RAY WAITS v. NATHAN HENDERSON, AND HIS FATHER DANIEL HENDERSON; COREY MOORE, AND HIS MOTHER JANE MOORE; IAN BAKER, AND HIS FATHER RICK BAKER
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RENDERED: MARCH 18, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000495-MR
RAY WAITS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-04909
v.
NATHAN HENDERSON, AND HIS FATHER
DANIEL HENDERSON; COREY MOORE, AND HIS
MOTHER JANE MOORE; IAN BAKER, AND
HIS FATHER RICK BAKER
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
McANULTY AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Ray Waits appeals from a January 23, 2004,
Opinion and Order and a February 19, 2004, Order of the Fayette
Circuit Court awarding damages against three juveniles and their
respective parent for vandalism to appellant’s personal
property.
1
We reverse and remand.
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
In August 2002, five juveniles vandalized a mobile
home and other items of personal property belonging to
appellant.
A complaint was filed against the juveniles in the
Fayette District Court, Juvenile Division.
Appellant sought
restitution of $9,759.00 for damage to his property.
It
appears, however, that restitution was not ordered in the
juvenile proceeding.
Two of the juveniles settled with
appellant and paid their proportionate share of the alleged
damages or $1,951.80 each.
The other three juveniles, Nathan,
Corey, and Ian, and their respective parent, believed the damage
estimate was inflated and refused to pay appellant.
Appellant initiated this action by filing a complaint
against Nathan, Corey, and Ian in the Fayette Circuit Court.2
Thereafter, appellant filed a motion for summary judgment on the
issue of liability.
The circuit court granted the motion and
entered a partial summary judgment in favor of appellant.
On
January 8, 2004, a bench trial was then conducted on the issue
of damages.
On January 23, 2004, the circuit court entered an
Opinion and Order that awarded appellant damages of $4,294.00.
The court apportioned fault equally among the three juvenile
defendants, awarding a judgment against each for $1,431.33.
Upon appellee’s motion to reconsider, by order entered February
19, 2004, the circuit court amended its previous order and held
2
The complaint was later amended to include a parent of each of the three
juveniles.
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that each of the five juveniles “should have been assessed
twenty percent (20%) liability, jointly and severally” for the
damages awarded.
The court then ordered that the damage award
of $4,294.00 be set off by the total amount appellant had
recovered from the two settling tortfeasors.3
The court further
ordered that “[a]fter said credit, the amount of damages due and
owing from these three defendants is $390.40 . . . .”
Thus, the
court required Nathan, Corey, and Ian to each pay appellant
$130.13.
This appeal follows.
Appellant contends the circuit court erroneously
ordered the damage award set off by the amount the two settling
tortfeasors paid appellant.
We agree.
KRS 411.182 codifies the allocation of fault and award
of damages in tort actions4 and reads, in relevant part, as
follows:
(1) In all tort actions, including products
liability actions, involving fault of more
than one (1) party to the action, including
third-party defendants and persons who have
been released under subsection (4) of this
3
The two settling tortfeasors had previously paid appellant $1,951.80 each
for a total of $3,903.60.
4
No party to this appeal has raised the issue of whether this statute is
applicable to damages arising from intentional torts. At least one Kentucky
Court has applied this statute to intentional tort claims, holding joint and
several liability claims are not available for intentional torts. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286 (Ky.App. 1998).
However, the prevailing view in most jurisdictions is that comparative
negligence principles are not applicable to intentional torts and thus joint
and several liability would be applied to intentional tort damage claims.
See Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Applicability of Comparative Negligence
Principles to Intentional Torts, 18 A.L.R.5th 525 (2005).
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section, the court, unless otherwise agreed
by all parties, shall instruct the jury to
answer interrogatories or, if there is no
jury, shall make findings indicating:
(a) The amount of damages each claimant
would be entitled to recover if contributory
fault is disregarded; and
(b) The percentage of the total fault of
all the parties to each claim that is
allocated to each claimant, defendant,
third-party defendant, and person who has
been released from liability under
subsection (4) of this section.
. . . .
(4) A release, covenant not to sue, or
similar agreement entered into by a claimant
and a person liable, shall discharge that
person from all liability for contribution,
but it shall not be considered to discharge
any other persons liable upon the same claim
unless it so provides. However, the claim of
the releasing person against other persons
shall be reduced by the amount of the
released persons' equitable share of the
obligation, determined in accordance with
the provisions of this section.
It is well-established that fault must be apportioned
among “each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, and
person who has been released from liability” and that the
liability of each is limited to the degree of fault apportioned
to each.
Stratton v. Parker, 793 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Ky. 1990).
It is equally clear that liability shall be imposed in
proportion to fault, without regard to whether a particular
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tortfeasor was named as a party to the action.
Floyd v.
Carlisle Construction Co., 758 S.W.2d 430 (Ky. 1988).
In Central Kentucky Drying Co. v. Dept. of Housing,
Building and Construction, 858 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1993), the
Supreme Court specifically addressed setoffs against damage
awards and held that Stratton precludes consideration of a
setoff for amounts paid by settling tortfeasors.
The Court
reasoned:
If we were to hold otherwise . . . there
would be a real chilling effect on voluntary
settlements of claims. Non-settling
defendants would always get the benefit of
set-offs from overpayments by settling
defendants, but would never have to pay more
than their apportioned share, even if there
was an underpayment by the settling
defendant.
Central Kentucky Drying Co., 858 S.W.2d at 168.
We view the
rule enunciated in Stratton, Central Kentucky Drying Co. and
Floyd as broad enough to encompass the circumstance presented in
the case sub judice.
Here, two of the five tortfeasors chose to settle with
appellant before he filed the complaint in the circuit court.
Nathan, Corey, and Ian chose to litigate rather than settle
their claims and should not be permitted to benefit from the
purported overpayment made by the settling tortfeasors.
Central Kentucky Drying Co., 858 S.W.2d 165.
See
To allow Nathan,
Corey, and Ian to benefit from the payment made by the settling
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tortfeasors would promote the “chilling effect” on voluntary
settlement of claims.
See id.
As such, we believe the circuit
court erroneously ordered the damage award to be set off by the
amount the settling tortfeasors paid appellant.
Additionally, we note that pursuant to KRS 411.182,
the allocation of several liability to the three tortfeasors
shall be based upon the total liability (100%) less that
percentage allocated to the two settling tortfeasors (40%), for
a total liability of 60 percent, applied against the total
damage award of $4,294.00.
The several liability of Nathan,
Corey, and Ian will be $858.80 each.
For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion and Order and
the Order of the Fayette Circuit Court are reversed and this
cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, IAN BAKER:
Donald R. Todd
Heather Pack Howell
Todd & Walter
Lexington, Kentucky
Stephen J. Isaacs
Lexington, Kentucky
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