TODD HOUSTON v. DEBORAH DUNCAN, NOW FRANK
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MARCH 25, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000462-ME
TODD HOUSTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT1
HONORABLE KEVIN L. GARVEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-FC-009168
v.
DEBORAH DUNCAN, NOW FRANK
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Todd Houston has appealed from the February 12,
2004, order of the Jefferson Family Court which modified a
previous custody order and awarded primary residence and
physical custody of the minor child, Brittani Nicole Duncan, to
Deborah Frank, the child’s maternal grandmother.
1
Having
This case originated in Jefferson Circuit Court with Hon. John W. Potter
presiding. On December 11, 2000, following the creation of the family court
system, an order was entered transferring this case to the Jefferson Family
Court.
concluded that the family court’s findings in support of the
modification of custody pursuant to KRS2 403.340 and KRS
403.270(2) were sufficient and that it did not abuse its
discretion, we affirm.
Brittani’s parents are Todd Houston and Stacey Duncan,
who is the daughter of Deborah Frank.
Todd and Stacey dated
from November 1992 to October 1993,3 and Stacey became pregnant
during that time.
Brittani was born on August 15, 1993.
On
November 29, 1993, Deborah filed a verified petition for
temporary custody of Brittani, naming Stacey as the respondent.4
On December 6, 1993, Stacey filed an entry of appearance and
waiver of notice, admitting that it would be in Brittani’s best
interests to grant temporary custody to Deborah.
On that same
date, an agreed order was entered providing that Deborah would
have temporary custody of Brittani with Stacey having visitation
with Brittani and reserving the issue of child support.
On February 27, 1995, Todd filed a motion to intervene
in the case and he and Stacey5 filed a joint motion for temporary
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
Todd was 20 years of age and Stacey was 18.
4
Todd was not joined as a party to the proceedings and Deborah’s petition
claimed that Todd had denied being Brittani’s natural father and had refused
to pay child support.
5
Todd and Stacey were represented by the same attorney, who entered his
appearance on their behalf on February 27, 1995.
-2-
custody of Brittani.6
Todd also filed a response to Deborah’s
verified petition, in which he stated that he was Brittani’s
natural father and that “he was not given notice of any of the
prior proceedings in this case, including the granting of
temporary custody . . . by agreed order between [Deborah] and
[Stacey].”
He also claimed that neither he nor Stacey desired
for Deborah to have temporary custody of Brittani.
Todd
requested joint custody with Stacey, with Todd being the primary
residential custodian.
The circuit court in an order entered on
March 6, 1995, allowed Todd to intervene in the case.
On March 27, 1995, Todd filed a motion to hold Deborah
in contempt for refusing to allow him visitation with Brittani.7
Deborah filed several motions,8 including a motion requesting
psychological evaluations of Todd and Stacey.9
On April 10,
1995, the circuit court ordered that psychological evaluations
6
In Todd’s motion to intervene, he stated that he was declared Brittani’s
father by an order entered on February 16, 1995. However, that order is not
filed in the record on appeal.
7
The affidavit stated that during a hearing on February 27, 1995, the circuit
court ordered that Todd be allowed visitation with Brittani. However, there
is no order to this effect in the record on appeal, and we have not been
provided with a videotape of that hearing.
8
Most of these motions were never addressed by the circuit court.
9
Deborah also filed a response objecting to Todd’s visitation request on the
grounds that Todd had a criminal case pending in Jefferson District Court and
that increased visitation should be denied until the psychological
evaluations could be completed.
-3-
be performed on Deborah, Todd, and Brittani.10
Todd filed a
motion for his parents to have visitation with Brittani, and the
circuit court ordered said visitation on May 1, 1995.11
On May
8, 1995, the circuit court entered an order pursuant to
Deborah’s motion that Jefferson County public schools and
DeSales High School, a private Catholic school, release Todd’s
school records.
On June 17, 1995, the circuit court entered an
order that all of Todd’s anger control records be provided.
On July 20, 1995, an agreed order12 was entered between
Deborah and Todd.
The order stipulated that Deborah and Todd
would share joint custody of Brittani, with Todd having “primary
physical possession” of Brittani.
Each party was to have
“custody” of Brittani 50 percent of the time and Stacey was
allowed visitation.
the parties.
