PATRICIA FERGUSON v. RICHARD PARKS, D/B/A EXQUISITE BELVEDERE BARBER SHOP; AND EXQUISITE BELVEDERE STYLING SALON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
February 18, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2003-CA-002287-MR
PATRICIA FERGUSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-02903
v.
RICHARD PARKS,
D/B/A EXQUISITE BELVEDERE BARBER
SHOP; AND EXQUISITE BELVEDERE
STYLING SALON
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, KNOPF, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Patricia Ferguson appeals from an order of the
Fayette Circuit Court entered October 2, 2003, dismissing her
complaint against Richard Parks.
Ferguson claims that in 1997
she was injured in a beauty parlor of which Parks was the
proprietor when she suffered an adverse reaction to a hair
coloring product applied by one of Parks’s employees.
her complaint against Parks in 1998.
matter was still pending, Parks died.
She filed
In May 2002, while the
In September 2002,
Ferguson moved the probate division of the Fayette District
Court to appoint an administrator for Parks’s estate.
The
motion included notice of the pending claim in circuit court.
In November, the district court appointed an administrator, but
Ferguson did not seek to revive the circuit-court action against
him.
In September 2003, the attorney who had represented Parks
filed a motion to dismiss Ferguson’s complaint because it had
not been revived within the period allowed by law for that
purpose.
The trial court granted the motion and Ferguson
appealed.
Technically, the death of a sole defendant or sole
plaintiff terminates a court’s jurisdiction because in the
absence of adverse parties there can be no case or controversy,
a constitutional requirement for adjudication.1
Certain causes
of action survive the death of a party, however, so in those
cases our law provides that the court’s jurisdiction over the
claim does not terminate, but rather abates and may be revived
1
Associated Industries of Kentucky v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d
947 (Ky. 1995); West v. Commonwealth, 887 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1994);
Veith v. City of Louisville, 355 S.W.2d 295 (Ky. 1962).
2
if a proper party is duly substituted for the decedent.2
CR
25.01 provides that jurisdiction over the substituted party and
over the revived claim is to be invoked by a “motion for
substitution,” which
may be made by the successors or
representatives of the deceased party or by
any party, and, together with the notice of
hearing, shall be served on the parties as
provided in Rule 5, and upon persons not
parties as provided in Rule 4 for the
service of summons.
KRS 395.278 provides that the “application to revive
an action” must be made “within one (1) year after the death of
the deceased party.”
Construed together, these provisions
require that within a year following the death of a party a
motion for substitution must be filed in the court where the
abated action is pending, or the action terminates and must be
dismissed.3
Ferguson contends that her district-court motion for
the appointment of an administrator should be deemed “an
application to revive” under KRS 395.278, because it put the
administrator on notice of her intention to continue the claim
against him.
2
As just explained, however, the purpose of KRS
Daniel v. Fourth and Market, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1968).
3
Daniel v. Fourth and Market, Inc., supra; Greyhound Corporation
v. Dowling, 334 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1960); Osborne v. Kenacre Land
Corporation, 65 S.W.3d 534 (Ky.App. 2001); Snyder v. Snyder, 769
S.W.2d 70 (Ky.App. 1989).
3
395.278 and CR 25.01 is not merely that notice be given to the
substituted party, but that the party be substituted, that the
lapsed jurisdiction of the court where the matter is pending be
revived.
Ferguson’s motion in district court did not invoke the
circuit court’s jurisdiction.
A thornier question is by what authority, then, the
circuit court entered its order to dismiss.
Parks’s erstwhile
counsel no longer represented a party in the case and so was not
authorized to move for dismissal,4 and as noted, Ferguson had not
moved to substitute the administrator.
If the court’s
jurisdiction had lapsed, how was the court to act?
The answer, we believe, is that a court always has
jurisdiction to consider its jurisdiction and may do so on its
own motion.5
Here, the court had lost jurisdiction over
Ferguson’s claim unless the claim was revived within a year of
Parks’s death.
When it became clear that the statutory period
had expired, the court was authorized to provide Ferguson with
an opportunity to explain why her claim should not be dismissed,
and, absent a sufficient explanation, to dismiss the claim for
4
Brantley v. Fallston
(Md.App. 1994); Fariss
Cir. 1985). Likewise,
brief to this Court on
appeal.
General Hospital, Inc., 636 A.2d 444
v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958 (4th
counsel was not authorized to submit a
behalf of a non-existent party to the
5
Privett v. Clendenin, 52 S.W.3d 530 (Ky. 2001); Commonwealth
Health Corporation v. Croslin, 920 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1996).
4
lack of jurisdiction.
We agree with the trial court that
Ferguson’s explanation was not sufficient and that dismissal was
therefore required.
Accordingly, we affirm the October 2, 2003,
order of the Fayette Circuit Court.
We also deny, as not properly before the Court, the motion
to dismiss the appeal by counsel who formerly represented Parks.
TACKETT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS WITH RESULT.
ENTERED:__________________
\s\ William L. Knopf__________
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Charles W. Arnold
Lexington, Kentucky
Stephen D. Wolnitzek
Wolnitzek & Rowekamp, P.S.C.
Covington, Kentucky
5
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.