MICHAEL ELLIOTT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 16, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000065-MR
MICHAEL ELLIOTT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS B. HOPPER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CR-00167
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Michael Elliott has appealed from an order
denying his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr 1
11.42.
Elliott contends that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel in connection with his murder trial because trial
counsel failed to investigate statements given by two
exculpatory witnesses and/or failed to call the witnesses to
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
testify during the trial.
Elliott also contends that the trial
court erred by denying his motion without conducting an
evidentiary hearing, erred by failing to recuse from presiding
over his motion, and erred in “denying the appellant’s claim of
actual innocence and his wrongful incarceration[.]”
Having
concluded that the motion was filed outside of the limitations
period for filing an RCr 11.42 motion, that Elliott could have
raised his ineffective assistance claim in his previous RCr
11.42 proceeding, that Elliott was not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his motion, that the trial judge did not
err in failing to recuse himself from the proceedings, and that
his claim of “actual innocence” and “wrongful incarceration” is
without merit, we affirm.
On December 10, 1991, a Laurel County grand jury
returned indictments against Elliott and his co-defendant, Allen
Cushman, for murder, 2 burglary in the first degree, 3 attempted
murder, 4 and robbery in the first degree. 5
Elliott was also
indicted as a persistent felony offender in the first degree
(PFO I). 6
The charges resulted from the August 21, 1991, murder
of Earl L. Cowden and the attempted murder of Cowden’s son,
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 506.010.
3
KRS 511.020.
4
KRS 506.010 and KRS 511.020.
5
KRS 515.020.
6
KRS 532.080(3).
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Leon.
Cushman was tried separately in November 1995, and was
convicted on all four counts of the indictment and sentenced to
death.
However, before Cushman perfected his appeal, and prior
to Elliott’s trial, he died of natural causes.
After nearly three years of delay brought on by an
interlocutory appeal taken by Elliott from the trial court’s
1992 denial of his ex parte request for the appointment of a
specially-trained mitigation investigator, in October 1997,
Elliott was tried in the Laurel Circuit Court.
At trial, the
Commonwealth’s case was heavily dependant upon an eyewitness
identification made by Cowden’s neighbor, Ted Proffitt.
On the
afternoon of Cowden’s murder, Proffitt testified that he was
working outside of his house when Mrs. Cowden and her grandson
ran out of a field that separated their houses and Mrs. Cowden
screamed that someone was breaking into her residence.
Proffitt
immediately ran to the Cowden residence to investigate and saw
both a strange car in the Cowden’s driveway and Cushman in the
basement of the house.
Proffitt then returned home to call the
state police.
While waiting for the police to arrive, Proffitt saw
Cowden driving down the road towards Cowden’s house, so he ran
towards the Cowden home in an attempt to stop Cowden before he
walked in on the intruders.
When Proffitt arrived at the Cowden
residence, he heard a loud “dynamite” sound in the house, and,
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looking through the open front door, saw a man standing over the
body of Cowden.
While testifying, Proffitt identified Elliott
as the man standing over Cowden’s body.
During cross-
examination, Elliott’s counsel attempted to impeach Proffitt’s
testimony by calling to the jury’s attention the fact that law
enforcement personnel did not ask Proffitt to identify Elliott
from a photographic lineup until two years after Cowden’s
murder, during co-defendant Cushman’s trial.
The Commonwealth’s case against Elliott was further
strengthened by the testimony of one of Elliott’s former
jail cellmates, Sam Shepard.
Shepard testified that he and
Elliott became acquainted while playing cards and checkers in
jail.
Elliott told him that he had met an older man
who knew that Cowden kept large sums of cash in his house
and they agreed to rob Cowden.
Shepard testified that Elliott
had told him that things had gone awry during the robbery and
that he had put a pillow case over Cowden’s head and shot him as
he begged for his life.
Shepard further testified that Elliott
was bragging about his crime and that he showed no
remorse.
Moreover, Elliott also told Shepard that he was happy
when Cushman died because only Cushman could testify
against him.
