
Commonwealth v. Whitworth, 74 S.W.3d 695, 698 (Ky. 2002);
Lipsteuer v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 732, 736 (Ky.
2000).
"The inquiry should be whether, from the evidence of
record, facts exist which would make it possible for the
nonmoving party to prevail.
In the analysis, the focus should
be on what is of record rather than what might be presented at
trial."
Welch v. American Publishing Co. of Kentucky, 3 S.W.3d
724, 730 (Ky. 1999); see also Murphy v. Second Street Corp., 48
S.W.3d 571, 573 (Ky.App. 2001).
As an appellate court, we need
not defer to the trial court's decision on summary judgment and
will review the issue de novo as only legal questions are
involved.
Hallahan v. The Courier Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 704-
705 (Ky.App. 2004).
Stathis is a white male alleging reverse racial
discrimination.
An analysis of the effect of a claim of reverse
discrimination under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA) is
12
governed by the allocation of the burden of proof in a reverse
discrimination claim brought under Title VII of the Federal
Civil Rights Act.
590 (Ky. 2002).
Jefferson County v. Zaring, 91 S.W.3d 583,
Thus, federal authorities interpreting the
Federal Civil Rights Act are applicable.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93
S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), was a Title VII action
brought by an African-American employee who claimed that he had
been subjected to employment discrimination because of his race.
While McDonnell Douglas was an employment discrimination case,
we believe its basic framework is analogous to the situation
presented in the present reverse discrimination claim, and we
will accordingly pattern our discussion upon its structure.
In McDonnell Douglas, the United States Supreme Court
established "the proper order and nature of proof in actions
under Title VII," 411 U.S. at 793-94, 93 S.Ct. at 1820, and
established the following tripartite analysis:
First, the plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. Second, if
the plaintiff carries his initial burden,
the burden shifts to the defendant to
"articulate some legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason" for the challenged
workplace decision. Third, if the defendant
carries this burden, the plaintiff has an
opportunity to prove that the legitimate
reasons the defendant offered were merely a
pretext for discrimination.
13
Notari v. Denver Water Dept., 971 F.2d 585, 588 (10th Cir.1992),
(citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824).
"Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back
and forth under this framework, '[t]he ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with
the plaintiff.'”
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000),
(quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)).
The
defendant's "burden is one of production, not persuasion."
530
U.S. at 142, 120 S.Ct. at 2106 (emphasis added).
In a typical discrimination case, as part of his
burden of establishing a prima facie case the plaintiff must
show that he belongs to a racial minority.
supra, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824.
McDonnell Douglas,
In a reverse
discrimination case, the McDonnell Douglas framework must be
appropriately adjusted.
First, because the plaintiffs are
"white male[s], [they] clearly do[ ] not satisfy prong one" of
the prima facie tests.
Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171
F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 1999).
"[I]f strictly applied, the
prima facie test would eliminate all reverse discrimination
suits."
Id. at 454.
See also Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d
151, 158 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Obviously, a White plaintiff can not
14
establish 'membership in a minority group' in the same way a
Black plaintiff can.").
Thus, "it is appropriate to adjust the
prima facie case to reflect the reverse discrimination context
of a lawsuit because the presumptions in Title VII analysis that
are valid when a plaintiff belongs to a disfavored group are not
necessarily justified when the plaintiff is a member of an
historically favored group."
F.2d at 589 (10th Cir. 1992).
Notari v. Denver Water Dept., 971
As such, in reverse
discrimination cases, the test has been modified to state that
"a prima facie case of 'reverse discrimination' is established
upon a showing that background circumstances support the
suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who
discriminates against the majority."
Murray v. Thistledown
Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985).
Applying the test established in Thistledown Racing
Club that "a prima facie case of 'reverse discrimination' is
established upon a showing that background circumstances support
the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who
discriminates against the majority," we believe that the reverse
discrimination claim must fail.
In developing his case of racial discrimination,
Stathis relies primarily upon the records of four minority
students.
However, Stathis’ conduct is clearly distinguishable
from the conduct of each of those students.
15
Only in the case of
one male minority student were threats of violence involved;
however, in that case the student accepted responsibility for
his conduct and expressed contrition over the incident.
Stathis
has failed to mitigate the conduct alleged against him with an
acknowledgment of wrong on his part, nor has he expressed
contrition concerning his conduct.
In summary, we do not believe that Stathis has made a
prima facie case of racial discrimination by demonstrating that
the Medical School is the unusual institution which
discriminates against the racial majority.
