ROGERS GROUP, INC., AND HOLLOWAY & SON CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. v. GARY MASTERSON; ROSZELLE MOORE; ANN WILSON; GENE SNAWDER; CLARA TOLES; DAN GIBSON; JUNE FIELDS; CONCERNED CITIZENS UNITED, INC.; CITY OF WEST POINT; WEST POINT CITY COUNCIL; WEST POINT PLANNING & ZONING COMMISSION; WEST POINT BOARD OF ZONING ADJUSTMENTS; AND HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT, HON. T. STEVEN BLAND, JUDGE
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RENDERED:
APRIL 29, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000341-MR
ROGERS GROUP, INC., AND
HOLLOWAY & SON CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN WOODS POTTER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-01627
GARY MASTERSON; ROSZELLE MOORE;
ANN WILSON; GENE SNAWDER; CLARA TOLES;
DAN GIBSON; JUNE FIELDS; CONCERNED
CITIZENS UNITED, INC.; CITY OF
WEST POINT; WEST POINT CITY COUNCIL;
WEST POINT PLANNING & ZONING COMMISSION;
WEST POINT BOARD OF ZONING ADJUSTMENTS;
AND HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT, HON. T. STEVEN BLAND,
JUDGE
APPELLEES
TO BE HEARD WITH:
NO. 2004-CA-000483-MR
CITY OF WEST POINT;
WEST POINT CITY COUNCIL;
WEST POINT PLANNING & ZONING COMMISSION;
AND WEST POINT BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS
v.
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HON. JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-01627
GARY MASTERSON; ROSZELLE MOORE;
ANN WILSON; GENE SNAWDER;
APPELLANTS
CLARA TOLES; DAN GIBSON;
JUNE FIELDS; CONCERNED CITIZENS
UNITED INC.; ROGERS GROUP, INC.;
HOLLOWAY & SON CONSTRUCTION, INC.;
AND HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT,
HON. T. STEVEN BLAND, JUDGE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND
REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
BARBER AND VANMETER, JUDGES; AND HUDDLESTON, SENIOR
BARBER, JUDGE:
The Hardin Circuit Court determined that a
previous judgment entered by another judge of that circuit was
void; being violative of the prohibition against illegal
judicial rezoning, thus, it set aside the judgment.
This litigation has a long history.
We affirm.
The story began
when the Fort Knox Military Reservation deeded some surplus land
to the City of West Point.
The City of West Point then
transferred the land to a private owner and reserved for itself
17 acres of land to be deeded to the City of West Point in the
future.
The land was then conveyed to Holloway & Son
Construction Co., Inc. (Holloway).
In 1996 Rogers Group, Inc.
(Rogers), a multi-state rock quarry company, became interested
in the land because of a supposedly marketable seam of limestone
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
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located on the property.
In February 1997 Rogers and Holloway
filed for a conditional use permit to mine the limestone.
Apparently the application process for the conditional
use permit broke down and Rogers and Holloway filed a
declaratory judgment action in Hardin Circuit Court challenging
the constitutionality of the City of West Point’s zoning system.
Circuit Case Number 97-CI-00904 was filed by Rogers and Holloway
against the City of West Point, West Point City Council, West
Point Planning & Zoning Commission, and West Point Board of
Zoning Adjustments – the same parties as the appellees in Case
No. 2004-CA-000341-MR and the appellants in Case No. 2004-CA000483-MR (hereafter collectively referred to as West Point).
West Point counter-claimed against Rogers and Holloway for the
17 acres it alleges is reserved in the deed.
The case progressed and a trial by deposition was
conducted, but before the court issued a decision the parties
reached an agreement to settle the case and presented that
settlement to the court in the form of an agreed judgment.
The
court entered the judgment as its own on June 15, 1999.
On June 25, 1999 Gary Masterson, Roszelle Moore, Ann
Wilson, Gene Snawder, Clara Toles, Dan Gibson, June Fields, and
Concerned Citizens United, Inc. (collectively referred to as
Concerned Citizens) filed a motion to intervene as parties in
97-CI-00904.
The court denied the motion generating the first
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appeal to this Court.
This Court upheld the circuit court’s
ruling and the Kentucky Supreme Court denied discretionary
review.