No child support was to be paid by any of
On June 5, 1996, Stacey filed a motion to
10
A motion filed by Deborah requesting the production of the medical and
juvenile records of Todd was granted by the circuit court in two separate
orders, each dated May 1, 1995.
11
Danny and Joyce Houston, Todd’s parents, were allowed visitation with
Brittani every other weekend from 6:00 p.m. on Saturday until 6:00 p.m. on
Sunday. This visitation order was modified by orders entered on May 9, 1995,
changing the time of the Houstons’ visitation to 11:00 a.m. Saturday until 11
a.m. on Sunday. Todd resided with his parents during this time and continued
to do so until his marriage in September 2000. Todd was granted visitation
with Brittani every week on Monday and Wednesday from 7:30 a.m. until 6:00
p.m. and on Father’s Day. Stacey was granted visitation with Brittani from
11:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. on Mother’s Day.
12
Hon. John W. Potter signed the order.
-4-
establish definite visitation.13
She claimed that neither Todd
nor Deborah was allowing her “appropriate” visitation with
Brittani and she requested overnight visitation.
Deborah filed
a motion for a psychological evaluation of Stacey, which was
granted by order entered on June 18, 1996.
The circuit court
referred this case to the Jefferson County Domestic Relations
Commissioner on June 11, 1996, with a handwritten request to
“expedite” the matter.
A hearing was held before the
Commissioner on June 27, 1996.
His report was filed on July 10,
1996, and the family court followed the recommendations and
entered an order on July 12, 1996.
The order did not allow
Stacey overnight visitation, but granted her specific visitation
with Brittani.
In an order dated December 11, 2000, this case was
transferred to the new family division of the Jefferson Circuit
Court.
On December 12, 2000, Todd filed a motion requesting
that the family court enter an order setting forth specific
visitation with Brittani for Deborah and him.14
On December 20,
2000, the family court, by separate orders, set Todd’s Christmas
visitation with Brittani and ordered the parties to complete a
13
Stacey hired a new attorney, who entered his appearance for her on the same
date.
14
By this time, according to a letter of record from Stacey’s former
attorney, Stacey’s whereabouts and address were unknown and she was not
considered for visitation.
-5-
mediation session regarding the remainder of Todd’s visitation
requests.15
The mediation outcome filed on March 9, 2001, noted
that the parties reached full agreement regarding the visitation
issue.
On July 11, 2001, Deborah filed a motion for
additional visitation with Brittani.
In her affidavit, Deborah
stated that Todd’s wife, Melissa Houston, and his mother, Joyce,
had contacted Child Protective Services (CPS) and made
allegations of child abuse against Deborah’s husband, Bud Frank.
Deborah claimed that her attorney advised her not to have any
contact with Brittani until the CPS complaint was resolved.
Deborah also claimed that due to the complaint she missed her
regular visitation with Brittani and since the complaint was
dismissed due to lack of evidence, she was entitled to make up
the missed visitation.
Again, the family court ordered the
parties to attend mediation to resolve the issues.
An agreement
was reached between the parties and filed on July 24, 2001.
On June 12, 2003, Todd filed a motion and affidavit to
modify custody.
Todd stated in his affidavit that it would be
in Brittani’s best interests for her to permanently reside with
him, with Deborah having some visitation.
15
The family court
On February 7, 2001, Deborah filed a motion to schedule a mediation date
and the family court entered an order on February 15, 2001, establishing that
mediation had been scheduled and reserved Deborah’s oral request for
attorney’s fees, pending the outcome of mediation and a written motion and
affidavit being filed by Deborah.
-6-
entered a mediation order on July 2, 2003.
A handwritten,
partial mediation agreement16 between the parties was entered on
July 31, 2003; however, the agreement did not address the change
of custody issue.
Since the custody issue had not been resolved
through mediation, Todd renewed his motion to modify custody and
a hearing was held before the family court on October 22, 2003.
At the hearing, Todd offered testimony from Janice
Haddaway, a child therapist who saw Brittani eight to ten times
prior to trial, his mother, his wife, and himself.