Elliott was convicted of murder, robbery, burglary,
and wanton endangerment.
He was sentenced to life without
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parole for 25 years on the murder conviction, 20 years on the
burglary conviction, 20 years on the robbery conviction, and
five years on the wanton endangerment conviction.
On direct
appeal the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Elliott’s
conviction and sentence by Opinion which was rendered on January
20, 2000, and became final on February 10, 2000. 7
On January 5, 2001, Elliott filed a pro se motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42.
On March 5, 2001,
the trial court entered an order denying the motion.
On June 7,
2002, in an unpublished Opinion, this Court affirmed the denial
of the motion. 8
On May 22, 2003, Elliott filed his second motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42.
On October 13,
2003, the trial court entered an order denying Elliott’s motion
without having conducted an evidentiary hearing.
Elliott
subsequently filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate, and a
motion requesting that the trial judge recuse himself from
presiding over his post-conviction proceedings, which were
denied by an order entered on December 3, 2003.
This appeal
followed. 9
7
Case No. 1997-SC-1038-MR.
8
Case No. 2001-CA-000751-MR.
9
As noted by the Commonwealth, the trial court entered the order denying
Elliott’s RCr 11.42 motion on October 13, 2003. Elliott thereafter filed a
motion to alter, amend, or vacate pursuant to CR 59.05, which was denied by
an order entered on December 3, 2003. Elliott timely filed his notice of
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Elliott contends that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to call two
exculpatory witnesses at trial, James Saylor and Scott Roberts.
Elliott alleges that Saylor was an alibi witness who could have
accounted for his whereabouts during the time that the crimes at
the Cowden residence occurred, 10 and that Roberts, who at one
time was incarcerated with Cushman, could have testified that
Cushman had told him that Elliott was not his accomplice, and
that Cushman had falsely implicated Elliott as his accomplice in
the crime in order to protect his actual accomplice.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
movant must satisfy a two-part test showing both that counsel's
performance was deficient and that the deficiency caused actual
prejudice resulting in a proceeding that was fundamentally
appeal on January 7, 2004. Pursuant to Mills v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 310
(Ky. 2005), which became final on September 22, 2005, the filing of a CR
59.05 motion does not toll the 30-day limitations period contained in RCr
12.04(3) for filing a notice of appeal from an RCr 11.42 motion. Id. at 320323. In Mills the Supreme Court exempted the defendant from the holding
because (1) his case involved a sentence of death, and (2) previous decisions
had suggested that the filing of a CR 59.05 motion did toll the time for
filing a notice of appeal. It appears that Elliott relied upon the previous
decisions which suggested that the filing of a CR 59.05 motion would toll the
limitations period. Therefore, even though Elliott is not under a sentence
of death, we like apply the exemption in the Mills holding to his notice of
appeal from the October 13, 2003, order denying his RCr 11.42 motion.
10
According to trial testimony, Cushman and his accomplice first came to the
Cowden residence at approximately 2:00 p.m., but Mrs. Cowden refused to let
them enter the residence. Cushman and the accomplice returned at
approximately 4:00 p.m. and committed the murder and other crimes. According
to Saylor’s statement, he was with Elliott the entire day, except between
approximately 3:30 p.m. to approximately 6:00 p.m. Based upon these times,
Saylor’s statement provides an alibi for the 2:00 p.m. incident at the Cowden
residence, but not the 4:00 p.m. incident when the actual crimes occurred.
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unfair and a result that was unreliable. 11
The burden is on the
movant to overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
assistance was constitutionally sufficient or that under the
circumstances counsel’s action might be considered “trial
strategy.” 12
A court must be highly deferential in reviewing
defense counsel’s performance and should avoid second-guessing
counsel’s actions based on hindsight. 13
In assessing counsel’s
performance, the standard is whether the alleged acts or
omissions were outside the wide range of prevailing professional
norms based on an objective standard of reasonableness. 14
“‘A
defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel, or counsel
adjudged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely
to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.’” 15
In
order to establish actual prejudice, a movant must show a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different or was rendered fundamentally unfair and
11
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80
L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); Commonwealth v. Tamme, 83 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Ky.