Concerned Citizens continued to pursue having the
judgment in 97-CI-00904 invalidated by filing a separate lawsuit
(Circuit Case Number 99-CI-01242) against West Point charging
that there were violations of the Open Meetings Act in its vote
to approve the settlement reached in 97-CI-00904.
The Hardin
Circuit Court dismissed the action generating a second appeal to
this Court.
Again this Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling
and the Kentucky Supreme Court denied discretionary review.
Five months after the Supreme Court denied
discretionary review in 97-CI-00904 and four months after
discretionary review was denied in 99-CI-01242, Concerned
Citizens instituted an independent action.
That action, filed
pursuant to CR 60.03, sought to have the judgment in 97-CI-00904
set aside on the ground that it constituted illegal judicial
rezoning.
That case, Circuit Case Number 02-CI-01627 is the
subject of the current appeals before this Court.
The circuit court determined that the judgment entered
in 97-CI-00904 did constitute illegal judicial rezoning and
ordered that the judgment be set aside as void.
In Case No.
2004-CA-000341-MR, Rogers and Holloway challenge the circuit
court’s order setting aside the judgment in 97-CI-00904.
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In
Case No. 2004-CA-000483-MR, West Point asks that this Court
reinstate those portions of the judgment in 97-CI-00904 that
provided that Rogers and Holloway would deed the 17 acres back
to West Point.
We shall deal with the issues raised in Case No. 2004CA-000341-MR first.
In that appeal Rogers and Holloway make
several arguments for why the circuit court’s judgment setting
aside the agreed judgment in 97-CI-00904 should be reversed.
West Point agrees with Rogers and Holloway at least to the
extent that it wishes the agreed judgment to be reinstated or
the 17 acres to be conveyed to it.
In their first two arguments Rogers and Holloway
contend that the agreed judgment in 97-CI-00904 was not illegal
judicial rezoning as found by the circuit court.
It argues that
the agreed judgment, rather than being illegal judicial
rezoning, is simply protection from an illegal zoning system.
They state that other courts have recognized this difference.
Concerned Citizens contends that the agreed judgment did
constitute illegal judicial rezoning.
Kentucky case law makes clear that the judicial system
is not to be substituted for decisions more appropriately made
by a legislative body.
American Beauty Homes Corp. v.
Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm’n, 379
S.W.2d 450, 455 (Ky. 1964).
Rezoning a piece of property is not
-5-
a judicial function.
City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d
173, 178 (Ky. 1971).
Even where a court has the authority to
find that an action by the legislative body is arbitrary, it
does not have the authority to order a particular classification
be applied to the property.
McKinstry v. Wells, 548 S.W.2d 169,
174 (Ky.App. 1977).
An examination of the agreed judgment at issue here
clearly shows that the court was engaging in judicial rezoning.
The agreed judgment is lengthy and a number of its provisions
offend the principles cited in the cases above.
For example,
the agreed judgment provides that Rogers’ and Holloway’s ability
to make use of the land is governed solely by the agreed
judgment and not by ordinances that have or may be adopted
pursuant to KRS Chapter 100.
It also provides that Rogers and
Holloway may operate a rock quarry on the property with details
of what that constitutes.
Further, the judgment is not only
binding on Rogers, Holloway, and West Point, but also their
successors and assigns.
In essence, the court zoned the
property at issue.
Rogers, Holloway, and West Point include in their
arguments that one of the motivations for the agreed judgment
was a concern that West Point’s zoning system would be found
invalid pursuant to Hardin County v. Jost, 897 S.W.2d 592
(Ky.App. 1995).
There Hardin County’s zoning system was struck
-6-
down in its entirety because its plan allowed for only two land
uses – residential and agricultural.
Any other use had to be
gained through a conditional use permit.
Id. at 593.
The
problems with the system were numerous, but at its core, Hardin
County’s zoning system was no system because it allowed only ad
hoc zoning.
There was no plan within which zoning could be
developed, thus, the laws with respect to zoning were not of
general application.
Id. at 595.
In the agreed judgment West Point acknowledges that
its system would likely be found unconstitutional for these same
reasons.
Whether this will ultimately be found by the court is
unknown, but even were the zoning system found to be invalid, it
does not follow that Rogers and Holloway may make any use of the
property it sees fit.