Through
their testimony, it was established that Todd was a caring
father; however, he worked third shift at his employment and did
not see Brittani much during the week.17
There was also
testimony that Brittani was a nervous child who suffered from an
adjustment disorder, anxiety, and depression.
It was further
established through their testimony that there were ongoing
disputes between Deborah and Todd and his wife.
Deborah presented testimony from her husband and
herself.
Both testified that Brittani was a very quiet child,
that she was happy living with them, that Deborah worked until
6:30 p.m. on weeknights, and that Bud took Brittani to school
16
The parties agreed to communicate by e-mail.
17
On weekdays Todd saw Brittani for approximately 45 minutes in the morning
before she went to school; for approximately 30 minutes after she got home
from school; and spoke with her by phone around 7:30 p.m. on his break. He
spent much more time with her on the weekends she was with him and all his
vacation time, 17 days a year, was spent with her.
-7-
and picked her up from school.
Deborah’s testimony confirmed
that there had been constant disputes between the parties.
When
asked by both her counsel and Todd’s counsel, Deborah testified
that she would be happy to have Brittani reside in her home
full-time.
The family court entered an opinion and order on
February 12, 2004,18 in which it determined that there was a need
for a primary residential custodian of Brittani.
The family
court found that based on the evidence presented that it would
be in Brittani’s best interests for Deborah and Todd to retain
joint custody, but for Deborah to serve as the primary
residential custodian.
This appeal followed.19
In reviewing a child custody award, the appellate
standard of review includes a determination of whether the
factual findings of the family court are clearly erroneous.20
A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by
18
On November 10, 2003, the family court entered an order that Deborah and
Todd must communicate with each other prior to addressing any issues about
Brittani.
19
Todd filed his notice of appeal in this case on March 4, 2004. His prehearing statement was due on March 24, 2004, but not received until March 25,
2004, and this Court issued a letter that the statement was filed late. Todd
then filed a motion for additional time on April 2, 2004, and tendered with
it his pre-hearing statement. There was no response filed by Deborah and on
April 14, 2004, this Court granted Todd’s motion for additional time. On May
19, 2004, this Court determined there was no need for a pre-hearing
conference and ordered that Todd’s brief was due on July 28, 2004. His brief
was filed on August 16, 2004.
20
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle, 719
S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986).
-8-
substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is evidence
sufficient to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable
person.21
Since the family court is in the best position to
evaluate the testimony and to weigh the evidence, an appellate
court should not substitute its own opinion for that of the
family court.22
If the findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence and if the correct law is applied, a family
court’s ultimate decision regarding custody will not be
disturbed, absent an abuse of discretion.23
Abuse of discretion
implies that the family court’s decision is unreasonable or
unfair.24
Thus, in reviewing the decision of the family court,
the test is not whether the appellate court would have decided
it differently, but whether the findings of the family court are
clearly erroneous, whether it applied the correct law, or
whether it abused its discretion.25
Todd asserts that as Brittani’s natural father, he has
a superior right to her custody.
However, the family court
found that Deborah, as a joint custodian of Brittani under the
agreed order of July 20, 1995, had the same custodial rights as
21
Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).
22
Reichle, 719 S.W.2d at 444.
23
Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982); Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74
S.W.3d 777, 782 (Ky.App. 2000).
24
Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Ky. 1994).
25
Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d at 782-83.
-9-
Todd.26
It is important to note that Todd failed to move the
family court for a factual finding that Deborah did not have
equal standing to pursue custody.
This failure is fatal to
Todd’s argument that he has a superior right to custody.27
While
normally a natural parent has a superior right to a child,28 that
right can be waived.
The family court’s finding that Todd
waived his superior right by entering into an agreed order with
Deborah in which they shared joint custody of Brittani is
supported by clear and convincing evidence.29
In Vinson,30 the Supreme Court of Kentucky discussed
the rights of a non-parent pursuing custody of a child:
When a non-parent does not meet the
statutory standard of de facto custodian,
the non-parent pursuing custody must prove
either of the following two exceptions to a
parent’s superior right or entitlement to
custody: (1) that the parent is shown by
clear and convincing evidence to be an unfit
custodian; or (2) that the parent has waived
26
Kentucky Civil Rule (CR) 52.04; see Vinson v. Sorrell, 136 S.W.3d 465, 471
(Ky 2004); and Jones v. Jones, 577 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Ky.App. 1979).
