TINA PARSONS REAMS v. BRIAN K. REAMS
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 25, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002227-MR
AND
NO. 2003-CA-002481-MR
TINA PARSONS REAMS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS B. HOPPER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00127
v.
BRIAN K. REAMS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND HENRY, JUDGES.
HENRY, JUDGE:
Tina Parsons Reams appeals from an order denying
a CR1 60.02 motion seeking to re-open a divorce decree on the
basis that a marital asset was omitted from the separation
agreement incorporated into the decree.
The circuit court held
that the motion was not filed within a reasonable time.
agree.
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
We
Before discussing the merits we must address a
procedural issue.
No appellee’s brief was filed in this case.
The appellant’s brief was filed April 13, 2004.
CR 76.12(2)(a)
requires that the appellee’s brief be filed within 60 days after
the date on which the appellant’s brief was filed; therefore the
brief should have been filed on June 13, 2004.
On November 22,
2004 appellee’s counsel filed a motion to file a late brief,
giving no reason for the delay in filing other than “counsel’s
inadvertence”.
The motion was denied.
The appellant’s
objection to the motion to file a late brief was also filed
late, and a motion to permit the late filing of the objection
was denied as moot due to the denial, by that time, of the
motion to file the late brief.
The penalties for failure to file an appellee’s brief
are found at CR 76.12(8)(c).
discretionary, not automatic.
Imposition of these penalties is
S.W.2d 246, 249 (Ky. 1997).
Blades v. Commonwealth, 957
In the event of conflict between
the two we may accept the appellant’s statement of the facts and
issues as correct pursuant to CR 76.12(8)(c) only to the extent
that we can say that the trial court’s findings are clearly
erroneous.
1986).
Whicker v. Whicker, 711 S.W.2d 857, 858 (Ky. App.
As discussed below we cannot say that the trial court’s
findings in this case are clearly erroneous.
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Tina and Brian Reams were divorced on September 5,
2000 and a separation agreement dividing the assets and the
debts of the parties was incorporated into the decree.
There
was no further controversy between the parties until June 26,
2003 when Tina filed a motion to re-open the divorce to
determine ownership of certain property located at 618 Line
Creek Road, London, Kentucky where she and Brian resided during
the marriage and where she continued to reside following the
divorce.
Included in her motion was a request to add Nancy
Reams, Brian’s mother (who claimed ownership of the residence)
as a party.
Tina alleges that the property was a gift from Brian’s
parents and that the residence was constructed with money given
as a wedding gift from Brian’s parents.
According to Tina,
there was an oral agreement that upon divorce, she was to
receive the residence.
During the three years after the
divorce, she continued to reside there without objection from
Brian or his mother.
However, in 2003, Nancy filed an action in
the Laurel District Court claiming she owned the residence and
seeking Tina’s eviction.
The record reveals that by a deed
recorded on June 5, 1973 in the Laurel County Clerk’s Office,
the disputed property was deeded to William and Nancy Reams.
Subsequent to the entry of the dissolution decree, William died
and Nancy became the sole title owner of the property.
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Nancy’s
eviction proceeding was successful and although Tina appealed
the eviction order the circuit court record does not indicate
the result of her appeal.
The Domestic Relations Commissioner found that Tina’s
CR 60.02 motion was not timely and recommended that her motions
to re-open the divorce to determine the ownership of the
property, add a claim against Nancy, and permit her to remain in
the residence pending resolution of her claims, be denied.
On
July 31, 2003, the Commissioner signed a notice of filing of a
report and Tina filed exceptions.
The exceptions were overruled
on September 30, 2003 and Tina appealed.
However, after it came
to the attention of the court that it failed to sign an order
accepting the commissioner’s recommendations, the order was
signed and entered on November 14, 2003.
Tina filed a second
appeal and both appeals have been consolidated.
In Fry v. Kersey, 833 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Ky. App. 1992)
the court held that CR 60.02 motion may be a proper vehicle for
reopening a decree when a party seeks to recover unassigned
property in which he or she had an interest at the time of the
decree.
Only CR 60.02(d), permitting relief where there has
been fraud affecting the proceedings, or CR 60.02(f) where there
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is a reason justifying extraordinary relief, have possible
application to Tina’s motion.2
The facts do not warrant a consideration of relief
under subsection (d).
The rule relates to “extrinsic fraud” and
is reserved for those cases where the fraud is perpetrated
against the court and involves egregious conduct that subverts
the integrity of the court.
Fraud between the parties alone
does not rise to the required level.
S.W.2d 218, 200 (Ky. App. 1998).
Rasnick v. Rasnick, 982
While we accept the facts
presented by Tina as accurate, there is no suggestion that any
fraud was committed against the court.
This was a simple case
where the parties entered into an agreed settlement.
The court
heard no evidence on the property issues; there was not,
therefore, even an opportunity to practice deceit upon the
court.
Subsection d is not applicable.
Subsection (f) is a “catch-all” provision and requires
that the motion be brought within a reasonable time.
Although
applicable to divorce decrees, it is to be applied in limited
circumstances:
In pertinent part, KRS 403.250(1) provides
that “the provisions [of a dissolution
decree] as to property disposition may not
be revoked or modified, unless the court
finds the existence of conditions that
justify the reopening of a judgment under
2
Subsections A, B, and C, require that the motion be made within one year
after the judgment or order. On the facts presented Subsection e is not
applicable.
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the laws of this state.” The law of this
state relating to the reopening of decrees
is found in CR 60.02. Under the residual
clause of that rule, a judgment may be set
aside for “reason[s] of an extraordinary
nature justifying relief.” CR 60.02(f).
Kentucky’s highest court has warned,
however, “because of the desirability of
according finality to judgments, this clause
must be invoked only with extreme caution,
and only under most unusual circumstances.
Fry, supra, at 392-394 (citations omitted).
The determination whether to grant relief from a
judgment or order pursuant to CR 60.02 is one left to
the discretion of the trial court and one of the chief
factors to consider is the moving party’s ability to
present his claim prior to the entry of the order
sought to be set aside.
Schott v. Citizens Fidelity
Bank & Trust Co., 692 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Ky. App. 1985).
If as Tina alleges, she and Brian owned the
residence by virtue of a marital gift, then she had to
have known that it was a marital asset at the time of
the decree and when she entered into the separation
agreement dividing the assets and debts of the
parties.3
We find no credible explanation why she
waited well over three years to seek to have the
property divided as a marital asset.
3
Tina claims that
See Taylor v. Taylor, 598 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. App. 1980) where the court
permitted the reopening of a divorce decree pursuant to CR 60.02 when at the
time of the decree the movant and the court were unaware of a tax warrant due
on marital property awarded to the movant.
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at the time the decree was entered Nancy told Tina she
could live in the house, that the property would be
deeded to her, and that because of Nancy’s promise,
she was induced to delay bringing an action to claim
ownership.
However, the basis for Tina’s motion to
reopen the decree is based on the contention that she
and Brian owned the property.
So, following Tina’s
logic, she was given permission by Nancy to live on
property Tina and Brian owned.
We find Tina’s
explanation is insufficient to justify the three-year
delay in raising the issue of the property as a
marital asset and that her motion pursuant to CR 60.02
was not made within a reasonable time.
The order of the Knox Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Marcia A. Smith
London, Kentucky
Douglas G. Benge
London, Kentucky
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