If the system were unconstitutional, then
West Point would obviously have to adopt a new comprehensive
plan and zoning rules.
There is no reason to believe that the
property in dispute would not be subject to those ordinances.
The contention by Rogers and Holloway that other case
law has recognized the distinction between protection from an
illegal zoning system and illegal judicial rezoning is not
supported by their references.
not persuasive.
Further, those authorities are
For instance, in Schwartz v. City of Flint, 426
Mich. 295, 395 N.W.2d 678 (1986) the Court engaged in a long
discussion about its own standards of review on zoning issues
-7-
and ultimately determined it had been employing an incorrect
standard.
The opinion is truly specific to Michigan law and we
do not see that it provides insight to the situation presented
in this case especially since Kentucky law on the subject is
quite clear.
We would note that even in Schwartz the Court
acknowledged that courts should not perform the legislative
function of zoning and that it is generally beyond the judicial
power to determine what restrictions are applicable to a
Id. 426 Mich. at 308-309, 395
particular piece of property.
N.W.2d at 683.
Likewise, City of Louisville v. Kavanaugh, 495 S.W.2d
502 (Ky. 1973) is distinguishable.
In that case the Court
clearly stated that it is not the role of the judiciary to
conduct de novo determinations about the zoning applicable to a
piece of property.
Id. at 505.
Although the circuit court in
Kavanaugh had directed the property be classified in a
particular zoning category, Kentucky’s highest court found that
this did not violate the rule against judicial rezoning because
the court had not made a de novo determination.
It had merely
ordered that the classification required by the record be
applied.
Id. at 506.
In the instant case there is no dispute that West
Point had no zoning classification that would have allowed the
operation of a rock quarry.
Thus, the agreed judgment created
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the zone in contravention of the rule against judicial rezoning,
and it applied it only to Rogers and Holloway.
The contention
by Rogers and Holloway that this action by the circuit court
represents only a fraction of the court’s power is not in line
with the case law that requires planning and zoning to be
applicable throughout the community.
Hardin County v. Jost,
supra.
Rogers and Holloway next contend that Concerned
Citizens did not file its independent action under CR 60.03 in a
timely manner.
CR 60.03 provides:
Rule 60.02 shall not limit the power of
any court to entertain an independent action
to relieve a person from a judgment, order
or proceeding on appropriate equitable
grounds. Relief shall not be granted in an
independent action if the ground of relief
sought has been denied in a proceeding by
motion under Rule 60.02, or would be barred
because not brought in time under the
provisions of that rule.
By its terms, CR 60.03 is to be read in conjunction
with CR 60.02 and the case law so recognizes.
Huffaker v.
Twyford, 445 S.W.2d 124, 125 (Ky. 1969).
In this case Concerned Citizens sought to set aside
the agreed judgment in 97-CI-00904 on the ground that the
court’s action was beyond its authority.
Concerned Citizens
argues that the judgment itself is void.
Under CR 60.02 a
judgment attacked by motion on the ground that it is void is not
-9-
required to be filed within a specific time.
Louisville, 262 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Ky. 1953).
Engle v. City of
The only
requirement is that the action be filed within a reasonable
time, Foremost Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 892 S.W.2d 607, 610
(Ky.App. 1995), and even this proposition is debatable since a
void judgment does not acquire validity with the passage of
time.
Wright & Miller 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.2d §2862.
Here Rogers and Holloway point to KRS 100.347 and its
requirement that an appeal from a planning and zoning decision
is required to be prosecuted within 30 days.
Rogers and
Holloway argue either that Concerned Citizens should be held to
the 30-day requirement or that it at least provides a good
indication of what the legislature considers to be a reasonable
time.
Rogers and Holloway also complain that Concerned Citizens
waited over three years after the agreed judgment was entered
and several months after the Supreme Court denied discretionary
review in the prior two appeals to file its action under CR
60.03 and this is simply too long.
The circuit court heard these arguments and determined
that Concerned Citizens had filed within a reasonable time.
The
standard of review is whether the circuit court abused its
discretion when it made that determination.
Fortney v. Mahan,
302 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Ky. 1957); Schott v. Citizens Fidelity Bank
and Trust Co., 692 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Ky.App. 1985).