27
Cherry 634 S.W.2d at 423.
28
See Davis v. Collingsworth, 771 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Ky. 1989).
29
The family court stated in its February 12, 2004, order:
[Todd] has apparently lost sight of the fact
that, pursuant to their Agreed Order granting
them equal time with the child, [Deborah] has
been placed on the same level as a parent with
regard to the child and, as pointed out above,
a significant change in circumstances must
occur for the Court to consider modification of
this relationship between grandmother and the
child.
30
136 S.W.3d at 468.
-10-
his or her superior right to custody by
clear and convincing evidence [footnotes
omitted] [emphasis original].
Just as any other constitutional right can be waived, a parent
through an intentional or voluntary relinquishment of his
superior right to custody can waive that right.31
“Waiver
requires that there must be some statement or action that
unequivocally waives the right to superior custody.”32
In this
case, once the agreed order was entered establishing Todd and
Deborah as joint custodians of Brittani, Deborah assumed the
role of a custodial parent.33
Deborah is not a de facto
custodian of Brittani under KRS 403.270, but she is a de jure
custodian because she was granted custody under a court order.
Also, it was not necessary for the family court to find that
Todd was an unfit parent, because pursuant to Vinson, the family
31
Greathouse v. Shreve, 891 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Ky. 1995).
32
Diaz v. Morales, 51 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Ky.App. 2001).
33
Todd argues that a parent does not lose his/her superior right to custody
just because “a child is left in the care of a non-parent for a considerable
length of time.” The custody situation in this case far exceeds this as
evidenced by the family court’s order. A person can contract away their
superior right to custody of his child. Boatright v. Walker, 715 S.W.2d 237
(Ky.App. 1986). There is no indication that the July 20, 1995, agreed order
was temporary in nature and thus it was sufficient evidence to prove waiver
of the superior right to custody. See James v. James, 457 S.W.2d 263 (Ky.
1970). Todd argues that the agreed order “constituted a vast improvement
with respect to his parental rights” and thus does not constitute proof of a
waiver on his part. However, what Todd fails to acknowledge is that he
already had the superior right as Brittani’s biological father and the agreed
order did not give him rights, but only minimized his rights as he agreed to
share them with Deborah. Todd could have argued his superior right to
Brittani and questioned Deborah’s standing prior to signing the agreed order;
however, he failed to do so.
-11-
court could find either a waiver of the superior right or that
the natural parent was unfit.
In Scheer v. Zeigler,34 this Court held that the
criteria for modification of a joint custody award is the same
as for modification of a sole custody award.
Thus, for there to
be modification of joint custody, as in all custody cases, the
party seeking modification must first meet the threshold
requirements for modification contained in KRS 403.340.
In this case, the family court properly set forth the
statutes for modification of custody.35
For a proposed
modification occurring more than two years36 after entry of the
custody decree, KRS 403.340(3) and (4) set forth the
requirements which must be met in order for the family court to
modify a prior custody award.37
34
The family court properly noted
21 S.W.3d 807 (Ky.App. 2000).
35
Todd next argues to this Court that KRS 403.340 should not apply to custody
awards between a parent and a non-parent, but cites no authority to support
this argument. As we noted, Todd waived this superior right to custody of
Brittani by clear and convincing evidence, e.g., the agreed order dated July
20, 1995. The agreed order is clear that the party’s had joint custody of
Brittani. “Joint custody modification falls exclusively within the purview
of KRS 405.340 and .350 . . . .” Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d at 784.
Therefore, we find no merit to this argument.
36
Todd’s motion for modification was filed almost 8 years after the agreed
order was entered on July 20, 1995.
37
KRS 403.340(3) and (4) provide as follows:
(3)
If a court of this state has jurisdiction
pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, the court shall not modify a
prior custody decree unless after hearing it
finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen
since the prior decree or that were unknown to
-12-
the court at the time of entry of the prior
decree, that a change has occurred in the
circumstances of the child or his custodian,
and that the modification is necessary to serve
the best interests of the child. When
determining if a change has occurred and
whether a modification of custody is in the
best interests of the child, the court shall
consider the following:
(a)
(b)
Whether the child has been integrated
into the family of the petitioner with
consent of the custodian;
(c)
The factors set forth in KRS 403.270(2)
to determine the best interests of the
child;
(d)
Whether the child’s present environment
endangers seriously his physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health;
(e)
Whether the harm likely to be caused by a
change of environment is outweighed by
its advantages to him; and
(f)
(4)
Whether the custodian agrees to the
modification;
Whether the custodian has placed the
child with a de facto custodian.
