ROBERT STANLEY v. YVONNE STANLEY
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RENDERED: APRIL 8, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002331-MR
ROBERT STANLEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE ELEANORE GARBER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-FD-000771
v.
YVONNE STANLEY
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
Robert L. Stanley has appealed from an
order of the Jefferson Family Court of September 30, 2003, which
denied his motion for a reduction in his child support
obligation.
It also denied in part his motion to vacate a
previous order of the court pursuant to the provisions of CR1
60.02(a) and (e).
Because we conclude that the order at issue
is not final or appealable, we dismiss the appeal.
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
Robert Stanley and Yvonne Stanley were married on
August 21, 1980.
Four children were born of the marriage.
Yvonne filed a petition for divorce in the Jefferson Circuit
Court in April 1992, and a decree of dissolution was entered in
July 1992.
The parties were awarded joint custody of the
children, and Robert was ordered to pay to Yvonne $113.50 per
week for their support.
In June 2002, Yvonne filed a motion requesting that
Robert’s child support obligation for three minor children be
increased and that Robert be ordered to pay his share of the
children’s extraordinary medical and dental expenses.
Those
expenses had accrued to several thousand dollars.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the domestic
relations commissioner filed his report on September 4, 2002.
The commissioner recommended that Robert’s child support be
increased to $187.00 per week for the period of June 28 to
September 7, 2002 (the second child’s eighteenth birthday) and
then reduced to $144.60 per week (for the remaining two minor
children).
The commissioner also recommended that Yvonne be
awarded a judgment against Robert in the amount of $4,232.75 for
his share of the children’s extraordinary medical and dental
expenses.
In an order entered September 24, 2002, the Jefferson
Family Court adopted the commissioner’s findings and
recommendations.
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On May 14, 2003, Robert, pro se, filed a motion
requesting that his child support and insurance obligation be
reviewed.
On July 10, 2003, Robert’s motion was amended by
counsel to request that the court’s order of September 24, 2002,
be vacated pursuant to the provisions of CR 60.02.
In support
of the amended motion, Robert contended that he had failed to
receive the commissioner’s report and that consequently he had
not filed his exceptions to the findings.
He maintained that he
also had failed to receive the court’s order adopting the
report.
Robert contended separately that his child support
obligation should be reduced since he had lost his job and was
earning substantially less money at a new position.
In
addition, he challenged the legitimacy of the records that
Yvonne had submitted during the 2002 hearing in support of her
claim for the children’s extraordinary medical expenses,
contending that the total sum as determined by the commissioner
was inaccurate.
He believed that the total unpaid expenses
amounted only to $2,834.28.
Robert also claimed to have
overpaid his child support obligation by more than $3,000.00, an
amount for which he urged that he was entitled to a credit
against the judgment.
In an order entered September 30, 2003, the Jefferson
Family Court rejected Robert’s claim that he had failed to
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receive notice of the court’s order of September 24, 2002.
The
court also denied his motion for relief with respect to the
award of $4,232.75 to Yvonne.
Concluding that Robert had shown
a clerical mistake in the amount of $5.03 in his favor, the
court credited him in this amount.
The court determined that
the commissioner had properly considered Yvonne’s evidence
regarding the children’s extraordinary medical expenses and
ruled that Robert had been afforded a fair opportunity to refute
that evidence at the 2002 hearing.
Finally, the court denied
Robert’s motion to modify his child support obligation.
However, the court was persuaded that Robert was
entitled to a credit with respect to his overpayment to Yvonne
of the costs of the children’s health insurance.
Yvonne
acknowledged at the hearing that Robert had been paying her
$40.00 per week in order to reimburse her for carrying the
children’s health insurance through her employer.
She explained
that the $40.00 had included her health insurance premium as
well.
The court found as follows:
[Yvonne] has submitted documentation
indicating that her insurance through Anthem
HMO costs $79.85 every two weeks to cover
herself and her children. The documents
indicate that employee-only coverage is
provided at a cost of $23.60 every two
weeks. Therefore, [Robert] is entitled to a
credit of $11.53 per week towards the common
law judgment. However, there is no
indication in the record as to how long
[Robert] has been reimbursing [Yvonne] for
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this coverage. Therefore, the Court has
insufficient information from which to base
its determination of the amount of credit to
which [Robert] is entitled. The issue will
be remanded with instructions to [Robert] to
provide evidence of when he began
reimbursing [Yvonne] for the health
insurance premium.
The court granted Robert’s request that he be given a
credit against the judgment for that portion of the health
insurance premium covering Yvonne alone.
However, the order
provided as follows:
[Robert’s] Motion for Entry of Satisfaction
of Judgment pursuant to CR 60.02(e) is
GRANTED to the extent that [Robert] is
entitled to a credit for that portion of the
health insurance premium attributed to
[Yvonne’s] share, or $11.53 per week. The
issue shall be remanded pending submission
of documentation indicating when [Robert]
began reimbursing [Yvonne] for said premium
payments.
Robert’s motion to reconsider was denied, and his appeal
followed.
This court has jurisdiction over appeals from final
judgment or orders of circuit courts.
KRS2 22A.020(1).
“A final
or appealable judgment is a final order adjudicating all the
rights of all the parties in an action or proceeding, or a
judgment made final under Rule 54.02.”
provides as follows:
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-5-
CR 54.01.
CR 54.02
When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may grant a final
judgment upon one or more but less than all
of the claims or parties only upon a
determination that there is no just reason
for delay. The judgment shall recite such
determination and shall recite that the
judgment is final. In the absence of such
recital, any order or other form of
decision, however designated, which
adjudicates less than all the claims or the
rights and liabilities of less than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to
any of the claims or parties, and the order
or other form of decision is interlocutory
and subject to revision at any time before
the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all
the parties.
The court’s order did not adjudicate all of the rights
of the parties.
Therefore, the judgment was interlocutory and
nonappealable and could only be made final and appealable by
satisfying the provisions of CR 54.02(1).
The court’s order of
September 30, 2003, did not contain the finality language
prescribed by the provisions of CR 54.02; nor did it recite the
determination that there was no just reason for delay as
mandated by the rule.
The order entered in this case resolved issues that
might ultimately come before the court.
However, it expressly
did not resolve Robert’s claim that he was entitled to credit
for his overpayment of insurance premiums.
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As the court noted
in its order, its ruling was dependent upon additional
presentation of evidence and a finding with respect to Robert’s
payment of Yvonne’s insurance premiums.
No final determination
on this issue had been made when the appeal was filed, and the
omission of the requirements of CR 54.02(1) is fatal.
Deaton, 528 S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1975).
Hale v.
As we noted in Bellarmine
College v. Hornung, 662 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Ky.App. 1983),
[s]ound judicial administration requires the
avoidance of piecemeal dispositions of
cases, and appellate courts must not be
indiscriminately thrust into the processes
of single-party or single-claims trial until
they are final.
As we are without jurisdiction to consider the appeal, it must
be dismissed.
Therefore, being sufficiently advised, this court
ORDERS that the appeal be, and it is hereby, DISMISSED.
ALL CONCUR.
/s/ Sara Combs________________
CHIEF JUDGE
ENTERED:
April 8, 2005
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sherry Hoard Long
Louisville, Kentucky
David M. Feldkamp
Louisville, Kentucky
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