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We do not
believe any abuse of discretion occurred.
It is clear that
Concerned Citizens has been challenging the agreed judgment in
one way or another since it was entered, and the circuit court
found that Rogers, Holloway, and West Point have not been misled
by any delay.
Rogers and Holloway next argue that Concerned Citizens
should have brought this action at the same time that it brought
99-CI-01242.
That action challenged West Point’s process of
approving the agreed judgment prior to its entry as being
violative of the Open Meetings Act.
While it is true that there
is generally opposition to piecemeal litigation, the policy
reasons behind that are to prevent a defendant from being
repeatedly hauled into court over the same or similar issues by
the same person or persons.
really been out of court.
In this case the parties have never
Further, even if we said the case
suffered from this defect since the agreed judgment is void,
other, different citizens or property owners of West Point could
file suit and the same result would occur.
Rogers’ and Holloway’s next argument is that Concerned
Citizens does not have standing to maintain an independent
action.
Rogers and Holloway contend that because Concerned
Citizens did not file this action based on KRS Chapter 100 it
must find standing outside the statute in the common law.
Under
common law in order to challenge a public entity’s action one
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must show some particular harm beyond that sustained by the
public generally.
While this is an interesting argument it must fail.
As this Court has recognized, even before the adoption of KRS
Chapter 100 and specifically KRS 100.347(2) which confers
standing on a wide basis, Kentucky courts have allowed a broader
class of persons or entities to maintain suit on zoning issues.
21st Cent. Dev. Co., LLC v. Watts, 958 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Ky.App.
1997).
Under the principles stated in Watts, Concerned Citizens
clearly has standing.
Finally, Rogers and Holloway argue that since
Concerned Citizens was never a party to the original case, 97CI-00904, it cannot file an independent action under CR 60.03.
There is no merit to this argument.
The language of the Rule
itself makes clear that it provides an avenue for anyone to
attack a judgment.
We turn now to Case No. 2004-CA-000483-MR in which
West Point argues that even if this Court upholds the circuit
court’s decision to set aside the agreed judgment in 97-CI00904, we should also rule that West Point should still receive
its 17 acres as set forth in that agreed judgment.
The only
argument that West Point makes in support of this result is that
none of the parties have objected to it receiving the 17 acres
-12-
and so it would like to put an end to this part of the
litigation.
Despite West Point’s representation, Rogers and
Holloway did respond that there is an issue about the 17 acres
of property.
In defense of the counter-claim by West Point in
97-CI-00904 Rogers and Holloway filed an answer disputing West
Point’s right to the acreage.
There, and in their brief to this
Court, Rogers and Holloway state that the reservation was void
because it was an agreement to agree and contained an inadequate
description of the property.
The circuit court found that the agreed judgment’s
provisions giving West Point the acreage and settling the zoning
issues were tied together.
Thus, it would be inequitable to set
aside only part of the agreed judgment.
We agree, especially
since it appears that if not for the agreed judgment there would
exist a dispute between the parties about whether West Point is
entitled to the property at all.
The judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court is affirmed
and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
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JOINT BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS,
ROGERS GROUP, INC. AND
HOLLOWAY AND SON CONSTRUCTION
CO., INC.:
David Pike
F. Keith Brown
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS, CITY OF
WEST POINT, WEST POINT CITY
COUNCIL, WEST POINT PLANNING &
ZONING COMMISSION, and WEST
POINT BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS:
Thomas E. Cooper
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, CITY OF
WEST POINT, WEST POINT CITY
COUNCIL, WEST POINT PLANNING &
ZONING COMMISSION, WEST POINT
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS:
Thomas E. Cooper
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, GARY
MASTERSON, ROSZELLE MOORE, ANN
WILSON, GENE SNAWDER, CLARA
TOLES, DAN GIBSON, JUNE
FIELDS, CONCERNED CITIZENS
UNITED, INC., ROGERS GROUP,
INC., HOLLOWAY & SON
CONSTRUCTION, INC., and HARDIN
CIRCUIT COURT, HON. T. STEVEN
BLAND, JUDGE:
W. Henry Graddy, IV
Midway, Kentucky
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