ERIC GARDNER v. JAMES LEE; CLARENCE STEELE; LEE WILSON; KEVIN BENNETT; CLIFTON GAY, JR.,; STEVE FEESE; LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; AND LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT
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RENDERED:
January 21, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002230-MR
ERIC GARDNER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 98-CI-00517, 98-CI-02417, 98-CI-03481
JAMES LEE; CLARENCE STEELE;
LEE WILSON; KEVIN BENNETT;
CLIFTON GAY, JR.,;
STEVE FEESE;
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
COUNTY GOVERNMENT,
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION;
AND LEXINGTON-FAYETTE
URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE: Eric Gardner appeals from a judgment of the
Fayette Circuit Court reflecting a jury verdict in favor of
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Government Civil Service Commission and other
defendants.
In a consolidated action, Gardner argued that he
was denied a job promotion in violation of KRS Chapter 344 as a
result of religious and racial discrimination.
He now raises
several claims of error and seeks a new trial.
For the reasons
stated herein, we reverse the judgment on appeal and remand the
matter to the Fayette Circuit Court.
At the time of filing of the consolidated actions,
Gardner was a “senior equipment operator” with the LexingtonFayette Urban County Government Division of Solid Waste.
His
primary job duty was to operate a sanitation vehicle.
In January, 1997, Gardner, a black male, was eligible
for a promotion to a
of Sanitation.
supervisory position with the Department
James Lee, the acting director of the Department
of Sanitation, promoted Clarence Steele, a white male, to the
position.
On February 11, 1998, Gardner filed the first of a
series of lawsuits in Fayette Circuit Court against LexingtonFayette Urban County Government, the Civil Service Commission,
and various Department of Sanitation and Public Works employees.
He alleged that Lee created a “religiously hostile” work
environment and refused to promote him because of his race; that
Steele engaged in unspecified wrongful acts facilitating Lee’s
conduct; and, that Jeff Wilson, the Commissioner of Public
Works, improperly approved Lee’s wrongful conduct.
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Gardner
alleged that these acts constituted a violation of KRS Chapter
344.
He sought a jury trial and damages.
On July 2, 1998, Gardner filed a second action in
Fayette Circuit Court.
On December 8, 1997, Lee had reprimanded
Gardner for failing to show up for work on November 26, 1997,
without calling in.
Two months later, on February 9, 1998,
Clifton Gay suspended Gardner for failing to show up for work on
January 26, 1998, without calling.
Gardner appealed the
reprimand and suspension to the Civil Service Commission.
On
June 5, 1998, the Commission rendered an opinion and order
upholding the suspension.
Gardner’s July 2, 1998, complaint
alleged that the Commission wrongfully upheld the suspension in
violation of KRS Chapter 344.
On September 25, 1998, Gardner filed a third action in
Fayette Circuit Court against the Commission and various
Department of Sanitation and Public Works employees.
This
action alleged that the Commission improperly denied Gardner’s
appeal from a June 19, 1998, reprimand.
This reprimand was
issued when Gardner failed to attend a June 18, 1998, safety
meeting.
Gardner had unsuccessfully contended that he was not
required to attend the meeting and that the reprimand was
therefore unsupported.
The three actions were prosecuted independently.
In
May of 2000, the trial court entered an order consolidating the
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actions.
After a protracted procedural history, a jury trial on
the consolidated actions commenced on February 24, 2003.
After
the proof was heard, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendants.
A judgment reflecting the verdict was rendered on
July 11, 2003.
Gardner’s subsequent motion under CR 59.05 to
alter, amend or vacate the judgment was denied, and this appeal
followed.
Gardner now argues that the trial court erred in
rendering a judgment in favor of the defendants, and raises a
litany of alleged errors in support of his contention.
He
maintains that the trial judge should have recused herself
because she is a cousin of the mayor of Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Government, and because she had once shared office space
with the government’s outside counsel.