Summary judgment was
appropriate.
GENDER DISCRIMINATION
Stathis contends that the circuit court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on his
claim of gender discrimination.
As previously noted, federal authorities are
applicable in interpreting a claim of discrimination under the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act.
Jefferson County v. Zaring, 91
S.W.3d 583, 590 (Ky. 2002).
A prima facie case for gender
discrimination requires a showing of disparate treatment between
the plaintiff and a person of the opposite gender whose
situation was “nearly identical.”
As stated in Leadbetter v.
Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 691 (6th Cir. 2004), an employment case,
16
"[i]n order for two or more employees to be considered
similarly-situated for purposes of creating an inference of
disparate treatment in a [reverse discrimination case], the
plaintiff must prove that all of the relevant aspects of his
employment situation are 'nearly identical' to those of the
[female employee] who he alleges [was] treated more favorably."
Id.
The similarities between the plaintiff and the female
employee must exist "in all relevant aspects of their respective
employment circumstances." Id.
Stathis bases his discrimination claims upon the
records of four minority students.
Of the four, only the fellow
student involved in the November 12, 1997, incident, Sharon
Steele, is a female.
Analogizing Leadbetter to the present student reverse
discrimination case, again, Steele’s conduct is distinguishable
from Stathis’ conduct.
Steele did not make physical threats
against Stathis, and Steele expressed contrition over the
incident.
As such, Steele’s situation was not “nearly
identical” to Stathis’ situation, and, accordingly, he has
failed to make a prima facie case of gender discrimination.
Accordingly, summary judgment on this claim was proper.
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
17
Stathis contends that the circuit court erred by
granting summary judgment to the appellants on his claim of
discrimination based upon disability.
Given the similar language and the stated purpose of
KRS Chapter 344 to embody the federal civil rights statutes,
including the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), this court
may look to federal case law in interpreting the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act with respect to Stathis’ claim of disability
discrimination under KRS 344.040.
Hallahan v. The Courier
Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 705-706 (Ky.App. 2004); KRS
344.020(1)(a).
Under KRS 344.010(4), a "disability" is defined as:
(a) A physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one (1) or more of the
major life activities of the individual;
(b) A record of such an impairment;
or
(c) Being regarded as having such an
impairment.
See also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
Whether the plaintiff has impairment and whether the
conduct affected by the impairment is a major life activity
under the statute are legal questions.
See Doebele v.
Sprint/United Management Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1129 (10th Cir.
2003).
The ultimate determination of whether the impairment
substantially limits the major life activity generally is a
18
factual issue for the jury, but it may be resolved upon summary
judgment under the appropriate circumstances.
Id. at 1130 n. 5.
See also Bristol v. Board of County Commissioners of the County
of Clear Creek, 281 F.3d 1148, 1157-60 (10th Cir. 2002).
Stathis bases his claim for discrimination upon his
allegations that the Medical School required him to undergo two
medical evaluations; that the Medical School based its decision
to terminate him upon its perception that Stathis was a danger
to himself and others; and that the Medical School perceived
that he had a mental impairment.
Stathis alleges that Dean
Nora, Dean Wilson, and the Hearing Committee believed that,
despite the evaluations to the contrary, Stathis was a danger to
others and based their decision to terminate his medical
education on their perception of his mental condition.
Stathis
argues that despite this perception, the Medical School did
nothing to provide any accommodation to him or provide any
alternative except permanent termination from medical school.
In Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534
U.S. 184, 197, 122 S.Ct. 681, 691, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002), the
Supreme Court defined "major life activities" other than working
as "those activities that are of central importance to daily
life."
The Court also held that to be substantially limiting,
impairment must do more than interfere with the activity in a
minor way or for a temporary period.
19
"[A]n individual must have
an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual
from doing activities that are of central importance to most
people's daily lives.
The impairment's impact must also be
permanent or long term."
534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. at 691.
Stathis has failed to satisfy the "regarded as" prong.
To begin with, Stathis has not identified a relevant "major life
activity."
These activities include "caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working."
(2001).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)
"Major life activities" go to the core of a person's
ability to function.
Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S.
184, 122 S.Ct. 681, 691, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002).
Stathis has failed to set forth evidence in the record
that the University, the Medical School, or their personnel
viewed Stathis as suffering from a disability which limits a
major life activity.
While the evidence demonstrates that he
was perceived as suffering from a behavioral problem which
threatened the educational and clinical environment at the
Medical School, we deem this as being clearly insufficient to
demonstrate that Stathis suffered, or was perceived as
suffering, from a disability which limited a major life
activity.