In determining whether a child’s present
environment may endanger seriously his
physical, mental, moral, or emotional health,
the court shall consider all relevant factors,
including, but not limited to:
(a)
The interaction and interrelationship of
the child with his parent or parents, his
de facto custodian, his siblings, and any
other person who may significantly affect
the child’s best interests;
(b)
The mental and physical health of all
individuals involved;
(c)
Repeated or substantial failure, without
good cause as specified in KRS 403.240,
or either parent to observe visitation,
child support or other provisions of the
decree which affect the child, except
that modification of custody orders shall
not be made solely on the basis of
failure to comply with visitation or
child support provisions, or on the basis
-13-
that in determining the best interests of the child, it is to
apply KRS 403.270(2).38
Todd acknowledges that pursuant to the statutes a
modification of custody was appropriate.
In fact, by filing his
motion, Todd sought a modification so he could become the sole
custodian.
Todd further conceded this need for modification in
his brief to this Court when he stated:
The family court correctly found that there
had been a significant change in
circumstance, warranting modification. More
of which parent is more likely to allow
visitation or pay child support;
(d)
38
If domestic violence and abuse, as
defined in KRS 403.720, is found by
the court to exist, the extent to
which the domestic violence and
abuse has affected the child and
the child’s relationship to both
parents.
KRS 403.270(2) states, in pertinent part, as follows:
The court shall determine custody in accordance
with the best interests of the child and equal
consideration shall be given to each parent and to
any de facto custodian. The court shall consider all
relevant factors including:
(a)
The wishes of the child’s parent or parents,
and any de facto custodian, as to his custody;
(b)
The wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(c)
The interaction and interrelationship of the
child with his parent or parents, his siblings,
and any other person who may significantly
affect the child’s best interests;
(d)
The child’s adjustment to his home, school, and
community;
(e)
The mental and physical health of all
individuals involved;
-14-
specifically, the Court found the parties’
relationship was strained and that they
found it difficult to communication [sic]
and cooperate with respect to Brittani. The
child was upset about this growing discord
and was, consequently, seeing a therapist
[citations omitted].39
Thus, Todd does not argue before this Court that the family
court did not make sufficient findings regarding the need for
modification, but rather that the family court erred in awarding
custody primarily to Deborah, rather than to him.
The family court stated:
[T]he Court concludes that it would be in
the best interest of Brittani for one party
to have primary residence, as well as final
decision[-]making authority for her. The
evidence as presented indicates the
grandmother is best suited to take on the
role of primary residential parent. Father
had proven to be a very caring and loving
father. However, his time with the child is
limited. The Court must remind the parties
that the decision it is making is designed
to promote the best interest of the child.
The child cannot thrive in an environment in
which everyone she loves is constantly
fighting and where she is placed squarely in
the middle. The solution for the Court is
to put the child in one primary residence,
with one primary custodian who, in the event
of disagreement, can make a decision
39
The family court found that both parties exhibited behaviors, including the
constant bickering over Brittani’s medical care, which led to Brittani’s
“nervous stomach” and the change in her behavior to a more quiet and reserved
child. The family court further made findings regarding its interview with
Brittani, and while it attempted to keep her feelings private, the family
court stated its interview with Brittani was “very revealing.” The family
court found “the child did confirm for the court that there is a great amount
of discord between the parties, and that it is her wish for the fighting to
just stop.” The family court concluded a change had to be made to stop the
fighting between the parties and the effect that it had on Brittani.
-15-
regarding the major aspects of the child’s
life. Brittani should never go without
proper medical treatment, etc. simply
because two people whom she loves and whom
[sic] love her can not, or will not, agree
[emphasis added].40
Todd argues that it was error for the family court to
name Deborah as Brittani’s primary residential custodian,
because she had not filed a motion for modification.