He argues that under KRS
Chapter 67A, only the mayor and the “head of the executive unit”
are authorized to engage in disciplinary matters; that Gardner’s
suspension on July 8, 1998, was brought about without due
process; that he was entitled to a new hearing before the
Commission because the recordings it provided were
unintelligible; and, that he is entitled to a judgment or a new
trial because he made a prima facie case of racial
discrimination.
Gardner goes on to argue that he should have
been permitted to present evidence showing that the discipline
to which he was subjected was unsupported by fact and was
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discriminatory; that the trial court erred in refusing to permit
the introduction of evidence that a document had been altered
and racial words had been used; that the trial court erred in
refusing to allow evidence showing that the government’s failure
to re-hire him after his discharge constituted unlawful
retaliation under KRS Chapter 344; that the court erred in
allowing the government to introduce evidence that Gardner had
committed an assault; and, that the trial court erred in
directing the jury to disregard a statement made by Gardner
during the closing argument.
In sum, Gardner seeks a new trial
with directions that the former trial judge recuse herself.
He
also seeks a declaration resolving the issues raised herein.
Gardner first argues that Judge Isaac committed
reversible error in failing to recuse herself from the case.
He
relies on KRS 26A.015(2), which states that “[A]ny justice or
judge of the Court of Justice . . .
shall disqualify himself in
any proceeding: (a) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party . . . [or] (e) Where he has knowledge of any
other circumstances in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.”
He cites a number of cases wherein the trial
judge did recuse himself/herself, or where it was held on appeal
that a recusal should have occurred.
He argues that Judge
Isaac’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned because she
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is a first cousin of the mayor.
Gardner maintains that he
sustained substantial prejudice and is entitled to a new trial.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has established rules
governing the operation of the Court of Justice.1
The
promulgation of these rules is authorized by the Kentucky
Constitution.2
In particular, SCR 4.300 Canon(3)(E) (“Kentucky Code
of Judicial Conduct”) states:
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or
herself in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
including but not limited to instances
where: . . . (d) the judge or the judge's
spouse, or a person within the third degree
of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an
officer, director or trustee of a party;
[or] . . . (iii) is known by the judge to
have a more than de minimis interest that
could be substantially affected by the
proceeding . . . .3
The SCR calculates the degree of relationship according to the
civil law system.4
Under the civil law method, degrees of
relationship are counted up from one party to the common
1
See generally, Rules of the Supreme Court (SCR) 4.300.
Ky. Const § 116 (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe rules
governing [the] practice and procedure for the Court of Justice.”).
3
SCR 4.300 Canon(3)(E)(1) is codified in KRS 26A.015.
4
Middle States Coal Co., Inc. v. Cornett, 584 S.W.2d 593 (Ky.App. 1979). See
also 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges 142.
2
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ancestor and then down to the other party.5
A parent is the
first degree of relationship, a grandparent is the second degree
of relationship; a parent’s sibling (an aunt or uncle) is the
third degree, and the sibling’s child (a cousin) is the fourth
degree of relationship.6
As such, Judge Isaac is the fourth
degree of relationship to Mayor Isaac and is not subject to the
authority of SCR 4.300 Canon 3(E)(1)(d) and KRS 26A.015.
However, this is not the end of the matter.
The issue
then becomes whether Judge Isaacs should disqualify herself in
this matter because her impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
We believe she should have disqualified herself
from this case.
This became clear when during the oral argument
in this case the attorney for the appellees admitted that Judge
Isaacs had recently recused herself from another case in which
the city and the Mayor were named parties.7
When asked to
address why the Judge would recuse from one case involving the
Mayor and not all cases involving her first cousin, the response
given can be paraphrased as because that was an important case,
and a high profile case.
We do not believe the nature of the
case nor the public awareness of the case dictates when recusal
5
Middle States Coal Co., Inc., supra.
Id.
7
The reason apparently given for Judge Isaac’s recusal in the case of
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Kentucky-American Water Company,
et al, Fayette Circuit Court Action 03-CI-3804, as stated in Appellees’ brief
was because the case had been one of “great public interest” and had been
“the subject of much public and political debate and was a key issue dividing
the candidates in the recent mayoral election.” Appellees’ brief p. 8.
6
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shall occur.