The record does not demonstrate that Stathis was
perceived as having a level of mental disability such that he
20
was regarded as being substantially limited in a major life
activity of central importance to daily life.
Rather, he was
regarded as having a quick temper and as using poor judgment in
the November 12, 1997, incident by making threats toward a
fellow student.
Upon the record, we do not believe there are
genuine issues of material fact regarding Stathis’ disability
claim.
On this claim we are of the opinion that summary
judgment was appropriate.
BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT
Stathis contends the circuit court erred by granting
summary judgment to the appellees on his breach of contract
claim.4
The court granted summary judgment on this claim in its
order of April 7, 1999, on the basis KRS 45A.245 (a section of
Kentucky’s Model Procurement Code) requires any claim against
the Commonwealth or its agencies to be brought in Franklin
Circuit Court.
KRS 45A.245(1) provides as follows:
Any person, firm or corporation, having a
lawfully authorized written contract with
the Commonwealth at the time of or after
June 21, 1974, may bring an action against
the Commonwealth on the contract, including
but not limited to actions either for breach
of contracts or for enforcement of contracts
or for both. Any such action shall be
brought in the Franklin Circuit Court and
shall be tried by the court sitting without
a jury. All defenses in law or equity,
4
We construe Stathis’ breach of contract claim as being against the
University and the College of Medicine only, and not applicable to Fosson and
Wilson in either their official or individual capacities. Hence we do not
address this claim as applicable to these individuals.
21
except the defense of governmental immunity,
shall be preserved to the Commonwealth.
(Emphasis added.)
As KRS 45A.245 applies only to written contracts, we
believe the court incorrectly concluded that the statute
required Stathis’ claim of breach of implied contract with the
Medical School be venued in Franklin Circuit Court.
has no application.
KRS 45A.245
Stathis claims breach of a
student/university implied contract.
He seeks the remedies of
monetary damages and reinstatement. CR 18.01.
Of course, the
monetary damage claim is barred by sovereign immunity.
Department of Corrections v. Furr, 23 S.W.3d 615, 619 (Ky. 2000)
(Agencies of the Commonwealth are subject only to administrative
sanctions, and may not be sued for monetary damages in Circuit
Court).
His claim of reinstatement, however, remains viable.
Our Supreme Court has noted that the relationship
between a private college and its students can be characterized
as contractual in nature.
562, 568 (Ky. 2003).
Centre College v. Trzop, 127 S.W.3d
We can discern no reason why the same rule
cannot be applied to public universities, and are of the opinion
that indeed an implied contract existed between Stathis and the
University and/or College of Medicine in this case.
Healy v. Larsson, 323 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (N.Y. 1971).
See, e.g.,
The rights
and obligations of the parties as contained in the University’s
bulletins, circulars and regulations made available to the
22
student become a part of the implied contract.
Vought v.
Teachers College, Columbia University, 511 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881
(N.Y. 1987).
The implicit terms of the implied contract are that
the University will act in good faith toward the student and the
student will fulfill the University’s academic requirements and
comply with its ethical, procedural, and other standards.
v. Long Island University, 48 F.Supp. 220, 224 (1999).
Tripp
However,
a contract between an educational institution and a student is
only enforceable so long as the student complies with the
college's rules and regulations.
Trzop, at 127 S.W.2d 568
(citing Lexington Theological Seminary, Inc. v. Vance, 596
S.W.2d 11 (Ky.App. 1979)).
It is elementary that a contract is not breached
unless the non-performance is substantial or material.
Fay E.
Sams Money Purchase Pension Plan v. Jansen, 3 S.W.3d 753, 757
(Ky.App. 1999).
Upon conflicting evidence it is a question of
fact as to which party breached the contract.
Schmidt v.
Schmidt, 343 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Ky. 1961).
Under their implied contract, at minimum it was to be
understood that if Stathis paid his tuition, achieved the
requisite academic standards, and complied with the requisite
rules of conduct and decorum, then the University would permit
him to complete his medical studies and award him a degree.
23
The crucial incident which resulted in Stathis’
dismissal from the medical school was the November 12, 1997,
incident on the OB/GYN floor involving an altercation between
Stathis and Sharon Steele.
While the Hearing Committee credited
testimony adverse to Stathis and rejected his version of events,
as we are reviewing this issue in the context of summary
judgment, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to him.
According to Stathis, Sharon Steele approached him and
asked him if he had taken care of one of his patients.