2002); Foley v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Ky. 2000).
12
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Moore v. Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 479, 482
(Ky. 1998); Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 912 (Ky. 1998).
13
Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ky. 2001); Harper v.
Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311, 315 (Ky. 1998).
14
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89; Tamme, 83 S.W.3d at 370; Commonwealth v.
Pelfrey, 998 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Ky. 1999).
15
Sanborn, 975 S.W.2d at 911 (quoting McQueen v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 70
(Ky. 1997)).
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unreliable. 16
Where the movant is convicted in a trial, a
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding considering the
totality of the evidence before the jury. 17
A movant is not
automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing on an RCr 11.42
motion unless there is an issue of fact which cannot be
determined on the face of the record. 18
“Where the movant’s
allegations are refuted on the face of the record as a whole, no
evidentiary hearing is required.” 19
Elliot’s conviction and sentence became final on
February 10, 2000, when the Opinion rendered by the Supreme
Court in his direct appeal became final.
Elliott did not file
his present RCr 11.42 motion until May 22, 2003.
Based upon
these dates, his motion was filed over three years and three
months after the judgment became final.
RCr 11.42(10) provides
as follows:
Any motion under this rule shall be
filed within three years after the judgment
becomes final, unless the motion alleges and
the movant proves either:
16
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 411-12
(Ky. 2002).
17
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95.
Foley, 17 S.W.3d at 884.
18
See also Bowling, 80 S.W.3d at 412; and
Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993).
19
Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726 (Ky.App. 1986) (citing Hopewell v.
Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Ky.App. 1985)).
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(a) that the facts upon which the claim is
predicated were unknown to the movant and
could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(b) that the fundamental constitutional
right asserted was not established within
the period provided for herein and has been
held to apply retroactively.
The fundamental right asserted in this case, effective
assistance of counsel, was in existence at all times relevant to
these proceedings, thus the exception contained in subsection
(b) is not applicable in this case.
Elliott, however, alleges
that the exception to the limitations period contained in
subsection (a) is applicable because he could not have
ascertained the existence of the Saylor and Roberts statements
within the limitations period through the exercise of due
diligence.
We disagree.
Following his indictment in this case, the Department
of Public Advocacy (DPA), Kentucky’s statewide public defender
system, was assigned to represent Elliott.
interviewed Saylor and Roberts.
The DPA attorneys
Though apparently not
transcribed at the time, the tape recordings of the interviews
were placed in Elliott’s DPA file.
At some point the DPA attorneys withdrew from the
case, and trial counsel was awarded the contract for Elliott’s
legal representation.
All of the DPA attorney files were turned
over to the trial counsel, including the taped interviews of
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Saylor and Roberts.
Saylor and Roberts were not called as
witnesses at the trial.
In support of the applicability of the exception
contained in RCr 11.42(10)(a), Elliott states in his brief as
follows:
The Appellant could not raise the issue in
his first RCr 11.42 because he did not know
the statements existed. The trial court did
appoint counsel to represent the Appellant
on his original RCr 11.42 motion but
overruled the pro se motion before appointed
counsel ever entered an appearance, much
less reviewed the trial counsel’s file and
further investigated the matter. It is
likely that appointed counsel would have
discovered the taped statements if he had
had adequate time to investigate but such
necessary time was not afforded counsel by
the trial court. The trial court itself
effectively precluded that Appellant from
raising the issue in his first RCr 11.42
motion [citation to record omitted].
. . .
It was only after the Kentucky Innocence
Project began investigating the Appellant’s
case that the taped statements were
discovered. The issue was raised as soon as
possible by the Appellant under the
exception rule of RCr 11.42(10)(a).
