JINCY ROUSE v. EDWIN DWIGHT ROUSE
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 10, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000026-MR
APPELLANT
JINCY ROUSE
v.
APPEAL FROM LEWIS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-CI-00024
EDWIN DWIGHT ROUSE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
MINTON AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
Jincy Rouse appeals the denial of her
post-decree motion to enforce a provision in an October 16,
2001, order confirming the report of the domestic relations
commissioner that required appellee to pay one-half of her
medical insurance premiums until she reached age 65.
In denying
her motion, the trial judge concluded that because appellant had
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
failed to procure medical insurance, there were no premiums for
appellee to pay under the terms of the October 16, 2001, order.
Finding no error in that determination, we affirm.
In the decree dissolving the parties’ marriage entered
on November 29, 1995, appellee was directed to “continue to pay
medical insurance on the Petitioner, Jincy Rouse, due to his
employment with Western Southern Life Insurance Company, the
company holding that policy.”
Although the decree also ordered
appellee to pay appellant maintenance in the amount of $1,200.00
per month to age 65, that amount was subsequently reduced to
$500.00 per month by order entered June 5, 1996.
On October 16, 2001, the trial court confirmed the
recommendation of the domestic relations commissioner that
maintenance again be modified “to the extent that each party pay
one-half (1/2) of the Petitioner’s medical insurance premium.”
An appeal from that order was docketed in this Court but the
appeal was ordered dismissed in May 2003, due to appellant’s
failure to timely file a brief.
Approximately one month after
the dismissal of her appeal, appellant filed a motion for
specific performance of the October 16, 2001, order.
The trial judge conducted a lengthy hearing on
appellant’s specific performance motion during which appellant
admitted that appellee had made required payments for COBRA
benefits of $110.00 per month until they expired in December
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1998.
In fact, appellant testified that appellee continued to
pay her the amount of the COBRA premium until December 2000,
despite her failure to procure a subsequent health insurance
policy.
Appellant explained her failure to obtain insurance by
citing its high cost and appellee’s statements that he could not
afford the rates appellant was being quoted.
Appellant also
conceded that prior to the hearing before the commissioner which
culminated in the October 16, 2001, order, appellee had tendered
to her checks in excess of $5000.00 (apparently representing
appellee’s calculation as to what he owed for medical insurance
premiums between the date he stopped making the $110.00 payments
and the date of the hearing), but that she had returned those
checks in anticipation of an argument by appellee that she
failed to mitigate her damages for uninsured expenses by failing
to purchase insurance appellee had paid her for.
At the hearing
before the commissioner, appellant took the position that
appellee should be required to pay her uninsured medical
expenses based upon his obligation to pay her health insurance
premiums.
In addressing appellant’s complaint with respect that
the failure to make premium payments, the commissioner entered
the following findings and conclusions:
At or about December 2, 1998,
Respondent [appellee] contacted twenty one
insurance companies in an effort to assist
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Petitioner to obtain medical insurance after
her COBRA benefits expired. At least one of
the companies, Central Reserve Life Health
Insurance, sent an application and premium
quote to Petitioner. Petitioner contacted
Respondent and he mailed her a check in the
amount of $394.17 for the premium.
Subsequently, the insurance company returned
to Respondent the $394.17 with its check
evidently refusing Petitioner medical
insurance. Respondent was not presented
with any other bills for medical insurance
premiums either by the Petitioner or an
insurance company on her behalf.
For a period of well over two (2)
years, Petitioner has made no effort to
obtain a policy of medical insurance.
*
*
*
Petitioner contends Respondent should be
ordered to pay hospital and medical bills
incurred by her after termination of COBRA
medical insurance benefits. Respondent was
not ordered to pay Petitioner’s medical
expenses, but only to pay premiums for
Petitioner’s medical insurance policy.
Respondent can not be held liable for
uninsured medical expenses without a showing
of fault on his part as to their having been
incurred. Petitioner is the would-be
insured and medical insurance coverage could
be obtained only by her personally applying
therefore. Respondent could not have done
so. Respondent did contact insurance
companies on Petitioner’s behalf and did all
he could to assist her in doing so.
Respondent is free of all fault for the
incurrence of the uninsured medical
expenses.
The commissioner thus absolved appellee from liability for
payment of the uninsured medical expenses and recommended that
“the medical insurance premium for Petitioner’s medical
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insurance be paid one-half (1/2) by each party when a policy of
medical insurance is obtained.” 2
These are the findings,
conclusions and recommendations which were confirmed by the
October 16, 2001, order at issue here.
The dismissal of appellant’s appeal from the October
16, 2001, order had the effect of rendering these findings res
judicata between these parties until such time as they were
altered or amended by appropriate order. 3
Nothing in the record
indicates that the findings have been in any way altered, nor
does it disclose any request for amendment or alteration
subsequent to the dismissal of the previous appeal.
It is
therefore clear that appellee’s obligation to pay one-half of
appellant’s medical insurance premiums fixed by the October 16,
2001, order arose only when and if she obtained a medical
insurance policy.
Nevertheless, appellant appears to argue that appellee
should be required to pay the medical insurance premiums from
and after October 16, 2001, plus interest, regardless of whether
she ever obtained a policy.
Not only is such a contention
contrary to the plain language of the commissioner’s
recommendation, it would require pure speculation to determine
2
Emphasis added.
3
See BTC Leasing v. Martin, 685 S.W.2d 191 (Ky.App. 1984).
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what constitutes one-half of the premium on a policy never
purchased.
In sum, the trial judge did not err in denying
appellant’s motion as the contingency for payment of one-half of
the premium never arose.
The judgment of the Lewis Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Charles L. Douglas, Jr.
Greenup, Kentucky
Thomas M. Bertram, II
Vanceburg, Kentucky
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