If there is an appearance of bias, prejudice or
impartiality present because of a relationship, it is present in
all cases involving the same parties.
Appellees argue that recusal was not required because
the relationship between the judge and the mayor was well known
and that the affidavit alleging lack of knowledge of this
relationship was signed by only one of Gardner’s attorneys, not
both.
However, in Abell v. Oliver, 117 S.W.3d 661 (Ky.App.
2003), this Court cited SCR 4.300, Canon 3F, relating to
remittal of disqualification, and held that “the language is
clear that any waiver must be signed by ‘all parties and
lawyers,’ and included in the record.”8
We believe the problem
presented herein could have easily been remedied.
We believe
the following portion of the concurring opinion by Judge David
Buckingham in Abell best states how simple it is for a judge to
avoid this potential problem:
This unfortunate situation could have been
avoided had the trial judge either allowed
the case to be transferred to another
Fayette Circuit Court judge or disclosed the
relationship prior to the trial. Neither of
those circumstances occurred, and I concur
with the majority that the judgment must be
vacated and the case remanded for a new
trial.
Id. at 663.
8
Id. at 663.
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Judge Buckingham’s concurring opinion continues on and
addressed the de minimis issue which had been addressed in the
majority opinion and in Middle States Coal Co., Inc., supra.
This theory is defined in Judge Buckingham’s opinion when he
again addresses why the judge should have recused in the Abell
case as follows:
However, under the definition of “de
minimis” in the terminology section of the
Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct, I
conclude that the judge’s husband in this
case had more than a de minimis interest.
“De minimis” is defined as “an insignificant
interest that could not raise reasonable
question as to a judge’s impartiality.” The
definition focuses on whether the interest
is so insignificant as not to raise a
reasonable question as to the judge’s
impartiality. I believe the judge’s
husband’s interest could clearly raise a
reasonable question as to the judge’s
impartiality in this case.
Regardless of whether or not the interest of
the judge’s husband was de minimis, the
judge was required to disqualify because of
the appearance of impropriety. Canon 3E(1)
requires disqualification where the judge’s
impartiality might reasonable be questioned.
“The test for appearance of impropriety is
whether the conduct would create in
reasonable minds a perception that the
judge’s ability to carry out judicial
responsibilities with integrity impartiality
and competence is impaired.” Commentary to
Canon 2A of the Kentucky Code of Judicial
Conduct. I believe the relationship created
in reasonable minds a perception that the
judge’s impartiality was impaired. Even
though there may have been no real basis for
disqualification, “[a] judge should disclose
on the record information that the judge
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believes the parties or their lawyers might
consider relevant to the question of
disqualification….” See commentary to Canon
3E(1). In short, the trial judge should
have disqualified herself for this
additional reason even if her husband’s
interest in the proceeding was only de
minimis. (Footnotes omitted).
Abell, 117 S.W.3d at 664.
While not necessary to our determination of whether or
not Judge Isaac’s should have recused from this case, we do
believe the Mayor as chief executive officer of the executive
branch of Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government has a
significant interest in the outcome of a civil action against
said governmental entity.
As set forth in both Middle States
Coal Co., Inc. and Abell when more than a de minimis interest
exist that could be substantially affected by the proceedings
any potential conflicts of interests or potential appearances of
impropriety should be disclosed.
Every party to an action has
the right to expect an unbiased and impartial judge determine
the various legal issues to be presented throughout the
procedure.
To require anything less brings into question the
integrity of the entire process and weakens the judicial system.
Gardner raises a number of additional claims of error.
In light of our reversal of the judgment on the issue of
disqualification/recusal, these additional arguments are moot.
However, we would be remiss if we did not state that upon remand
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the new judge should revisit the many issues raised by Gardner
and is not bound by Judge Isaac’s rulings.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court and remand the matter for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
William C. Jacobs
Lexington, KY
Terry Sellars
Lexington, KY
Matthew L. Mooney
Lexington, KY
Theresa L. Holmes
Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Government
Lexington, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
William C. Jacobs
Lexington, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
Terry Sellars
Lexington, KY
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