When
Stathis answered no, Steele began to insult him and criticize
him, calling him “stupid” and “lazy.”
Stathis told Steele that
his care of his patients was none of her business.
Stathis
walked away from Sharon Steele, but Steele pursued Stathis and
began to berate him again.
Stathis concedes that both he and
Steele argued and raised their voices.
Indeed, Stathis realized
that this was not appropriate in the hospital setting, told
Steele that he was not going to continue, and told her that if
she wanted to “they could finish it outside.”
By this, however,
Stathis contends that he meant only that they should continue
their argument outside, not engage in a physical confrontation.
Stathis denies that he at any time made any comment threatening
Sharon Steele with physical harm.
Accepting Stathis’ version of the November 12, 1997,
incident, as we must pursuant to Steelvest, we believe a fact-
24
finder might reasonable believe that his conduct did not rise to
the level such that he breached the conduct code of the Medical
School and, accordingly, did not breach the contract between the
parties.
If Stathis was not in breach of the parties’ contract,
it follows that the College of Medicine was in default for
dismissing him from enrollment.
As there are genuine issues of material fact
concerning the events of November 12, 1997, and,
correspondingly, who first breached the contract between the
parties, summary judgment was not appropriate.
SUMMARY
We affirm the Fayette Circuit Court upon all issues
presented in this appeal with the exception of the issue
pertaining to breach of contract and Stathis’ claim of
reinstatement.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
TACKETT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
VANMETER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART,
AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
VANMETER, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART.
I concur with most of the majority opinion, but I
respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion insofar as
25
it directs remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings on the issue of whether Stathis breached the conduct
code of the Medical School.
By virtue of the disciplinary
hearing held by the Medical School, that determination has
already been made.
My view is that “[j]udicial scrutiny of the
determination of disciplinary matters between a university and
its students, or student organizations, is limited to
determining whether the university substantially adhered to its
own published rules and guidelines for disciplinary proceedings
so as to ascertain whether its actions were arbitrary or
capricious."
Nawaz v. State University of New York University
at Buffalo School of Dental Medicine, 295 A.D.2d 944, 944, 744
N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (2002); see Nickerson v. University of Alaska
Anchorage, 975 P.2d 46, 50 n. 1 (Alaska 1999); 15A Am. Jur. 2d
Colleges and Universities § 30 (2000) (recognizing that
matriculation and payment of fee creates contract subject to
conditions that no student will be arbitrarily expelled and that
student will submit to reasonable rules and regulations, and
recognizing that university authorities’ exercise of discretion
in expelling student for violation of a reasonable rule or
regulation will not be interfered with by the courts absent a
showing of bad faith or some extraneous motive).
26
Similar to the approach taken by courts in other
states, I would restrict the courts’ review to the substantial
evidence standard of review applicable to the decisions of
administrative agencies.
As stated in Kentucky Unemployment
Ins. Com'n v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Kentucky,
Inc., 91 S.W.3d 575, 578-579 (Ky. 2002):
"If the findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence of probative value,
then they must be accepted as binding and it
must then be determined whether or not the
administrative agency has applied the
correct rule of law to the facts so found."
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kentucky
Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, Ky., 437 S.W.2d
775, 778 (1969). The administrative
agency's findings will be upheld even though
there exists evidence to the contrary in the
record. Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights v.
Fraser, Ky., 625 S.W.2d 852, 856 (1981).
Substantial evidence is defined as "evidence
of substance and relative consequence having
the fitness to induce conviction in the
minds of reasonable [persons]." OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, Ky.,
976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (1998). We must also
determine whether the decision of the
administrative agency was arbitrary or
clearly erroneous, which is defined as
"unsupported by substantial evidence."
Danville-Boyle County Planning and Zoning
Comm'n v. Prall, Ky., 840 S.W.2d 205, 208
(1992). "If there is any substantial
evidence to support the action of the
administrative agency, it cannot be found to
be arbitrary and will be sustained." Taylor
v. Coblin, Ky., 461 S.W.2d 78, 80 (1970).
While Stathis’ version of the altercation differed
from that of the other witnesses, my view is that the testimony
27
of the other witnesses constituted substantial evidence to
support the College of Medicine’s decision that Stathis had
breached the HSSPBC, and therefore the College of Medicine was
justified in terminating its contract with him.
I would affirm
the Fayette Circuit Court in all respects.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda B. Sullivan
Lexington, Kentucky
Stephen L. Barker
Katherine M. Coleman
Lexington, Kentucky
28
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