In his reply brief, Elliott supplements his argument
as follows:
The Appellant filed a pro se RCr 11.42
in January, 2001 and the Department of
Public Advocacy was appointed to represent
the Appellant on his RCr 11.42 motion on
January 18, 2001. Before DPA had adequate
time to review and investigate Appellant’s
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case or supplement the pro se motion, the
trial court summarily denied Appellant’s RCr
11.42 motion without a hearing on March 2,
2001. The second RCr 11.42 motion was filed
after the Kentucky Innocence Project had
thoroughly investigated the Appellant’s
case, filed motions for DNA testing with the
trial court and filed a federal lawsuit on
behalf of Appellant for DNA testing (the
trial court denied Appellant’s request for
DNA testing of blood samples found at the
scene and ordered the destruction of all
physical evidence). 20
Appellee correctly asserts that it was
during the investigation by Kentucky
Innocence Project (KIP) the information
about Jimmy Saylor and Scott Roberts was
discovered. When Appellant filed his
initial RCr 11.42, he did not know that
these taped statements were made to his
original attorneys and his subsequent
attorneys did not tell him. Appellant was
precluded from any further development of
this issue because the trial court summarily
denied the original RCr 11.42 motion.
RCr 11.42 requires a motion [to] state
all grounds for holding the sentence invalid
of which the movant has knowledge. Final
disposition of the motion shall conclude all
issues that could reasonably have been
presented in the same proceeding. RCr
11.42(3). . . .
The trial court hastily entered a
denial of Appellant’s original RCr 11.42
without allowing the DPA adequate time to
develop an investigation into Appellant’s
case. That final disposition came on March
2, 2001. The Appellant submits that at the
time of that final disposition, he had no
knowledge of the taped statements of Saylor
and Roberts. In the instant case, the
second RCr 11.42 was filed after a complete
20
This Court granted a writ of prohibition.
and it matched the victim’s.
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The blood was eventually tested
and thorough investigation by the Kentucky
Innocence Project (the last interview with
Roberts was shortly before the filing of the
motion), litigation on both the state and
federal level regarding DNA testing of
forensic evidence found at the crime scene
was completed, and no other issues that
could reasonably be presented in the motion
were found to exist. The second RCr 11.42
motion meets the exceptions of RCr
11.42(10)(a).
Elliott concedes that tape recordings of the Saylor
and Roberts statements were contained in trial counsel’s files,
and that his current attorneys discovered the statements upon
examination of the files.
As the statements were discoverable
by the mere perfunctory examination of the attorney files in the
case, with due diligence, the files could reasonably have been
examined and any issues divulged by the statements could have
been raised within the three-year limitations period prescribed
by RCr 11.42(10)(a), for example, in Elliott’s initial RCr 11.42
motion. 21
In any event, an examination of the attorney files was
not necessary to identify trial counsel’s failure to call alibiwitness Saylor as an issue supporting a claim of ineffective
21
In his brief, Elliott somewhat misportrays his original RCr 11.42 motion as
an unskilled pro se prison inmate effort. However, Elliott filed his first
RCr 11.42 motion on January 1, 2001. Included in the record is a letter to
Elliott from Gordon W. Rahn of the Department of Public Advocacy dated
December 18, 2000. The letter begins “Enclosed are the original and two
copies of the RCr 11.42 motion I drafted for you. As we discussed, you will
file this pro se.” Based upon this, it appears that Elliott’s original
motion, though filed pro se, was prepared by a DPA attorney, not by Elliott
acting alone or with the assistance of a prison legal aid.
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assistance.
Elliott had actual knowledge of all facts necessary
to be aware that Elliott could have provided him with at least a
partial alibi for the events of August 21, 1991.
As a
participant in the trial, he was also situated to know that
trial counsel failed to call his alibi witness.
Based upon
this, the tape recording of Saylor’s statement was not essential
to Elliott’s ability to have raised this issue within the
limitations period, for example, upon the filing of his initial
RCr 11.42 motion.
Similarly, the Roberts statement indicates that
Roberts apparently told Elliott about Cushman’s statement.
In
the November 25, 1992, tape recording, the DPA attorney
interviewing Roberts asked him if Elliott had ever promised him
anything.