However,
once Todd filed his motion, the family court was required to
determine whether change of custody was proper and what
custodial arrangement was in the best interests of Brittani.
At
the custody modification hearing, Deborah was questioned by
counsel for both parties regarding her desire to have custody of
Brittani.
Todd did not object to this testimony coming into
evidence.
Further, the family court judge plainly explained to
the parties at the hearing that it would determine with whom
Brittani would live.
The family court judge interviewed
Brittani in his chambers, but the interview was viewed in the
courtroom by counsel for both parties.
No objection was made to
the family court judge’s interview of Brittani.
In the family
court judge’s discussion with Brittani, both parties were
considered as custodians, but there was no objection made by
40
The family court had previously stated:
The issue surrounding the flu shot is a perfect
example of such. Neither party took any steps
contrary to what the other wished or recommended;
rather, they simply could not reach an agreement, not
knowing who should take the responsibility for making
the final decision.
-16-
Todd at that time.
After the interview, the family court judge
again spoke to the parties and their counsel.
The judge made it
clear that he was making a decision as to whom Brittani would
live with, but no objection was made by Todd.
Todd argues that with the exception of finding that he
had “limited” time to spend with Brittani, the family court did
not provide any basis for modification of custody in favor of
Deborah.
However, Todd failed to file a motion under CR 52.04
asking the family court to make more specific findings as to its
choice for primary residential custodian for Brittani.
CR 52.01
provides that “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury . . . the court shall find the facts specifically . . . .”
CR 52.04 provides:
A final judgment shall not be reversed
or remanded because of the failure of the
trial court to make a finding of fact on an
issue essential to the judgment unless such
failure is brought to the attention of the
trial court by a written request for a
finding on that issue or by a motion
pursuant to Rule 52.02.
Obviously, factual findings in support of the family
court’s determination of primary residential custodian are
essential to its judgment.
Todd did not at any time move the
family court to make more specific findings to support its
custody modification award.
Although Todd claims the findings
should have been more detailed, he argues that he was not
-17-
required to ask the family court for more specific findings
under CR 52.02 or CR 52.04 because the family court’s decision
was not silent on this issue.
He cites no law to support this
argument, which we determine to be without merit.
In Crum v. Commonwealth,41 the parent argued that the
family court failed to state “specifically” its findings to
justify termination of his parental rights.
This Court stated
“[n]evertheless, Crum had the opportunity and the right to make
a request for more specific findings and elected not to do so.
Accordingly, any alleged error is waived on appeal” [citations
omitted].
Likewise, in the case before us, Todd did not
properly preserve this issue for appellate review.42
Todd further argues that even though the family court
stated otherwise, “it cannot even be said that the parties have
joint legal custody, which by definition, precludes one party
from being declared a primary custodian.”
The family court
stated as follows:
Upon a review of the evidence as a
whole presented, the Court believes that a
significant change has occurred which
warrants the need for a modification.
However, the Court does not believe that the
situation before it rises to the level of
41
928 S.W.2d 355 (Ky.App. 1996).
that “[t]he failure, if there was
to make adequate findings of fact
required by CR 52.02 or CR 52.04;
42
See also Cherry, 634 S.W.2d at 425 (stating
a failure, on the part of the trial judge
was not brought to his attention as
consequently it is waived”).
Vinson, 136 S.W.3d at 471.
-18-
requiring a full change of custody, rather,
merely a designation of primary residential
custodian.
. . .
Based upon that analysis, the Court
concludes that it would be in the best
interest of Brittani for one party to have
primary residence, as well as final
decision[-]making authority for her. The
evidence as presented indicates that
grandmother is best suited to take on the
role of primary residential parent. Father
has proven to be a very caring and loving
father. However, his time with the child is
limited.
. . .
Therefore, grandmother shall be awarded
primary residence and physical possession of
the child. Moreover, in the event of a
disagreement, grandmother shall have final
decision[-]making authority. Father shall
be entitled to liberal parenting time with
the child.
. . .
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that physical
possession and primary residence of the
child, Brittani Nicole Duncan, shall be
modified. Petitioner, Deborah Frank, shall
be awarded primary residence and physical
possession of the child, as well as final
decision[-]making authority in the event of
disagreement. Parenting time for the
Intervening Respondent, Todd Houston, shall
be as set forth above.
As the Supreme Court of Kentucky noted in Fenwick,43
the term “primary residential custodian” is not defined in the
43
114 S.W.3d at 779.
-19-
Kentucky statutes.
However, that term is generally used to
refer to the party with whom the child will primarily reside.
In a joint custody situation such as this, the custodian is
awarded “‘visitation,’” “‘time-sharing,’” or “‘parenting time’”
with the child.44
The Supreme Court further noted that a
“designation of primary residential custodian normally confers
on the party “(1) the primary role in minor day-to-day decisions
concerning the child; (2) the responsibility for providing a
residence,” and “(3) the normal routine care and control of the
child.”45
Joint custody does not require an equal division of
time,46 or equal assignment of decision-making authority
concerning the child.47
The parties and the courts are free to
vest great authority in one custodian even under a joint custody
arrangement.
While, the essential nature of joint custody is
the custodians sharing decision-making authority,48 the parties
will often agree, or the court will designate, that one of the
custodians will act as the “primary residential custodian.”49
44
Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d at 779 (citing Drury v. Drury, 32 S.W.3d 521, 523
(Ky.App. 2000)).
45
Id.
46
Squires v. Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765 (Ky. 1993).
47
Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Ky. 2003).
48
Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d at 767.
49
Todd cites Aton v. Aton, 911 S.W.2d 612 (Ky.App. 1995), to support his
argument that the definition of joint custody precludes one party from being
declared a primary custodian. However, this portion of Aton has been
abrogated. See Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d at 773.
-20-
Under the family court’s current order in this case,
Deborah would assume the primary role in the minor day-to-day
decisions concerning Brittani, she would be primarily
responsible for providing a residence for Brittani, and she
would assume Brittani’s normal routine care and control, while
Todd’s rights include specific visitation times, “liberal
parenting time with the child,” the right to give Deborah input
on decisions affecting Brittani, and the right to access
information concerning Brittani in regard to her health, her
education, and other matters reserved for her custodians.50
family court’s decision in this case was close.
The
There was
sufficient evidence to support an award of primary residential
custody to either Deborah or Todd.
“However, the trial judge
held the ultimate power of decision in this case, and under our
standard of review we cannot say that his ruling was clearly
50
Todd was awarded visitation with Brittani as follows:
[E]very other Thursday, beginning with picking
the child up at school at the end of the school
day on Thursday afternoon, and shall continue
until he returns her to school on Monday
morning. In the event a long weekend falls on
his visitation weekend, he shall keep the child
that Monday and return her to school on Tuesday
morning. During the weeks in which he does not
have the child for the weekend, he shall be
allowed visitation with her to commence at the
end of the school day on Wednesday and shall
continue overnight with him returning the child
to school on Thursday morning. The holiday
visitation schedule which the parties have
previously entered will remain the same until
further Orders of the Court.
-21-
erroneous.”51
Further, the family court awarded formal decision
making authority to Deborah only in the “event of a
disagreement.”
Todd argues that there were more appropriate
ways, e.g., use of a parenting coordinator,52 for the family
court to modify the custody order, rather than stripping him of
his right to share in the decision-making regarding Brittani.53
However, this type of modification is exactly what he asked the
family court to do in regard to Deborah’s rights with Brittani,
when he moved for sole custody of Brittani.
While the family
court’s award comes very near to an award of sole custody, we
conclude that the family court’s decision properly constituted a
modification of the original joint custody arrangement pursuant
to the factors set forth in KRS 403.340(3) and (4) and KRS
403.270(2).
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
51
Aton, 911 S.W.2d at 616.
52
This is a program provided through the family court to provide parents in
high conflict an alternative to litigation.
53
Todd argues in his brief that the family court order does not contain a
requirement that Deborah consult with him. We conclude that the language in
the order, as conceded by counsel for Deborah at oral argument, requires
Deborah to consult with Todd in good faith in making all significant
decisions regarding Brittani.
-22-
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
W. Bronson Howell
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sammy Deeb
A. Holland Houston
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Sammy Deeb
Louisville, Kentucky
-23-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.