Roberts replied as follows:
Naugh. (inaudible) I think he’s got a kids
[sic] mind myself, you know. To myself, he
does. He’s not got a very good attitude
down there. I know that. And nobody don’t
like him too much on the walk and he stays
pretty much by hisself back there in the
back cell. I know he want [sic] hardly even
talk to me when I first went in his cell
because I kept telling him, after I found
out his name, I said [“]I know who you are,
you know, ain’t no use trying to keep it a
secret who you are because I know who you
are. (inaudible) I ain’t no kin to this
person that you both done this or that
to.[”] He said, [“]I’ll let you know flat
out know that I’m innocent of the charge[.”]
And I said [“] well, that guy’s [sic] 22 got
22
An apparent reference to Cushman.
- 13 -
something to tell you that’s why I’ve been
trying to talk to you.[”] It was two days
before I could even get the boy to even talk
to me, you know, and that’s when I let him
know. About what I said to you all, you
know. (Emphasis added).
While somewhat ambiguous, it appears that Elliott may have had
actual knowledge of the statement Cushman made to Roberts. 23
In summary, the Saylor and Roberts statements were
easily discoverable simply by examining the attorney files.
Further, Elliott had actual knowledge concerning the testimony
Saylor could have presented in his favor, and may have had
actual knowledge of Cushman’s statement to Roberts.
Based upon
these factors, Elliott has failed to demonstrate that the
23
We also note that in his direct appeal Elliott raised as an issue that it
was improper for the Commonwealth to have referred to a statement made by
Elliott to cellmate Sam Shepherd to the effect that “he was glad that Allen
Cushman had died and could not testify against him.” The Supreme Court
addressed the issue as follows:
Elliott’s theory is that the Commonwealth “implied”
that Cushman would have testified against him had he
lived. In fact, however, the Commonwealth introduced
Elliott’s own statements in which the appellant
indicated that Cushman would have testified against
him, and the only thing in the record indicating what
Cushman would have said are Elliott’s own admissions.
Neither the prosecutor not any of the Commonwealth’s
witnesses spoke about any declaration that Allen
Cushman had made against the appellant, and this
claim of error is without merit as Elliott’s own
incriminating statements were relevant, admissible
evidence against him. See KRE 801(A)(b)(1)
[emphasis added].
So while the Roberts statement indicates that Cushman had falsely implicated
Elliott as an accomplice, Cushman’s allegedly false implication of Elliott
was not introduced against Elliott at trial.
- 14 -
exception to the limitations period contained in RCr
11.42(10)(a) is applicable in this case.
As an additional matter, we also note that for similar
reasons to those already discussed, Elliott’s RCr 11.42 motion
is also barred by RCr 11.42(3), which requires a movant, upon
filing a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42, to “state all grounds for
holding the sentence invalid of which [he] has knowledge,” and
that “[f]inal disposition of the motion shall conclude all
issues that could reasonably have been presented in the same
proceeding.”
For the reasons already discussed, issues
involving Saylor and Roberts “could reasonably have been
presented” in Elliott’s initial RCr 11.42 motion.
Elliott also contends that the trial court erred by
denying his motion without an evidentiary hearing.
However, as
his motion is barred by RCr 11.42(10)(a) and RCr 11.42(3), his
entitlement for relief is conclusively refuted from the face of
the record.
As there are no issues of fact concerning this,
Elliott was not entitled to a hearing. 24
Elliott also contends that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to recuse.
Because of our disposition of
this case, however, this issue is moot.
Elliott’s entitlement
to relief is refuted by the face of the record, there are no
24
Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001).
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discretionary decisions at issue, and any action by the circuit
judge which allegedly may have been improper is irrelevant. 25
We
accordingly need not address this issue on the merits.
Finally, Elliott alleges that the trial court “erred
in denying [his] claim of actual innocence and his wrongful
incarceration.”
As this claim could have been raised in his
previous RCr 11.42 motion, this claim is likewise not a proper
issue for the present RCr 11.42 petition.
RCr 11.42(3).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Laurel
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis J. Burke
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Wm. Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
25
James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 884 (Ky.App. 2002).
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